63 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1939–2024 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mendezgreen2 sentences2009See Mendez, 275 Kan. at 428-29 (finding officers’ warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment did not fall under the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement because there was no indication that anyone inside the apartment needed emergency assistance). *765 Other state and federal courts that have considered similar situations — where a defendant sought to suppress evidence relating to his or her violence or threatened violence toward police officers subsequent to an unlawful search or seizure or a warrandess entry — have generally held that evidence of a separate, independent 2007“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” [Citation omitted].’ ” In Mendez, 275 Kan. at 425 , our Supreme Court recognized that in order to establish application of the emergency doctrine, three requirements must be met: (1) the police must have reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency is at hand and that their assistance is needed immediately for the protection of life or property; (2) the search must not be primarily motivated by the intent to arrest and seize evidence; and (3) t | 3 | 7 |
State v. Canaangreen2 sentences2006See Canaan, 265 Kan. at 843 (inventory search of impounded automobile; plain view); State v. Box, 28 Kan. 2003See Canaan, 265 Kan. at 843 (inventory search of impounded automobile; plain view); State v. Box 28 Kan. | 3 | 3 |
Evans v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Compare United States v. Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding search when driver was foaming at the mouth and unable to talk and officer was seeking information explaining nature of the defendant's condition and the best means of treating it), and Evans v. State, 364 So.2d 93 (Fla. Dist. 2018Compare United States v. Dunavan , 485 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding search when driver was foaming at the mouth and unable to talk and officer was seeking information explaining nature of the defendant's condition and the best means of treating it), and Evans v. State , 364 So.2d 93 (Fla. Dist. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Robert Orville Dunavan, United States of America v. James Edward Mitchellgreen2 sentences2020Compare United States v. Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding search when driver was foaming at the mouth and unable to talk and officer was seeking information explaining nature of the defendant's condition and the best means of treating it), and Evans v. State, 364 So.2d 93 (Fla. Dist. 2018Compare United States v. Dunavan , 485 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding search when driver was foaming at the mouth and unable to talk and officer was seeking information explaining nature of the defendant's condition and the best means of treating it), and Evans v. State , 364 So.2d 93 (Fla. Dist. | 2 | 2 |
Barnhardt v. American Glycerin Co.green2 sentences1946(Barnhardt v. Glycerin Co., 113 Kan. 136, 138, 139 , 213 Pac. 663 ; Eldredge v. Sargent, 150 Kan. 824, 833 , 96 P. 2d 870 ; 45 C. 1946(Barnhardt v. Glycerin Co., 113 Kan. 136, 138, 139 , 213 Pac. 663 ; Eldredge v. Sargent, 150 Kan. 824, 833 , 96 P. 2d 870 ; 45 C. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Sanchez-Loredogreen2 sentences2024"Those recognized exceptions are: 'consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.'" State v. Sanchez-Loredo, 294 Kan. 50, 55 , 272 P.3d 34 (2012). 2024"Those recognized exceptions are: 'consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.'" State v. Sanchez-Loredo, 294 Kan. 50, 55 , 272 P.3d 34 (2012). | 1 | 13 |
Mincey v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2007Emergency Doctrine Our Supreme Court in State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. 704, 719-20 , 101 P.3d 1218 (2004), set forth the rationale of the emergency doctrine exception that was explained by the United States Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 57 L. 2007Emergency Doctrine Our Supreme Court in State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. 704, 719-20 , 101 P.3d 1218 (2004), set forth the rationale of the emergency doctrine exception that was explained by the United States Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 57 L. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Baughmangreen2 sentences2006App. 2d 812, 814 , 32 P.3d 199 (2001), where Judge Beier opined: " ‘Kansas has previously recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement: consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause to search accompanied by exigent circumstances, of which hot pursuit is one example; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. 2004A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it meets one of several recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement: “ ‘consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause to search accompanied by exigent circumstances, of which hot pursuit is one example; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.’ [Citations omitted.]” Mendez, 275 Kan. at 420 -21 (quoting State v. Baughman, 29 Kan. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Drennangreen2 sentences2007Emergency Doctrine Our Supreme Court in State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. 704, 719-20 , 101 P.3d 1218 (2004), set forth the rationale of the emergency doctrine exception that was explained by the United States Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 57 L. 2007Emergency Doctrine Our Supreme Court in State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. 704, 719-20 , 101 P.3d 1218 (2004), set forth the rationale of the emergency doctrine exception that was explained by the United States Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 57 L. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Conngreen2 sentences2008The exceptions to the warrant requirement generally recognized in this state are: "consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause to search accompanied by exigent circumstances . . .; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses." State v. Conn, 278 Kan. 387, 390-91 , 99 P.3d 1108 (2004); see State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. 271, 273-74 , 64 P.3d 419 (2003). 2008The exceptions to the warrant requirement generally recognized in this state are: "consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause to search accompanied by exigent circumstances . . .; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses." State v. Conn, 278 Kan. 387, 390-91 , 99 P.3d 1108 (2004); see State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. 271, 273-74 , 64 P.3d 419 (2003). | 1 | 3 |
