guilty plea hearing in Georgia

2004In a habeas proceeding, the State has the burden of establishing the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, and may do so by “showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or . . . fill[ing] a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.” Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473 (1) ( 211 SE2d 764 ) (1975).

2004In a habeas proceeding, the State has the burden of establishing the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, and may do so by “showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or . . . fill[ing] a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.” Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473 (1) ( 211 SE2d 764 ) (1975).

2024As Goodman explained, that means there must be “a record of the guilty plea hearing adequate for the reviewing court to determine whether (1) the defendant has freely and voluntarily entered the plea with (2) an understanding of the nature of the charges against him and (3) an understanding of the consequences of his plea.” 249 Ga. at 13 (1).

2024As Goodman explained, that means there must be “a record of the guilty plea hearing adequate for the reviewing court to determine whether (1) the defendant has freely and voluntarily entered the plea with (2) an understanding of the nature of the charges against him and (3) an understanding of the consequences of his plea.” 249 Ga. at 13 (1).

2021When a defendant challenges the validity of a guilty plea, the State has “the burden of showing that the plea was made intelligently and voluntarily.”3 And the State may satisfy its burden to show that a plea was knowingly and voluntarily made by demonstrating “on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood the rights being waived and possible consequences of the plea or by pointing to extrinsic evidence affirmatively showing that the plea was voluntary and knowing.”4 More specifically, to establish that Rios’s guilty plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently m

2021When a defendant challenges the validity of a guilty plea, the State has “the burden of showing that the plea was made intelligently and voluntarily.”3 And the State may satisfy its burden to show that a plea was knowingly and voluntarily made by demonstrating “on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood the rights being waived and possible consequences of the plea or by pointing to extrinsic evidence affirmatively showing that the plea was voluntary and knowing.”4 More specifically, to establish that Rios’s guilty plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently m

2026The State bears the burden of showing the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered, and it may meet this burden by showing on the guilty plea hearing record “that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea, or by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.” Loyd v. State, 288 Ga. 481, 485 (2)(b) ( 705 SE2d 616 ) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2026The State bears the burden of showing the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered, and it may meet this burden by showing on the guilty plea hearing record “that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea, or by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.” Loyd v. State, 288 Ga. 481, 485 (2)(b) ( 705 SE2d 616 ) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted).

1993“When a defendant enters a plea of guilty and subsequently challenges the validity of the guilty plea, the State may meet its burden of demonstrating the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered ‘ “by two means, (1) showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or (2) fill(ing) a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Wood, supra at 180 .

1993"When a defendant enters a plea of guilty and subsequently challenges the validity of the guilty plea, the State may meet its burden of demonstrating the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered `"by two means, (1) showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or (2) fill(ing) a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary." (Cit.)' [Cit.]" Wood, supra at 180 . *160 Although the guilty plea proceedings wer

1994The State may accomplish this end by two means, (1) showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or (2) fill a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dean v. State, 177 Ga. App. 123, 125 (2) ( 338 SE2d 711 ) (1985).

1994The State may accomplish this end by two means, (1) showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or (2) fill a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dean v. State, 177 Ga. App. 123, 125 (2) ( 338 SE2d 711 ) (1985).

2023(Citation omitted.) Zellmer v. State, 273 Ga. App. 609, 611 (2) ( 615 SE2d 654 ) (2005).

2023(Citation omitted.) Zellmer v. State, 273 Ga. App. 609, 611 (2) ( 615 SE2d 654 ) (2005).

2017Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 897, 899 (1) ( 581 SE2d 407 ) (2003) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2017Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 897, 899 (1) ( 581 SE2d 407 ) (2003) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2003Compare also State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332 ( 454 SE2d 468 ) (1995) (USCR 33.9 permits a trial court to learn the factual basis from material contained in other parts of the record so long as the trial court makes clear on the plea hearing record that he is relying on those parts of the record; the record of the guilty plea hearing would thus show the trial court’s awareness of the factual basis of the plea). 6 See, e.g., Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga. App. 14, 18 (3) (d) ( 512 SE2d 640 ) (1999). 7 Green v. State, 265 Ga. 263, 264 (2) ( 454 SE2d 466 ) (1995). 8 Id. at 265 . 9 (Citations and punctuat

2003Compare also State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332 ( 454 SE2d 468 ) (1995) (USCR 33.9 permits a trial court to learn the factual basis from material contained in other parts of the record so long as the trial court makes clear on the plea hearing record that he is relying on those parts of the record; the record of the guilty plea hearing would thus show the trial court’s awareness of the factual basis of the plea). 6 See, e.g., Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga. App. 14, 18 (3) (d) ( 512 SE2d 640 ) (1999). 7 Green v. State, 265 Ga. 263, 264 (2) ( 454 SE2d 466 ) (1995). 8 Id. at 265 . 9 (Citations and punctuat

2009(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Obi, 229 Ga. App. at 96 (2), citing Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 422 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996).

