21 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1954–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kozikgreen2 sentences2002See id. at 119 ("[EJrror is harmful [if] absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [Defendant]." (Citation and quotations omitted) (second alteration in original.)); see also State v. Kozik, 688 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1984) ("[Wle do not upset the verdict of a jury merely because some error or irregularity may have occurred, but will do so only if it is something substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different result." (Quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in origi 1993See State v. Kozik, 688 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1984) (error must be substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different result). 6 . | 2 | 2 |
Hackford v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1998In Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 250 , 364 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1961), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is both the privilege and the duty of the Commission to have before it all of the competent evidence having a material bearing on the issues necessary to consider in making the award." In vacating an order of the Commission because of a deficiency in the evidence supporting a medical panel report, the Hackford court noted that "[u]pon remand it was the prerogative of the Commission either to make a determination upon the evidence ... or if it deemed the interests of just 1998In Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 250 , 364 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1961), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is both the privilege and the duty of the Commission to have before it all of the competent evidence having a material bearing on the issues necessary to consider in making the award." In vacating an order of the Commission because of a deficiency in the evidence supporting a medical panel report, the Hackford court noted that "[u]pon remand it was the prerogative of the Commission either to make a determination upon the evidence ... or if it deemed the interests of just | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hawkinsgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 52 , 366 P.3d 884 (“To reverse a trial verdict, we 20240381-CA 10 2026 UT App 74 State v. Paramoure must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result.”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 379 P.3d 1181 (Utah 2016). 2026See State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 52 , 366 P.3d 884 (“To reverse a trial verdict, we 20240381-CA 10 2026 UT App 74 State v. Paramoure must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result.”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 379 P.3d 1181 (Utah 2016). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gibsongreen1 sentence2026See State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 52 , 366 P.3d 884 (“To reverse a trial verdict, we 20240381-CA 10 2026 UT App 74 State v. Paramoure must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result.”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 379 P.3d 1181 (Utah 2016). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 10856412green2 sentences2026In other words, would an 20240381-CA 6 2026 UT App 74 State v. Paramoure objectively reasonable person, considering all the facts and circumstances that the Defendant was confronted with, use the force the Defendant did to discipline his child. 2026See State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 52 , 366 P.3d 884 (“To reverse a trial verdict, we 20240381-CA 10 2026 UT App 74 State v. Paramoure must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result.”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 379 P.3d 1181 (Utah 2016). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Salgadogreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., State v. Salgado, 2018 UT App 139, ¶ 38 , 427 P.3d 1228 (explaining that a jury instruction may amount to an improper comment on the evidence where the court emphasizes certain evidence, comments on the weight of the evidence, or comments on the merits of the case in a way that indicates a preference toward one party); State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 235 , ¶¶ 20–21, 359 P.3d 1272 (explaining that rule 19(f) forbids a judge from telling the jury what the evidence is and from opining on the credibility of evidence or on disputed issues of fact). ¶22 Second, Aguilar argues that in providin 2022See, e.g., State v. Salgado, 2018 UT App 139, ¶ 38 , 427 P.3d 1228 (explaining that a jury instruction may amount to an improper comment on the evidence where the court emphasizes certain evidence, comments on the weight of the evidence, or comments on the merits of the case in a way that indicates a preference toward one party); State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 235 , ¶¶ 20–21, 359 P.3d 1272 (explaining that rule 19(f) forbids a judge from telling the jury what the evidence is and from opining on the credibility of evidence or on disputed issues of fact). ¶22 Second, Aguilar argues that in providin | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gintergreen1 sentence2022Because Scott has not shown coerciveness under the circumstances, we cannot say that the