Meng v. Pennergreen2 sentences1962(Metzinger v. Subera, 175 Kan. 542, 547, 548 , 266 P. 2d 287 ; Meng v. Penner, 179 Kan. 789, 792, 793 , 298 P. 2d 246 , and the numerous cases cited therein.) In this connection defendants argue that violation of a statute or rule which would be negligence in ordinary circumstances may be excused under the emergency doctrine, and that when Hanks suddenly came upon the car in the ditch with its severely injured occupants, he was confronted with an “emergency” and acted in the same manner as other ordinary reasonable-minded persons would have acted under the same circumstances. 1962(Metzinger v. Subera, 175 Kan. 542, 547, 548 , 266 P. 2d 287 ; Meng v. Penner, 179 Kan. 789, 792, 793 , 298 P. 2d 246 , and the numerous cases cited therein.) In this connection defendants argue that violation of a statute or rule which would be negligence in ordinary circumstances may be excused under the emergency doctrine, and that when Hanks suddenly came upon the car in the ditch with its severely injured occupants, he was confronted with an “emergency” and acted in the same manner as other ordinary reasonable-minded persons would have acted under the same circumstances. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Boydgreen2 sentences2008The exceptions to the warrant requirement generally recognized in this state are: "consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause to search accompanied by exigent circumstances . . .; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses." State v. Conn, 278 Kan. 387, 390-91 , 99 P.3d 1108 (2004); see State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. 271, 273-74 , 64 P.3d 419 (2003). 2008The exceptions to the warrant requirement generally recognized in this state are: "consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause to search accompanied by exigent circumstances . . .; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses." State v. Conn, 278 Kan. 387, 390-91 , 99 P.3d 1108 (2004); see State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. 271, 273-74 , 64 P.3d 419 (2003). | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Neighborsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Steven Curtis Waupekenaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gonzalesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bryantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Whartongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vale v. Louisianagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Warehouse Groceries Management, Inc., a Corporation v. Sav-U-Warehouse Groceries, Inc., a Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Metzinger v. Suberagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2004App. 2d 405, 409-10 , 947 P.2d 1030 (1997): “The emergency doctrine reflects a recognition that the police perform a community caretaking function which goes beyond fighting crime. [Citation omitted.] Under this function, the community looks to the police to render aid and assistance to protect fives and property on an emergency basis regardless of whether a crime is involved.” *32 In Mendez, 275 Kan. at 425 , this court approved the use in Jones of a three-part test from People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-78 , 383 N.Y.S.2d 246 , 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976), for analyzing the applicability of th 2004See State v. Anderson, 259 Kan. 16 , Syl. ¶ 1, 910 P.2d 180 (1996) (on a motion to suppress evidence, State bears the burden of proving the lawfulness of the search and seizure). , As the Jones court further observed: “It is important to keep in mind that reasonable grounds under the emergency doctrine differs from the probable cause required under the more familiar crime-related exigent circumstances exception.” 24 Kan. | 8 | 2000–2014 |
People v. Mitchell
red
2 sentences2004App. 2d 405, 409-10 , 947 P.2d 1030 (1997): “The emergency doctrine reflects a recognition that the police perform a community caretaking function which goes beyond fighting crime. [Citation omitted.] Under this function, the community looks to the police to render aid and assistance to protect fives and property on an emergency basis regardless of whether a crime is involved.” *32 In Mendez, 275 Kan. at 425 , this court approved the use in Jones of a three-part test from People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-78 , 383 N.Y.S.2d 246 , 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976), for analyzing the applicability of th 2004App. 2d 405, 409-10 , 947 P.2d 1030 (1997): “The emergency doctrine reflects a recognition that the police perform a community caretaking function which goes beyond fighting crime. [Citation omitted.] Under this function, the community looks to the police to render aid and assistance to protect fives and property on an emergency basis regardless of whether a crime is involved.” *32 In Mendez, 275 Kan. at 425 , this court approved the use in Jones of a three-part test from People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-78 , 383 N.Y.S.2d 246 , 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976), for analyzing the applicability of th | 5 | 1997–2006 |
