operation rule in Pennsylvania

1982As the opinion of the Court in Armour & Co. v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 116 , 69 A. 2d 405 (1949) observed: ‘Nor is it of legal significance in this connection that the operations thus conducted require large and extensive plants and organizations, trained men and intricate machinery, for even though the labor be. skilled, the operations delicate, a large plant involved, and expensive machinery utilized, such factors, neither individually nor collectively, convert what is essentially a mere processing operation into a manufacturing one: cf. Rieck-Mcjunkin Dairy Co. v. Pittsburgh School Distric

1982As the opinion of the Court in Armour & Co. v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 116 , 69 A. 2d 405 (1949) observed: ‘Nor is it of legal significance in this connection that the operations thus conducted require large and extensive plants and organizations, trained men and intricate machinery, for even though the labor be. skilled, the operations delicate, a large plant involved, and expensive machinery utilized, such factors, neither individually nor collectively, convert what is essentially a mere processing operation into a manufacturing one: cf. Rieck-Mcjunkin Dairy Co. v. Pittsburgh School Distric

1982As the opinion of the Court in Armour & Co. v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 116 , 69 A. 2d 405 (1949) observed: ‘Nor is it of legal significance in this connection that the operations thus conducted require large and extensive plants and organizations, trained men and intricate machinery, for even though the labor be. skilled, the operations delicate, a large plant involved, and expensive machinery utilized, such factors, neither individually nor collectively, convert what is essentially a mere processing operation into a manufacturing one: cf. Rieck-Mcjunkin Dairy Co. v. Pittsburgh School Distric

1982As the opinion of the Court in Armour & Co. v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 116 , 69 A. 2d 405 (1949) observed: ‘Nor is it of legal significance in this connection that the operations thus conducted require large and extensive plants and organizations, trained men and intricate machinery, for even though the labor be. skilled, the operations delicate, a large plant involved, and expensive machinery utilized, such factors, neither individually nor collectively, convert what is essentially a mere processing operation into a manufacturing one: cf. Rieck-Mcjunkin Dairy Co. v. Pittsburgh School Distric

1942The order entered in the court below is reversed and the record is returned to that court for further action in harmony with this opinion, the costs of this appeal to be paid by the Federal Land Bank of Baltimore. 1 The devise became effective prior to the passage of the Act of July 15, 1935, P. L. 1013 (20 PS §229), limiting the operation of the rule in Shelley’s case. 2 “(a) In the following cases “children” was construed as a word of purchase: Gernet v. Lynn, 31 Pa. 94 ; Guthrie’s Appeal, 37 Pa. 9 ; Cote and Wife v. VonBonnhorst, 41 Pa. 243 ; Huber’s Appeal, 80 Pa. 348 ; Affoltter v. May, 1

1942The order entered in the court below is reversed and the record is returned to that court for further action in harmony with this opinion, the costs of this appeal to be paid by the Federal Land Bank of Baltimore. 1 The devise became effective prior to the passage of the Act of July 15, 1935, P. L. 1013 (20 PS §229), limiting the operation of the rule in Shelley’s case. 2 “(a) In the following cases “children” was construed as a word of purchase: Gernet v. Lynn, 31 Pa. 94 ; Guthrie’s Appeal, 37 Pa. 9 ; Cote and Wife v. VonBonnhorst, 41 Pa. 243 ; Huber’s Appeal, 80 Pa. 348 ; Affoltter v. May, 1

1917This evidence brings the case within the operation of the principle declared in Dempsey v. Buck Run Coal Co., 227 Pa. 571 , where Mr. Justice Mestrezat, inter alia, said: ‘If to the owner’s knowledge the mine foreman or any other employee is neglecting the performance of his duties or the mine is in a condition which endangers the health or safety of the workmen, it is the duty of the owner to act promptly and have the dangers to the safety of the men removed.’ ” In the latest case above cited, Sudnik v. Coal Company, supra, Mr. Justice Moschziskee concludes his opinion with this statement, vi

1913This evidence brings the case within the operation of the principle declared in Dempsey v. Coal Co., 227 Pa. 571 , where Mr. Justice Mestrezat said (p. 579) : “While the owner is not responsible for the neglect of the duties imposed by statute upon the mine foreman, the former must nevertheless ‘use every precaution to insure the safety of the workmen.’ If any matter injuriously affecting the health or safety of the men is brought to his attention it is his duty to take the proper steps to correct it.

1915He “was not an ordinary house servant, and therefore does not come within the operation of the principle declared in McConnell’s Appeal, 97 Pa. 31 :” Lewis’s Estate, Rhodes’s Appeal, 156 Pa. 337 ; McTamany’s Estate, 44 Pa. Superior Ct. 484 .

1893She was not an ordinary house servant, and therefore does not come within the operation of the principle declared in McConnell’s Appeal, 97 Pa. 31 .

