emergency doctrine in Colorado

2003Id., at 479; People v. Malczewski, 744 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo.1987).

1990“In determining whether the emergency exception has been satisfied, a court must examine the totality of circumstances, including the delay likely to be occasioned by obtaining a warrant, the character of the investigation, and the potential risk posed to other persons from any unnecessary delay, and must evaluate those circumstances as they would have appeared to a prudent and trained police officer at the time of the challenged entry.” Malczewski, 744 P.2d at 66 .

2002In fact, both the so-called emergency doctrine and the emergency exigent circumstance exception have their genesis in People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57 , 562 P.2d 422 (1977). 6 While the court in Amato noted that the emergency doctrine "has been treated as a variant of the exigent circumstances doctrine," Amato, 193 Colo. at 60 , 562 P.2d at 424 , it did not require probable cause when there was "an immediate crisis and the probability that assistance will be helpful" and the officers' "primary purpose in being there was to render assistance and not to search for evidence." Id. at 61 , 562 P.2d at

2002In fact, both the so-called emergency doctrine and the emergency exigent circumstance exception have their genesis in People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57 , 562 P.2d 422 (1977). 6 While the court in Amato noted that the emergency doctrine "has been treated as a variant of the exigent circumstances doctrine," Amato, 193 Colo. at 60 , 562 P.2d at 424 , it did not require probable cause when there was "an immediate crisis and the probability that assistance will be helpful" and the officers' "primary purpose in being there was to render assistance and not to search for evidence." Id. at 61 , 562 P.2d at

1999See People v. Harper, 902 P.2d 842 , 845 n. 2 (Colo.1995) (holding that the emergency doctrine fits into the framework of the plain view exception by satisfying the first requirement necessary for the exception to apply).

1999See People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57, 60 , 562 P.2d 422, 424 (1977) (noting that under that doctrine, police can obtain evidence or seize contraband when there exists "an immediate crisis and the probability that assistance will be helpful”); see also Harper, 902 P.2d at 845 n. 2 (noting that the requirements of the emergency doctrine are separate and distinct from those of the exigent circumstances exception). .

2012See People v. Thompson, 770 P.2d 1282 , 1285 (Colo.1989) (emergency doctrine exception to warrant requirement is but a specific example of exigent circumstances doctrine); see also People v. Chavez, 240 P.3d 448 , 451 (Colo.App.2010). ¶ 50 Again, Hanson was denied an opportunity to question Deputy Ashby regarding the content of his report, his observations, and the circumstances leading to the initial entry, all of which were relevant in determining whether the emergency doctrine even applied.

2012See People v. Thompson, 770 P.2d 1282 , 1285 (Colo.1989) (emergency doctrine exception to warrant requirement is but a specific example of exigent circumstances doctrine); see also People v. Chavez, 240 P.3d 448 , 451 (Colo.App.2010). ¶ 50 Again, Hanson was denied an opportunity to question Deputy Ashby regarding the content of his report, his observations, and the circumstances leading to the initial entry, all of which were relevant in determining whether the emergency doctrine even applied.

2016We did, however, conclude that this statutory framework “reflects the legislature’s recognition that once ballots are printed and distributed, and voting is underway, the election process must be allowed to proceed, and any late-arising issues regarding a candidate’s eligibility are to be resolved through a post-election contest.” Hanlen, ¶ 44, 333 P.3d at 51 . ¶10 With regard to the questions whether Speers was eligible to hold office and, if not, whether Figueroa, the other candidate on the ballot, was instead the one who was legally elected, Figueroa filed a separate election contest in the

2015Hanlen, 333 P.3d at 46-47 . 1 After the district court invalidated the emergency rule, the clerks counted the votes for Speers and determined that she won the election by roughly a two-to-one ratio.

2002Thus, this case is unlike People v. Kluhsman where we ruled that the emergency exception justified police officers' entry into the defendant's residence to search for injured persons based on the defendant's blood-streaked appearance and statements that "people had been chasing him all night," that "they were trying to kill him," that "he had killed a couple of his pursuers," and that there were many people in his home that "had engaged in sexual acts and urinated inside the house." Kluhsman, 980 P.2d at 532, 535 .

2002In Kluhsman, we found that the police officers' decision to enter the defendant's home and search for injured people was justified under both the emergency exception of the "exigent circumstances" doctrine and the "emergency doctrine." Kluhsman, 980 P.2d at 535 , 535 n. 7. 5 .

1984A public emergency “is a variant of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.” People v. Clements, supra. And, the emergency doctrine applies “if there exists a factual situation which supports a ‘colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another.’ ” People v. Clements, supra. Here, the officers discovered a door one foot ajar on a cold November evening after the hour of midnight in a burglary-prone neighborhood.