State v. Ramirez
green
2 sentences2020State v. Ramirez, 278 Kan. 402, 404-05 , 100 P.3d 94 (2004). 2006Any warrantless search is considered unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception; Kansas recognizes the following eight exceptions to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable: consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause to search accompanied by exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. 278 Kan. at 404-05 . | 4 | 2006–2020 |
State v. Fitzgerald
green
2 sentences2015Those recognized exceptions are: 'consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.' [State v.] Fitzgerald, 286 Kan. [1124,] 1127[, 192 P.3d 171 (2008)]." In the district court, the State argued that two exceptions to the warrant requirement were present in this case: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; and, (2) probable cause plus exigent circumstances. 2015Those recognized exceptions are: ‘consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.’ [State v.] Fitzgerald, 286 Kan. [1124,] 1127[, 192 P.3d 171 (2008)].” In the district court, the State argued that two exceptions to the warrant requirement were present in this case: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; and, (2) probable cause plus exigent circumstances. | 4 | 2012–2015 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2007For example, in State v. Jones, 2 Kan. 2001App. 2d at 410-13 , we analyzed earlier mentions of the emergency doctrine in Kansas appellate decisions, concluding that only State v. Jones, 2 Kan. | 4 | 1997–2007 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2016Other exceptions include “search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.” Johnson, 297 Kan. at 223 . 2014It is the State’s burden to validate a warrantless search by fitting it within one of tire recognized exceptions, which are: consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely reg *727 ulated businesses. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Johnson, 297 Kan. 210, 223 , 301 P.3d 287 (2013). | 3 | 2014–2016 |
State v. Box
neutral
2 sentences2006See Canaan, 265 Kan. at 843 (inventory search of impounded automobile; plain view); State v. Box, 28 Kan. 2003See Canaan, 265 Kan. at 843 (inventory search of impounded automobile; plain view); State v. Box 28 Kan. | 3 | 2001–2006 |
Eldredge v. Sargent
green
2 sentences1956They contend further that the emergency doctrine, relied on by appellant, does not apply where the operator’s own negligence placed him in the unexpected situation, citing Eldredge v. Sargent, 150 Kan. 824 , 96 P. 2d 870 , and DeGraw v. Kansas City & Leavenworth Transportation Co., 170 Kan. 713 , 228 P. 2d 527 . 1956They contend further that the emergency doctrine, relied on by appellant, does not apply where the operator’s own negligence placed him in the unexpected situation, citing Eldredge v. Sargent, 150 Kan. 824 , 96 P. 2d 870 , and DeGraw v. Kansas City & Leavenworth Transportation Co., 170 Kan. 713 , 228 P. 2d 527 . | 3 | 1946–1958 |
State v. Richard
green
2 sentences2023These warrant requirement exceptions include: "'consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; 8 stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.'" Howard, 305 Kan. at 989 (quoting State v. Richard, 300 Kan. 715, 726-27 , 333 P.3d 179 [2014]). 2023These warrant requirement exceptions include: "'consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; 8 stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.'" Howard, 305 Kan. at 989 (quoting State v. Richard, 300 Kan. 715, 726-27 , 333 P.3d 179 [2014]). | 2 | 2019–2023 |
State v. Rupnick
green
2 sentences2022State v. Rupnick, 280 Kan. 720, 727 , 125 P.3d 541 (2005). 2022State v. Rupnick, 280 Kan. 720, 727 , 125 P.3d 541 (2005). | 2 | 2008–2022 |
State v. Doelz
green
2 sentences2022The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include "'consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent 5 circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.'" State v. Doelz, 309 Kan. 133, 140 , 432 P.3d 669 (2019). "[A] subclass of the probable-cause-plus-exigent-circumstances exception is called the automobile exception." 309 Kan. at 143 . 2022The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include "'consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent 5 circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.'" State v. Doelz, 309 Kan. 133, 140 , 432 P.3d 669 (2019). "[A] subclass of the probable-cause-plus-exigent-circumstances exception is called the automobile exception." 309 Kan. at 143 . | 2 | 2020–2022 |
State v. Blair
green
2 sentences2006The emergency doctrine does not apply under the facts of this case.” Blair, 31 Kan. 2003App. 2d 202 , 62 P.3d 661 (2002), also discussed the emergency doctrine but had consent and probable cause issues as well. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
State v. Boyle
green
2 sentences2003The Jones II opinion suggested that State v. Boyle, 207 Kan. 833 , 486 P.2d 849 (1971), was not really an emergency doctrine case because there were two independent grounds to justify the warrantless search- — consent and probable cause, coupled with exigent circumstances. 24 Kan. 2003The Jones II opinion suggested that State v. Boyle, 207 Kan. 833 , 486 P.2d 849 (1971), was not really an emergency doctrine case because there were two independent grounds to justify the warrantless search- — consent and probable cause, coupled with exigent circumstances. 24 Kan. | 2 | 1997–2003 |
State v. Fisher
green
