guilty plea hearing in Iowa

2024“In deciding whether a factual basis exists, we consider the entire record before the district court at the guilty plea hearing, including any statements made by the defendant, facts related by the prosecutor, the minutes of testimony, and the presentence report.” State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999).

2022Our decision is based only on the “record before the district court at the guilty plea hearing, including any statements made by the defendant, facts related by the prosecutor, the minutes of testimony, and the presentence report.” Id.

2017See id. (explaining the difference between a due process challenge to a guilty plea and a challenge to the adequacy of the plea proceeding).

2017See State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 58 (Iowa 2013) (explaining the difference between a due process challenge to a guilty plea and a challenge to the adequacy of the plea proceeding).

2021See State v. Walton, 228 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Iowa 1975).

2021See State v. Walton, 228 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Iowa 1975) (“Our task here, then, is to examine all the circumstances before trial court to determine if at the time his plea was accepted there existed an unresolved reasonable doubt as to defendant’s competence to plead guilty.”).

2016The record “need only demonstrate the facts that support the offense.” State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Iowa 2013).

2014State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572, 578 (Iowa 2013) (noting we may examine the statements made by the defendant and the prosecutor at a guilty plea proceeding to determine whether a factual basis has been established).

2019“If trial counsel permits a defendant to plead guilty and waives the defendant’s right to file a motion in arrest of judgment when there is no factual basis to support the defendant’s guilty plea, trial counsel breaches an essential duty.” Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 29 (Iowa 2014). “[W]e consider the entire record before the district court at the guilty plea hearing, including any statements made by the defendant, facts related by the prosecutor, the minutes of testimony, and the presentence report.” State v. Gines, 844 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted).

2016In determining whether a factual basis exists, “we consider the entire record before the district court at the guilty plea hearing, including any statements made by the defendant, facts related by the prosecutor, the minutes of testimony, and the presentence report.”3 Id.

2024The court is not required to “have before it evidence that the crime was committed beyond a reasonable doubt” to accept a guilty plea, “but only [evidence] that there be a factual basis to support the charge.” State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 62 (Iowa 2013). “[T]he record does not need to show the totality of evidence necessary to support a guilty conviction, but it need only demonstrate facts that support the offense.” State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Iowa 2010).

2019State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Iowa 2010).

2021See State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Iowa 1982) (stating a claim that a 8 Following receipt of the June 2016 Dr. Huston report, the district court scheduled a competency hearing and directed that Bennett to be evaluated at a state facility.

2018See State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Iowa 1982) (stating a defendant’s claim that a competency hearing was required “goes to the very heart of the court’s determination that the plea was entered voluntarily, intelligently, and understandably”).

2017See, e.g., United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 940 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding plea despite narration of the nature of the charges being given by the prosecutor rather than the court); United States v. Conrad, 598 F.2d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting claim that plea court did not adequately inform defendant of the penalties “provided by law” when it discussed only the bargained-for sentence because “[m]atters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be controlling” (alteration in original) (quoting McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 468 n.20)).

2017See, e.g., United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 940 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding plea despite narration of the nature of the charges being given by the prosecutor rather than the court); United States v. Conrad, 598 F.2d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting claim that plea court did not adequately inform defendant of the penalties “provided by law” when it discussed only the bargained-for sentence because “[m]atters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be controlling” (alteration in original) (quoting McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 468 n.20)).

2017The court then asked Gregersen to state in his own words what he had done to commit the offense, and the following exchange occurred: THE DEFENDANT: I intentionally shot a firearm in a building occupied by another person in a place with—and caused them fear. 1 Although Schminkey also lists presentence investigation (PSI) reports as materials from which a factual basis for a guilty plea may be determined, we note that this is only true if the PSI report is part of the “record before the district court at the guilty plea hearing.” 597 N.W.2d at 788 ; see also State v. Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d 857, 869

1999See Brooks, 555 N.W.2d at 448-49 ; State v. Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d 857, 867-68 (Iowa 1980), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Kirchoff 452 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1990).

2017State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016) (noting “substantial compliance” with rule 2.8(2)(d) will suffice).

2017State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016) (noting “substantial compliance” with rule 2.8(2)(d) will suffice).

2017See, e.g., United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 940 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding plea despite narration of the nature of the charges being given by the prosecutor rather than the court); United States v. Conrad, 598 F.2d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting claim that plea court did not adequately inform defendant of the penalties “provided by law” when it discussed only the bargained-for sentence because “[m]atters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be controlling” (alteration in original) (quoting McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 468 n.20)).

