operation rule in Massachusetts

1999Hull v. Attleboro Savings Bank, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 18, 27 (1992).

1998Bank, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 18, 27 (1992).

2005Moreover, “if cases are to have finality, the operation of rule 60(b) must receive ‘extremely [meager] scope.’ ” Bowers, 16 Mass.App.Ct. at 33 , citing Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1967) (“[r]ule 60 is to litigation what mouth-to-mouth resuscitation is to first aid: a life-saving treatment, applicable in desperate cases”).

1990Generally, in the interests of finality of judgments, “the operation of rule 60(b)(6) must receive ‘extremely meagre scope.’ ” Bowers v. Board of Appeals of Marshfield, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 33 , quoting from Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1967).

2005Moreover, “if cases are to have finality, the operation of rule 60(b) must receive ‘extremely [meager] scope.’ ” Bowers, 16 Mass.App.Ct. at 33 , citing Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1967) (“[r]ule 60 is to litigation what mouth-to-mouth resuscitation is to first aid: a life-saving treatment, applicable in desperate cases”).

2005The operation of the rule “must receive ‘extreme meagre scope.’ ” Bowers v. Bd. of Appeals of Marshfield, 16 Mass.App.Ct. 29, 33 (1981) (citation omitted).

2014“Such formalized objection . . . serves the vital purpose of notifying both the prosecutor and the court that attendant delays may not be excluded from the operation of the rule.” Id.

2014See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bourdon, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 420, 426 (2008) (“formalized objection . . . serves the vital purpose of notifying both the prosecutor and the court that *525 attendant delays may not be excluded from the operation of the rule”); Commonwealth v. Fling, supra at 236 , citing Commonwealth v. Fleenor, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 28 n.4 (1995) (“an objection to a specific continuance [must be] timely noted” and should be made on record or filed in writing).

2008Section 10(f) is the Legislature’s codification of the common-law public duty rule. 8 See Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 317-318 (2002).

2005The rule acts “to preserve the delicate balance between the finality of final judgments and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in the light of all the facts.” Freitas, supra, at 198 (citation omitted).

2005Further, the court must have “an indication that the claim is ‘worthy of judicial investigation’ . . . raising a material question of law meriting discussion and decision, or a real controversy as to essential facts arising from conflicting or doubtful evidence.” See Berube v. McKesson Wine & Spirits Co., 7 Mass.App.Ct. 426, 433 (1979). “[W]e have recognized that. . . denial of a rule 60(b) motion based upon a claim of a lawyer’s negligence could increase court congestion ‘by replacing the dismissed action with a new action for malpractice’ . . .” See Colley v. Benson, Young & Downs Insurance

2005Further, the court must have “an indication that the claim is ‘worthy of judicial investigation’ . . . raising a material question of law meriting discussion and decision, or a real controversy as to essential facts arising from conflicting or doubtful evidence.” See Berube v. McKesson Wine & Spirits Co., 7 Mass.App.Ct. 426, 433 (1979). “[W]e have recognized that. . . denial of a rule 60(b) motion based upon a claim of a lawyer’s negligence could increase court congestion ‘by replacing the dismissed action with a new action for malpractice’ . . .” See Colley v. Benson, Young & Downs Insurance

2005Further, the court must have “an indication that the claim is ‘worthy of judicial investigation’ . . . raising a material question of law meriting discussion and decision, or a real controversy as to essential facts arising from conflicting or doubtful evidence.” See Berube v. McKesson Wine & Spirits Co., 7 Mass.App.Ct. 426, 433 (1979). “[W]e have recognized that. . . denial of a rule 60(b) motion based upon a claim of a lawyer’s negligence could increase court congestion ‘by replacing the dismissed action with a new action for malpractice’ . . .” See Colley v. Benson, Young & Downs Insurance

2004See Porotta v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 321 Mass. 638, 641 (1947); Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou, supra at 626-627 .

2004Corp., supra at 666-670, the procedural rule and the mechanic’s lien statute may peaceably coexist, and we will therefore apply the rule in such proceedings. b.

2002“The operation of an exception is to retain in the grantor some portion of his former estate, which by the exception is taken out of, or excluded from, the grant; and whatever is thus excepted remains in him as of his former title because it is not granted.” Wood v. Boyd, 145 Mass. 176, 179 (1887).

2002A reservation, on the other hand, “vests in the grantor some new right or interest not before existing in him.” Ibid.

2002Compare Adoption of Whitney, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 832, 837 (2002).

1992In the subsequent case of West v. Molders Foundry Co., 342 Mass. 8, 10 (1961), the court characterized this intrusion into the area of the “collateral source rule” as a “question of evidence on the issue of damages.” But further exceptions to the operation of the rule as an exclusionary rule of evidence were allowed with great circumspection.

1992See Geiger v. Allen, supra at 334 , and cases cited.

1977Survey Mass. Law § 2.6; compare Dilorio v. Tipaldi, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 640, 645-646 [1976;]), the plaintiff is in no position to complain of the hardship resulting from the application in this case of the doctrines which he now claims are contradictory.

1976The tenants receive an economic benefit in the form of reduced rents since their rental charge is based in part on that portion of the mortgage amortization which is not covered by the Federal subsidy. 12 This kind of economic benefit, however, “no more, embodies the attributes of income or profits than do welfare benefits, food stamps, or other government subsidies.” United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, supra. By a logical extension of this reasoning, we conclude that the economic benefit realized by the plaintiffs (the reduction in their operating costs through payment of interest on t

1975It provided further: “Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.” This might on its face suggest something stronger than a permissive presumption, but the court described the operation of the presumption as follows: “Under prior decisions, principally United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63 (1965), such statutory provisions authorize but do not require the tri

1975See id. at 406-407 .