operation rule in Kentucky

1938On the contrary, the later opinions of this court have followed the doctrine as laid down in the case of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. Nipp’s Adm’x, 125 Ky. 49 , 100 S. W. 246 , 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1131 , saying: ‘But the operation of this rule (anticipating the presence of persons on the track) has been confined to cities and thickly populated communities, and has not been, and will not be, extended to rural communities or sparsely settled regions, although footpaths crossing the track and the right of way may be used by a large number of persons each day.’ “In that opinion it is recognize

1938On the contrary, the later opinions of this court have followed the doctrine as laid down in the case of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. Nipp’s Adm’x, 125 Ky. 49 , 100 S. W. 246 , 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1131 , saying: ‘But the operation of this rule (anticipating the presence of persons on the track) has been confined to cities and thickly populated communities, and has not been, and will not be, extended to rural communities or sparsely settled regions, although footpaths crossing the track and the right of way may be used by a large number of persons each day.’ “In that opinion it is recognize

1997The cases of O’ Rear, supra, and the more recent case of Commonwealth v. Kroger, Ky., 503 S.W.2d 722 (1974), best illustrate the operation of the presumption of validity and the burden of proof in a property tax case.

1993Instead, contrary to the purpose of the commerce clause, retroactive application might operate only to limit the legislature’s future willingness to attempt the “legitimate state taxation of interstate commerce.” American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 181 , 110 S.Ct. at 2332 .

1993Instead, contrary to the purpose of the commerce clause, retroactive application might operate only to limit the legislature’s future willingness to attempt the “legitimate state taxation of interstate commerce.” American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 181 , 110 S.Ct. at 2332 .

1990Co. v. Wiley, 134 Ky. 461 , 121 S.W. 402 (1909), a case alleging failure of the railroad to comply with its rules pertaining to safe construction, O’Rear, J., stated: It has been so often decided by this court that the rules governing the conduct of a business may be read in a suit between the employer and employe by either party, when the injured party is suing to recover for injuries inflicted because of the violation or nonobservance of the rule, and was himself in a service and performing work in the sphere of the operation of the rule, that we deem it no longer an unsettled question.

1990Co. v. Wiley, 134 Ky. 461 , 121 S.W. 402 (1909), a case alleging failure of the railroad to comply with its rules pertaining to safe construction, O’Rear, J., stated: It has been so often decided by this court that the rules governing the conduct of a business may be read in a suit between the employer and employe by either party, when the injured party is suing to recover for injuries inflicted because of the violation or nonobservance of the rule, and was himself in a service and performing work in the sphere of the operation of the rule, that we deem it no longer an unsettled question.

1956Simmerman v. Fort Hartford Coal Co., 310 Ky. 572 , 221 S.W.2d 442 , 11 A.L.R.2d 381 . (3) Equally unavailing is the argument that, by the appellee’s endorsement of the bimonthly voucher checks, written memoranda were created against which Mullins could not orally testify.

1956Simmerman v. Fort Hartford Coal Co., 310 Ky. 572 , 221 S.W.2d 442 , 11 A.L.R.2d 381 . (3) Equally unavailing is the argument that, by the appellee’s endorsement of the bimonthly voucher checks, written memoranda were created against which Mullins could not orally testify.

1934Hawes, etc., v. Orr, etc., 10 Bush, 431 ; Erhman v. Kendrick, 1 Metc. 149 ; Watson v. Wilson, 2 Dana, 406 , 26 Am.

1934Hawes, etc., v. Orr, etc., 10 Bush, 431 ; Erhman v. Kendrick, 1 Metc. 149 ; Watson v. Wilson, 2 Dana, 406 , 26 Am.

1934Trainmen Engineers v. Nolan, 196 Ky. 296 , 244 S. W. 759 ; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Daviess, 243 Ky. 356 , 47 S. W. (2d) 990 .” We entertain no doubt as to the misrepresentations, as here are shown by the uncontradicted evidence to have been made,, clearly' come within the operation of the rule of the cited cases, and that the policy was thereby avoided.

1934Trainmen Engineers v. Nolan, 196 Ky. 296 , 244 S. W. 759 ; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Daviess, 243 Ky. 356 , 47 S. W. (2d) 990 .” We entertain no doubt as to the misrepresentations, as here are shown by the uncontradicted evidence to have been made,, clearly' come within the operation of the rule of the cited cases, and that the policy was thereby avoided.

1934Trainmen Engineers v. Nolan, 196 Ky. 296 , 244 S. W. 759 ; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Daviess, 243 Ky. 356 , 47 S. W. (2d) 990 .” We entertain no doubt as to the misrepresentations, as here are shown by the uncontradicted evidence to have been made,, clearly' come within the operation of the rule of the cited cases, and that the policy was thereby avoided.

1934Trainmen Engineers v. Nolan, 196 Ky. 296 , 244 S. W. 759 ; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Daviess, 243 Ky. 356 , 47 S. W. (2d) 990 .” We entertain no doubt as to the misrepresentations, as here are shown by the uncontradicted evidence to have been made,, clearly' come within the operation of the rule of the cited cases, and that the policy was thereby avoided.

