52 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1924–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kent v. Sutkergreen2 sentences2016See id. at 433 (recognizing “that a ‘purely technical,’ non-merits judgment ‘may not be used as a basis for the operation of the doctrine of res judicata’ ” (quoting Kent v. Sutker, 40 So.2d 145, 147 (Fla.1949))). 2013In contrast, we have recognized that a “purely technical,” non-merits judgment “may not be used as a basis for the operation of the doctrine of res judicata.” Kent v. Sutker, 40 So.2d 145, 147 (Fla.1949). 8 The Engle judgment was a final judgment on the merits because it resolved substantive elements of the class’s claims against the Engle defendants. | 4 | 5 |
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglasgreen2 sentences2016See id. at 433 (recognizing “that a ‘purely technical,’ non-merits judgment ‘may not be used as a basis for the operation of the doctrine of res judicata’ ” (quoting Kent v. Sutker, 40 So.2d 145, 147 (Fla.1949))). 2013See id. at 433 (recognizing “that a ‘purely technical,’ non-merits judgment ‘may not be used as a basis for the operation of the doctrine of res judicata’ ” (quoting Kent v. Sutker, 40 So.2d 145, 147 (Fla.1949))); McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F.Supp. 1521, 1524 (D.Mass.1985) (specifically noting that following decertification of a class action, individual plaintiffs are “bound by all rulings of substantive law” (emphasis added)). | 2 | 2 |
State St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Badragreen2 sentences2015Bank & Trust Co. v. Badra, 765 So.2d 251, 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“A judgment rendered on any grounds which do not involve the merits of the action may not be used as the basis for the operation of the doctrine of res judica-ta.”). 2015Bank & Trust Co. v. Badra, 765 So.2d 251, 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“A judgment rendered on any grounds which do not involve the.merits of the action may not be used as the basis for the operation of the doctrine of res judica-ta.”). | 2 | 2 |
Allbright v. Hanftgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Allbright v. Hanft, 333 So.2d 112, 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) ("a judgment rendered on any grounds which do not involve the merits of the action may not be used as the basis for the operation of the doctrine of res judicata"); § 120.56(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000) ("A substantially affected person may seek an *8 administrative determination of the invalidity of an existing rule at any time during the existence of the rule"). 2000See Allbright v. Hanft, 333 So.2d 112, 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). | 2 | 2 |
Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure re Sentencing Guidelinesgreen2 sentences1997See Ch. 93^06, Laws of Fla. According to the supreme court: “Existing caselaw construing the application of sentencing guidelines that is in conflict with the provisions of this rule or the statement of purpose or the principles embodied by the 1994 sentencing guidelines set out in subsection 921.001(4) is superseded by the operation of this rule.” Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure re Sentencing Guidelines, 628 So.2d 1084, 1089 (Fla.1993); see also Capers v. State, 670 So.2d 967, 970 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), approved, 678 So.2d 330 (Fla.1996). 1995Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure re Sentencing Guidelines, 628 So.2d 1084, 1089 (Fla.1993); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.702(b). [7] We therefore conclude that the victim's vulnerability on account of age justifies upward departure for offenses committed after January 1, 1994, even in sentencing for an offense of which the victim's age is an element. | 2 | 2 |
Noble v. Yorkegreen2 sentences2021Id.; see also Noble v. Yorke, 490 So. 2d 29, 31 (Fla. 1986) (holding absent specific statutory provision, there is no rule of law which in general exempts statutory rights and defenses from the operation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel). 1986Recently, our supreme court in Noble v. Yorke, 490 So.2d 29 (Fla.1986), where the respondent was injured by a dog bite when she was told by the petitioner to disregard a “bad dog” sign displayed on the property, stated that: [Ajbsent specific statutory provision, there is no rule of law which in general exempts statutory rights and defenses from the operation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. | 1 | 2 |
McCormack v. Abbott Laboratoriesgreen1 sentence2013See id. at 433 (recognizing “that a ‘purely technical,’ non-merits judgment ‘may not be used as a basis for the operation of the doctrine of res judicata’ ” (quoting Kent v. Sutker, 40 So.2d 145, 147 (Fla.1949))); McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F.Supp. 1521, 1524 (D.Mass.1985) (specifically noting that following decertification of a class action, individual plaintiffs are “bound by all rulings of substantive law” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Fred McGilvray, Inc. v. Askewgreen1 sentence2013Such an operation of a presumption within the framework of a motion for summary judgment is consistent with the way the Supreme Court applied a statutory presumption in Fred McGilvray, Inc. v. Askew, 340 So.2d 475, 479-80 (Fla.1976). | 1 | 1 |
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Bookgreen1 sentence2011See PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 407, 123 S.Ct. 1531 (holding that courts should not speculate on how an arbitrator might rule “in a manner that casts [agreements’] enforceability into doubt,” and in such cases the proper course is to compel arbitration); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 40 (1st Cir.2006) (interpreting PacifiCare to state that “[g]iven the presumption in favor of arbitration, a court should not foreclose the operation of that presumption by deciding that there is a question of arbitrability when there is the possibility that an arbitrator’s decision in the first instance wou | 1 | 1 |
Reese v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Christopher v. State, 583 So.2d 642, 646 (Fla.1991); see also Reese v. State, 694 So.2d 678, 683 (Fla.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Punsky v. Clay County Sheriff's Officegreen1 sentence2011See Punsky v. Clay County Sheriffs Office, 18 So.3d 577, 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 794138green1 sentence2011See PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 407, 123 S.Ct. 1531 (holding that courts should not speculate on how an arbitrator might rule “in a manner that casts [agreements’] enforceability into doubt,” and in such cases the proper course is to compel arbitration); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 40 (1st Cir.2006) (interpreting PacifiCare to state that “[g]iven the presumption in favor of arbitration, a court should not foreclose the operation of that presumption by deciding that there is a question of arbitrability when there is the possibility that an arbitrator’s decision in the first instance wou | 1 | 1 |
