operation rule in Connecticut

1996There are two requirements for the operation of the rule: The witness must be available, and he must be a witness whom the party would naturally produce.” (Citations omitted.) Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 674-75 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960).

1996There are two requirements for the operation of the rule: The witness must be available, and he must be a witness whom the party would naturally produce.” (Citations omitted.) Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 674-75 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960).

1997The fact that the parent is the emotional beneficiary of the medical services does not alter that fact, nor does the pragmatic reality that parents are often more economically able to work, and to have sources of revenue and hence are frequently less often judgment proof, alter the reality that the medical services are rendered to the child. ". . . the law does not forbid an infant to contract, but gives him for his protection the privilege of avoiding contracts which are injurious to him and rescinding all others, whether fair or not, whether executed or executory . . . excepting from CT Page

1996No argument can logically be advanced that medical care is not a "necessary. " . . . the law does not forbid an infant to contract, "but gives him for his protection the privilege of avoiding contracts which are injurious to him and rescinding all others, whether fair or not, whether executed or executory . . . excepting from the operation of the privilege only contracts for necessaries . . ." Shutter v. Fudge, 108 Conn. 528 , 530 , 531 (1928).

1989The court stated that it was “entitled to draw some inference where the actual party to the litigation could have been here to testify as to what he intended.” The rule concerning inferences to be drawn from the failure of an available witness to testify is too well known in Connecticut trial and appellate proceedings to justify lengthy discussion of this claim. “ ‘The failure of a party to produce a witness who is within his power to produce and who would naturally have been produced by him, permits the inference that the evidence of the witness would be unfavorable to the party’s cause.’ Ezz

1989The court stated that it was “entitled to draw some inference where the actual party to the litigation could have been here to testify as to what he intended.” The rule concerning inferences to be drawn from the failure of an available witness to testify is too well known in Connecticut trial and appellate proceedings to justify lengthy discussion of this claim. “ ‘The failure of a party to produce a witness who is within his power to produce and who would naturally have been produced by him, permits the inference that the evidence of the witness would be unfavorable to the party’s cause.’ Ezz

1985“There are two requirements for the operation of the rule: The witness must be available, and he must be a witness whom the party would naturally produce.” Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 675 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960); State v. Carrione, 188 Conn. 681, 686 , 453 A.2d 1137 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 , 103 S. Ct. 1775 , 76 L.

1985“There are two requirements for the operation of the rule: The witness must be available, and he must be a witness whom the party would naturally produce.” Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 675 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960); State v. Carrione, 188 Conn. 681, 686 , 453 A.2d 1137 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 , 103 S. Ct. 1775 , 76 L.

1989State v. Carrione, 188 Conn. 681, 688 , 453 A.2d 1137 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 , 103 S. Ct. 1775 , 76 L.

1985“There are two requirements for the operation of the rule: The witness must be available, and he must be a witness whom the party would naturally produce.” Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 675 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960); State v. Carrione, 188 Conn. 681, 686 , 453 A.2d 1137 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 , 103 S. Ct. 1775 , 76 L.

1989State v. Carrione, 188 Conn. 681, 688 , 453 A.2d 1137 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 , 103 S. Ct. 1775 , 76 L.

1985“There are two requirements for the operation of the rule: The witness must be available, and he must be a witness whom the party would naturally produce.” Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 675 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960); State v. Carrione, 188 Conn. 681, 686 , 453 A.2d 1137 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 , 103 S. Ct. 1775 , 76 L.

1989State v. Carrione, 188 Conn. 681, 688 , 453 A.2d 1137 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 , 103 S. Ct. 1775 , 76 L.

1985“There are two requirements for the operation of the rule: The witness must be available, and he must be a witness whom the party would naturally produce.” Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 675 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960); State v. Carrione, 188 Conn. 681, 686 , 453 A.2d 1137 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 , 103 S. Ct. 1775 , 76 L.