verdict-urging instruction was improper. ¶23 Under Lactod, courts must consider certain factors when assessing whether an instruction was coercive under the circumstances, including “any colloquy between the judge and the jury fore[person], circumstances surrounding the giving of the instruction, and consideration of the American Bar Association Standards on Criminal Justice Relating to Trial by Jury.” Id. (quotation simplified); accord Ginter, 2013 UT App 92, ¶ 6 . ¶24 Beginning with “any colloquy” betwee | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dozahgreen1 sentence2016See United States v. Mondestin, 535 F. 20130771 -CA 11 2016 UT App 13 State v. Dozah App’x 819, 823–24 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (vacating convictions after noting ‚several problems that arise when a court fundamentally changes [a] jury instruction in response to a question raised during deliberations‛); State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (holding that a supplemental instruction did not amount to reversible error when it merely clarified a point of law on which the jury had already been instructed). ¶27 Defendant claims that the district court’s written response constituted a | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Winsky Mondestingreen2 sentences2016See United States v. Mondestin, 535 Fed.Appx. 819, 823-24 (11th (per curiam) (vacating convictions after noting "several problems that arise when a court fundamentally changes [a] jury instruction in response to a question raised during deliberations"); State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (holding that a supplemental instruction did not amount to reversible error when it merely clarified a point of law on which the jury had already been instructed). 127 Defendant claims that the district court's written response constituted a supplemental instruction which erroneously stated the l 2016See Mondestin, 535 Fed.Appx. at 824 (explaining that a contradictory supplemental instruction is improper because, inter alia, "it has the potential to confuse the jurors, leav ing them uncertain of which standard to apply"); see also United States v. Robinson, 86 Fed.Appx. 820, 823 (6th Cir.2003) (considering whether a supplemental instruction caused the jury to be confused or misled). 29 It is a plausible reading of the note that the jury intended to ask whether leaving Kelly in the canyon was sufficient on its own to constitute aggravated assault. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2016See Mondestin, 535 Fed.Appx. at 824 (explaining that a contradictory supplemental instruction is improper because, inter alia, "it has the potential to confuse the jurors, leav ing them uncertain of which standard to apply"); see also United States v. Robinson, 86 Fed.Appx. 820, 823 (6th Cir.2003) (considering whether a supplemental instruction caused the jury to be confused or misled). 29 It is a plausible reading of the note that the jury intended to ask whether leaving Kelly in the canyon was sufficient on its own to constitute aggravated assault. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Portergreen2 sentences2016See United States v. Mondestin, 535 Fed.Appx. 819, 823-24 (11th (per curiam) (vacating convictions after noting "several problems that arise when a court fundamentally changes [a] jury instruction in response to a question raised during deliberations"); State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (holding that a supplemental instruction did not amount to reversible error when it merely clarified a point of law on which the jury had already been instructed). 127 Defendant claims that the district court's written response constituted a supplemental instruction which erroneously stated the l 2016See United States v. Mondestin, 535 F. 20130771 -CA 11 2016 UT App 13 State v. Dozah App’x 819, 823–24 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (vacating convictions after noting ‚several problems that arise when a court fundamentally changes [a] jury instruction in response to a question raised during deliberations‛); State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (holding that a supplemental instruction did not amount to reversible error when it merely clarified a point of law on which the jury had already been instructed). ¶27 Defendant claims that the district court’s written response constituted a | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2013State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989). 2013State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen1 sentence2008See also State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992) ("We acknowledge that a supplemental instruction has the potential to be coercive, depending on its content, if given to jurors who have reached an impasse. | 1 | 1 |
