guilty plea violation in California

2004Adhering to the framework it had set forth in Walker , the Supreme Court revisited the "distinction between a mere misadvisement with regard to the consequences of a guilty plea and a violation of a plea agreement," as illustrated by a comparison of two United States Supreme Court decisions, Timmreck and Santobello. ( Id. at p. 354, citing United States v. Timmreck (1979) 441 U.S. 780 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 634 , 99 S.Ct. 2085 ], and Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 427 , 92 S.Ct. 495 ].) The court stated: "The contrast between the Timmreck and Santobello decisions provides a usef

2004Adhering to the framework it had set forth in Walker , the Supreme Court revisited the "distinction between a mere misadvisement with regard to the consequences of a guilty plea and a violation of a plea agreement," as illustrated by a comparison of two United States Supreme Court decisions, Timmreck and Santobello. ( Id. at p. 354, citing United States v. Timmreck (1979) 441 U.S. 780 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 634 , 99 S.Ct. 2085 ], and Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 427 , 92 S.Ct. 495 ].) The court stated: "The contrast between the Timmreck and Santobello decisions provides a usef

2004Adhering to the framework it had set forth in Walker , the Supreme Court revisited the "distinction between a mere misadvisement with regard to the consequences of a guilty plea and a violation of a plea agreement," as illustrated by a comparison of two United States Supreme Court decisions, Timmreck and Santobello. ( Id. at p. 354, citing United States v. Timmreck (1979) 441 U.S. 780 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 634 , 99 S.Ct. 2085 ], and Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 427 , 92 S.Ct. 495 ].) The court stated: "The contrast between the Timmreck and Santobello decisions provides a usef

2004Adhering to the framework it had set forth in Walker , the Supreme Court revisited the "distinction between a mere misadvisement with regard to the consequences of a guilty plea and a violation of a plea agreement," as illustrated by a comparison of two United States Supreme Court decisions, Timmreck and Santobello. ( Id. at p. 354, citing United States v. Timmreck (1979) 441 U.S. 780 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 634 , 99 S.Ct. 2085 ], and Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 427 , 92 S.Ct. 495 ].) The court stated: "The contrast between the Timmreck and Santobello decisions provides a usef

2025The trial court sentenced him to the low term of 16 months and dismissed the strike prior and probation denial priors pursuant to 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 and People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568 . 2 section 1385.

2017In affirming the Sixth Amendment's right of self-representation upon a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, the high court stated, "The right to defend is personal.... [A]lthough [the defendant] may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' [Citation.]" ( Faretta , supra , 422 U.S. at p. 834 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 .) We have held that "a capital defendant representing himself under Faretta has no duty to 'present a defense' but may simply 'put the state to its proof

2015A defendant’s guilty plea and waiver of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary—“made with a full awareness of the nature of the right being waived and the consequences of the waiver….” (People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 500 .) As set forth above, the court carefully advised defendant of the consequences of his plea to attempted murder.

2015A defendant’s guilty plea and waiver of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary—“made with a full awareness of the nature of the right being waived and the consequences of the waiver….” (People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 500 .) Defendant was well aware of the distinction between his “eligibility” and “entitlement” to half-time credits; he declined the court’s offer to withdraw the plea; and he decided to accept the four-year stipulated term without any guarantees about the amount of conduct credits he would earn.

2013(See People v. Lobaugh, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 786 ; People v. Lovings, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311 .) And, federal courts which have addressed the question have held that an IAC claim survives a guilty plea with a waiver of appeal rights if the IAC is alleged to have directly affected the plea or the waiver and to have rendered the plea or the waiver itself unknowing or involuntary.

2013(See People v. Lobaugh, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 786 ; People v. Lovings, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311 .) And, federal courts which have addressed the question have held that an IAC claim survives a guilty plea with a waiver of appeal rights if the IAC is alleged to have directly affected the plea or the waiver and to have rendered the plea or the waiver itself unknowing or involuntary.

2013(See People v. Lobaugh, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 786 ; People v. Lovings, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311 .) And, federal courts which have addressed the question have held that an IAC claim survives a guilty plea with a waiver of appeal rights if the IAC is alleged to have directly affected the plea or the waiver and to have rendered the plea or the waiver itself unknowing or involuntary.

2013(See People v. Lobaugh, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 786 ; People v. Lovings, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311 .) And, federal courts which have addressed the question have held that an IAC claim survives a guilty plea with a waiver of appeal rights if the IAC is alleged to have directly affected the plea or the waiver and to have rendered the plea or the waiver itself unknowing or involuntary.

2025The trial court sentenced him to the low term of 16 months and dismissed the strike prior and probation denial priors pursuant to 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 and People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568 . 2 section 1385.

2025(People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 956 .) Under the prevailing law, on a properly noticed motion, the lower court should conduct an in camera hearing in which it first determines whether sufficient grounds exist for maintaining the confidentiality of the informant’s identity.

2021(People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 691, fn. 17 ; People v. Chambers (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1050-1051 .) The record of defendant’s prior conviction, entered into evidence, showed defendant entered a guilty plea to a violation of section 246 on March 17, 1998.