2022See State v. Martin, 197 Conn. 17 , 21 n.7, 495 A.2d 1028 (1985) (‘‘[t]he only practical difference is that the plea of nolo contendere may not be used against the defen- dant as an admission in a subsequent criminal or civil case’’), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Das, 291 Conn. 356 , 968 A.2d 367 (2009); AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, 107 Conn. App. 321 , 328 n.7, 945 A.2d 494 (2008) (‘‘A plea of nolo contendere is a declaration by the accused that he will not contest the charge.

2022See State v. Martin, 197 Conn. 17 , 21 n.7, 495 A.2d 1028 (1985) (‘‘[t]he only practical difference is that the plea of nolo contendere may not be used against the defen- dant as an admission in a subsequent criminal or civil case’’), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Das, 291 Conn. 356 , 968 A.2d 367 (2009); AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, 107 Conn. App. 321 , 328 n.7, 945 A.2d 494 (2008) (‘‘A plea of nolo contendere is a declaration by the accused that he will not contest the charge.

2009Ed. 2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. 12 This court had occasion to explain the operation of this framework in Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 638 , 791 A.2d 518 (2002): “[Tjhere are four elements to a prima facie case where the aggrieved party is alleging illegal denial of tenure: 13 (1) that she belongs to a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for tenure; (3) that, despite her qualifications, she was denied tenure; and (4) that the denial took place under circumstances permitting an inference of discrimination.” “Under this analysis, the employee must first make a prima facie

2009Ed. 2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. 12 This court had occasion to explain the operation of this framework in Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 638 , 791 A.2d 518 (2002): “[Tjhere are four elements to a prima facie case where the aggrieved party is alleging illegal denial of tenure: 13 (1) that she belongs to a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for tenure; (3) that, despite her qualifications, she was denied tenure; and (4) that the denial took place under circumstances permitting an inference of discrimination.” “Under this analysis, the employee must first make a prima facie

1993In Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465 , 468 n. 4, 594 A.2d 1 (1991), the court discussed the operation of this rule: The defendant's motion to strike simply stated that the plaintiff had "failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Because the defendant did not specify the distinct reasons for the claimed insufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint in its motion, the motion was "fatally defective" under Practice Book Section 154 notwithstanding the defendant's inclusion of such reasons in its supporting memorandum.

1993In Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465 , 468 n. 4, 594 A.2d 1 (1991), the court discussed the operation of this rule: The defendant's motion to strike simply stated that the plaintiff had "failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Because the defendant did not specify the distinct reasons for the claimed insufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint in its motion, the motion was "fatally defective" under Practice Book Section 154 notwithstanding the defendant's inclusion of such reasons in its supporting memorandum.

1989The court stated that it was “entitled to draw some inference where the actual party to the litigation could have been here to testify as to what he intended.” The rule concerning inferences to be drawn from the failure of an available witness to testify is too well known in Connecticut trial and appellate proceedings to justify lengthy discussion of this claim. “ ‘The failure of a party to produce a witness who is within his power to produce and who would naturally have been produced by him, permits the inference that the evidence of the witness would be unfavorable to the party’s cause.’ Ezz

1989The court stated that it was “entitled to draw some inference where the actual party to the litigation could have been here to testify as to what he intended.” The rule concerning inferences to be drawn from the failure of an available witness to testify is too well known in Connecticut trial and appellate proceedings to justify lengthy discussion of this claim. “ ‘The failure of a party to produce a witness who is within his power to produce and who would naturally have been produced by him, permits the inference that the evidence of the witness would be unfavorable to the party’s cause.’ Ezz

1960Shutter v. Fudge, 108 Conn. 528, 530 ; Riley v. Mallory, 33 Conn. 201, 206 .