Lowenfield v. Phelpsgreen1 sentence2008See id. at 28 ; see also Lowen-field, 484 U.S. at 285, 240 , 108 S.Ct. 546 ("We are mindful that the jury returned with its verdict soon [ (thirty minutes)] after receiving the supplemental instruction, and that this suggests the possibility of coercion.") In this case, where the jury deliberated for less than thirty minutes after receiving the in struction, coercion is strongly inferred. 15 £34 Finally, under the cireumstances of this case, the instruction was not "reasonably within the ABA-recommended standards for verdict-urging instructions." See Lactod, 761 P.2d at 81 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Archuletagreen1 sentence2006See State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rossgreen2 sentences2002State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ¶ 18 , 18 P.3d 1123 (citing State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (stating that "error is not plain where there was no settled appellate law to guide the trial court."). 1 23 There is no Utah case law addressing whether a trial court must give a supplemental instruction after the jury has requested one but then reaches a verdict without the supplemental instruction. 2002State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ¶ 18 , 18 P.3d 1123 (citing State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (stating that "error is not plain where there was no settled appellate law to guide the trial court."). 1 23 There is no Utah case law addressing whether a trial court must give a supplemental instruction after the jury has requested one but then reaches a verdict without the supplemental instruction. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Tillmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Parkingreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kazdagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. O'BANNON
green
2 sentences2026So while the second paragraph of the supplemental instruction explicitly allocated the burden to the State, the first paragraph effectively lowered it. ¶22 But even “if a jury instruction is erroneous, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case.” State v. O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71 , ¶ 15, 274 P.3d 992 (quotation simplified). 2026So while the second paragraph of the supplemental instruction explicitly allocated the burden to the State, the first paragraph effectively lowered it. ¶22 But even “if a jury instruction is erroneous, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case.” State v. O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71 , ¶ 15, 274 P.3d 992 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Julian v. State
green
1 sentence2023Second, relying principally on Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), he claimed that the 2008 amendments to the PCRA are unconstitutional because “the legislature has no authority to diminish or restrict” the court’s writ power. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Maama
green
2 sentences2022See, e.g., State v. Salgado, 2018 UT App 139, ¶ 38 , 427 P.3d 1228 (explaining that a jury instruction may amount to an improper comment on the evidence where the court emphasizes certain evidence, comments on the weight of the evidence, or comments on the merits of the case in a way that indicates a preference toward one party); State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 235 , ¶¶ 20–21, 359 P.3d 1272 (explaining that rule 19(f) forbids a judge from telling the jury what the evidence is and from opining on the credibility of evidence or on disputed issues of fact). ¶22 Second, Aguilar argues that in providin 2022See, e.g., State v. Salgado, 2018 UT App 139, ¶ 38 , 427 P.3d 1228 (explaining that a jury instruction may amount to an improper comment on the evidence where the court emphasizes certain evidence, comments on the weight of the evidence, or comments on the merits of the case in a way that indicates a preference toward one party); State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 235 , ¶¶ 20–21, 359 P.3d 1272 (explaining that rule 19(f) forbids a judge from telling the jury what the evidence is and from opining on the credibility of evidence or on disputed issues of fact). ¶22 Second, Aguilar argues that in providin | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Lactod
green
2 sentences2022Therefore, we do not address whether the supplemental instruction was coercive per se and move straight to analyzing whether the instruction was proper “under the specific circumstances of the case.” See Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31 . 2022Because Scott has not shown coerciveness under the circumstances, we cannot say that the verdict-urging instruction was improper. ¶23 Under Lactod, courts must consider certain factors when assessing whether an instruction was coercive under the circumstances, including “any colloquy between the judge and the jury fore[person], circumstances surrounding the giving of the instruction, and consideration of the American Bar Association Standards on Criminal Justice Relating to Trial by Jury.” Id. (quotation simplified); accord Ginter, 2013 UT App 92, ¶ 6 . ¶24 Beginning with “any colloquy” betwee | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Timothy v. Pia Anderson Dorius Reynard Moss
green
1 sentence2019The latter date is when the statute of limitations on the judgment began to run. 2 Cite as: 2019 UT 70 Opinion of the Court account held in a minor son’s name. 4 Despite this, the Keetches testified at a supplemental hearing in March 2011 that they had no assets. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Layton City v. Carr
green
2 sentences2017Layton City v. Carr, 2014 UT App 227, ¶ 6 , 336 P.3d 587 . 2017Layton City v. Carr, 2014 UT App 227, ¶ 6 , 336 P.3d 587 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Couch
green
