operation rule in Maryland

1985Stanford, supra. Similarly, the decision to suspend the operation of the rule upon proper application will be set aside on appeal only in “ ‘extreme cases of clear abuse.’ ” Langrall, Muir & Nopinger v. Gladding, 282 Md. 397, 400 , 384 A.2d 737, 739 (1978) (quoting Stanford, 260 Md. at 555 , 273 A.2d at 193 ).

1985Stanford, supra. Similarly, the decision to suspend the operation of the rule upon proper application will be set aside on appeal only in “ ‘extreme cases of clear abuse.’ ” Langrall, Muir & Nopinger v. Gladding, 282 Md. 397, 400 , 384 A.2d 737, 739 (1978) (quoting Stanford, 260 Md. at 555 , 273 A.2d at 193 ).

2015Although, when the Court of Appeals adopted Rule 2-625, it did not expressly exempt State judgments from the operation of that rule, it did not need to, as “any waiver of immunity must emanate the legislature.” Id. (quoting Bradshaw v. Prince George’s Cnty., 284 Md. 294, 300 , 396 A.2d 255 (1979)).

2015Although, when the Court of Appeals adopted Rule 2-625, it did not expressly exempt State judgments from the operation of that rule, it did not need to, as “any waiver of immunity must emanate the legislature.” Id. (quoting Bradshaw v. Prince George’s Cnty., 284 Md. 294, 300 , 396 A.2d 255 (1979)).

2015This presumption, along with the history of Rule 2-625, assisted us in concluding “Rule 2-625 [did] not extinguish an unrenewed judgment held by the State after twelve years.” Id. at 684, 78 A.3d 909 .

2015Although, when the Court of Appeals adopted Rule 2-625, it did not expressly exempt State judgments from the operation of that rule, it did not need to, as “any waiver of immunity must emanate the legislature.” Id. (quoting Bradshaw v. Prince George’s Cnty., 284 Md. 294, 300 , 396 A.2d 255 (1979)).

2015In Crowe v. Houseworth, 272 Md. 481 , 325 A.2d 592 (1974), the Court of Appeals held that a circuit court abused its discretion by denying a plaintiffs request to join certain co-plaintiffs as necessary parties after the expiration of the statute of limitations.

2015In Crowe v. Houseworth, 272 Md. 481 , 325 A.2d 592 (1974), the Court of Appeals held that a circuit court abused its discretion by denying a plaintiffs request to join certain co-plaintiffs as necessary parties after the expiration of the statute of limitations.

2013Moreover, the rule of harmonization requires that we “not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor ... confíne strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.” Lowery v. State, 430 Md. 477, 496 , 61 A.3d 794 (2013) (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275-76 , 987 A.2d 18 (2010)).

2013Moreover, the rule of harmonization requires that we “not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor ... confíne strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.” Lowery v. State, 430 Md. 477, 496 , 61 A.3d 794 (2013) (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275-76 , 987 A.2d 18 (2010)).

2013Moreover, the rule of harmonization requires that we “not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor ... confíne strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.” Lowery v. State, 430 Md. 477, 496 , 61 A.3d 794 (2013) (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275-76 , 987 A.2d 18 (2010)).

2013Moreover, the rule of harmonization requires that we “not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor ... confíne strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.” Lowery v. State, 430 Md. 477, 496 , 61 A.3d 794 (2013) (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275-76 , 987 A.2d 18 (2010)).

2012Johnson, 283 Md. at 197 , 388 A.2d 926 (“sequestration of witnesses is mandatory and [ ] there is no exception in it for a principal investigator”). 3 As this Court explained: [I]n Maryland no exemption from the operation of the rule on witnesses exists for a witness who is a detective or police officer assisting in the preparation or presentation of the State’s case.

2012Johnson, 283 Md. at 197 , 388 A.2d 926 (“sequestration of witnesses is mandatory and [ ] there is no exception in it for a principal investigator”). 3 As this Court explained: [I]n Maryland no exemption from the operation of the rule on witnesses exists for a witness who is a detective or police officer assisting in the preparation or presentation of the State’s case.

2010Section 25 of the Restatement, supra, cited in EFCO, supra, and cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Dill v. Avery, supra, 305 Md. at 210 , 502 A.2d 1051 , is titled “Exemplification of the General Rule Concerning Splitting.” It explains the operation of the rule in section 24 (the transactional test) in situations similar to the present case: The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the ease not presented in the first action, or (2

2010Section 25 of the Restatement, supra, cited in EFCO, supra, and cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Dill v. Avery, supra, 305 Md. at 210 , 502 A.2d 1051 , is titled “Exemplification of the General Rule Concerning Splitting.” It explains the operation of the rule in section 24 (the transactional test) in situations similar to the present case: The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the ease not presented in the first action, or (2