Christopher v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Christopher v. State, 583 So.2d 642, 646 (Fla.1991); see also Reese v. State, 694 So.2d 678, 683 (Fla.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Ramirez v. Stategreen1 sentence2011In Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 580 (Fla.1999), the Supreme Court described the operation of this rule: Codified at section 90.108, Florida Statutes (1995), the rule of completeness provides that “when a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him or her at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement that in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously.” This rule has been applied to verbal statements as well. | 1 | 1 |
Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure (Rule 12.525)green1 sentence2006See Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure (Rule 12.525), 897 So.2d 467 (Fla.2005). | 1 | 1 |
Weit v. Rhodesgreen1 sentence2004Spanos Enters., Inc., 348 So.2d 920, 922 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Weit v. Rhodes, 691 So.2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Cabinet Craft v. AG Spanos Enterprisesgreen1 sentence2004Spanos Enters., Inc., 348 So.2d 920, 922 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Weit v. Rhodes, 691 So.2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Alperingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Capers v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Capers v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ivory v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Colcord v. Florida Rock Industries, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gordon v. WARREN HEATING & ACgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gillespie v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fernandez v. Cohn
green
1 sentence2016We most recently explained the operation of the rule in Fernandez v. Cohn, 54 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hallgren
green
1 sentence2016Hallgren, 124 So.3d at 357 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna
green
1 sentence2011This rationale is consistent with that used by the United States Supreme Court in Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 448-49, 126 S.Ct. 1204 , to address the “conundrum” that a contract ultimately found to be unenforceable could be used to arbitrate a dispute: It is true, as respondents assert, that the Prima Paint[ 13 ] rule permits a court to enforce an arbitration agreement in a contract that the arbitrator later finds to be void. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Carnival Corp. v. Middleton
green
2 sentences2010The Florida Supreme Court in Allie stated the general rule that “[u]n-der the federal scheme ... a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is considered a dismissal on the merits by the operation of the rule [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) ].” 503 So.2d at 1241 ; Carnival Corp. v. Middleton, 941 So.2d at 424-25 . 2010The Florida Supreme Court in Allie stated the general rule that "[u]nder the federal scheme ... a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is considered a dismissal on the merits by the operation of the rule [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)]." 503 So.2d at 1241 ; Carnival Corp. v. Middleton, 941 So.2d at 424-25 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Allie v. Ionata
green
2 sentences2010The Florida Supreme Court in Allie stated the general rule that “[u]n-der the federal scheme ... a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is considered a dismissal on the merits by the operation of the rule [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) ].” 503 So.2d at 1241 ; Carnival Corp. v. Middleton, 941 So.2d at 424-25 . 2010The Florida Supreme Court in Allie stated the general rule that "[u]nder the federal scheme ... a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is considered a dismissal on the merits by the operation of the rule [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)]." 503 So.2d at 1241 ; Carnival Corp. v. Middleton, 941 So.2d at 424-25 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Perkins
green
1 sentence2005Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), and State v. Perkins, 349 So.2d 161 (Fla.1977), recognized the proper operation of the doctrine in the criminal context, while Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24 , 100 S.Ct. 1999 , 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), acknowledged limitations of the application of the doctrine in criminal cases. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ashe v. Swenson
green
2 sentences2005Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), and State v. Perkins, 349 So.2d 161 (Fla.1977), recognized the proper operation of the doctrine in the criminal context, while Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24 , 100 S.Ct. 1999 , 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), acknowledged limitations of the application of the doctrine in criminal cases. 2005Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), and State v. Perkins, 349 So.2d 161 (Fla.1977), recognized the proper operation of the doctrine in the criminal context, while Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24 , 100 S.Ct. 1999 , 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), acknowledged limitations of the application of the doctrine in criminal cases. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Standefer v. United States
green
2 sentences2005Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), and State v. Perkins, 349 So.2d 161 (Fla.1977), recognized the proper operation of the doctrine in the criminal context, while Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24 , 100 S.Ct. 1999 , 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), acknowledged limitations of the application of the doctrine in criminal cases. 2005Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), and State v. Perkins, 349 So.2d 161 (Fla.1977), recognized the proper operation of the doctrine in the criminal context, while Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24 , 100 S.Ct. 1999 , 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), acknowledged limitations of the application of the doctrine in criminal cases. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Burger v. State
green
