guilty plea hearing in Missouri

1979The standard for determining whether a Rule 27.26 movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing is that stated in Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Mo. banc 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 911 , 95 S.Ct. 832 , 42 L.Ed.2d 841 (1975): “A 27.26 movant, in order to be entitled to an eviden-tiary hearing, must plead facts, not conclusions, which, if true, would entitle him to relief and must show that such factual allegations are not refuted by facts elicited at the guilty plea hearing. 2 (Emphasis in original.) This standard has been applied consistently by Missouri appellate courts to support the

1979The relevant determinations with regard to the allegedly defective guilty plea are outlined in Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. banc 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911 , 95 S.Ct. 832 , 42 L.Ed.2d 841 (1975), and its progeny: A 27.26 movant, in order to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, must plead facts, not conclusions, which, if true, would entitle him to relief and must show that such factual allegations are not refuted by facts elicited at the guilty plea hearing.

2023“Among those defenses waived by a guilty plea is a claim of self-defense.” Courtney v. State, 662 S.W.3d 344 , 350 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (citing Rice v. State, 585 S.W.2d 488, 494 (Mo. banc 1979)).

1986However, our supreme court has stated that a 27.26 movant must plead facts entitling the movant to relief and “must show that such factual allegations are not refuted by facts elicited at the guilty plea hearing.” Rice v. State, 585 S.W.2d 488, 492 (Mo. banc 1979).

1989As the court stated in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 , 91 S.Ct. 160, 167 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), “[a]n individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understanding^ consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.” The principles which are controlling in this case are those set out in Thomas v. State, 605 S.W.2d 792, 794-95 (Mo. banc 1980), thus: “[3,4] To be entitled to an evidentia-ry hearing on the voluntariness of a guilty plea, defendant must plead facts which if true e

1984“To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of a guilty plea, defendant must plead facts which if true entitle him to relief and must show that such factual allegations are not refuted by facts elicited at the guilty plea hearing.” Thomas v. State, 605 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Mo. banc 1980).

2005Holloway v. State, 989 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Mo.App.1999), overruled on other grounds by State v. Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75 (Mo. banc 1999).

2002Holloway v. State, 989 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Mo.App.1999), overruled on other grounds by State v. Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75 (Mo. banc 1999).

2005“If the facts presented to the court during the guilty plea hearing do not establish the commission of the offense, the court should reject the guilty plea.” Carmons v. State, 26 S.W.3d 382, 384 (Mo.App.2000).

2002“If the facts presented to the court during the guilty plea hearing do not establish the commission of the offense, the court should reject the guilty plea.” Carmons v. State, 26 S.W.3d 382, 384 (Mo.App.

1993Wedlow v. State, 841 S.W.2d at 217[11]; White v. State, 781 S.W.2d 167, 168-169 [4] (Mo.App.1989); Pines v. State, 778 S.W.2d 724, 726 [2] (Mo.App.1989); Robinson v. State, 772 S.W.2d 770, 773, n. 1 (Mo.App.1989); LaRose v. State, 724 S.W.2d 339, 340 [1] (Mo.App.1987).

1992LaRose v. State, 724 S.W.2d 339, 340 (Mo.App. 1987).

2023However, because a guilty plea acts as a waiver of the right to confront accusers, Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2018), the right to be present during a guilty plea hearing is rooted only in the Due Process Clause.

2023While Whirley’s conviction and sentence arose from a guilty plea, the Missouri Supreme Court has only recently held “‘that a guilty plea does not bar a claim on appeal “where on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.”’” State v. Russell, 598 S.W.3d 133 , 139 (Mo. 2020) (quoting Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798, 804 (2018); other citation omitted).

2018In Moore v. State , 934 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. banc 1996), appointed counsel in a guilty-plea case filed a statement in lieu of an amended motion, stating that he had reviewed the file "with the exclusion of the transcripts of the guilty plea hearing ..., the sentencing hearing ..., and movant's pro se motion...." [Emphasis added.] On the basis of this "review," post-conviction counsel determined that "no additional facts or grounds can be added in an amended motion." Id. at 290 .

2018In Moore v. State , 934 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. banc 1996), appointed counsel in a guilty-plea case filed a statement in lieu of an amended motion, stating that he had reviewed the file "with the exclusion of the transcripts of the guilty plea hearing ..., the sentencing hearing ..., and movant's pro se motion...." [Emphasis added.] On the basis of this "review," post-conviction counsel determined that "no additional facts or grounds can be added in an amended motion." Id. at 290 .

2010Kennell v. State, 209 S.W.3d 504, 506 (Mo.App.2006). “ ‘If the facts presented to the court during the guilty plea hearing do not establish the commission of the offense, the court should reject the guilty plea.’” Smith v. State, 141 S.W.3d 108, 111 (Mo.App.2004) (quoting B rown, 45 S.W.3d at 508 ).

2004“If the facts presented to the court during the guilty plea hearing do not establish the commission of the offense, the court should reject the guilty plea.” Brown, 45 S.W.3d at 508 .

2023“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Hampton v. State, 495 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Mo. 1973).

2012Garris contends he did not waive his constitutional challenge to the validity of §§ 558.018.5(2) and 558.021.2, RSMo 2000, because he filed pretrial motions to raise these issues at the earliest opportunity- A guilty plea “represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” Hampton v. State, 495 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Mo. banc 1973).

2021The law requires this because “a guilty plea is a waiver of several constitutional rights,” Shafer, 969 S.W.2d at 731 , and “it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently ‘waive’ his rights . . . .” Hubbard v. State, 31 S.W.3d 25, 34 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (quoting Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1990)).

2000This is so in that “a guilty plea is a waiver of several constitutional rights,” Shafer, 969 S.W.2d at 731 , and “‘it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently “waive” his right[s]Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir.1990) (quoting Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 , 86 S.Ct. 836, 841 , 15 L.Ed.2d 815, 821 (1966)).

2021However, “[t]he suspicion or actual presence of some degree of mental illness or need for psychiatric treatment does not equate with incompetency to stand trial [or plead guilty].” Henderson v. State, 977 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998).

2000“The suspicion or actual presence of some degree of mental illness or need for psychiatric treatment does not equate with incompetency to stand trial [or plead guilty].” Henderson v. State, 977 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo.App.1998).

2018See Barnes v. State , 385 S.W.3d 517 , 522 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012).

2017Dykes v. State, 574 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Mo. App. S.D. 1978); see also, Barnes v. State, 385 S.W.3d 517, 522 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012). .

2014See White v. State, 957 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Mo.App.W.D.1997) (claim of prejudice from misinformation that movant would have to serve only 40 percent of sentence was refuted where counsel stated at sentencing hearing that movant would have to serve 85 percent of sentence).

2014See White v. State, 957 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997) (claim of prejudice from misinformation that movant would have to serve only 40 percent of sentence was refuted where counsel stated at sentencing hearing that movant would have to serve 85 percent of sentence).

2004See White v. State, 781 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Mo.App.E.D.1989) (“[A] mere allegation that an attorney tells a movant to he at a guilty plea hearing does not entitle movant to an evidentiary hearing.”).

1993Wedlow v. State, 841 S.W.2d at 217[11]; White v. State, 781 S.W.2d 167, 168-169 [4] (Mo.App.1989); Pines v. State, 778 S.W.2d 724, 726 [2] (Mo.App.1989); Robinson v. State, 772 S.W.2d 770, 773, n. 1 (Mo.App.1989); LaRose v. State, 724 S.W.2d 339, 340 [1] (Mo.App.1987).

1988Chapman v. State, 641 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Mo.App.1982).

1987Chapman v. State, 641 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Mo.App.1982).

1977“A 27.26 movant, in order to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, must plead facts, not conclusions, which, if true, would entitle him to relief and must show that such factual allegations are not refuted by facts elicited at the guilty plea hearing.” Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Mo. banc 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911 , 95 S.Ct. 832 , 42 L.Ed.2d 841 (1975); Hogshooter v. State, 514 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Mo.App.1974).

1975Most recently, the Missouri Supreme Court has stated, “A 27.26 movant, in order to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, must plead facts, not conclusions, which, if true, would entitle him to relief and must show that such factual allegations are not refuted by facts elicited at the guilty plea hearing.” Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Mo. banc 1974); Hogshooter v. State, 514 S.W.2d 109 (Mo.App.1974).

2002State v. Driver, 912 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. banc 1995). 6 As previously noted, the guilty plea hearing transcript that Mr. Brown has filed appears to conclusively refute his *732 claim that he was misled into pleading guilty by a promise of placement in a treatment program and that he was promised release if he successfully completed it.

1999Driver, 912 S.W.2d at 55-56 .

2019A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel following a guilty plea is irrelevant except to the extent that it infringes upon the voluntariness and knowledge with which the guilty plea was made, Bequette v. State, 161 S.W.3d 905, 906 (Mo.App.

2006Simmons, 100 S.W.3d at 146 ; Bequette, 161 S.W.3d at 907 .

2014In so ruling, the court instructed that, rather than relying on a defendant’s response that his counsel advised him regarding the nature of the charge, the circuit court, when conducting a guilty plea hearing, should "ascertain facts on the record regarding the defendant’s specific conduct that the State believes supports the elements of the charged crime.” Id. at 704 (emphasis in the original).

2014The Court admonishes that it would be the better practice “for the plea court, when conducting a guilty plea hearing, to ascertain facts on the record regarding the defendant’s specific conduct that the State believes supports the elements of the charged crime [because s]imply reciting the charging document [probably] merely quotes the statutory elements,” rather than "defendant's actual, factually-specific conduct leading to the charge.” Id. at 703-04, 2014 WL 4547840 at *6 .

1999Pointer, 641 S.W.2d at 449 (citing Flood v. State, 476 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Mo.1972)).

1976Flood v. State, 476 S.W.2d 529 [3] (Mo.1972).

1990See McMahon v. State, 569 S.W.2d 753, 758 [3, 4] (Mo. banc 1978); Guy on v. State, 776 S.W.2d 907, 908 [3] (Mo.App.1989); LaRose v. State, 724 S.W.2d 339, 340 [2] (Mo.App.1987).

1980Baker was followed in McMahon v. State, 569 S.W.2d 753 [1-4] (Mo.banc 1978).

1989See Smith v. State, 743 S.W.2d 900, 901 [5] (Mo.App.1988) (to be entitled to an eviden-tiary hearing as to the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the allegations contained in the motion must not be refuted by the facts elicited at the guilty plea proceeding).

1988Smith, 743 S.W.2d at 901 .