61 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Boykin v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2007See Aguirre-Mata II , 125 S.W.3d at 475 n.6 (constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea are privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and rights to counsel, trial by jury (6) and confrontation of accusers, citing Boykin , 395 U.S. at 243 ). 2007See Aguirre-Mata II, 125 S.W.3d at 475 n.6 (constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea are privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and rights to counsel, trial by jury6 and confrontation of accusers, citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 ). | 5 | 8 |
Sexton v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Furthermore, the actual charging language from Lamar’s indictment does not appear anywhere in his plea papers. 10 (f) Defendant may testify under oath in open court admitting his culpability or acknowledging that allegations in the charging instrument are true and correct First of all, as noted above, Lamar was not placed under oath at the time he purportedly entered his guilty plea.2 See King v. State, No. 12-12-00020-CR, 2013 WL 2407198 at *6 (Tex.App.—Tyler May 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (Defendant’s plea colloquy did not constitute a judicial confession, 2015Additionally, the actual charging language from Scott’s information appears nowhere in his plea papers. 9 (f) Defendant may testify under oath in open court admitting his culpability or acknowledging that allegations in the charging instrument are true and correct First, as noted above, the trial court did not place Scott under oath at the time he purportedly entered his guilty plea.2 See King v. State, No. 12-12-00020-CR, 2013 WL 2407198 at *6 (Tex.App.—Tyler May 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (Defendant’s plea colloquy did not constitute a judicial confession, | 4 | 4 |
Mendez v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 350 ; Starks, 266 S.W.3d at 613 ; Hall, 2010 WL 654157 , at *4; Wilson, 2006 WL 1892381 , at *3; see also Neely v. State, No. 2-07-254-CR, 2008 WL 1932140 , at *2-3 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth May 1, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (applying Mendez to contention that the trial court should not have accepted the defendant’s guilty plea because evidence admitted during the guilty plea hearing showed the defendant lacked the necessary intent to support his conviction; holding that because the defendant did not ask to withdraw his guilty plea, he may n 2010See Mendez , 138 S.W.3d at 350 ; Starks , 266 S.W.3d at 613 ; Hall , 2010 WL 654157 , at *4; Wilson , 2006 WL 1892381 , at *3; see also Neely v. State , No. 2-07-254-CR, 2008 WL 1932140 , at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 1, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (applying Mendez to contention that the trial court should not have accepted the defendant's guilty plea because evidence admitted during the guilty plea hearing showed the defendant lacked the necessary intent to support his conviction; holding that because the defendant did not ask to withdraw his guilty plea, he | 4 | 4 |
Aguirre-Mata v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See Aguirre-Mata II , 125 S.W.3d at 475 n.6 (constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea are privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and rights to counsel, trial by jury (6) and confrontation of accusers, citing Boykin , 395 U.S. at 243 ). 2007See Aguirre-Mata II, 125 S.W.3d at 475 n.6 (constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea are privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and rights to counsel, trial by jury6 and confrontation of accusers, citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 ). | 3 | 3 |
Wolfe v. Stategreen2 sentences1980Because the record on original submission did not contain a transcription of the court reporter’s notes from the guilty plea hearing, the panel was constrained to hold under the authority of Wolfe v. State, 560 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) and its progeny that appellant was making an improper attempt collaterally to attack sufficiency of the evidence. 1980Wolfe v. State, 560 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex.Cr. | 2 | 3 |
Ex Parte Reedygreen2 sentences2014Martinez, 330 S.W.3d at 900 ; Ex parte Reedy, 282 S.W.3d 492, 500 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009). 2013Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891, 900 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 3073 (2011); Ex parte Reedy, 282 S.W.3d 492, 500 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009). | 2 | 2 |
Salinas v. Stategreen2 sentences2011App. 1991). 4 See Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 740 (Tex. Crim. 2010App. 1991). 4 See Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 740 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Garcia v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See Garcia , 149 S.W.3d at 144 (acknowledging that a litigant is never deemed to give up a waivable right unless “he says so plainly, freely, and intelligently, sometimes in writing and always on the record”). 2005See Garcia, 149 S.W.3d at 144 (acknowledging that a litigant is never deemed to give up a waivable right unless “he says so plainly, freely, and intelligently, sometimes in writing and always on the record”). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Amanda Mitchell, AKA Amanda Foster, Amanda Mitchellgreen2 sentences1999United States. v. Mitchell, 122 F.3d 185, 189-91 (3rd Cir.1997), rev'd, - U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1307 , 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999). 1999United States v. Mitchell, 122 F.3d 185, 189-91 (3rd Cir. 1997) rev’d, 526 U.S. 314 , 119 S.Ct. 1307 , 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999). | 2 | 2 |
