operation principle in Michigan

2025Additionally, we have decided that, in the context of the termination phase of the proceedings, “drug use alone, in the absence of any connection to abuse or neglect, cannot justify termination solely through the operation of the doctrine of anticipatory neglect.” LaFrance, 306 Mich App at 731 .

2018See, e.g., id. at 537-538 , 542- 543; Brown Trust, 312 Mich App at 703-704 .

2018Describing the operation of the doctrine of res judicata, this Court has stated that “a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.” Wayne Co v City of Detroit, 233 Mich App 275, 277 ; 590 NW2d 619 (1998) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

2018Describing the operation of the doctrine of res judicata, this Court has stated that “a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.” Wayne Co v City of Detroit, 233 Mich App 275, 277 ; 590 NW2d 619 (1998) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

2018The doctrine bars a second, subsequent action when “(1) the first action was decided on the merits, (2) the matter contested in the second action was or could have been resolved in the first, and (3) both actions involve the same parties or their privies.” Verbrugghe v Select Specialty Hosp- Macomb Co, Inc, 279 Mich App 741, 744-745 ; 760 NW2d 583 (2008) (internal citation and notation omitted).

2018The doctrine bars a second, subsequent action when “(1) the first action was decided on the merits, (2) the matter contested in the second action was or could have been resolved in the first, and (3) both actions involve the same parties or their privies.” Verbrugghe v Select Specialty Hosp- Macomb Co, Inc, 279 Mich App 741, 744-745 ; 760 NW2d 583 (2008) (internal citation and notation omitted).

2013COOLEY recognized in Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (2d ed, 1888), p 2, “It is customary in the law to arrange the wrongs for which individuals may demand legal redress into two classes: the first embracing those which consist in a mere breach of contract, and the second those which arise independent of contract.” 35 Churchill v Howe, 186 Mich 107 ; 152 NW 989 (1915). 36 Id. at 111, 114 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 37 See, e.g., O’Neill v James, 138 Mich 567, 573 ; 101 NW 828 (1904) (quoting caselaw stating that a party who commits a wrong independent of contract “brings him

2013COOLEY recognized in Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (2d ed, 1888), p 2, “It is customary in the law to arrange the wrongs for which individuals may demand legal redress into two classes: the first embracing those which consist in a mere breach of contract, and the second those which arise independent of contract.” 35 Churchill v Howe, 186 Mich 107 ; 152 NW 989 (1915). 36 Id. at 111, 114 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 37 See, e.g., O’Neill v James, 138 Mich 567, 573 ; 101 NW 828 (1904) (quoting caselaw stating that a party who commits a wrong independent of contract “brings him

2013Accordingly, because the word “tort” has “acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning” in our common law, and because the Legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law when enacting legislation, we conclude that the term “tort” as used in MCL 691.1407(1) is a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages.40 38 Stillson v Gibbs, 53 Mich 280, 284 ; 18 NW 815 (1884) (“The purpose of an action for tort is to recover the damages which the plaintiff has sustained from an injury done him by the defendant.”); Kalembach v Michigan Cent R Co, 8

2013Accordingly, because the word “tort” has “acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning” in our common law, and because the Legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law when enacting legislation, we conclude that the term “tort” as used in MCL 691.1407(1) is a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages.40 38 Stillson v Gibbs, 53 Mich 280, 284 ; 18 NW 815 (1884) (“The purpose of an action for tort is to recover the damages which the plaintiff has sustained from an injury done him by the defendant.”); Kalembach v Michigan Cent R Co, 8

2013Accordingly, because the word “tort” has “acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning” in our common law, and because the Legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law when enacting legislation, we conclude that the term “tort” as used in MCL 691.1407(1) is a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages.40 38 Stillson v Gibbs, 53 Mich 280, 284 ; 18 NW 815 (1884) (“The purpose of an action for tort is to recover the damages which the plaintiff has sustained from an injury done him by the defendant.”); Kalembach v Michigan Cent R Co, 8

2013Accordingly, because the word “tort” has “acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning” in our common law, and because the Legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law when enacting legislation, we conclude that the term “tort” as used in MCL 691.1407(1) is a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages.40 38 Stillson v Gibbs, 53 Mich 280, 284 ; 18 NW 815 (1884) (“The purpose of an action for tort is to recover the damages which the plaintiff has sustained from an injury done him by the defendant.”); Kalembach v Michigan Cent R Co, 8