2007Id.

2010Because a record of the guilty plea hearing helps to ensure that the State can meet its burden of proof on the voluntariness of the plea and to enable reviewing courts to determine that the rights of the accused have been protected, see State v. Germany, 245 Ga. 326, 328 , 265 S.E.2d 13 (1980), this Court since 1982 has expressly required that the record of a guilty plea hearing must be adequate for a reviewing court to determine whether the mandate of Boykin v. Alabama was followed.

2010Because a record of the guilty plea hearing helps to ensure that the State can meet its burden of proof on the voluntariness of the plea and to enable reviewing courts to determine that the rights of the accused have been protected, see State v. Germany, 245 Ga. 326, 328 , 265 S.E.2d 13 (1980), this Court since 1982 has expressly required that the record of a guilty plea hearing must be adequate for a reviewing court to determine whether the mandate of Boykin v. Alabama was followed.

2006Bazemore v. State, supra. The State can accomplish this by “ ‘showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or [adding to] a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.’ [Cit.]” Foskey, supra, 277 Ga. at 482 (1).

2005The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers ([Boykin v. Alabama, supra at 243]), and the trial court has a duty to ensure that the defendant understands the constitutional rights being waived. [Cits.] The record must disclose the accused’s voluntary waiver of those constitutional rights since waiver will not be presumed from a silent record. [Cits.] In a habeas proceeding, the State has the burden of establishing the plea was knowi

2018See Cazanas v. State , 270 Ga. 130 , 131, 508 S.E.2d 412 (1998). " 'The State may meet its burden by showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood all the rights being waived and possible consequences of the plea or by pointing to extrinsic evidence affirmatively showing that the plea was voluntary and knowing.' " Graham v. State , 300 Ga. 620 , 620, 797 S.E.2d 459 (2017) (citation omitted).

2018See Cazanas v. State , 270 Ga. 130 , 131, 508 S.E.2d 412 (1998). " 'The State may meet its burden by showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood all the rights being waived and possible consequences of the plea or by pointing to extrinsic evidence affirmatively showing that the plea was voluntary and knowing.' " Graham v. State , 300 Ga. 620 , 620, 797 S.E.2d 459 (2017) (citation omitted).

2009See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969); see also Bowers v. Moore, 266 Ga. 893 ( 471 SE2d 869 ) (1996).

2009See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969); see also Bowers v. Moore, 266 Ga. 893 ( 471 SE2d 869 ) (1996).

2007The [S]tate has the burden on direct review to show that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered. [Cits.] The [S]tate may meet its burden by showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was aware of the rights being waived and the consequences of the plea .... [Cit.] King v. State, 270 Ga. 367, 369 (1) ( 509 SE2d 32 ) (1998).

2007The [S]tate has the burden on direct review to show that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered. [Cits.] The [S]tate may meet its burden by showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was aware of the rights being waived and the consequences of the plea .... [Cit.] King v. State, 270 Ga. 367, 369 (1) ( 509 SE2d 32 ) (1998).

2019Wright v. State , 292 Ga. 825 , 826 (1), 742 S.E.2d 468 (2013) (citations omitted).

2019Wright v. State , 292 Ga. 825 , 826 (1), 742 S.E.2d 468 (2013) (citations omitted).

2006Bazemore v. State, supra. The State can accomplish this by “ ‘showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or [adding to] a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.’ [Cit.]” Foskey, supra, 277 Ga. at 482 (1).

