operation rule in Colorado

1965The agreement not to partition may be implied as well as express; and will be readily implied and enforced if such implication proves necessary to secure a fulfillment of an agreement between the co-tenants, or if the granting of partition would destroy the estate sought to be partitioned. * * *” In Nagel v. Kitchen, 381 Ill. 178 , 44 N.E.2d 853 , we find the following pertinent language: “Defendants contend that since plaintiff joined in the execution of the leases covering these various properties it amounted to an implied agreement not to partition the lands during the period of the leases.

1965The agreement not to partition may be implied as well as express; and will be readily implied and enforced if such implication proves necessary to secure a fulfillment of an agreement between the co-tenants, or if the granting of partition would destroy the estate sought to be partitioned. * * *” In Nagel v. Kitchen, 381 Ill. 178 , 44 N.E.2d 853 , we find the following pertinent language: “Defendants contend that since plaintiff joined in the execution of the leases covering these various properties it amounted to an implied agreement not to partition the lands during the period of the leases.

1912In Brady v. People, 45 Colo. 364 , it was held as follows: “Section 388a of the code provides that, whenever the supreme court shall dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, in cases where jurisdiction would attach if the action had come np on writ of error, it shall be entered as pending on error.

1912In Brady v. People, 45 Colo. 364 , it was held as follows: “Section 388a of the code provides that, whenever the supreme court shall dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, in cases where jurisdiction would attach if the action had come np on writ of error, it shall be entered as pending on error.

1896Mackey v. Mackey, 16 Colo. 134 .

1896Mackey v. Mackey, 16 Colo. 134 .

2020Section 18-1.3-603(1) expressly ties a restitution order to a conviction, but a defendant’s death during the pendency of his appeal abates his conviction and “leav[es] the defendant as if he had never been indicted or convicted.” Griffin, ¶ 4 (quoting Estate of Parsons, 10 367 F.3d at 413 ).

2017As we only recently observed, in our opinion in Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶¶ 54-59 , 390 P.3d 816, 824-25 , we have, however, not always described the operation of this test in precisely the same terms.

2017As we only recently observed, in our opinion in Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶¶ 54-59 , 390 P.3d 816, 824-25 , we have, however, not always described the operation of this test in precisely the same terms.

2007The public defender’s conduct resulted in the trial court’s denying defendant a hearing on the merits of his postconviction claim, and, therefore, the judicial proceeding he sought, and to which he would have been entitled absent the operation of the doctrine of laches, “never took place.” See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 , 120 S.Ct. 1029 .

2007The public defender’s conduct resulted in the trial court’s denying defendant a hearing on the merits of his postconviction claim, and, therefore, the judicial proceeding he sought, and to which he would have been entitled absent the operation of the doctrine of laches, “never took place.” See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 , 120 S.Ct. 1029 .

1992However, while an unreasonable delay or a default in the performance of a party’s obligations under a contract may bar that party from seeking specific performance, White v. Greenamyre, 77 Colo. 33 , 234 P. 164 (1925), the right to object to any such default may also be lost through the operation of waiver or estoppel, especially if the misconduct of the party making the objection has contributed to that default.

1992However, while an unreasonable delay or a default in the performance of a party’s obligations under a contract may bar that party from seeking specific performance, White v. Greenamyre, 77 Colo. 33 , 234 P. 164 (1925), the right to object to any such default may also be lost through the operation of waiver or estoppel, especially if the misconduct of the party making the objection has contributed to that default.

1992See Price v. Immel, 48 Colo. 163 , 109 P. 941 (1910); Howard v. Interstate Development Co., 29 Colo.App. 287 , 483 P.2d 1366 (1971).

1992See Price v. Immel, 48 Colo. 163 , 109 P. 941 (1910); Howard v. Interstate Development Co., 29 Colo.App. 287 , 483 P.2d 1366 (1971).

1987However, if these issues should arise again, we repeat today what we said in Wells v. People, 197 Colo. 350, 355 , 592 P.2d 1321 , 1325 n. 2 (1979), in the context of another presumption used in criminal cases that the "better procedure” to avoid confusion of the jury is for the trial court to instruct on the state’s burden of proof and the defendant’s right to remain silent in the same instruction in which it explains the operation of the presumption.

1987However, if these issues should arise again, we repeat today what we said in Wells v. People, 197 Colo. 350, 355 , 592 P.2d 1321 , 1325 n. 2 (1979), in the context of another presumption used in criminal cases that the "better procedure” to avoid confusion of the jury is for the trial court to instruct on the state’s burden of proof and the defendant’s right to remain silent in the same instruction in which it explains the operation of the presumption.

1985The operation of this test may be illustrated by consideration of a recent case of this court, Messenger v. Main, supra .

1985The operation of this test may be illustrated by consideration of a recent case of this court, Messenger v. Main, supra. There, the buyers requested both rescission of the contract and damages.

1985Crossroads Shopping Center, 646 P.2d at 332 ; IV Restatement of Property § 395, Comment a; Leach at 661.

1976The posture of the present case suggests the merit of the rule." Polster v. Griff's of America, Inc., 184 Colo. 418 , 520 P.2d 745 (1974).

1976The posture of the present case suggests the merit of the rule." Polster v. Griff's of America, Inc., 184 Colo. 418 , 520 P.2d 745 (1974).

1968It was there stated: “Following Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125 , 105 N.E. 92 , 52 L.R.A., N.S., 505, a body of law has developed making the liability of a hospital for injuries suffered by a patient, through the negligence of its employees, depend on whether the injury-producing act was ‘administrative’ or ‘medical.’ The wisdom and workability of this rule exempting hospitals from the normal operation of the doctrine of respondeat superior have in recent years come under increasing attack.

1968It was there stated: “Following Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125 , 105 N.E. 92 , 52 L.R.A., N.S., 505, a body of law has developed making the liability of a hospital for injuries suffered by a patient, through the negligence of its employees, depend on whether the injury-producing act was ‘administrative’ or ‘medical.’ The wisdom and workability of this rule exempting hospitals from the normal operation of the doctrine of respondeat superior have in recent years come under increasing attack.

1961Co. v. Soxman, 138 U.S. 431 , illustrates the operation of this exception to the general rule.

1897In Weisert v. Muehl, supra, the court say: “ In our opinion, there is no such difference between an ordinary life insurance company and mutual benefit associations like the one under consideration, as would restrict the operation of the rule just mentioned to the former, and not extend and apply it to the latter class of life insurance companies.

1890In Belden v. Seymour, supra, it was said: “ The only operation of the clause in a deed regarding the consideration is to prevent a resulting trust in the grantor, and to estop him forever to deny the deed for the uses therein mentioned.” We deem further reference to authorities unnecessary.