Mitchell v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999As to the question of whether the guilty plea hearing should be considered separate from the sentencing hearing, i.e., whether the proceeding is unitary or bifurcated, the Supreme Court noted: “Our rule is applicable whether or not the sentencing hearing is deemed a proceeding separate from the Rule 11 hearing, an issue we need not resolve.” 5 Id. at-, 119 S.Ct. at 1314 . *97 For the above reasons, we question whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion in Carroll can be reconciled with the subsequent United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mitchell . 1999As to the question of whether the guilty plea hearing should be considered separate from the sentencing hearing, i.e., whether the proceeding is unitary or bifurcated, the Supreme Court noted: “Our rule is applicable whether or not the sentencing hearing is deemed a proceeding separate from the Rule 11 hearing, an issue we need not resolve.” 5 Id. at-, 119 S.Ct. at 1314 . | 1 | 4 |
Ex Parte Martinezgreen2 sentences2014Martinez, 330 S.W.3d at 900 ; Ex parte Reedy, 282 S.W.3d 492, 500 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009). 2013Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891, 900 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 3073 (2011); Ex parte Reedy, 282 S.W.3d 492, 500 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009). | 1 | 2 |
Kniatt v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Applicable Law "A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of three constitutional rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the right not to incriminate oneself." Id. (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)). 2010See Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Brocegreen1 sentence2019See id.; see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 576 (1989) (double-jeopardy claims are cognizable for first time on appeal despite guilty plea if they can be resolved without resort to evidence contradicting the indictments). | 1 | 1 |
Perez, Eduardogreen1 sentence2016Perez v. State, 424 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence2015One point is particularly worth noting: double jeopardy complaints are not waived simply because the issue was not raised earlier on appropriate occassions.Ob- jections can be raised at any time.A guilty plea does not bar relief from double je- Opardy violations.Ex parte Fortune, 797 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990).Doub1e jeopar- dy complaints involve fundamental constitutional protections,and points raising the prohibition against double jeopardy are not waived by insufficiently specific objec- tions in the trial court.Ex parte Pleasant, 577 S.W.2d 256,257 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979);1 Jones v. Stat | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Pleasantgreen1 sentence2015One point is particularly worth noting: double jeopardy complaints are not waived simply because the issue was not raised earlier on appropriate occassions.Ob- jections can be raised at any time.A guilty plea does not bar relief from double je- Opardy violations.Ex parte Fortune, 797 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990).Doub1e jeopar- dy complaints involve fundamental constitutional protections,and points raising the prohibition against double jeopardy are not waived by insufficiently specific objec- tions in the trial court.Ex parte Pleasant, 577 S.W.2d 256,257 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979);1 Jones v. Stat | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Innocent Batamulagreen2 sentences2015App. P. 66.3(f), is exemplified by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Batamula, 788 F.3d 166, 175 (5th Cir. 2015) where the Court held the federal writ under Padilla was not foreclosed by the district court’s admonishments at the guilty plea hearing, noting that: the mere fact that a defendant, who has already signed a plea agreement upon counsel’s advice, is told by the trial judge that the plea will likely result in deportation does not foreclose the defendant’s ability to demonstrate that “counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Were 2015Id. (internal citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Norvell v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Sandersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jeffery v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marsh v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| McGuire v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| James v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fimberg v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bowie v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hill v. Lockhartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Strickland v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cox v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte McClellandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boyd v. Duttongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anders v. California