2004The attorney who represented petitioner at the guilty plea hearing testified about his normal practice of informing a client that a guilty plea waives the right to trial and the right to subpoena witnesses and, in response to petitioner’s questioning, stated, “If it’s not on the form [the transcript of proceeding], I didn’t advise you of that right.” While evidence of an attorney’s routine or standard practice can support a finding of compliance with constitutional standards (Bazemore v. State, 273 Ga. 160, 162 ( 535 SE2d 760 ) (2000)), the attorney’s testimony at the habeas hearing covered on

2024See, e.g., Wilson v. Kemp, 288 Ga. 779, 779-780 (727 SE2d 90) (2011) (reversing denial of habeas petition where plea hearing rec- ord showed limited discussion of the defendant’s right to remain si- lent at the guilty plea hearing without explaining that defendant would have that right at trial); Sutton v. Sanders, 283 Ga. 28, 28-29 (656 SE2d 796) (2008) (reversing denial of habeas petition because plea hearing record did not expressly indicate that the defendant was advised of his right to a jury trial); Arnold, 282 Ga. at 67-68 51 (reversing denial of habeas petition because record did not e

2024See, e.g., Wilson v. Kemp, 288 Ga. 779, 779-780 (727 SE2d 90) (2011) (reversing denial of habeas petition where plea hearing rec- ord showed limited discussion of the defendant’s right to remain si- lent at the guilty plea hearing without explaining that defendant would have that right at trial); Sutton v. Sanders, 283 Ga. 28, 28-29 (656 SE2d 796) (2008) (reversing denial of habeas petition because plea hearing record did not expressly indicate that the defendant was advised of his right to a jury trial); Arnold, 282 Ga. at 67-68 51 (reversing denial of habeas petition because record did not e

2023The State bears the burden on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to establish that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily and “may meet this burden by showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea, or by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.” DeToma v. State, 296 Ga. 90, 91 (1) (765 SE2d 596) (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). 11 Pretermitting whether Pugh was competent when he entered the guilty plea, the State

2023The State bears the burden on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to establish that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily and “may meet this burden by showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea, or by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.” DeToma v. State, 296 Ga. 90, 91 (1) (765 SE2d 596) (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). 11 Pretermitting whether Pugh was competent when he entered the guilty plea, the State

2021When a defendant challenges the validity of a guilty plea, the State has “the burden of showing that the plea was made intelligently and voluntarily.”3 And the State may satisfy its burden to show that a plea was knowingly and voluntarily made by demonstrating “on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood the rights being waived and possible consequences of the plea or by pointing to extrinsic evidence affirmatively showing that the plea was voluntary and knowing.”4 More specifically, to establish that Rios’s guilty plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently m

2021When a defendant challenges the validity of a guilty plea, the State has “the burden of showing that the plea was made intelligently and voluntarily.”3 And the State may satisfy its burden to show that a plea was knowingly and voluntarily made by demonstrating “on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood the rights being waived and possible consequences of the plea or by pointing to extrinsic evidence affirmatively showing that the plea was voluntary and knowing.”4 More specifically, to establish that Rios’s guilty plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently m

2003Compare also State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332 ( 454 SE2d 468 ) (1995) (USCR 33.9 permits a trial court to learn the factual basis from material contained in other parts of the record so long as the trial court makes clear on the plea hearing record that he is relying on those parts of the record; the record of the guilty plea hearing would thus show the trial court’s awareness of the factual basis of the plea). 6 See, e.g., Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga. App. 14, 18 (3) (d) ( 512 SE2d 640 ) (1999). 7 Green v. State, 265 Ga. 263, 264 (2) ( 454 SE2d 466 ) (1995). 8 Id. at 265 . 9 (Citations and punctuat

2003Compare also State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332 ( 454 SE2d 468 ) (1995) (USCR 33.9 permits a trial court to learn the factual basis from material contained in other parts of the record so long as the trial court makes clear on the plea hearing record that he is relying on those parts of the record; the record of the guilty plea hearing would thus show the trial court’s awareness of the factual basis of the plea). 6 See, e.g., Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga. App. 14, 18 (3) (d) ( 512 SE2d 640 ) (1999). 7 Green v. State, 265 Ga. 263, 264 (2) ( 454 SE2d 466 ) (1995). 8 Id. at 265 . 9 (Citations and punctuat

2003Brumby, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 (Citation omitted.) Grantham v. State, 267 Ga. 635 ( 481 SE2d 219 ) (1997). 2 Id. 3 266 Ga. 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996). 4 Id. at 422 (existing record, including the transcript of the guilty plea hearing, was immaterial to the appeal); see Grantham, supra at 636 ; Thorpe v. State, 253 Ga. App. 263, n. 1 ( 558 SE2d 804 ) (2002). 5 Grantham, supra at 636 ; flaine, supra at 421-422. 6 See Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 390, 391 (3) ( 565 SE2d 805 ) (2002); Grantham, supra at 635 .

