operation rule in Arkansas

1989But it is insisted by counsel for the plaintiff that the taxes alleged in the complaint takes the case at bar out of the operation of the principle decided in these cases and brings it with the rule announced in DICKINSON v. HOUSLEY, 130 Ark. 259 , 197 S.W. 25 .

1989But it is insisted by counsel for the plaintiff that the taxes alleged in the complaint takes the case at bar out of the operation of the principle decided in these cases and brings it with the rule announced in DICKINSON v. HOUSLEY, 130 Ark. 259 , 197 S.W. 25 .

1946The just ru.le on the subject, and the one which we prefer to follow, is that ‘a plaintiff who proves the happening of an accident, and is otherwise entitled to certain presumptions arising therefrom, does not lose the benefit of such presumptions because he has alleged what he conceives to be the specific cause of the accident. ’ Kluska v. Yeomans, 54 Wash. 465 , 103 Pac. 819 , 132 Am.

1915The just rule on the .subject, and the one which we prefer to follow, is that ‘ ‘.a plaintiff who proves the happening of .an accident, and is otherwise entitled to certain presumptions arising therefrom, does not lose the benefit of such presumptions 'because he has alleged what he conceives to be the specific cause of the accident.” Kluska v. Yeomans (Wash.), 103 Pac. 819 . (11) The only other assignment which we deem to be of sufficient importance to call for discussion is that ■which relates to .the testimony of two or three witnesses who were permitted to testify .concerning the moral cha

1946Co. v. Coy, 113 Ark. 265 , 168 S. W. 1106 , reiterated the rule long observed in this State that pleadings are treated as amended to conform to the proof in the case, and it necessarily results from the operation of that rule of practice here that the plaintiff can take advantage of the general presumption which arises in the jurisdiction where the injury occurred, even though there are one or more specific allegations of negligence in the complaint.

1946Co. v. Coy, 113 Ark. 265 , 168 S. W. 1106 , reiterated the rule long observed in this State that pleadings are treated as amended to conform to the proof in the case, and it necessarily results from the operation of that rule of practice here that the plaintiff can take advantage of the general presumption which arises in the jurisdiction where the injury occurred, even though there are one or more specific allegations of negligence in the complaint.

1942There is no ambiguity or obscurity in either of. these clauses, and no room for the operation of the rule that a clear grant of the fee by an earlier provision of the will will not be modified or qualified by a later obscure and ambiguous provision, as said by the Tennessee court. .Since the last clause in a will governs in its construction in determining the intention of the testator, we are constrainted to agree to the holding of the Tennessee court, that it was the intention of the testator to devise to his said three daughters a life estate only, with a remainder in fee to their children,

1929Since the last clause in a will governs in its construction in determining the intention of the testator, we are constrained to agree to the holding of the Tennessee court, that it was the intention of the testator to devise to his said three daughters a life estate only, with a remainder in fee to their children, and if no children, then to the children of the testator then living, their heirs and assigns (Gist v. Pettus, 115 Ark. 401 , 171 S. W. 480 ; Little v. McGuire, 113 Ark. 500 , 168 S. W. 1084 ; Jackson v. Lady, 140 Ark. 523 , 216 S. W. 505 ), the devise in the first clause of the item

1942There is no ambiguity or obscurity in either of. these clauses, and no room for the operation of the rule that a clear grant of the fee by an earlier provision of the will will not be modified or qualified by a later obscure and ambiguous provision, as said by the Tennessee court. .Since the last clause in a will governs in its construction in determining the intention of the testator, we are constrainted to agree to the holding of the Tennessee court, that it was the intention of the testator to devise to his said three daughters a life estate only, with a remainder in fee to their children,

1942There is no ambiguity or obscurity in either of. these clauses, and no room for the operation of the rule that a clear grant of the fee by an earlier provision of the will will not be modified or qualified by a later obscure and ambiguous provision, as said by the Tennessee court. .Since the last clause in a will governs in its construction in determining the intention of the testator, we are constrainted to agree to the holding of the Tennessee court, that it was the intention of the testator to devise to his said three daughters a life estate only, with a remainder in fee to their children,