2017See, e.g., United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 940 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding plea despite narration of the nature of the charges being given by the prosecutor rather than the court); United States v. Conrad, 598 F.2d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting claim that plea court did not adequately inform defendant of the penalties “provided by law” when it discussed only the bargained-for sentence because “[m]atters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be controlling” (alteration in original) (quoting McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 468 n.20)).

2017The court then asked Gregersen to state in his own words what he had done to commit the offense, and the following exchange occurred: THE DEFENDANT: I intentionally shot a firearm in a building occupied by another person in a place with—and caused them fear. 1 Although Schminkey also lists presentence investigation (PSI) reports as materials from which a factual basis for a guilty plea may be determined, we note that this is only true if the PSI report is part of the “record before the district court at the guilty plea hearing.” 597 N.W.2d at 788 ; see also State v. Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d 857, 869

1999See Brooks, 555 N.W.2d at 448-49 ; State v. Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d 857, 867-68 (Iowa 1980), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Kirchoff 452 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1990).

2014In doing so, the majority implicitly perpetuates the view that considering an attorney’s “strategic reasons for permitting his [or her] client to plead guilty” would undermine “the public’s confidence in our criminal justice system.” State v. Hack, 545 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Iowa 1996).

2014In doing so, the majority implicitly perpetuates the view that considering an attorney’s “strategic reasons for permitting his [or her] client to plead guilty” would undermine “the public’s confidence in our criminal justice system.” State v. Hack, 545 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Iowa 1996).

2017When determining if there is a factual basis to support the plea, we consider “the minutes of testimony, statements made by the defendant and the prosecutor at the guilty plea hearing, and the presentence investigation report.” Id.

2016In determining whether a factual basis exists, a court considers “the entire record before [it] at the guilty plea hearing, including any statements made by the defendant, facts related by the prosecutor, and the minutes of testimony.” State v. Keene, 630 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 2001).

2022However, our supreme court has long recognized a defendant may challenge a guilty plea without filing a motion in arrest of judgment if the district court did not “ensure the defendant understands the necessity of filing a motion to challenge a guilty plea and the consequences of a failure to do so.” State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Iowa 2003); see also State v. West, 326 N.W.2d 316, 317 (Iowa 1982) (reaching the merits of the defendant’s guilty-plea challenge “because the trial court did not advise him pursuant to [current rule 2.8(2)(d)] that a failure to challenge the plea by motion in a

2022However, our supreme court has long recognized a defendant may challenge a guilty plea without filing a motion in arrest of judgment if the district court did not “ensure the defendant understands the necessity of filing a motion to challenge a guilty plea and the consequences of a failure to do so.” State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Iowa 2003); see also State v. West, 326 N.W.2d 316, 317 (Iowa 1982) (reaching the merits of the defendant’s guilty-plea challenge “because the trial court did not advise him pursuant to [current rule 2.8(2)(d)] that a failure to challenge the plea by motion in a

2022See id.

2019“If trial counsel permits a defendant to plead guilty and waives the defendant’s right to file a motion in arrest of judgment when there is no factual basis to support the defendant’s guilty plea, trial counsel breaches an essential duty.” Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 29 (Iowa 2014). “[W]e consider the entire record before the district court at the guilty plea hearing, including any statements made by the defendant, facts related by the prosecutor, the minutes of testimony, and the presentence report.” State v. Gines, 844 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted).

2018“We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo.” State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006).

2016“Absent a written plea of guilty describing all the matters set forth in the rule, noncompliance with oral requirements of the rule normally constitutes reversible error.” State v. Meron, 675 N.W.2d 537, 542 (Iowa 2004).

2015See Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Iowa 2010). 5 Here, Hopkins maintains his guilty plea lacked a factual basis because neither Hopkins’ admissions nor the minutes of testimony establish that Ingram suffered bodily injury—a necessary element of willful injury causing bodily injury. 1 “In deciding whether a factual basis exists, we consider the entire record before the district court at the guilty plea hearing, including any statements made by the defendant, facts related by the prosecutor, the minutes of testimony, and the presentence report.” State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (I

2015“Because this element is a state of mind, circumstantial evidence is generally used to prove malice.” State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 49 (Iowa 2003). “‘[W]e consider the entire record before the district court at the guilty plea hearing, including any statements made by the defendant, facts related by the prosecutor, the minutes of testimony, and the presentence report.’” State v. Gines, 844 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d at 788 ).

2014State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Iowa 2002).