2003Brumby, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 (Citation omitted.) Grantham v. State, 267 Ga. 635 ( 481 SE2d 219 ) (1997). 2 Id. 3 266 Ga. 421 ( 467 SE2d 570 ) (1996). 4 Id. at 422 (existing record, including the transcript of the guilty plea hearing, was immaterial to the appeal); see Grantham, supra at 636 ; Thorpe v. State, 253 Ga. App. 263, n. 1 ( 558 SE2d 804 ) (2002). 5 Grantham, supra at 636 ; flaine, supra at 421-422. 6 See Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 390, 391 (3) ( 565 SE2d 805 ) (2002); Grantham, supra at 635 .

1982Although it is preferable to have a knowing and intelligent plea of guilty shown on the record of the guilty plea hearing, so as to terminate the issue once and for all, Boykin as construed by Purvis v. Connell, 227 Ga. 764 ( 182 SE2d 892 ); Huff v. Barnett, 230 Ga. 446 ( 197 SE2d 345 ); and Bailey v. Baker, 232 Ga. 84 ( 205 SE2d 278 ), does not require this as the sole means of making this determination." Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 475 (1) ( 211 SE2d 764 ).

1982Although it is preferable to have a knowing and intelligent plea of guilty shown on the record of the guilty plea hearing, so as to terminate the issue once and for all, Boykin as construed by Purvis v. Connell, 227 Ga. 764 ( 182 SE2d 892 ); Huff v. Barnett, 230 Ga. 446 ( 197 SE2d 345 ); and Bailey v. Baker, 232 Ga. 84 ( 205 SE2d 278 ), does not require this as the sole means of making this determination." Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 475 (1) ( 211 SE2d 764 ).

2024See, e.g., Wilson v. Kemp, 288 Ga. 779, 779-780 (727 SE2d 90) (2011) (reversing denial of habeas petition where plea hearing rec- ord showed limited discussion of the defendant’s right to remain si- lent at the guilty plea hearing without explaining that defendant would have that right at trial); Sutton v. Sanders, 283 Ga. 28, 28-29 (656 SE2d 796) (2008) (reversing denial of habeas petition because plea hearing record did not expressly indicate that the defendant was advised of his right to a jury trial); Arnold, 282 Ga. at 67-68 51 (reversing denial of habeas petition because record did not e

2024See, e.g., Wilson v. Kemp, 288 Ga. 779, 779-780 (727 SE2d 90) (2011) (reversing denial of habeas petition where plea hearing rec- ord showed limited discussion of the defendant’s right to remain si- lent at the guilty plea hearing without explaining that defendant would have that right at trial); Sutton v. Sanders, 283 Ga. 28, 28-29 (656 SE2d 796) (2008) (reversing denial of habeas petition because plea hearing record did not expressly indicate that the defendant was advised of his right to a jury trial); Arnold, 282 Ga. at 67-68 51 (reversing denial of habeas petition because record did not e

2014Thus, Harris did have a right to appeal his guilty plea.7 However, as discussed below, “it is clear that each of his claims can be resolved against him, so a timely appeal would have been unsuccessful and the motion for an out-of-time appeal was properly denied.” 8 To support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Harris points to a colloquy at the guilty plea hearing in which the prosecuting attorney asked Harris, 5 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 S Ct 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 6 Stephens v. State, 291 Ga. 837, 838-839 ( 733 SE2d 266 ) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted). 7 See id. at 8

2014Thus, Harris did have a right to appeal his guilty plea.7 However, as discussed below, “it is clear that each of his claims can be resolved against him, so a timely appeal would have been unsuccessful and the motion for an out-of-time appeal was properly denied.” 8 To support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Harris points to a colloquy at the guilty plea hearing in which the prosecuting attorney asked Harris, 5 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 S Ct 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 6 Stephens v. State, 291 Ga. 837, 838-839 ( 733 SE2d 266 ) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted). 7 See id. at 8