1907But in Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439 , the learned trial judge, while fully recognizing the general rule, thought, and so charged, that the testimony going to show the knowledge of the vendor, who was the defendant in the case, of the fact that the plaintiff was to receive compensation from the purchaser of the property which the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant to sell, and the failure of the vendor to object, would if believed by the jury, take the case out of the operation of the rule.

1906Co. v. Flanigan, 112 Pa. 558 , the point decided, as stated in the syllabus, was as follows : “ Where one acts in a dual capacity as agent, or servant' for two separate employers, nothing less than clear proof of consent of both employers, not merely to double service, but to the double compensation, will suffice to validate an express contract with the second employers.” In the case of Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439 , Mr. Justice Stebbett said: “ Conceding, for the sake of the argument, that it would be competent for persons, circumstanced as the parties in this case were, to waive or suspend by

2019Id.

2016Citizens note that, prior to Act 13, municipalities could regulate, via ordinance, areas where drilling could take place within a municipality, as the 1984 Act did not preclude such regulation, but, conversely, municipalities could not enact ordinances which purported to set standards for the operation of such wells to the extent that such standards conflicted with those set forth in the Oil and Gas Act. 31 Citizens’ Initial Brief at 18 (citing Huntley & Huntley v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 600 Pa. 207 , 964 A.2d 855 (2009)).

2016Citizens note that, prior to Act 13, municipalities could regulate, via ordinance, areas where drilling could take place within a municipality, as the 1984 Act did not preclude such regulation, but, conversely, municipalities could not enact ordinances which purported to set standards for the operation of such wells to the extent that such standards conflicted with those set forth in the Oil and Gas Act. 31 Citizens’ Initial Brief at 18 (citing Huntley & Huntley v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 600 Pa. 207 , 964 A.2d 855 (2009)).

2014Nevertheless, I find it significant that, even though the time required to obtain a warrant was considerably longer in the 1920’s, the Carroll Court, as related above, expressed a warrant preference which was in alignment with our current state constitutional standard, i.e., “where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used.” Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156 , 45 S.Ct. 280 .

2014Nevertheless, I find it significant that, even though the time required to obtain a warrant was considerably longer in the 1920’s, the Carroll Court, as related above, expressed a warrant preference which was in alignment with our current state constitutional standard, i.e., “where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used.” Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156 , 45 S.Ct. 280 .

1989The application here of the per se rule first announced in Commonwealth v. Randall, 515 Pa. 410 , 528 A.2d 1326 (1987), demonstrates in and of itself the absurdity and lack of logic inherent in the operation of such a rule and necessitates the restoration of the Bighum-Roots principle to our jurisprudence.

1989The application here of the per se rule first announced in Commonwealth v. Randall, 515 Pa. 410 , 528 A.2d 1326 (1987), demonstrates in and of itself the absurdity and lack of logic inherent in the operation of such a rule and necessitates the restoration of the Bighum-Roots principle to our jurisprudence.

1986However, this conversion is actually a complex way of further separating the pure iron from the impurities. 7 Therefore, although we acknowledge that Harscos metal recovery operation is significantly more complex than the processing of scrap metal as outlined in Deitch, 8 “[t]he application of labor to materials and the sophisticated nature of the operation are factors to be considered but are not in themselves determinative of whether a corporation is engaged in manufacturing in a legal sense.” Deitch, 449 Pa. at 99 , 295 A.2d at 840 .

1986However, this conversion is actually a complex way of further separating the pure iron from the impurities. 7 Therefore, although we acknowledge that Harscos metal recovery operation is significantly more complex than the processing of scrap metal as outlined in Deitch, 8 “[t]he application of labor to materials and the sophisticated nature of the operation are factors to be considered but are not in themselves determinative of whether a corporation is engaged in manufacturing in a legal sense.” Deitch, 449 Pa. at 99 , 295 A.2d at 840 .

1984Woods v. Peckich, 473 Pa. 226 , 373 A.2d 1345 (1977); Dice v. Bender, 383 Pa. 94 , 117 A.2d 725 (1955). “[I]f the operation of the doctrine should prove to be harsh or arbitrary in particular instances, equity can and should refuse to give it effect, and, under its power to remove a cloud on title, can and should cancel a notice of lis pendens which might otherwise exist.” Dice v. Bender, supra, 383 Pa. at 98 , 117 A.2d at 727 .

1984Woods v. Peckich, 473 Pa. 226 , 373 A.2d 1345 (1977); Dice v. Bender, 383 Pa. 94 , 117 A.2d 725 (1955). “[I]f the operation of the doctrine should prove to be harsh or arbitrary in particular instances, equity can and should refuse to give it effect, and, under its power to remove a cloud on title, can and should cancel a notice of lis pendens which might otherwise exist.” Dice v. Bender, supra, 383 Pa. at 98 , 117 A.2d at 727 .

1980Byrne v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 357 , 103 A. 53 (1918).

1980Byrne v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 357 , 103 A. 53 (1918).