green
2 sentences2011We note that there is no reporter’s record of the guilty plea hearing and that no motion for new trial appears in the clerk’s record.4 After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if there is any arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf.5 Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.6 Contrary to the State’s contention, its choice not to proceed on five other counts of aggravated sexual 2011We note that there is no reporter’s record of the guilty plea hearing and that no motion for new trial appears in the clerk’s record.4 After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if there is any arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf.5 Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.6 Contrary to the State’s contention, its choice not to proceed on five other counts of aggravated sexual | 5 | 2008–2015 |
Stafford v. State
green
2 sentences2011We note that there is no reporter’s record of the guilty plea hearing and that no motion for new trial appears in the clerk’s record.4 After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if there is any arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf.5 Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.6 Contrary to the State’s contention, its choice not to proceed on five other counts of aggravated sexual 2010We note that there is no reporter’s record of the guilty plea hearing and that no motion for new trial appears in the clerk’s record.4 After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if there is any arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf.5 Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.6 Because Appellant entered an open plea of guilty, our independent review for potential error is limited | 4 | 2010–2015 |
Starks v. State
green
2 sentences2010See Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 350 ; Starks, 266 S.W.3d at 613 ; Hall, 2010 WL 654157 , at *4; Wilson, 2006 WL 1892381 , at *3; see also Neely v. State, No. 2-07-254-CR, 2008 WL 1932140 , at *2-3 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth May 1, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (applying Mendez to contention that the trial court should not have accepted the defendant’s guilty plea because evidence admitted during the guilty plea hearing showed the defendant lacked the necessary intent to support his conviction; holding that because the defendant did not ask to withdraw his guilty plea, he may n 2010See Mendez , 138 S.W.3d at 350 ; Starks , 266 S.W.3d at 613 ; Hall , 2010 WL 654157 , at *4; Wilson , 2006 WL 1892381 , at *3; see also Neely v. State , No. 2-07-254-CR, 2008 WL 1932140 , at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 1, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (applying Mendez to contention that the trial court should not have accepted the defendant's guilty plea because evidence admitted during the guilty plea hearing showed the defendant lacked the necessary intent to support his conviction; holding that because the defendant did not ask to withdraw his guilty plea, he | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Brady v. United States
green
2 sentences2003Since a guilty plea is a waiver of trial, it must be an intelligent act “done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Id . at 748, 90 S. Ct. at 1469 . 2003Since a guilty plea is a waiver of trial, it must be an intelligent act "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Id . at 748, 90 S. Ct. at 1469 . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Carroll v. State
green
2 sentences1999As to the question of whether the guilty plea hearing should be considered separate from the sentencing hearing, i.e., whether the proceeding is unitary or bifurcated, the Supreme Court noted: “Our rule is applicable whether or not the sentencing hearing is deemed a proceeding separate from the Rule 11 hearing, an issue we need not resolve.” 5 Id. at-, 119 S.Ct. at 1314 . *97 For the above reasons, we question whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion in Carroll can be reconciled with the subsequent United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mitchell . 1999As to the question of whether the guilty plea hearing should be considered separate from the sentencing hearing, i.e., whether the proceeding is unitary or bifurcated, the Supreme Court noted: “Our rule is applicable whether or not the sentencing hearing is deemed a proceeding separate from the Rule 11 hearing, an issue we need not resolve.” 5 Id. at-, 119 S.Ct. at 1314 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Ex Parte Tuley
green
1 sentence2018As we stated in Tuley , convicting *638 courts should give great respect to knowing, voluntary, and intelligent pleas of guilty. 109 S.W.3d at 391 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Luckett v. State
green
1 sentence2015Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. 2008); Lockett v. State, 394 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2012); 2) APPELLANT’S MENTAL COMPETENCE: Appellant was found mentally competent by two psychologists who examined him for purposes of the guilty plea hearing. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rosenkrans v. State
green
