emergency clause in Arkansas

2009See generally Heath v. Westark Poultry Processing Corp. , 259 Ark. 141 , 531 S.W.2d 953 (1976).

2009See generally Heath v. Westark Poultry Processing Corp. , 259 Ark. 141 , 531 S.W.2d 953 (1976).

2023The Act’s emergency clause differs from the one in Safe Surgery, which stated an emergency existed for implementation of a new set of rules for the ballot-initiative or referendum process but didn’t explain why the prior rules couldn’t continue or how the rule changes impacted public peace, health, or safety. 15 We should give substantial deference to the legislature’s determination of whether an emergency exists when it gives some explanation which was the original meaning behind the language in Amendment 7. 16 Applying that deference here, I conclude the appellees are unlikely to succeed on

2023The Act’s emergency clause differs from the one in Safe Surgery, which stated an emergency existed for implementation of a new set of rules for the ballot-initiative or referendum process but didn’t explain why the prior rules couldn’t continue or how the rule changes impacted public peace, health, or safety. 15 We should give substantial deference to the legislature’s determination of whether an emergency exists when it gives some explanation which was the original meaning behind the language in Amendment 7. 16 Applying that deference here, I conclude the appellees are unlikely to succeed on

2002The circuit court ruled that the emergency clause was valid under this court’s holding in Jumper v. McCollum, 179 Ark. 837 , 18 S.W.2d 359 (1929).

2002The circuit court ruled that the emergency clause was valid under this court’s holding in Jumper v. McCollum, 179 Ark. 837 , 18 S.W.2d 359 (1929).

1957In Cunningham v. Walker, 198 Ark. 928 , 132 S. W. 2d 24 , in speaking of the validity of an emergency clause, we said: “If fair-minded and intelligent men might reasonably differ as to the sufficiency and truth of the fact assigned, the courts will not interfere.

1957In Cunningham v. Walker, 198 Ark. 928 , 132 S. W. 2d 24 , in speaking of the validity of an emergency clause, we said: “If fair-minded and intelligent men might reasonably differ as to the sufficiency and truth of the fact assigned, the courts will not interfere.

2008As stated in Tate v Bennett, 341 Ark. 829 , 833 , 20 S.W.3d 370 (2000), "Pursuant to Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution, acts of the General Assembly that do not contain an emergency clause or a specified effective date become effective ninety days after adjournment of the legislative session at which they were enacted." See also, Priest v. Polk, 332 Ark. 673 , 912 S.W.2d 902 (1995); and State v. Ziegenbein, 282 Ark. 162 , 666 S.W.2d 698 (1984).

2008As stated in Tate v Bennett, 341 Ark. 829 , 833 , 20 S.W.3d 370 (2000), "Pursuant to Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution, acts of the General Assembly that do not contain an emergency clause or a specified effective date become effective ninety days after adjournment of the legislative session at which they were enacted." See also, Priest v. Polk, 332 Ark. 673 , 912 S.W.2d 902 (1995); and State v. Ziegenbein, 282 Ark. 162 , 666 S.W.2d 698 (1984).

1947The following serve to emphasize our holdings: - Foster v. Graves, 168 Ark. 1033 , 275 S. W. 653 : “The statute . . . did not go into effect until January 10, 1924, by reason of the fact that there was no separate roll call [on the emergency clause”].

1947The following serve to emphasize our holdings: - Foster v. Graves, 168 Ark. 1033 , 275 S. W. 653 : “The statute . . . did not go into effect until January 10, 1924, by reason of the fact that there was no separate roll call [on the emergency clause”].

2021See Steinmetz, supra; Wofford, supra (citing Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984); Mincey, supra. The Supreme Court’s statements of the emergency exception reiterate that the emergency exception does not depend on the officers’ subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating; rather, it requires only an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid.

2021See Steinmetz, supra; Wofford, supra (citing Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984); Mincey, supra. The Supreme Court’s statements of the emergency exception reiterate that the emergency exception does not depend on the officers’ subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating; rather, it requires only an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid.

2018See Reeves v. State , 374 Ark. 415 , 421 n.2, 288 S.W.3d 577 , 582 n.2 (2008) (stating that pursuant to amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution, acts of the General Assembly that do not carry an emergency clause or specified effective date become effective on the ninety-first day after adjournment of the legislative session at which they were enacted).

2018See Reeves v. State , 374 Ark. 415 , 421 n.2, 288 S.W.3d 577 , 582 n.2 (2008) (stating that pursuant to amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution, acts of the General Assembly that do not carry an emergency clause or specified effective date become effective on the ninety-first day after adjournment of the legislative session at which they were enacted).

2014See, e.g., Rosario v. State, 319 Ark. 764 , 894 S.W.2d 888 (1995).

2014See, e.g., Rosario v. State, 319 Ark. 764 , 894 S.W.2d 888 (1995).

2019Priest v. Polk, 322 Ark. 673 , 912 S.W.2d 902 (1995).

2008As stated in Tate v Bennett, 341 Ark. 829 , 833 , 20 S.W.3d 370 (2000), "Pursuant to Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution, acts of the General Assembly that do not contain an emergency clause or a specified effective date become effective ninety days after adjournment of the legislative session at which they were enacted." See also, Priest v. Polk, 332 Ark. 673 , 912 S.W.2d 902 (1995); and State v. Ziegenbein, 282 Ark. 162 , 666 S.W.2d 698 (1984).

1949The emergency clause of Act 5 is as definite as was that clause in Act No. 4 which was sustained in the case of Fulkerson v. Refunding Board, 201 Ark. 957 , 147 S.W. 2d, 980 .

1949The emergency clause of Act 5 is as definite as was that clause in Act No. 4 which was sustained in the case of Fulkerson v. Refunding Board, 201 Ark. 957 , 147 S.W. 2d, 980 .

2021Wofford, 330 Ark. 8 , 952 S.W.2d 646 .

2021Wofford, 330 Ark. 8 , 952 S.W.2d 646 .

2003See Massongill v. County of Scott, 329 Ark. 98 , 947 S.W.2d 749 (1997). 3 For example, the Farnsworth courts' reasoning, in my opinion, supports a conclusion that justices of the peace should be deemed to be county "officials" within the meaning of A.C.A. § 14-26-101 , and thus entitled to workers' compensation coverage by the county.

2003See Massongill v. County of Scott, 329 Ark. 98 , 947 S.W.2d 749 (1997). 3 For example, the Farnsworth courts' reasoning, in my opinion, supports a conclusion that justices of the peace should be deemed to be county "officials" within the meaning of A.C.A. § 14-26-101 , and thus entitled to workers' compensation coverage by the county.

1989Concerning appellants' challenge that the emergency clause to Ordinance No. 3992 violated amendment 7, we believe the question raised is best answered in Chastain v. City of Little Rock, 208 Ark. 142 , 185 S.W.2d 95 (1945).

1989Concerning appellants' challenge that the emergency clause to Ordinance No. 3992 violated amendment 7, we believe the question raised is best answered in Chastain v. City of Little Rock, 208 Ark. 142 , 185 S.W.2d 95 (1945).