86 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1864–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Floresgreen2 sentences2020Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 277-78 (recognizing the ease with which a defendant may avoid the operation of waiver by placing the claims in the context of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 428 (1997) (“doctrine of waiver does not bar review of an issue when the waiver arises from ineffective assistance of appellate counsel” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2003See People v. Thomas, 164 Ill. 2d 410, 420 , 647 N.E.2d 983 (1995) (recognizing the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver and res judicata by couching his claims in the context of ineffective assistance and reiterating the rule that a petitioner cannot obtain relief under the Act by simply “ ‘rephrasing previously addressed issues in constitutional terms’ ”), quoting People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 277-78 (1992). | 7 | 7 |
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences2020Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 277-78 (recognizing the ease with which a defendant may avoid the operation of waiver by placing the claims in the context of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 428 (1997) (“doctrine of waiver does not bar review of an issue when the waiver arises from ineffective assistance of appellate counsel” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 1999Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 277 (noting the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver simply by arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996); People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 428 (1997); People v. Erickson, 183 Ill. 2d 213, 223 (1998). | 3 | 3 |
Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Parkgreen2 sentences2004See Aleckson, 176 Ill.2d at 93 , 223 Ill.Dec. 451 , 679 N.E.2d 1224 ("Therefore, the nonretroactive application was expressly limited to the facts of the case and could not have `retarded' the future operation of Mueller [v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 267 Ill. 2004See Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2d at 93 (“Therefore, the nonretroactive application was expressly limited to the facts of the case and could not have ‘retarded’ the future operation of Mueller”). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2003See People v. Thomas, 164 Ill. 2d 410, 420 , 647 N.E.2d 983 (1995) (recognizing the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver and res judicata by couching his claims in the context of ineffective assistance and reiterating the rule that a petitioner cannot obtain relief under the Act by simply “ ‘rephrasing previously addressed issues in constitutional terms’ ”), quoting People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 277-78 (1992). 2003See People v. Thomas, 164 Ill. 2d 410, 420 , 647 N.E.2d 983 (1995) (recognizing the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver and res judicata by couching his claims in the context of ineffective assistance and reiterating the rule that a petitioner cannot obtain relief under the Act by simply “ ‘rephrasing previously addressed issues in constitutional terms’ ”), quoting People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 277-78 (1992). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Whiteheadgreen2 sentences1999Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 277 (noting the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver simply by arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996); People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 428 (1997); People v. Erickson, 183 Ill. 2d 213, 223 (1998). 1999Flores , 153 Ill. 2d at 277 (noting the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver simply by arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); People v. Whitehead , 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996); People v. Moore , 177 Ill. 2d 421, 428 (1997); People v. Erickson , 183 Ill. 2d 213, 223 (1998). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Ericksongreen2 sentences1999Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 277 (noting the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver simply by arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996); People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 428 (1997); People v. Erickson, 183 Ill. 2d 213, 223 (1998). 1999Flores , 153 Ill. 2d at 277 (noting the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver simply by arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); People v. Whitehead , 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996); People v. Moore , 177 Ill. 2d 421, 428 (1997); People v. Erickson , 183 Ill. 2d 213, 223 (1998). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Stewartgreen2 sentences1998See Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 275 , citing People v. Stewart, 141 Ill. 2d 107 (1990). 1998See Flores, 153 Ill.2d at 275 , 180 Ill.Dec. 1 , 606 N.E.2d 1078 , citing People v. Stewart, 141 Ill.2d 107 , 152 Ill.Dec. 286 , 565 N.E.2d 968 (1990). | 2 | 2 |
Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Centergreen2 sentences1998In Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 (1997), Justice Harrison, writing in dissent, explained the operation of this principle: “The legislature is presumed to know the construction the courts have placed upon a statute. 1998In Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill.2d 1, 20-21 , 227 Ill.Dec. 769 , 688 N.E.2d 106 (1997), Justice Harrison, writing in dissent, explained the operation of this principle: "The legislature is presumed to know the construction the courts have placed upon a statute. | 2 | 2 |
Tri-City Jewish Center v. Blass Riddick Chilcotegreen2 sentences2009App. 3d at 3 , quoting Tri-City Jewish Center v. Blass Riddick Chilcote, 159 Ill. 2007"Through the operation of waiver, a party may become bound by an award which otherwise would be open to attack*** Waiver occurs whenever a party intentionally relinquishes a known right, either expressly or by conduct inconsistent with an intent to enforce that right." Tri-City, 159 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Enisgreen1 sentence2020People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 375 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Spreitzergreen1 sentence2020People v. Spreitzer, 143 Ill. 2d 210, 221 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Diederich v. Waltersgreen1 sentence2017See id. at ¶39-¶40. | 1 | 1 |