1 sentence2015App. 1972) (Defendant’s admission constituted a “judicial admission” because he was sworn in as a witness). 6 Rosenkrans v. State, 758 S.W.2d 388 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988, pet. ref’d) provides an example of an oral stipulation in support of a guilty plea: 7 trial court took judicial notice of Diaz’s plea papers (Supp. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
North Carolina v. Pearce
red
2 sentences2015The double jeopardy clause of both the Texas and Federal Constitutions protect against three abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,and multiple punishments for the same offense.North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,716-17 , 89 S.Ct. 2072,2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969);Phillips v. State, 787 S.W.2d 391,393 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990).The Unit- ed States and Texas Constitutions protect the accused from attempts to secure addit- ional punishment after a prior conviction and sentence.Brown v. Ohio,432 U.S. 161l 165-66, 2015The double jeopardy clause of both the Texas and Federal Constitutions protect against three abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,and multiple punishments for the same offense.North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,716-17 , 89 S.Ct. 2072,2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969);Phillips v. State, 787 S.W.2d 391,393 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990).The Unit- ed States and Texas Constitutions protect the accused from attempts to secure addit- ional punishment after a prior conviction and sentence.Brown v. Ohio,432 U.S. 161l 165-66, | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fuller v. State
green
1 sentence2015Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. 2008); Lockett v. State, 394 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2012); 2) APPELLANT’S MENTAL COMPETENCE: Appellant was found mentally competent by two psychologists who examined him for purposes of the guilty plea hearing. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ex Parte Fortune
green
1 sentence2015One point is particularly worth noting: double jeopardy complaints are not waived simply because the issue was not raised earlier on appropriate occassions.Ob- jections can be raised at any time.A guilty plea does not bar relief from double je- Opardy violations.Ex parte Fortune, 797 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990).Doub1e jeopar- dy complaints involve fundamental constitutional protections,and points raising the prohibition against double jeopardy are not waived by insufficiently specific objec- tions in the trial court.Ex parte Pleasant, 577 S.W.2d 256,257 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979);1 Jones v. Stat | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Phillips v. State
green
1 sentence2015The double jeopardy clause of both the Texas and Federal Constitutions protect against three abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,and multiple punishments for the same offense.North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,716-17 , 89 S.Ct. 2072,2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969);Phillips v. State, 787 S.W.2d 391,393 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990).The Unit- ed States and Texas Constitutions protect the accused from attempts to secure addit- ional punishment after a prior conviction and sentence.Brown v. Ohio,432 U.S. 161l 165-66, | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brown v. Ohio
green
1 sentence2015The double jeopardy clause of both the Texas and Federal Constitutions protect against three abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,and multiple punishments for the same offense.North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,716-17 , 89 S.Ct. 2072,2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969);Phillips v. State, 787 S.W.2d 391,393 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990).The Unit- ed States and Texas Constitutions protect the accused from attempts to secure addit- ional punishment after a prior conviction and sentence.Brown v. Ohio,432 U.S. 161l 165-66, | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Padilla v. Kentucky green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Jones v. United States green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Mason v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Bell v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Carroll v. State green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Ex Parte Curtis green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| United States v. Ury green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Ex Parte Siebold green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Louis E. White v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| James David McClain v. Lawrence E. Wilson, Warden neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Rice v. United States neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| McLennan v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Haney v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Isam v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| David Brown v. E.P. Perini William Brown, Attorney General of Ohio green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Ex Parte Crisp green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Ex Parte Crisp green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Crisp v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Jimmy Frank v. Frank Blackburn, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.