1932But under such circum *487 stances the previous judgment is conclusive only as to those matters which were in fact in issue and actually or necessarily adjudicated.” The position taken by this court in the case of Teague v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky. 665 , 189 S. W. 908 , L.

1932But under such circum *487 stances the previous judgment is conclusive only as to those matters which were in fact in issue and actually or necessarily adjudicated.” The position taken by this court in the case of Teague v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky. 665 , 189 S. W. 908 , L.

1930Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 153 Ark. 114 , 239 S. W. 753 .” The Utah court, in the Crockett case, after reciting that the claimed exemption right was not expressly given, and if it existed at all it was by implication or through the operation of a presumption, both of which it discarded, reached the same conclusion as did the Oregon court, and in doing so said, inter alia: “It thus appears that the tax is not for the purpose of raising revenue for the payment of the usual and ordinary expenses of state government, but for the construction and maintenance of public highways.

1930Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 153 Ark. 114 , 239 S. W. 753 .” The Utah court, in the Crockett case, after reciting that the claimed exemption right was not expressly given, and if it existed at all it was by implication or through the operation of a presumption, both of which it discarded, reached the same conclusion as did the Oregon court, and in doing so said, inter alia: “It thus appears that the tax is not for the purpose of raising revenue for the payment of the usual and ordinary expenses of state government, but for the construction and maintenance of public highways.

1930A charitable use which is relieved from the operation of that rule must be so definitely expressed that the courts can judicially, and with reasonable certainty, apply the gift to that object.” The case of Gerick’s Executor v. Gerick et al., 158 Ky. 478 , 165 S. W. 695 , construed a provision in the will of Henry Gerick in this language: “I hereby appoint Henry J.

1930A charitable use which is relieved from the operation of that rule must be so definitely expressed that the courts can judicially, and with reasonable certainty, apply the gift to that object.” The case of Gerick’s Executor v. Gerick et al., 158 Ky. 478 , 165 S. W. 695 , construed a provision in the will of Henry Gerick in this language: “I hereby appoint Henry J.

1929The case of Webber v. Gibson, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 125 Id., 13 Ky. Op. 603 , affords an apt ánd effective illustra *449 tion of the operation of the principle.

1929The case of Webber v. Gibson, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 125 Id., 13 Ky. Op. 603 , affords an apt ánd effective illustra *449 tion of the operation of the principle.

1927J. 5758, secs. 95, 96, and Parks v. Smoot, 105 Ky. 63 , 48 S. W. 146 , and cases cited.

1927J. 5758, secs. 95, 96, and Parks v. Smoot, 105 Ky. 63 , 48 S. W. 146 , and cases cited.

1926If it be desired to provide some method by which a surety company may have some control of a trust as to which it has merely become surety for the officer of a court, such as a guardian or administrator, to whom the court has given such fund in charge, the method must be provided by the legislative department of the government, for the law as it now stands in this .state does not authorize it. ’ ’ The case of Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Butler, 130 Ga. 225 , 60 S. E. 851 , 16 L.

1926If it be desired to provide some method by which a surety company may have some control of a trust as to which it has merely become surety for the officer of a court, such as a guardian or administrator, to whom the court has given such fund in charge, the method must be provided by the legislative department of the government, for the law as it now stands in this .state does not authorize it. ’ ’ The case of Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Butler, 130 Ga. 225 , 60 S. E. 851 , 16 L.

1925So far as we are aware the only 'decision upon facts as here found, supporting plaintiff’s position is Brown v. Levy, 29 Tex. Civ.

1925R. 693; Geary v. Taylor, 166 Ky. 501 , and the Chambers case, supra. The 'averments in plaintiff’s pleading bring his cause of action squarely within, the doctrine, and they must 'be accepted as true upon demurrer; Nor can the fact that the contract in this 'ease was in writing and signed by the agent alone, plus the further fact that the husband, acting as agent for his wife, as alleged, executed his individual notes for the contract price of the improvements, relieve the case from the operation of that rule, since it appears from plaintiff’s pleading that all of those acts were done before i

1913When properly construed and applied, we do not find anything in Stites v. Norton, 125 Ky., 672 , or in Merchants Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Rohrman, 138 Ky., 530 , and kindred cases relied upon by plaintiffs that can take this case out of the operation of the rule laid down by the act of 1906.

1913When properly construed and applied, we do not find anything in Stites v. Norton, 125 Ky., 672 , or in Merchants Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Rohrman, 138 Ky., 530 , and kindred cases relied upon by plaintiffs that can take this case out of the operation of the rule laid down by the act of 1906.

1883(State v. Merchants’ Exchange Mutual Benefit Society, 2 Central Law Journal, 391; 105 Mass., 149 .) The certificate issued in this case is in substance a policy of insurance, and a contract between the company issuing and the person receiving it.