1942There is no ambiguity or obscurity in either of. these clauses, and no room for the operation of the rule that a clear grant of the fee by an earlier provision of the will will not be modified or qualified by a later obscure and ambiguous provision, as said by the Tennessee court. .Since the last clause in a will governs in its construction in determining the intention of the testator, we are constrainted to agree to the holding of the Tennessee court, that it was the intention of the testator to devise to his said three daughters a life estate only, with a remainder in fee to their children,

1942There is no ambiguity or obscurity in either of. these clauses, and no room for the operation of the rule that a clear grant of the fee by an earlier provision of the will will not be modified or qualified by a later obscure and ambiguous provision, as said by the Tennessee court. .Since the last clause in a will governs in its construction in determining the intention of the testator, we are constrainted to agree to the holding of the Tennessee court, that it was the intention of the testator to devise to his said three daughters a life estate only, with a remainder in fee to their children,

2003"Since . . . the terms treason, felony and breach of the peace, as used in the constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the operation of the privilege all criminal offenses, the conclusion results that the claim of privilege of exemption from arrest and sentence was without merit. . . ." Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 , 446 (1908).

2003Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 , 614 (1972), rehearing denied 409 U.S. 902 (1972) (emphasis added).

2003Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 , 614 (1972), rehearing denied 409 U.S. 902 (1972) (emphasis added).

1994In affirming the trial court’s finding that the motion to set aside the judgment should not be granted, we held in McDonald’s Corp. v. Hawkins, 319 Ark. 1 , 888 S.W.2d 649 (1994), that the law of the case applied, referring to the fact that, in our earlier opinion, we made reference to the trial court’s letter opinion and that “the chancellor concluded that the default judgment should stand and an order was entered denying the motion.” We do not retreat from this position.

1994In affirming the trial court’s finding that the motion to set aside the judgment should not be granted, we held in McDonald’s Corp. v. Hawkins, 319 Ark. 1 , 888 S.W.2d 649 (1994), that the law of the case applied, referring to the fact that, in our earlier opinion, we made reference to the trial court’s letter opinion and that “the chancellor concluded that the default judgment should stand and an order was entered denying the motion.” We do not retreat from this position.

1989State Highway Comm. v. Kesner, 239 Ark. 270 , 388 S.W.2d 905 (1965), where the court pointed out that an order “which establishes the plaintiffs right to recover, but leaves for future determination the exact amount of his recovery, is not final.” 239 Ark. at 278 .

1989State Highway Comm. v. Kesner, 239 Ark. 270 , 388 S.W.2d 905 (1965), where the court pointed out that an order “which establishes the plaintiffs right to recover, but leaves for future determination the exact amount of his recovery, is not final.” 239 Ark. at 278 .

1973The cases of Letzkus v. Nothwang, 170 Ark. 403 , 279 S.W. 1006 (1926) and First National Bank of Ft.

1973The cases of Letzkus v. Nothwang, 170 Ark. 403 , 279 S.W. 1006 (1926) and First National Bank of Ft.

1946The just ru.le on the subject, and the one which we prefer to follow, is that ‘a plaintiff who proves the happening of an accident, and is otherwise entitled to certain presumptions arising therefrom, does not lose the benefit of such presumptions because he has alleged what he conceives to be the specific cause of the accident. ’ Kluska v. Yeomans, 54 Wash. 465 , 103 Pac. 819 , 132 Am.

1944In Cunningham v. Pease Company, 74 N. H. 435, 69 Atl. 120 , 20 L.

