operation rule in Montana

1995State v. Radi (1975), 168 Mont. 320, 326 , 542 P.2d 1206, 1210 ; State v. Meidinger (1972), 160 Mont. 310, 320 , 502 P.2d 58, 64 .

1995State v. Radi (1975), 168 Mont. 320, 326 , 542 P.2d 1206, 1210 ; State v. Meidinger (1972), 160 Mont. 310, 320 , 502 P.2d 58, 64 .

1995State v. Radi (1975), 168 Mont. 320, 326 , 542 P.2d 1206, 1210 ; State v. Meidinger (1972), 160 Mont. 310, 320 , 502 P.2d 58, 64 .

1995State v. Radi (1975), 168 Mont. 320, 326 , 542 P.2d 1206, 1210 ; State v. Meidinger (1972), 160 Mont. 310, 320 , 502 P.2d 58, 64 .

1987Further, the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated “that a decision rendered on any ground which does not involve the merits of the action may not be used as a basis for the operation of the doctrine of res judicata.” Robertson Lumber Co. v. Progressive Contractors, Inc. (N.D. 1968), 160 N.W.2d 61, 77 .

1958An imperative duty is laid upon him to ascertain all the instruments which constitute essential parts of his title, and to inform himself of all that they contain.” Quoted with approval by this court in Piccolo v. Tanaka, 78 Mont. 445, 451 , 253 Pac. 890 .

1958An imperative duty is laid upon him to ascertain all the instruments which constitute essential parts of his title, and to inform himself of all that they contain.” Quoted with approval by this court in Piccolo v. Tanaka, 78 Mont. 445, 451 , 253 Pac. 890 .

1957Washington Water Power Co. v. Superior Court, 41 Wash.2d 484 , 250 P.2d 536, 539 , the court said: "The obligation of going forward to escape the operation of the rule always belongs to the plaintiff (or cross-complainant) and not to the defendant." In Emmco Ins.

1957Washington Water Power Co. v. Superior Court, 41 Wash.2d 484 , 250 P.2d 536, 539 , the court said: "The obligation of going forward to escape the operation of the rule always belongs to the plaintiff (or cross-complainant) and not to the defendant." In Emmco Ins.

1957Co. v. Walker, 57 N.M. 525 , 260 Pac. (2d) 712, 714 , the court said: “The duty rests upon the plaintiff at every stage of the proceeding to use diligence and to expedite his case to a final determination * * To the same effect are United States v. Pacific Fruit and Produce Co., 9 Cir., 138 F. (2d) 367, and Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, 17 Cal. App. (2d) 103, 61 Pac. (2d) 514 .

1957Co. v. Walker, 57 N.M. 525 , 260 Pac. (2d) 712, 714 , the court said: “The duty rests upon the plaintiff at every stage of the proceeding to use diligence and to expedite his case to a final determination * * To the same effect are United States v. Pacific Fruit and Produce Co., 9 Cir., 138 F. (2d) 367, and Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, 17 Cal. App. (2d) 103, 61 Pac. (2d) 514 .

1957Co. v. Walker, 57 N.M. 525 , 260 Pac. (2d) 712, 714 , the court said: “The duty rests upon the plaintiff at every stage of the proceeding to use diligence and to expedite his case to a final determination * * To the same effect are United States v. Pacific Fruit and Produce Co., 9 Cir., 138 F. (2d) 367, and Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, 17 Cal. App. (2d) 103, 61 Pac. (2d) 514 .

1957Co. v. Walker, 57 N.M. 525 , 260 P.2d 712, 714 , the court said: "The duty rests upon the plaintiff at every stage of the proceeding to use diligence and to expedite his case to a final determination * * *." To the same effect are United States v. Pacific Fruit and Produce Co., 9 Cir., 138 F.2d 367 , and Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, 17 Cal.App.2d 103 , 61 P.2d 514 . *961 In Price v. Sunfield, 57 Ariz. 142 , 112 P.2d 210, 212 , the court stated the applicable rule as follows: "The general rule is that it is the duty of the plaintiff to see that his case is brought up for trial within a reasona

1957Co. v. Walker, 57 N.M. 525 , 260 P.2d 712, 714 , the court said: "The duty rests upon the plaintiff at every stage of the proceeding to use diligence and to expedite his case to a final determination * * *." To the same effect are United States v. Pacific Fruit and Produce Co., 9 Cir., 138 F.2d 367 , and Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, 17 Cal.App.2d 103 , 61 P.2d 514 . *961 In Price v. Sunfield, 57 Ariz. 142 , 112 P.2d 210, 212 , the court stated the applicable rule as follows: "The general rule is that it is the duty of the plaintiff to see that his case is brought up for trial within a reasona

1957Co. v. Walker, 57 N.M. 525 , 260 P.2d 712, 714 , the court said: "The duty rests upon the plaintiff at every stage of the proceeding to use diligence and to expedite his case to a final determination * * *." To the same effect are United States v. Pacific Fruit and Produce Co., 9 Cir., 138 F.2d 367 , and Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, 17 Cal.App.2d 103 , 61 P.2d 514 . *961 In Price v. Sunfield, 57 Ariz. 142 , 112 P.2d 210, 212 , the court stated the applicable rule as follows: "The general rule is that it is the duty of the plaintiff to see that his case is brought up for trial within a reasona

1957Co. v. Walker, 57 N.M. 525 , 260 P.2d 712, 714 , the court said: "The duty rests upon the plaintiff at every stage of the proceeding to use diligence and to expedite his case to a final determination * * *." To the same effect are United States v. Pacific Fruit and Produce Co., 9 Cir., 138 F.2d 367 , and Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, 17 Cal.App.2d 103 , 61 P.2d 514 . *961 In Price v. Sunfield, 57 Ariz. 142 , 112 P.2d 210, 212 , the court stated the applicable rule as follows: "The general rule is that it is the duty of the plaintiff to see that his case is brought up for trial within a reasona

1928There is another reason for this operation of the rule, if there be a fatal irregularity, and it is that, when there is a fatal irregularity in the conduct of the sale of the seized property, the officer who seized and sells it thereby becomes a trespasser ab initio and, on that account, the owner may replevy from the purchaser. (3 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., 2663; 4 Id. 3265; 34 Cyc., supra; Blake v. Johnson, 1 N. H. 91; Brackett v. Vining, 49 Me. 356 ; Farnsworth Co. v. Rand, 65 Me. 19 .) Having said this much about the application of the rule against replevying from an officer who seized f

1928There is another reason for this operation of the rule, if there be a fatal irregularity, and it is that, when there is a fatal irregularity in the conduct of the sale of the seized property, the officer who seized and sells it thereby becomes a trespasser ab initio and, on that account, the owner may replevy from the purchaser. (3 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., 2663; 4 Id. 3265; 34 Cyc., supra; Blake v. Johnson, 1 N. H. 91; Brackett v. Vining, 49 Me. 356 ; Farnsworth Co. v. Rand, 65 Me. 19 .) Having said this much about the application of the rule against replevying from an officer who seized f

1923The court, after referring to the statute and cases above cited, held that the facts took it out of the operation of the rule laid down in Barkley v. Logan and Plaisted v. Nowlan, supra, and brought it Avithin the rule announced in Largey v. Sedman, supra. Speaking of the position of the appellant Cooney and the issue raised on the appeal, the court held that “it was in no way dependent upon the determination of any isssue betAA’een the petitioners and any other person whose land Avas sought to be included in the district.