Craig v. United Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2009App. 3d 1, 4 (2007). “ ‘Through the operation of waiver, a party may become bound by an award which otherwise would be open to attack.’ ” Craig, 377 Ill. 2009Failure to raise a timely objection results in the waiver of even a legitimate claim. “ ‘Through the operation of waiver, a party may become bound by an award which otherwise would be open to attack.’ ” Craig, 377 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Mueller v. BD. OF FIRE & POLICE COM'RS OF ZURICHgreen1 sentence2004See Aleckson, 176 Ill.2d at 93 , 223 Ill.Dec. 451 , 679 N.E.2d 1224 ("Therefore, the nonretroactive application was expressly limited to the facts of the case and could not have `retarded' the future operation of Mueller [v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 267 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Sharkey v. Thurstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Turner
green
2 sentences2023The Turner court noted “the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver simply by arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” 187 Ill. 2d at 413 . 2012The Turner court stated, “If petitioner’s counsel had amended the post-conviction petition to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise petitioner’s claims on direct appeal, these claims would not have been barred by waiver” and noted “the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver simply by arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 413 . ¶ 24 The Turner court emphasized that counsel’s failure to amend the postconviction petition to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel prevented the trial court f | 4 | 2012–2023 |
The People v. Bongiorno
green
2 sentences2001People v. Bongiorno , 358 Ill. 171 (1934). 2001People v. Bongiorno, 358 Ill. 171 (1934). | 3 | 1973–2001 |
Matviuw v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1997Matviuw v. Johnson, 111 Ill.App.3d 629, 632 , 67 Ill.Dec. 370 , 444 N.E.2d 606 (1982); Dils v. City of Chicago, 62 Ill.App.3d 474 , 481 n. 1, 19 Ill.Dec. 255 , 378 N.E.2d 1130 (1978). 1997Matviuw v. Johnson, 111 Ill. | 3 | 1997–1997 |
Heuser v. Harris
green
2 sentences1923Heuser v. Harris, 42 Ill. 425 ; Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625 ; Franklin v. Hastings, supra. The preamble of the statute of 43 Elizabeth enumerates many specific charitable purposes; but not only in jurisdictions where the statute is or has been in force or is adopted or recognized as part of the law of those jurisdictions, but also in jurisdictions where it is not so adopted or recognized but is considered simply as persuasive authority, or as an aid in determining what constitutes a charity, many purposes are deemed to be charitable which are not specifieally named in the statute, but are 1893In the case of Heuser v. Harris, 42 Ill. 425 , it was held that the statute of 43 Eliz., chapter 4, is in force in this State, and it operates to exclude conveyances and devises, for such uses, from the operation of the rule against perpetuities. | 3 | 1893–1923 |
First Health Group Corp. v. Ruddick
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 49 . 2014Id. at 49 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Stanley v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2003Respondent here claims, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), that this court should more closely consider the second Mathews factor because the "risk from the operation of the presumption in section 1(D)(q) is that the court will automatically find a parent unfitness [ sic ] upon proof of conviction without considering the present circumstances showing that the person can be a fit parent." We note that Stanley is distinguishable from the case at bar. 2003Respondent here claims, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), that this court should more closely consider the second Mathews factor because the "risk from the operation of the presumption in section 1(D)(q) is that the court will automatically find a parent unfitness [ sic ] upon proof of conviction without considering the present circumstances showing that the person can be a fit parent." We note that Stanley is distinguishable from the case at bar. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Lanier v. Associates Finance, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991Our supreme court, in Lanier ( 114 Ill. 2d 1 ), has explained the Rule of 78’s as follows: “Under the Rule of 78’s, which is also known as the sum-of-the-digits method, a higher percentage of the total finance charge for a loan is attributable to the first months of the loan than is attributable to the last months.” (Lanier, 114 Ill. 2d at ,6.) The simplest example of the operation of the rule is premised on a 12-month loan. 1989(Lanier, 114 Ill. 2d at 6 , 499 N.E.2d at 442 .) The operation of the rule is best illustrated with an example of a one-year loan payable in 12 monthly payments. | 2 | 1989–1991 |
Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Savings Bank
green
2 sentences1990The heart of this appeal concerns the operation of the presumption of gift which arises from the creation of a statutory joint tenancy previously described. ( Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Savings Bank (1964), 31 Ill.2d 587 , 202 N.E.2d 470 ; Frey v. Wubbena (1962), 26 Ill.2d 62 , 185 N.E.2d 850 .) Respondent maintains on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to negate the presumption the decedent made a gift to him of a survivorship interest in the CDs; and (2) the court erred in considering certain of his testimony in a discovery deposition as an admission. 1990The heart of this appeal concerns the operation of the presumption of gift which arises from the creation of a statutory joint tenancy previously described. ( Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Savings Bank (1964), 31 Ill.2d 587 , 202 N.E.2d 470 ; Frey v. Wubbena (1962), 26 Ill.2d 62 , 185 N.E.2d 850 .) Respondent maintains on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to negate the presumption the decedent made a gift to him of a survivorship interest in the CDs; and (2) the court erred in considering certain of his testimony in a discovery deposition as an admission. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Frey v. Wubbena
green