2010Section 25 of the Restatement, supra, cited in EFCO, supra, and cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Dill v. Avery, supra, 305 Md. at 210 , 502 A.2d 1051 , is titled “Exemplification of the General Rule Concerning Splitting.” It explains the operation of the rule in section 24 (the transactional test) in situations similar to the present case: The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the ease not presented in the first action, or (2

2010The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, opining: We need not decide the unlikely prospect that the petition for an ex parte injunction to restrain the sale of land preserving an asset for a general creditor was sufficient to comply with the Feigley[ v. Feigley, 7 Md. 537 (1855)] requisite that the proceeding relate directly to the property in question, since Angelos’ property interest was acquired through a mortgage obtained prior to the commencement of the litigation upon which Maryland Casualty’s lis pendens claim rests, and therefore is not subject to the operation of the doctrine.

2006(Citations omitted.) In Enterprise , the issue before the Court was "whether the lessor of a motor vehicle is relieved of financial responsibility for third-party claims resulting from the negligent operation of its rental vehicle by a permittee when the vehicle's operation is in violation of the express terms of the rental agreement." 341 Md. at 543 , 671 A.2d at 510 .

2006(Citations omitted.) In Enterprise , the issue before the Court was "whether the lessor of a motor vehicle is relieved of financial responsibility for third-party claims resulting from the negligent operation of its rental vehicle by a permittee when the vehicle's operation is in violation of the express terms of the rental agreement." 341 Md. at 543 , 671 A.2d at 510 .

2004So also, a person using the process of the criminal law to enforce payment of a debt is abusing legal process and is liable in damages.” Id. at 513 , 471 A.2d 297 (quoting Harper & James, swpra, at 331).

2004So also, a person using the process of the criminal law to enforce payment of a debt is abusing legal process and is liable in damages.” Id. at 513 , 471 A.2d 297 (quoting Harper & James, swpra, at 331).

2004Two crimes created by legislative enactment may not be punished separately if the legislature intended the offenses to be punished by one sentence.... [I]f we are unsure of the legislative intent in punishing offenses as a single merged crime or as distinct offenses, we in effect, give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and hold that the crimes do merge. 321 Md. at 222 , 582 A.2d at 529 .

2004Two crimes created by legislative enactment may not be punished separately if the legislature intended the offenses to be punished by one sentence.... [I]f we are unsure of the legislative intent in punishing offenses as a single merged crime or as distinct offenses, we in effect, give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and hold that the crimes do merge. 321 Md. at 222 , 582 A.2d at 529 .

2003There is no statute, and never has been one, classifying offenses as ‘penitentiary misdemeanors’ for limitations purposes, which is independent of the statutory sentencing provisions associated with particular offenses.” Id. at 618, 579 A.2d at 271 .

1999Id. at 454 , 559 A.2d at 804 .

1999Id. at 454 , 559 A.2d at 804 .

1994Like the State, which believes that a specific reservation adds nothing to the usual operation of the rule, he relies on State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57 , 570 A.2d 193 (1990), and United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.1979).

1994Like the State, which believes that a specific reservation adds nothing to the usual operation of the rule, he relies on State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57 , 570 A.2d 193 (1990), and United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.1979).

1994Bennett v. Westfall, 186 Md. 148 , 46 A.2d 358 (1946), established the operation of the doctrine of equitable subrogation in the context of mortgage priority.

1994Bennett v. Westfall, 186 Md. 148 , 46 A.2d 358 (1946), established the operation of the doctrine of equitable subrogation in the context of mortgage priority.

1994Like the State, which believes that a specific reservation adds nothing to the usual operation of the rule, he relies on State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57 , 570 A.2d 193 (1990), and United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.1979).

1986“The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused person, placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the safeguards with which the humanity of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with impunity defy the processes of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries and turn them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle of personal liberty \i.e., pretrial release].” [ 223 U.S. at 457-58 , 32 S.Ct. at 254-55 , 56 L.Ed. at 506 .] Upon the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal

1986“The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused person, placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the safeguards with which the humanity of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with impunity defy the processes of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries and turn them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle of personal liberty \i.e., pretrial release].” [ 223 U.S. at 457-58 , 32 S.Ct. at 254-55 , 56 L.Ed. at 506 .] Upon the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal

1986“The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused person, placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the safeguards with which the humanity of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with impunity defy the processes of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries and turn them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle of personal liberty \i.e., pretrial release].” [ 223 U.S. at 457-58 , 32 S.Ct. at 254-55 , 56 L.Ed. at 506 .] Upon the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal

1986“The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused person, placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the safeguards with which the humanity of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with impunity defy the processes of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries and turn them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle of personal liberty \i.e., pretrial release].” [ 223 U.S. at 457-58 , 32 S.Ct. at 254-55 , 56 L.Ed. at 506 .] Upon the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal