guilty plea hearing in Maryland

2016In affirming the judgment of our Court — which had been reported at Yonga v. State, 221 Md.App. 45 , 108 A.3d 448 (2015) — the Court of Appeals adopted the portion of Judge Charles Moylan’s analysis that juxtaposed a guilty plea with a claim of newly discovered evidence.

2016In affirming the judgment of our Court — which had been reported at Yonga v. State, 221 Md.App. 45 , 108 A.3d 448 (2015) — the Court of Appeals adopted the portion of Judge Charles Moylan’s analysis that juxtaposed a guilty plea with a claim of newly discovered evidence.

2015This result is consistent with Daughtry, 419 Md. at 80 n. 31, 18 A.3d at 87 n. 31 (“Because our emphasis as an appellate court must be on what the trial judge could fairly determine at a defendant’s guilty-plea hearing in determining whether a defendant understood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, we may look only to the record as a whole that was before the trial judge during *653 that proceeding.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2015This result is consistent with Daughtry, 419 Md. at 80 n. 31, 18 A.3d at 87 n. 31 (“Because our emphasis as an appellate court must be on what the trial judge could fairly determine at a defendant’s guilty-plea hearing in determining whether a defendant understood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, we may look only to the record as a whole that was before the trial judge during *653 that proceeding.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2026According to the reviewing court, the transcript of the guilty plea hearing contained no reference to the terms of a plea agreement; however, the terms of the agreement were apparently “explained to the presiding judge off the record.” Id. at 731.

2020That does not mean that the State must prove its case before the court may accept a guilty plea, or that a guilty plea hearing is akin to a trial on a stipulated set of facts.4 Rather, the factual basis inquiry confirms that the plea is “truly 4 “The plea of not guilty, accompanied by an ‘Agreed Statement of Facts,’ is a peculiar animal.” Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 541 (1978) (quoting Covington v. State, 34 Md.

2020That does not mean that the State must prove its case before the court may accept a guilty plea, or that a guilty plea hearing is akin to a trial on a stipulated set of facts.4 Rather, the factual basis inquiry confirms that the plea is “truly 4 “The plea of not guilty, accompanied by an ‘Agreed Statement of Facts,’ is a peculiar animal.” Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 541 (1978) (quoting Covington v. State, 34 Md.

2020In sum, the affirmative misrepresentation cases cited by Petitioner constitute a limited exception to the general rule that a guilty plea is valid if it is “entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 755 (citation omitted).

2017Skok, 361 Md. at 78 , 760 A.2d 647 ; see also id. at 80-81, 760 A.2d 647 (“[T]he courts have consistently held that the scope of a coram nobis proceeding encompasses issues concerning the voluntariness of a guilty or nolo contendere plea, and whether the record shows that such plea was understandingly and voluntarily made[.]”).

2017Skok, 361 Md. at 78 , 760 A.2d 647 ; see also id. at 80-81, 760 A.2d 647 (“[T]he courts have consistently held that the scope of a coram nobis proceeding encompasses issues concerning the voluntariness of a guilty or nolo contendere plea, and whether the record shows that such plea was understandingly and voluntarily made[.]”).

2016See Yonga, 446 Md. at 216-217 , 130 A.3d 486 , and Yonga, 221 Md.App. at 68-69 , 108 A.3d 448 .

2016See Yonga, 446 Md. at 216-217 , 130 A.3d 486 , and Yonga, 221 Md.App. at 68-69 , 108 A.3d 448 .

2014See also State v. Castellon-Gutier-rez, 198 Md.App. 633, 644-55 , 18 A.3d 968 (2011) (without a discussion of the appropriateness of doing so, evidence extrinsic to the plea hearing was considered in a coram nobis proceeding — and subsequently by this Court upon appeal — in determining whether the defendant, after conviction and sentencing following his guilty plea, was properly advised of his appellate rights).

2014See also State v. Castellon-Gutier-rez, 198 Md.App. 633, 644-55 , 18 A.3d 968 (2011) (without a discussion of the appropriateness of doing so, evidence extrinsic to the plea hearing was considered in a coram nobis proceeding — and subsequently by this Court upon appeal — in determining whether the defendant, after conviction and sentencing following his guilty plea, was properly advised of his appellate rights).

2011Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537 , 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2444 , 115 L.Ed.2d 481, 489 (1991)). [31] Because our emphasis as an appellate court must be on what "the trial judge could fairly determine" at a defendant's guilty-plea hearing in determining whether a defendant understood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, Priet, 289 Md. at 291 , 424 A.2d at 361 , we may look only to "the record as a whole" that was before the trial judge during that proceeding.

2011Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537 , 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2444 , 115 L.Ed.2d 481, 489 (1991)). [31] Because our emphasis as an appellate court must be on what "the trial judge could fairly determine" at a defendant's guilty-plea hearing in determining whether a defendant understood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, Priet, 289 Md. at 291 , 424 A.2d at 361 , we may look only to "the record as a whole" that was before the trial judge during that proceeding.

2003We include cases involving bargains as to pleas only, in that the conditions on acceptance of such bargains (absent a rule) are essentially the same and moreover, usually encourage waivers of the right to trial by jury. *390 United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406, 411-12 (5th Cir.1971) 17 , involved a guilty plea waiver, but the Fifth Circuit’s comments are also relevant in a waiver of jury trial context.

1993Those jurisdictions, "[a]s a matter of state public policy, [legislatively] abandoned the guilty-plea-waiver rule." State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis.2d 119 , 332 N.W.2d 744, 747 (1983).

1993Those jurisdictions, "[a]s a matter of state public policy, [legislatively] abandoned the guilty-plea-waiver rule." State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis.2d 119 , 332 N.W.2d 744, 747 (1983).

1985United States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193, 194-95 (4th Cir.1983) (defendant “freely admitted” total amount due beyond amount involved in conviction); United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant “repeatedly acknowledged” the full monetary scope of criminal activity); United States v. Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 307-08 (5th Cir.1975) (defendant signed consent judgment in favor of victim of unconvicted counts and voluntarily admitted entire amount owed); United States v. Black, 589 F.Supp. 594, 597-99 (D.

1985In a series of cases federal courts have approved the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation beyond the counts for which a criminal defendant is convicted where such restitution is an express condition of a plea bargain, United States v. Suter, 755 F.2d 523, 526-27 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2331 , 85 L.Ed.2d 848 (1985) (agreed amount of restitution for mail fraud scheme in plea bargain exceeded monetary loss for actual conviction and indictment); Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 194-96 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant agreed to make restitution beyond amount

1985United States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193, 194-95 (4th Cir.1983) (defendant “freely admitted” total amount due beyond amount involved in conviction); United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant “repeatedly acknowledged” the full monetary scope of criminal activity); United States v. Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 307-08 (5th Cir.1975) (defendant signed consent judgment in favor of victim of unconvicted counts and voluntarily admitted entire amount owed); United States v. Black, 589 F.Supp. 594, 597-99 (D.

1985United States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193, 194-95 (4th Cir.1983) (defendant “freely admitted” total amount due beyond amount involved in conviction); United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant “repeatedly acknowledged” the full monetary scope of criminal activity); United States v. Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 307-08 (5th Cir.1975) (defendant signed consent judgment in favor of victim of unconvicted counts and voluntarily admitted entire amount owed); United States v. Black, 589 F.Supp. 594, 597-99 (D.

1985In a series of cases federal courts have approved the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation beyond the counts for which a criminal defendant is convicted where such restitution is an express condition of a plea bargain, United States v. Suter, 755 F.2d 523, 526-27 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2331 , 85 L.Ed.2d 848 (1985) (agreed amount of restitution for mail fraud scheme in plea bargain exceeded monetary loss for actual conviction and indictment); Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 194-96 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant agreed to make restitution beyond amount

1985In a series of cases federal courts have approved the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation beyond the counts for which a criminal defendant is convicted where such restitution is an express condition of a plea bargain, United States v. Suter, 755 F.2d 523, 526-27 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2331 , 85 L.Ed.2d 848 (1985) (agreed amount of restitution for mail fraud scheme in plea bargain exceeded monetary loss for actual conviction and indictment); Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 194-96 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant agreed to make restitution beyond amount

1985United States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193, 194-95 (4th Cir.1983) (defendant “freely admitted” total amount due beyond amount involved in conviction); United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant “repeatedly acknowledged” the full monetary scope of criminal activity); United States v. Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 307-08 (5th Cir.1975) (defendant signed consent judgment in favor of victim of unconvicted counts and voluntarily admitted entire amount owed); United States v. Black, 589 F.Supp. 594, 597-99 (D.