2013COOLEY recognized in Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (2d ed, 1888), p 2, “It is customary in the law to arrange the wrongs for which individuals may demand legal redress into two classes: the first embracing those which consist in a mere breach of contract, and the second those which arise independent of contract.” 35 Churchill v Howe, 186 Mich 107 ; 152 NW 989 (1915). 36 Id. at 111, 114 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 37 See, e.g., O’Neill v James, 138 Mich 567, 573 ; 101 NW 828 (1904) (quoting caselaw stating that a party who commits a wrong independent of contract “brings him

2013COOLEY recognized in Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (2d ed, 1888), p 2, “It is customary in the law to arrange the wrongs for which individuals may demand legal redress into two classes: the first embracing those which consist in a mere breach of contract, and the second those which arise independent of contract.” 35 Churchill v Howe, 186 Mich 107 ; 152 NW 989 (1915). 36 Id. at 111, 114 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 37 See, e.g., O’Neill v James, 138 Mich 567, 573 ; 101 NW 828 (1904) (quoting caselaw stating that a party who commits a wrong independent of contract “brings him

2013COOLEY recognized in Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (2d ed, 1888), p 2, “It is customary in the law to arrange the wrongs for which individuals may demand legal redress into two classes: the first embracing those which consist in a mere breach of contract, and the second those which arise independent of contract.” 35 Churchill v Howe, 186 Mich 107 ; 152 NW 989 (1915). 36 Id. at 111, 114 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 37 See, e.g., O’Neill v James, 138 Mich 567, 573 ; 101 NW 828 (1904) (quoting caselaw stating that a party who commits a wrong independent of contract “brings him

2013COOLEY recognized in Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (2d ed, 1888), p 2, “It is customary in the law to arrange the wrongs for which individuals may demand legal redress into two classes: the first embracing those which consist in a mere breach of contract, and the second those which arise independent of contract.” 35 Churchill v Howe, 186 Mich 107 ; 152 NW 989 (1915). 36 Id. at 111, 114 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 37 See, e.g., O’Neill v James, 138 Mich 567, 573 ; 101 NW 828 (1904) (quoting caselaw stating that a party who commits a wrong independent of contract “brings him

2004Further, I respectfully urge the United States Supreme Court to consider granting certiorari in this case to clarify the operation of the presumption against the waiver of trial counsel in Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458 ; 58 S Ct 1019 ; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938).

2004Further, I respectfully urge the United States Supreme Court to consider granting certiorari in this case to clarify the operation of the presumption against the waiver of trial counsel in Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458 ; 58 S Ct 1019 ; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938).

1990Where an unintentional killing occurred during the commission of a misdemeanor that was not inherently dangerous, there was no presumption of mens rea. 2 In People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672 ; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), this Court abolished the common-law rule that the mens rea for murder was supplied by the intention to commit the underlying felony. 56 The holding in Aaron necessarily implies that a killing which occurred during the commission of a felony could — consistent with the evidence — be involuntary manslaughter or an innocent homicide.

1990Where an unintentional killing occurred during the commission of a misdemeanor that was not inherently dangerous, there was no presumption of mens rea. 2 In People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672 ; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), this Court abolished the common-law rule that the mens rea for murder was supplied by the intention to commit the underlying felony. 56 The holding in Aaron necessarily implies that a killing which occurred during the commission of a felony could — consistent with the evidence — be involuntary manslaughter or an innocent homicide.

1988This Court has stated: There is no reason why an unsuccessful attempt to show the negligence of deceased in some particular respect should place upon the plaintiff the burden of proving by affirmative evidence that the deceased used due care in all respects — a burden which did not rest upon him before the attempt was made. [ Gillett, supra at 416 .] The majority also asserts that the special verdict form that prescribes the order of jury deliberations *73 somehow negated any error resulting from failure to give SJI2d 10.08.

