10 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. McGuirkgreen2 sentences1985In Commonwealth v. McGuirk, 376 Mass. 338, 343-344 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1120 (1979), we noted that the requirements mandated by Henderson can be satisfied in one of at least three ways: "(1) an explanation of the essential elements by the judge at the guilty plea hearing; (2) a representation that counsel has explained to the defendant the elements he admits by his plea; (3) defendant's statements admitting to facts constituting the unexplained element or stipulation to such facts." The motion judge was correct in concluding that the defendant admitted as true the facts as stated by 1985In Commonwealth v. McGuirk, 376 Mass. 338, 343-344 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1120 (1979), we noted that the requirements mandated by Henderson can be satisfied in one of at least three ways: “(1) an explanation of the essential elements by the judge at the guilty plea hearing; (2) a representation that counsel has explained to the defendant the elements he admits by his plea; (3) defendant’s statements admitting to facts constituting the unexplained element or stipulation to such facts.” The motion judge was correct in concluding that the defendant admitted as true the facts as stated by | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Saferiangreen1 sentence2025When the basis for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "the defendant must show that the behavior of counsel fell measurably below that of an ordinary, fallible lawyer and that such failing 'likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence.'" Commonwealth v. Prado, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 253 , 255 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lopezgreen1 sentence2016Where, as here, a defendant challenges a guilty plea under rule 30 “after court records have been destroyed lawfully pursuant to court rules, the defendant bears the burden of proof.” Commonwealth v. Grannum, 457 Mass. 128, 133 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. Lopez, 426 Mass. 657, 661-662, 664-665 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Grannumgreen2 sentences2016Where, as here, a defendant challenges a guilty plea under rule 30 “after court records have been destroyed lawfully pursuant to court rules, the defendant bears the burden of proof.” Commonwealth v. Grannum, 457 Mass. 128, 133 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. Lopez, 426 Mass. 657, 661-662, 664-665 (1998). 2016“In such cases, the defendant must present evidence sufficient to rebut a presumption that the plea proceeding was conducted correctly.” Grannum, supra. The “plea judge’s statement of customary practice can be necessary and probative.” Commonwealth v. Tokarev, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 819, 821 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Diaz, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 347, 351 (2009). 18 In some cases, we have interpreted the rights under art. 12 to be more expansive than those guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Diazgreen1 sentence2016“In such cases, the defendant must present evidence sufficient to rebut a presumption that the plea proceeding was conducted correctly.” Grannum, supra. The “plea judge’s statement of customary practice can be necessary and probative.” Commonwealth v. Tokarev, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 819, 821 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Diaz, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 347, 351 (2009). 18 In some cases, we have interpreted the rights under art. 12 to be more expansive than those guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
Ferrara v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2016Prior to the issuance of a ruling on the defendant’s motion, this court decided Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014), in which we articulated, in reliance on Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290-297 (1st Cir. 2006), a two-prong framework for analyzing a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea under rule 30 (b) in a case involving the misconduct of Dookhan at the Hinton drug lab. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Tokarevgreen1 sentence2016“In such cases, the defendant must present evidence sufficient to rebut a presumption that the plea proceeding was conducted correctly.” Grannum, supra. The “plea judge’s statement of customary practice can be necessary and probative.” Commonwealth v. Tokarev, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 819, 821 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Diaz, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 347, 351 (2009). 18 In some cases, we have interpreted the rights under art. 12 to be more expansive than those guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bolducgreen1 sentence1981Cf. Commonwealth v. Bolduc, 375 Mass. 530, 536 (1978), and cases cited, stating that a defendant challenging a guilty plea entered into before the Supreme Court’s decision in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), on the ground that it was made involuntarily has the burden of showing the claimed involuntariness. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Scott
green
2 sentences2016Prior to the issuance of a ruling on the defendant’s motion, this court decided Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014), in which we articulated, in reliance on Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290-297 (1st Cir. 2006), a two-prong framework for analyzing a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea under rule 30 (b) in a case involving the misconduct of Dookhan at the Hinton drug lab. 2016Consequently, we established a special evidentiary rule whereby a defendant seeking to vacate a guilty plea under rule 30 (b) as a result of the revelation of Dookhan’s misconduct, and proffering a certificate of drug analysis (drug certificate) from the defendant’s case signed by Dookhan on the line labeled “Assistant Analyst,” would be entitled to “a conclusive presumption that egregious government misconduct occurred in the defendant’s case.” Id. at 352 . | 3 | 2015–2016 |
McGuirk v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences1985In Commonwealth v. McGuirk, 376 Mass. 338, 343-344 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1120 (1979), we noted that the requirements mandated by Henderson can be satisfied in one of at least three ways: "(1) an explanation of the essential elements by the judge at the guilty plea hearing; (2) a representation that counsel has explained to the defendant the elements he admits by his plea; (3) defendant's statements admitting to facts constituting the unexplained element or stipulation to such facts." The motion judge was correct in concluding that the defendant admitted as true the facts as stated by 1985In Commonwealth v. McGuirk, 376 Mass. 338, 343-344 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1120 (1979), we noted that the requirements mandated by Henderson can be satisfied in one of at least three ways: “(1) an explanation of the essential elements by the judge at the guilty plea hearing; (2) a representation that counsel has explained to the defendant the elements he admits by his plea; (3) defendant’s statements admitting to facts constituting the unexplained element or stipulation to such facts.” The motion judge was correct in concluding that the defendant admitted as true the facts as stated by | 2 | 1985–2007 |
Boykin v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1981Cf. Commonwealth v. Bolduc, 375 Mass. 530, 536 (1978), and cases cited, stating that a defendant challenging a guilty plea entered into before the Supreme Court’s decision in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), on the ground that it was made involuntarily has the burden of showing the claimed involuntariness. 1978L. c. 265, § 23, fails to fulfil his constitutional duty to insure that the plea is knowingly and voluntarily made (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [1969]), if he does not inform the defendant that he will be ineligible, under G. | 2 | 1978–1981 |
Henderson v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1978The defendant now argues that his plea is invalid under Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), because "[a]t the guilty plea hearing no inquiry was made as to whether the defendant understood the elements of the offense of Second-Degree Murder nor was he informed as to what such elements were.”* ** 4 Specifically, the defendant argues that he was not told that malice aforethought is an element of murder in the second degree. 1978Defense counsel did not purport to stipulate to that fact; they did not explain to him that his plea would be an admission of that fact; and he made no factual statement or admission necessarily implying that he had such intent.” Henderson v. Morgan, supra at 646 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.