1942There is no ambiguity or obscurity in either of. these clauses, and no room for the operation of the rule that a clear grant of the fee by an earlier provision of the will will not be modified or qualified by a later obscure and ambiguous provision, as said by the Tennessee court. .Since the last clause in a will governs in its construction in determining the intention of the testator, we are constrainted to agree to the holding of the Tennessee court, that it was the intention of the testator to devise to his said three daughters a life estate only, with a remainder in fee to their children,

1942There is no ambiguity or obscurity in either of. these clauses, and no room for the operation of the rule that a clear grant of the fee by an earlier provision of the will will not be modified or qualified by a later obscure and ambiguous provision, as said by the Tennessee court. .Since the last clause in a will governs in its construction in determining the intention of the testator, we are constrainted to agree to the holding of the Tennessee court, that it was the intention of the testator to devise to his said three daughters a life estate only, with a remainder in fee to their children,

1942There is no ambiguity or obscurity in either of. these clauses, and no room for the operation of the rule that a clear grant of the fee by an earlier provision of the will will not be modified or qualified by a later obscure and ambiguous provision, as said by the Tennessee court. .Since the last clause in a will governs in its construction in determining the intention of the testator, we are constrainted to agree to the holding of the Tennessee court, that it was the intention of the testator to devise to his said three daughters a life estate only, with a remainder in fee to their children,

1928No. 4, Faulkner County, 67 Ark. 236 , 54 S. W. 217 .

1928No. 4, Faulkner County, 67 Ark. 236 , 54 S. W. 217 .

1925The case of Bigelow v. Gillott, 123 Mass. 102 , is particularly in point because the Massachusetts statute on the subject of revocation of wills is almost identical with our own.

1922Vance v. State, 70 Ark. 272 ; St.

1920The courts are gravitating toward the English rule so thoroughly discussed by Mr. Justice Smith, in Chicot County v. Davies, 40 Ark. 200 ; for while they say that the enrolled bill is not conclusive of the valid enactment of the law, and that we may look beyond it to the journals, they supply by presumption everything necessary to its validity, save where the journal affirmatively shows a violation of the Constitution.” It is suggested that the presumption must be indulged that the bill was presented to the Governor more than twenty days after the sine die adjournment of the Legislature becaus

1915Wilmans v. Robinson, 67 Ark. 517 ; Wheelock v. Simons, 75 Ark. 19 ; Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 95 Ark. 18 ; Dempsey v. Davis, 98 Ark. 570 . (3) It is argued that the language of the conveylanee brings it within the operation of the rule in Shelley’s case, as discussed in the case of Hardage v. Stroope, 58 Ark. 303 , but the language of the conveyance is diff erent and does not fall within the rule.

1915Wilmans v. Robinson, 67 Ark. 517 ; Wheelock v. Simons, 75 Ark. 19 ; Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 95 Ark. 18 ; Dempsey v. Davis, 98 Ark. 570 . (3) It is argued that the language of the conveylanee brings it within the operation of the rule in Shelley’s case, as discussed in the case of Hardage v. Stroope, 58 Ark. 303 , but the language of the conveyance is diff erent and does not fall within the rule.

1915This is fully explained in Wilmans v. Robinson, supra, where the language of the two conveyances, is 'distinguished.

1915Wilmans v. Robinson, 67 Ark. 517 ; Wheelock v. Simons, 75 Ark. 19 ; Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 95 Ark. 18 ; Dempsey v. Davis, 98 Ark. 570 . (3) It is argued that the language of the conveylanee brings it within the operation of the rule in Shelley’s case, as discussed in the case of Hardage v. Stroope, 58 Ark. 303 , but the language of the conveyance is diff erent and does not fall within the rule.

1915Wilmans v. Robinson, 67 Ark. 517 ; Wheelock v. Simons, 75 Ark. 19 ; Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 95 Ark. 18 ; Dempsey v. Davis, 98 Ark. 570 . (3) It is argued that the language of the conveylanee brings it within the operation of the rule in Shelley’s case, as discussed in the case of Hardage v. Stroope, 58 Ark. 303 , but the language of the conveyance is diff erent and does not fall within the rule.

1915Wilmans v. Robinson, 67 Ark. 517 ; Wheelock v. Simons, 75 Ark. 19 ; Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 95 Ark. 18 ; Dempsey v. Davis, 98 Ark. 570 . (3) It is argued that the language of the conveylanee brings it within the operation of the rule in Shelley’s case, as discussed in the case of Hardage v. Stroope, 58 Ark. 303 , but the language of the conveyance is diff erent and does not fall within the rule.