2 sentences2016VOROS, Judge (concurrmg in part and concurring in the result in part): {40 I concur in the majority - opinion except as to Part II, in which I concur only in the result In my opinion, the trial court's supplemental instruction violated the principles adopted by our supreme court in State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981). {41 Directing a jury back to a correct elements instruction is almost always a prudent course. 2016In my opinion, the trial court’s supplemental instruction violated the principles adopted by our supreme court in State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981). ¶41 Directing a jury back to a correct elements instruction is almost always a prudent course. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hooks v. Workman
green
1 sentence2014"An Allen charge is a supplemental instruction ... designed to encourage a divided jury to agree on a verdict." Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.3d 715 , 719 n. 1 (10th Cir.2010) (omission in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Davis
green
1 sentence2013Don’t be influenced by what you think our personal opinions are; rather, you decide the case based upon the law explained in these instructions and the evidence presented in court.” 20110204‐CA 37 2013 UT App 228 State v. Davis ¶105 In sum, Davis has not demonstrated that the supplemental instruction created a reasonable likelihood of a different result. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles
green
2 sentences2010Supplemental Jury Instruction ¶ 13 Defendant next argues that the trial court’s supplemental instruction, given during jury deliberations in response to a written jury question, inaccurately conveyed Utah law and failed to address jury unanimity problems. “[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶ 14 , 48 P.3d 968 . 2010Supplemental Jury Instruction ¶ 13 Defendant next argues that the trial court’s supplemental instruction, given during jury deliberations in response to a written jury question, inaccurately conveyed Utah law and failed to address jury unanimity problems. “[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶ 14 , 48 P.3d 968 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Jacobs
green
2 sentences2007Cf. Jacobs, 2006 UT App 356 ¶ 10 , 144 P.3d 226 (The appellate court explained that it did not need to conduct an indecent liberties analysis "because the State focused only on the touching prong at trial." And although the instruction regarding forcible sexual abuse listed both prongs, the trial court had clarified in a supplemental instruction to the jury "[that] 'indecent liberties' was not defined because it [was] not the theory of the case."). 9 . 2007Cf. Jacobs, 2006 UT App 356 ¶ 10 , 144 P.3d 226 (The appellate court explained that it did not need to conduct an indecent liberties analysis "because the State focused only on the touching prong at trial." And although the instruction regarding forcible sexual abuse listed both prongs, the trial court had clarified in a supplemental instruction to the jury "[that] 'indecent liberties' was not defined because it [was] not the theory of the case."). 9 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Parker
green
2 sentences2002Therefore, we assume that as part of his trial strategy, defense counsel did not insist that the trial court give the supplemental instruction before the verdict was read. 5 See State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, ¶ 10 , 4 P.3d 778 (" IKF the challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy, we will not find that it demonstrates inadequacy of counsel." " (Citation omitted.)). 2002Therefore, we assume that as part of his trial strategy, defense counsel did not insist that the trial court give the supplemental instruction before the verdict was read. 5 See State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, ¶ 10 , 4 P.3d 778 (" IKF the challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy, we will not find that it demonstrates inadequacy of counsel." " (Citation omitted.)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2002State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ¶ 6 , 18 P.3d 1123 (citations omitted). 118 Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel be *490 cause defense counsel did not object to the trial court's failure to give a supplemental instruction. 2002State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ¶ 6 , 18 P.3d 1123 (citations omitted). 118 Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel be *490 cause defense counsel did not object to the trial court's failure to give a supplemental instruction. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Stevens v. Collard
green
1 sentence1994Hackford v. Industrial Comm’n, 12 Utah 2d 250 , 364 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1961) (“Upon remand it was the prerogative of the Commission either to make a determination upon the evidence in the light of the decision of this court, or if it deemed the interests of justice to so require, to order and hold a supplemental hearing to allow the parties to present additional evidence.”); Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 , 598 n. 9 (Utah App.1992) (“It is the trial court’s obligation on remand to make adequate findings addressing the issue_ Accordingly, we leave to the trial court’s sound discretion the | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Allen v. United States green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Utah Cooperative Ass'n v. White Distributing & Supply Co. neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.