1979Therefore, this case is distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 467 Pa. 436 , 359 A.2d 174 (1976), where the prosecution in an attempt to toll the rule, sought and obtained entry of nolle prosequi two days before the expiration of the mandatory period under rule 1100.

1979Therefore, this case is distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 467 Pa. 436 , 359 A.2d 174 (1976), where the prosecution in an attempt to toll the rule, sought and obtained entry of nolle prosequi two days before the expiration of the mandatory period under rule 1100.

1978Though it is true that the failure of a passenger to object to excessive speed may be a basis for the jury to conclude that the passenger was contributorily negligent, Reeves v. Winslow, 394 Pa. 291 , 147 A.2d 357 (1959); Guiducci v. Mason, 326 Pa. 490 , 192 A. 632 (1937); Kropko v. Galida, 155 Pa.Super. 446 , 38 A.2d 491 (1944), the operation of this presumption depends very much on the circumstances.

1978Though it is true that the failure of a passenger to object to excessive speed may be a basis for the jury to conclude that the passenger was contributorily negligent, Reeves v. Winslow, 394 Pa. 291 , 147 A.2d 357 (1959); Guiducci v. Mason, 326 Pa. 490 , 192 A. 632 (1937); Kropko v. Galida, 155 Pa.Super. 446 , 38 A.2d 491 (1944), the operation of this presumption depends very much on the circumstances.

1978Though it is true that the failure of a passenger to object to excessive speed may be a basis for the jury to conclude that the passenger was contributorily negligent, Reeves v. Winslow, 394 Pa. 291 , 147 A.2d 357 (1959); Guiducci v. Mason, 326 Pa. 490 , 192 A. 632 (1937); Kropko v. Galida, 155 Pa.Super. 446 , 38 A.2d 491 (1944), the operation of this presumption depends very much on the circumstances.

1978Though it is true that the failure of a passenger to object to excessive speed may be a basis for the jury to conclude that the passenger was contributorily negligent, Reeves v. Winslow, 394 Pa. 291 , 147 A.2d 357 (1959); Guiducci v. Mason, 326 Pa. 490 , 192 A. 632 (1937); Kropko v. Galida, 155 Pa.Super. 446 , 38 A.2d 491 (1944), the operation of this presumption depends very much on the circumstances.

1978Though it is true that the failure of a passenger to object to excessive speed may be a basis for the jury to conclude that the passenger was contributorily negligent, Reeves v. Winslow, 394 Pa. 291 , 147 A.2d 357 (1959); Guiducci v. Mason, 326 Pa. 490 , 192 A. 632 (1937); Kropko v. Galida, 155 Pa.Super. 446 , 38 A.2d 491 (1944), the operation of this presumption depends very much on the circumstances.

1978Though it is true that the failure of a passenger to object to excessive speed may be a basis for the jury to conclude that the passenger was contributorily negligent, Reeves v. Winslow, 394 Pa. 291 , 147 A.2d 357 (1959); Guiducci v. Mason, 326 Pa. 490 , 192 A. 632 (1937); Kropko v. Galida, 155 Pa.Super. 446 , 38 A.2d 491 (1944), the operation of this presumption depends very much on the circumstances.

1977As to the effect of rebutting evidence upon the presumption, see: Com. v. Thompson, supra, 257-8 and 269; Deitch Co. v. Board of Assessment, 417 Pa. 213 , 209 A. 2d 397 (1965); Com. v. Husick, 33 Somerset 60 (1975); Com. v. Milosevich, 28 Somerset 109 (1973); Turney Tax Sale, 30 Somerset 161 (1974). .

1977As to the effect of rebutting evidence upon the presumption, see: Com. v. Thompson, supra, 257-8 and 269; Deitch Co. v. Board of Assessment, 417 Pa. 213 , 209 A. 2d 397 (1965); Com. v. Husick, 33 Somerset 60 (1975); Com. v. Milosevich, 28 Somerset 109 (1973); Turney Tax Sale, 30 Somerset 161 (1974). .

1977See also, Commonwealth v. Walley, 466 Pa. 363 , 353 A.2d 396 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cropper, 463 Pa. 529 , 345 A.2d 645 (1975); Commonwealth v. Bamber, 463 Pa. 216 , 344 A.2d 799 (1975).

1977See also, Commonwealth v. Walley, 466 Pa. 363 , 353 A.2d 396 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cropper, 463 Pa. 529 , 345 A.2d 645 (1975); Commonwealth v. Bamber, 463 Pa. 216 , 344 A.2d 799 (1975).

1977See also, Commonwealth v. Walley, 466 Pa. 363 , 353 A.2d 396 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cropper, 463 Pa. 529 , 345 A.2d 645 (1975); Commonwealth v. Bamber, 463 Pa. 216 , 344 A.2d 799 (1975).

1977See also, Commonwealth v. Walley, 466 Pa. 363 , 353 A.2d 396 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cropper, 463 Pa. 529 , 345 A.2d 645 (1975); Commonwealth v. Bamber, 463 Pa. 216 , 344 A.2d 799 (1975).