2 sentences2004E.g., Magar v. State, 308 Ark. 380 , 826 S.W.2d 221 (1992) (finding privilege inapplicable to defendant's admission to minister's accusation of sexual abuse of minors where conversation was initiated by minister for disciplinary purposes and not for spiritual counseling); Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171 , 231 S.E.2d 769 (1977) (holding defendant could not claim privilege concerning conversational statements to clergy member who was his friend and frequent companion concerning defendant's intent to kill his wife and her lover); Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160 , 417 N.Y.S.2d 226 , 390 N.E.2d 1151 2004E.g., Magar v. State, 308 Ark. 380 , 826 S.W.2d 221 (1992) (finding privilege inapplicable to defendant's admission to minister's accusation of sexual abuse of minors where conversation was initiated by minister for disciplinary purposes and not for spiritual counseling); Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171 , 231 S.E.2d 769 (1977) (holding defendant could not claim privilege concerning conversational statements to clergy member who was his friend and frequent companion concerning defendant's intent to kill his wife and her lover); Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160 , 417 N.Y.S.2d 226 , 390 N.E.2d 1151 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Magar v. State
green
2 sentences2004E.g., Magar v. State, 308 Ark. 380 , 826 S.W.2d 221 (1992) (finding privilege inapplicable to defendant's admission to minister's accusation of sexual abuse of minors where conversation was initiated by minister for disciplinary purposes and not for spiritual counseling); Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171 , 231 S.E.2d 769 (1977) (holding defendant could not claim privilege concerning conversational statements to clergy member who was his friend and frequent companion concerning defendant's intent to kill his wife and her lover); Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160 , 417 N.Y.S.2d 226 , 390 N.E.2d 1151 2004E.g., Magar v. State, 308 Ark. 380 , 826 S.W.2d 221 (1992) (finding privilege inapplicable to defendant's admission to minister's accusation of sexual abuse of minors where conversation was initiated by minister for disciplinary purposes and not for spiritual counseling); Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171 , 231 S.E.2d 769 (1977) (holding defendant could not claim privilege concerning conversational statements to clergy member who was his friend and frequent companion concerning defendant's intent to kill his wife and her lover); Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160 , 417 N.Y.S.2d 226 , 390 N.E.2d 1151 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Keenan v. Gigante
green
2 sentences2004E.g., Magar v. State, 308 Ark. 380 , 826 S.W.2d 221 (1992) (finding privilege inapplicable to defendant's admission to minister's accusation of sexual abuse of minors where conversation was initiated by minister for disciplinary purposes and not for spiritual counseling); Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171 , 231 S.E.2d 769 (1977) (holding defendant could not claim privilege concerning conversational statements to clergy member who was his friend and frequent companion concerning defendant's intent to kill his wife and her lover); Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160 , 417 N.Y.S.2d 226 , 390 N.E.2d 1151 2004E.g., Magar v. State, 308 Ark. 380 , 826 S.W.2d 221 (1992) (finding privilege inapplicable to defendant's admission to minister's accusation of sexual abuse of minors where conversation was initiated by minister for disciplinary purposes and not for spiritual counseling); Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171 , 231 S.E.2d 769 (1977) (holding defendant could not claim privilege concerning conversational statements to clergy member who was his friend and frequent companion concerning defendant's intent to kill his wife and her lover); Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160 , 417 N.Y.S.2d 226 , 390 N.E.2d 1151 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette)
green
1 sentence2002Id. at 74 ; see also United States v. Alperin, 128 F.Supp.2d 1251 (N.D.Cal.2001)(" Jaffee does not discuss how the privilege is to be applied when a criminal defendant's constitutional rights are implicated."); 3 JACK B. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Scott v. State
green
1 sentence2002A close reading of Medlin and Chicone , however, yields the inescapable conclusion that the presumption of knowledge applies only to cases of actual possession, and we said as much in Chicone .... 808 So.2d at 171 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Johnson v. Feder green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| McShay v. State neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Balsam v. DEPT. OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERVICES green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| City of Miami Beach v. Mr. Samuel's, Inc. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Burritt v. Harris green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Childers v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Paley v. Cocoa Masonry, Inc. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| State v. Kurtz green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Indian Towing Co. v. United States green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Frazier v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Hardison v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Breedlove v. State neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Rowan v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Bank of Augusta v. Earle green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Lake v. Hancock ex rel. Payne green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Southern Gulf Utilities, Inc. v. Boca Ciega Sanitary District green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Lego v. Twomey green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Yniestra neutral | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| City of Coral Gables v. Baljet green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Holl v. Talcott green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| West v. State green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Spencer v. State green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| National Surety Corp. v. Windham green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Wawner v. Sellic Stone Studio green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| City of Tampa v. Easton green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Scott v. City of Tampa neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Tomasello Cocoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Nisbet green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.