1984A public emergency “is a variant of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.” People v. Clements, supra. And, the emergency doctrine applies “if there exists a factual situation which supports a ‘colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another.’ ” People v. Clements, supra. Here, the officers discovered a door one foot ajar on a cold November evening after the hour of midnight in a burglary-prone neighborhood.

1983The emergency doctrine is a variant of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and will be invoked where facts exist which support a “colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another.” People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267, 271 (Colo.1983) (quoting McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo.1981)); see also People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57 , 562 P.2d 422 (1977).

1983The emergency doctrine is a variant of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and will be invoked where facts exist which support a "colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another." People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267, 271 (Colo.1983) (quoting McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo.1981)); see also People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57 , 562 P.2d 422 (1977).

2022See In re Marriage of Turilli, 2021 COA 151, ¶ 38 (courts must avoid statutory interpretations that would lead to illogical or absurd results). ¶ 43 Father asserts that our interpretation would encourage “trials by ambush.” He claims that if the emergency hearing becomes a “standard modification or restriction proceeding” under subsection (1)(b)(I), a responding parent would have to defend against the allegations without the benefit of full discovery under C.R.C.P. 16.2.

2022See Lewis, 66 P.3d at 207 ; see also In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007) (district court can believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted). ¶ 51 Father also asserts that the magistrate erred by simply finding that J.C.T. was endangered while in his care, instead of making a specific finding that he actually committed or caused J.C.T.’s injuries.4 However, the magistrate found, and the record supports, 4 Father also asserts that the magistrate erred because the legislature’s inclusion of “due to the parenting time or contact by the parent”

2022See Lewis, 66 P.3d at 207 ; see also In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007) (district court can believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted). ¶ 51 Father also asserts that the magistrate erred by simply finding that J.C.T. was endangered while in his care, instead of making a specific finding that he actually committed or caused J.C.T.’s injuries.4 However, the magistrate found, and the record supports, 4 Father also asserts that the magistrate erred because the legislature’s inclusion of “due to the parenting time or contact by the parent”

2019See § 24-6-402(4). 11 ¶ 28 Citing to Lewis v. Town of Nederland, 934 P.2d 848 (Colo. App. 1996), defendants suggest that there is an emergency exception that is applicable to executive sessions.

2013See Knapp, 392 So.2d at 198 ("The emergency rule is not an exception to the general rule requiring reasonable care." (citation omitted)).

2012See People v. Thompson, 770 P.2d 1282 , 1285 (Colo.1989) (emergency doctrine exception to warrant requirement is but a specific example of exigent circumstances doctrine); see also People v. Chavez, 240 P.3d 448 , 451 (Colo.App.2010). ¶ 50 Again, Hanson was denied an opportunity to question Deputy Ashby regarding the content of his report, his observations, and the circumstances leading to the initial entry, all of which were relevant in determining whether the emergency doctrine even applied.

2012See People v. Thompson, 770 P.2d 1282 , 1285 (Colo.1989) (emergency doctrine exception to warrant requirement is but a specific example of exigent circumstances doctrine); see also People v. Chavez, 240 P.3d 448 , 451 (Colo.App.2010). ¶ 50 Again, Hanson was denied an opportunity to question Deputy Ashby regarding the content of his report, his observations, and the circumstances leading to the initial entry, all of which were relevant in determining whether the emergency doctrine even applied.

2003People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d 370, 379 (Colo.1986) (“Under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, police officers may enter private property without a warrant where there is a reasonable belief that the premises have been or are being burglarized in order to secure the premises and to search for suspects and victims.”) While the emergency exception must be narrowly cir- eumscribed to justify only conduct necessary to render immediate assistance, it is no less applicable merely because the officers also prepare, or even subjectively hope, to encounter the perpetrators of a crime.

2003People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d 370, 379 (Colo. 1986) ("Under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, police officers may enter private property without a warrant where there is a reasonable belief that the premises have been or are being burglarized in order to secure the premises and to search for suspects and victims.") While the emergency exception must be narrowly circumscribed *1017 to justify only conduct necessary to render immediate assistance, it is no less applicable merely because the officers also prepare, or even subjectively hope, to encounter the perpetrators of a crime.

2002See People v. Wright, 804 P.2d 866, 870 (Colo.1991)(search of purse for information was not justified by emergency exception where owner was already receiving medical care and was conscious and able to give whatever information was required).

2002See People v. Wright, 804 P.2d 866, 870 (Colo.1991)(search of purse for information was not justified by emergency exception where owner was already receiving medical care and was conscious and able to give whatever information was required).

1987United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1055 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1100 , 97 S.Ct. 1122 , 51 L.Ed.2d 549 (1977); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 , 94 S.Ct. 173 , 38 L.Ed.2d 68 (1973); People v. Boorem, 184 Colo. 233 , 519 P.2d 939 (1974).