2 sentences2003The Jones II opinion explained the difference between the exigent circumstances exception and the emergency exception by setting forth the following quote from State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 240-41 , 686 P.2d 750 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1066 (1984). “ ‘The exigent circumstances exception is triggered when the police, with probable cause but no warrant, enter a dwelling in the reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatens the destruction of evidence, [citations omitted], or when they have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress or has *426 just been committed 2003The Jones II opinion explained the difference between the exigent circumstances exception and the emergency exception by setting forth the following quote from State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 240-41 , 686 P.2d 750 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1066 (1984). “ ‘The exigent circumstances exception is triggered when the police, with probable cause but no warrant, enter a dwelling in the reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatens the destruction of evidence, [citations omitted], or when they have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress or has *426 just been committed | 2 | 1997–2003 |
Fisher v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2003The Jones II opinion explained the difference between the exigent circumstances exception and the emergency exception by setting forth the following quote from State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 240-41 , 686 P.2d 750 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1066 (1984). “ ‘The exigent circumstances exception is triggered when the police, with probable cause but no warrant, enter a dwelling in the reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatens the destruction of evidence, [citations omitted], or when they have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress or has *426 just been committed 1997As explained in State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 240-41 , 686 P.2d 750 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1066 (1984), the exigent circumstances exception is distinct from the emergency exception, and the two are often confused: “The exigent circumstances exception is triggered when the police, with probable cause but no warrant, enter a dwelling in the reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatens the destruction of evidence, [citations omitted], or when they have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress or has just been committed in a dwelling and the delay attendant to | 2 | 1997–2003 |
Omni Outdoor Advertising of Missouri, Inc. v. City of Topeka
green
2 sentences2023Different standards of proof and of preparation may apply to the emergency hearing as opposed to the full trial.'" 241 Kan. at 137 (quoting Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 , 1057 [7th Cir. 1972]) (Emphasis added.) Following this discussion, the court held that a district court can "consolidate a hearing on a motion for a temporary injunction with a trial on the merits of an injunction action, providing that no prejudice results to the parties." 241 Kan. at 138 . 2023Different standards of proof and of preparation may apply to the emergency hearing as opposed to the full trial.'" 241 Kan. at 137 (quoting Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 , 1057 [7th Cir. 1972]) (Emphasis added.) Following this discussion, the court held that a district court can "consolidate a hearing on a motion for a temporary injunction with a trial on the merits of an injunction action, providing that no prejudice results to the parties." 241 Kan. at 138 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Building
green
1 sentence2023Different standards of proof and of preparation may apply to the emergency hearing as opposed to the full trial.'" 241 Kan. at 137 (quoting Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 , 1057 [7th Cir. 1972]) (Emphasis added.) Following this discussion, the court held that a district court can "consolidate a hearing on a motion for a temporary injunction with a trial on the merits of an injunction action, providing that no prejudice results to the parties." 241 Kan. at 138 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Knight green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Hill
green
1 sentence2021"Probable cause is the reasonable belief that a specific crime has been or is being committed and that the defendant committed [a] crime." Hill, 281 Kan. at 146 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Estrada-Vital green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Overman green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Voit neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Murry green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Vandevelde green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Brigham City v. Stuart green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Horn green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Alvidrez green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Geimer v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Commonwealth v. Silo green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Lewis L. Wayne v. United States green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Helen Frances Sutton Root v. Isabel H. Gauper green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Mesecher v. Cropp green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Hallett v. Stone green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Holle v. Lake green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Carpenter v. Strimple green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Winfough v. Tri-State Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Barzen v. Kepler neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Mulich v. Graham Ship ex rel. Logan neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| DeGraw v. Kansas City & Leavenworth Transportation Co. green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Picou v. Kansas City Public Service Co. green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.