1928In Riley v. Mallory (1866) 33 Conn. 201, 206 , the court, citing Judge Reeve’s lectures on Domestic Relations, states a general proposition that the law does not forbid an infant to contract, “but gives him for his protection the privilege of avoiding contracts which are injurious to him and rescinding all others, whether fair or not, whether executed or executory, . . . excepting from the operation of the privilege only contracts for *531 necessaries, contracts which he may be compelled in equity to execute, and executed contracts where he has enjoyed the benefit of them and cannot restore th

2016Practice Book § 11-20A (a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, there shall be a presumption that documents filed with the court shall be available to the public." The 2005 commentary explains, inter alia: "As used in subsection (a) above, the words 'Except as otherwise provided by law' are intended to exempt from the operation of this rule all established procedures for the sealing or ex parte filing, in camera inspection and/or nondisclosure to the public of documents, records and other materials, as required or permitted by statute; e.g., General Statutes §§ 12-242vv (pertaining

2016Practice Book § 11-20A (a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, there shall be a presumption that documents filed with the court shall be available to the public." The 2005 commentary explains, inter alia: "As used in subsection (a) above, the words 'Except as otherwise provided by law' are intended to exempt from the operation of this rule all established procedures for the sealing or ex parte filing, in camera inspection and/or nondisclosure to the public of documents, records and other materials, as required or permitted by statute; e.g., General Statutes §§ 12-242vv (pertaining

2000Furthermore, the appropriate inquiry with respect to [claim] preclusion is whether the party had an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter in the earlier proceeding." (Emphasis in original.) Rosenfield v. Cymbala , 43 Conn. App. 83 , 87 , 681 A.2d 999 (1996).

2000Furthermore, the appropriate inquiry with respect to [claim] preclusion is whether the party had an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter in the earlier proceeding." (Emphasis in original.) Rosenfield v. Cymbala , 43 Conn. App. 83 , 87 , 681 A.2d 999 (1996).

1999In Laurel Beach , the court held that a board cannot reverse its previous decision "unless the facts and circumstances CT Page 3311 which actuated the decision are shown to have so changed as to vitiate or materially affect the reason which produced and supported it." In Grace Community Church v. Planning Zoning Commission , 42 Conn. Sup. 256 , 271 (1992), the court (Fuller, J.) explained the operation of the rule as follows: "An administrative agency which has acted . . . is not allowed to reverse itself unless a change of circumstances intervenes that materially affects the merits of the cas

1997(Emphasis added). ". . . the exclusive right of the minor plaintiff in this action to recover them must be recognized." Botelho v. Curtis , 28 Conn. Sup. 493 , 497 (1970). ". . . a child injured by the negligence of another person is not barred of his remedy by the mere fact that the negligence of his parent contributed to produce the injury." Botelho , supra , p. 497. (internal citations omitted).

1997(Emphasis added). ". . . the exclusive right of the minor plaintiff in this action to recover them must be recognized." Botelho v. Curtis , 28 Conn. Sup. 493 , 497 (1970). ". . . a child injured by the negligence of another person is not barred of his remedy by the mere fact that the negligence of his parent contributed to produce the injury." Botelho , supra , p. 497. (internal citations omitted).

1997Blakeslee Sons, Inc., 149 Conn. 79 (1961), where the court held that the operation of a steam-powered pile driver was intrinsically dangerous and came within the rule imposing absolute liability." Christ Church Parish v. Cadet Chemical Corporation, 25 Conn. Sup. 191 , 194 , 199 A.2d 707 (1964).

1997Blakeslee Sons, Inc., 149 Conn. 79 (1961), where the court held that the operation of a steam-powered pile driver was intrinsically dangerous and came within the rule imposing absolute liability." Christ Church Parish v. Cadet Chemical Corporation, 25 Conn. Sup. 191 , 194 , 199 A.2d 707 (1964).

1997Blakeslee Sons, Inc., 149 Conn. 79 (1961), where the court held that the operation of a steam-powered pile driver was intrinsically dangerous and came within the rule imposing absolute liability." Christ Church Parish v. Cadet Chemical Corporation, 25 Conn. Sup. 191 , 194 , 199 A.2d 707 (1964).

1996The operation of this rule is well illustrated by the recent case of Schwartz v. Stevenson, 37 Conn. App. 581 (1985).