2 sentences1990The heart of this appeal concerns the operation of the presumption of gift which arises from the creation of a statutory joint tenancy previously described. ( Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Savings Bank (1964), 31 Ill.2d 587 , 202 N.E.2d 470 ; Frey v. Wubbena (1962), 26 Ill.2d 62 , 185 N.E.2d 850 .) Respondent maintains on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to negate the presumption the decedent made a gift to him of a survivorship interest in the CDs; and (2) the court erred in considering certain of his testimony in a discovery deposition as an admission. 1990The heart of this appeal concerns the operation of the presumption of gift which arises from the creation of a statutory joint tenancy previously described. ( Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Savings Bank (1964), 31 Ill.2d 587 , 202 N.E.2d 470 ; Frey v. Wubbena (1962), 26 Ill.2d 62 , 185 N.E.2d 850 .) Respondent maintains on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to negate the presumption the decedent made a gift to him of a survivorship interest in the CDs; and (2) the court erred in considering certain of his testimony in a discovery deposition as an admission. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Thomas v. Van Meter
green
2 sentences1989App. 391, 400-01 , 32 N.E.2d 180, 184 , quoting 21 C.J. 215-16, citing Thomas v. Van Meter (1896), 164 Ill. 304 . 1941J. 215-216; Thomas v. Van Meter, 164 Ill. 304 .) “the question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the chancellor, and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is so clearly wrong as to amount to an abuse of discretion.” (21 C. | 2 | 1941–1989 |
Crerar v. Williams
green
2 sentences1923Heuser v. Harris, 42 Ill. 425 ; Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625 ; Franklin v. Hastings, supra. The preamble of the statute of 43 Elizabeth enumerates many specific charitable purposes; but not only in jurisdictions where the statute is or has been in force or is adopted or recognized as part of the law of those jurisdictions, but also in jurisdictions where it is not so adopted or recognized but is considered simply as persuasive authority, or as an aid in determining what constitutes a charity, many purposes are deemed to be charitable which are not specifieally named in the statute, but are 1911(Heuser v. Harris, supra; Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625 .) Though a private trust cannot be created in perpetuity, that rule has no application to a gift for charitable uses. | 2 | 1911–1923 |
Farmer v. People
green
2 sentences1907Farmer v. The People, etc., 77 Ill., 322 ; Roth v. Eppy, 80 Ill., 283 .” “¡Numerous Illinois cases are cited in support of the contention that the rule is still in force, hut those decided since the date of the enactment all relate to matters of procedure, or steps taken for the enforcement of a remedy. 1900The obvious intention of the enactment was to prevent the operation of the rule Farmer v. The People, etc., 77 Ill. 322 ; Roth v. Eppy, 80 Ill. 283 . | 2 | 1900–1907 |
Roth v. Eppy
neutral
2 sentences1907Farmer v. The People, etc., 77 Ill., 322 ; Roth v. Eppy, 80 Ill., 283 .” “¡Numerous Illinois cases are cited in support of the contention that the rule is still in force, hut those decided since the date of the enactment all relate to matters of procedure, or steps taken for the enforcement of a remedy. 1900The obvious intention of the enactment was to prevent the operation of the rule Farmer v. The People, etc., 77 Ill. 322 ; Roth v. Eppy, 80 Ill. 283 . | 2 | 1900–1907 |
The Village of Posen, Illinois v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council
green
1 sentence2020“Through the operation of waiver, a party may become bound by an award that otherwise would be open to attack.” Village of Posen v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, 2014 IL App (1st) 133329, ¶ 32 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Djikas v. Grafft
green
1 sentence2009As noted above, a party’s conduct may be considered inconsistent with a prior order for purposes of revestment, “if the conduct reasonably can be construed as an indication that the parties do not view the prior order as final and binding.” Djikas, 344 Ill. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Dils v. City of Chicago
green
2 sentences1997Matviuw v. Johnson, 111 Ill.App.3d 629, 632 , 67 Ill.Dec. 370 , 444 N.E.2d 606 (1982); Dils v. City of Chicago, 62 Ill.App.3d 474 , 481 n. 1, 19 Ill.Dec. 255 , 378 N.E.2d 1130 (1978). 1997Matviuw v. Johnson, 111 Ill.App.3d 629, 632 , 67 Ill.Dec. 370 , 444 N.E.2d 606 (1982); Dils v. City of Chicago, 62 Ill.App.3d 474 , 481 n. 1, 19 Ill.Dec. 255 , 378 N.E.2d 1130 (1978). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Thomas green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Culligan Fyrprotexion, Inc. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Kirby v. United States green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Dowdell v. United States green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Coy v. Iowa green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| United States v. Millard Bowie green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Cuyler v. Sullivan green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Moshe v. Anchor Organization for Health Maintenance green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Trustees of Schools v. City of Chicago & Board of Education green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Wagner green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Reiff v. Reiff green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Barker v. Wingo green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Testa v. Kaluzny Brothers, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| The People v. Washington green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| The People v. Moore green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Frazer v. Board of Supervisors green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Backus green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Company green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Fireman's Fund Insurance v. New Zealand Insurance green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Schell v. Albrecht green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Entz v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Mandel Bros. Inc. v. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Forman Realty Corp. v. Brenza green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| The PEOPLE v. James green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.