1981Thus, while the contrary has been held, by the weight of authority the defense of laches is not available against the government, state or national, in a suit by it to enforce a public right or to protect a public interest, or, as the rule is sometimes expressed, the laches of its officers or agents will not be imputed to the government. *570 "In some jurisdictions the rule exempting the government from the operation of the doctrine of laches applies in favor of municipal corporations and other governmental agencies when the right sought to be enforced by them is public or governmental in char

1981Thus, while the contrary has been held, by the weight of authority the defense of laches is not available against the government, state or national, in a suit by it to enforce a public right or to protect a public interest, or, as the rule is sometimes expressed, the laches of its officers or agents will not be imputed to the government. *570 "In some jurisdictions the rule exempting the government from the operation of the doctrine of laches applies in favor of municipal corporations and other governmental agencies when the right sought to be enforced by them is public or governmental in char

1981Thus, while the contrary has been held, by the weight of authority the defense of laches is not available against the government, state or national, in a suit by it to enforce a public right or to protect a public interest, or, as the rule is sometimes expressed, the laches of its officers or agents will not be imputed to the government. *570 "In some jurisdictions the rule exempting the government from the operation of the doctrine of laches applies in favor of municipal corporations and other governmental agencies when the right sought to be enforced by them is public or governmental in char

1981Thus, while the contrary has been held, by the weight of authority the defense of laches is not available against the government, state or national, in a suit by it to enforce a public right or to protect a public interest, or, as the rule is sometimes expressed, the laches of its officers or agents will not be imputed to the government. *570 "In some jurisdictions the rule exempting the government from the operation of the doctrine of laches applies in favor of municipal corporations and other governmental agencies when the right sought to be enforced by them is public or governmental in char

1981Thus, while the contrary has been held, by the weight of authority the defense of laches is not available against the government, state or national, in a suit by it to enforce a public right or to protect a public interest, or, as the rule is sometimes expressed, the laches of its officers or agents will not be imputed to the government. *570 "In some jurisdictions the rule exempting the government from the operation of the doctrine of laches applies in favor of municipal corporations and other governmental agencies when the right sought to be enforced by them is public or governmental in char

1981Thus, while the contrary has been held, by the weight of authority the defense of laches is not available against the government, state or national, in a suit by it to enforce a public right or to protect a public interest, or, as the rule is sometimes expressed, the laches of its officers or agents will not be imputed to the government. *570 "In some jurisdictions the rule exempting the government from the operation of the doctrine of laches applies in favor of municipal corporations and other governmental agencies when the right sought to be enforced by them is public or governmental in char

1967See Obremski v. Dworzanin (1948), 322 Mich 285 ; Stadler v. Ciprian (1933), 265 Mich 252 ; Flanders Co. v. Canners’ Exchange Subscribers at Warner Inter-Insurance Bureau (1926), 235 Mich 157 .

1967See Obremski v. Dworzanin (1948), 322 Mich 285 ; Stadler v. Ciprian (1933), 265 Mich 252 ; Flanders Co. v. Canners’ Exchange Subscribers at Warner Inter-Insurance Bureau (1926), 235 Mich 157 .

1938Ruth v. Vroom, supra. Robson should have had his car under such control that he could have stopped when he knew, or should have known, that he could not proceed with safety.

1937On page 559 of the Morlock opinion, we adopted 8 Thompson on Corporations (3d Ed.), p. 157, § 6074, which states: “"Where a corporation purchased the assets of another and expressly agreed to pay its debts, the creditors of the latter may sue such purchasing corporation on the contract as a contract made for their benefit.” Appellant contends that George Realty Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 275 Mich. 442 , which denied a legal action to a creditor of the selling corporation, limits and restricts the operation of the rule in the Morlock Case, and that the reasoning of the George Realty Case should

1927In the absence of an express statute, if the tax title proves to be worthless, the tax purchaser cannot recover the money paid by him either against the officer, the owner of the land, or the tax district which collected and used the tax; and this is so even though the taxes were lawfully assessed and were paid by his purchase.” And see Harding v. Auditor General, 136 Mich. 358 ; also 3 Thompson on Real Property, § 2777, p. 933, where it is said: “Tax titles are to some extent uncertain, and usually depend upon numerous contingencies.

1909Thick v. Washer, 137 Mich. 155 ( 100 N. W. 394 ), and cases there cited.

1909Thick v. Washer, 137 Mich. 155 ( 100 N. W. 394 ), and cases there cited.

1907The claim is made that it is so exempt by reason of Downes v. Harper Hospital, decided by this court in 1894 and reported in 101 Mich. 555 (25 L.