1996Saccavino v. Gambardella, 22 Conn. Sup. 167 , 169 (1960).

1996The courts themselves have restricted the operation of the rule by creating, for example, the public policy exception to the rule as set forth in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods Inc., 179 Conn. 471 (1980) and by cases such as Finley itself which permit personnel manuals to form the basis for finding a contractual relationship.

1995A witness who would naturally be produced by a party is one who is known to that party and who, by reason of his relationship to that party or to the issues, or both, could reasonably be expected to have peculiar or superior information material to the case which, if favorable, the party would produce.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 675 ; see State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 105-106 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 469-70 , 551 A.2d 1231 (1988); Shelnitz v. Greenberg, 200 Conn. 58, 73 , 509 A.2d 1023 (1986); State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 705 ,

1995A witness who would naturally be produced by a party is one who is known to that party and who, by reason of his relationship to that party or to the issues, or both, could reasonably be expected to have peculiar or superior information material to the case which, if favorable, the party would produce.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 675 ; see State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 105-106 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 469-70 , 551 A.2d 1231 (1988); Shelnitz v. Greenberg, 200 Conn. 58, 73 , 509 A.2d 1023 (1986); State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 705 ,

1995A witness who would naturally be produced by a party is one who is known to that party and who, by reason of his relationship to that party or to the issues, or both, could reasonably be expected to have peculiar or superior information material to the case which, if favorable, the party would produce.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 675 ; see State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 105-106 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 469-70 , 551 A.2d 1231 (1988); Shelnitz v. Greenberg, 200 Conn. 58, 73 , 509 A.2d 1023 (1986); State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 705 ,

1995A witness who would naturally be produced by a party is one who is known to that party and who, by reason of his relationship to that party or to the issues, or both, could reasonably be expected to have peculiar or superior information material to the case which, if favorable, the party would produce.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 675 ; see State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 105-106 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 469-70 , 551 A.2d 1231 (1988); Shelnitz v. Greenberg, 200 Conn. 58, 73 , 509 A.2d 1023 (1986); State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 705 ,

1995A witness who would naturally be produced by a party is one who is known to that party and who, by reason of his relationship to that party or to the issues, or both, could reasonably be expected to have peculiar or superior information material to the case which, if favorable, the party would produce.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 675 ; see State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 105-106 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 469-70 , 551 A.2d 1231 (1988); Shelnitz v. Greenberg, 200 Conn. 58, 73 , 509 A.2d 1023 (1986); State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 705 ,

1995A witness who would naturally be produced by a party is one who is known to that party and who, by reason of his relationship to that party or to the issues, or both, could reasonably be expected to have peculiar or superior information material to the case which, if favorable, the party would produce.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 675 ; see State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 105-106 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 469-70 , 551 A.2d 1231 (1988); Shelnitz v. Greenberg, 200 Conn. 58, 73 , 509 A.2d 1023 (1986); State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 705 ,

1995Quinebaug Bank v. Tarbox , 20 Conn. 510 , 515 (1850).

1995A witness who would naturally be produced by a party is one who is known to that party and who, by reason of his relationship to that party or to the issues, or both, could reasonably be expected to have peculiar or superior information material to the case which, if favorable, the party would produce.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 675 ; see State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 105-106 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 469-70 , 551 A.2d 1231 (1988); Shelnitz v. Greenberg, 200 Conn. 58, 73 , 509 A.2d 1023 (1986); State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 705 ,

1995A witness who would naturally be produced by a party is one who is known to that party and who, by reason of his relationship to that party or to the issues, or both, could reasonably be expected to have peculiar or superior information material to the case which, if favorable, the party would produce.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 675 ; see State v. Grant, 221 Conn. 93, 105-106 , 602 A.2d 581 (1992); State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 469-70 , 551 A.2d 1231 (1988); Shelnitz v. Greenberg, 200 Conn. 58, 73 , 509 A.2d 1023 (1986); State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 705 ,