2017In affirming the Sixth Amendment's right of self-representation upon a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, the high court stated, "The right to defend is personal.... [A]lthough [the defendant] may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' [Citation.]" ( Faretta , supra , 422 U.S. at p. 834 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 .) We have held that "a capital defendant representing himself under Faretta has no duty to 'present a defense' but may simply 'put the state to its proof

2017In affirming the Sixth Amendment's right of self-representation upon a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, the high court stated, "The right to defend is personal.... [A]lthough [the defendant] may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' [Citation.]" ( Faretta , supra , 422 U.S. at p. 834 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 .) We have held that "a capital defendant representing himself under Faretta has no duty to 'present a defense' but may simply 'put the state to its proof

2017There, the defendant, who was represented by counsel, claimed that his decision not to present evidence at the penalty phase of trial was tantamount to a guilty plea in violation of section 1018. ( Id. at p. 527, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 .) We rejected this argument, finding that section 1018 did not govern, in part because the defendant's "choice did not amount to an admission that he believed death was the appropriate penalty, nor did he give up his right to confront or cross-examine those testifying against him at the penalty phase." ( Ibid. ) We found section 1018's scope not so br

2017There, the defendant, who was represented by counsel, claimed that his decision not to present evidence at the penalty phase of trial was tantamount to a guilty plea in violation of section 1018. ( Id. at p. 527, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 .) We rejected this argument, finding that section 1018 did not govern, in part because the defendant's "choice did not amount to an admission that he believed death was the appropriate penalty, nor did he give up his right to confront or cross-examine those testifying against him at the penalty phase." ( Ibid. ) We found section 1018's scope not so br

2016(People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 304-305 .) A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (Id. at p. 305, quoting Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 573 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 954, 965 ].) Whether a waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is a question of law subject to de novo review, based on the entire record.

2015We acknowledge that, in reaching its conclusion, the court in Tovar held the constitutional requirements for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel in the context of a guilty plea hearing are "satisfied when [, as occurred there,] the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea." (Tovar, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 81 .) However, the court did not state these advisements were constitutional minimums or that its holding ap

2015We acknowledge that, in reaching its conclusion, the court in Tovar held the constitutional requirements for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel in the context of a guilty plea hearing are "satisfied when [, as occurred there,] the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea." (Tovar, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 81 .) However, the court did not state these advisements were constitutional minimums or that its holding ap

2015“A plea may not be withdrawn simply because the defendant has changed his mind. [Citation.]” (People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1456 .) “Postplea apprehension (buyer’s remorse) regarding the anticipated sentence, even if it occurs well before sentencing, is not sufficient to compel the exercise of judicial discretion to permit withdrawal of the plea of guilty. [Citation.]” (People v. Knight (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337, 344 .) 8.

2015“A plea may not be withdrawn simply because the defendant has changed his mind. [Citation.]” (People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1456 .) “Postplea apprehension (buyer’s remorse) regarding the anticipated sentence, even if it occurs well before sentencing, is not sufficient to compel the exercise of judicial discretion to permit withdrawal of the plea of guilty. [Citation.]” (People v. Knight (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337, 344 .) 8.

2015We acknowledge that, in reaching its conclusion, the court in Tovar held the constitutional requirements for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel in the context of a guilty plea hearing are "satisfied when [, as occurred there,] the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea." (Tovar, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 81 .) However, the court did not state these advisements were constitutional minimums or that its holding ap

2013Under these circumstances, where defendant was effectively representing himself in connection with any motion to withdraw the plea, and where the trial court’s statements could have mislead [sic] a lay defendant, the court should address the merits of this claim.” We disagree with defendant’s position. “ ‘The purpose of the general doctrine of waiver [or forfeiture] is to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had.’ ” (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023 (Walker), overruled on other grounds i

2013The Attorney General concedes that the court misadvised defendant concerning the length of the parole term.4 The court’s failure to advise, or misadvisement, of the parole consequences of a guilty plea is a violation of the court’s obligation under Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d at page 605 , to advise a criminal defendant of the direct consequences of his or her conviction upon entry of a guilty plea. ( Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 351-352; see also People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 609 .) But as the high court has explained, establishing that the trial court failed to advise or gave an i

2013The Attorney General concedes that the court misadvised defendant concerning the length of the parole term.4 The court’s failure to advise, or misadvisement, of the parole consequences of a guilty plea is a violation of the court’s obligation under Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d at page 605 , to advise a criminal defendant of the direct consequences of his or her conviction upon entry of a guilty plea. ( Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 351-352; see also People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 609 .) But as the high court has explained, establishing that the trial court failed to advise or gave an i

2012Equally distinguishable is People v. Harvey (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 660 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 858 ], where the appellate court reversed the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea because defense counsel failed to inform the defendant of a psychiatric report concluding that the defendant lacked the capacity to premeditate or form malice aforethought and those findings, if believed by a trier of fact, would have precluded any conviction of first or second degree murder.

2012Equally distinguishable is People v. Harvey (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 660 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 858 ], where the appellate court reversed the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea because defense counsel failed to inform the defendant of a psychiatric report concluding that the defendant lacked the capacity to premeditate or form malice aforethought and those findings, if believed by a trier of fact, would have precluded any conviction of first or second degree murder.