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22 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1913–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McIntyre v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2018Ass’n v. Geary, 635 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Ky. 1982), as holding that while a legislative determination of emergency is subject to judicial review, “legislative judgment in that respect must be 60 The majority opinion cites to McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W. 931, 933 (Ky. 1927), for the proposition that even if the emergency clause was ineffective, the bill would take effect 90 days after the adjournment of the legislature. 2018Ass’n v. Geary, 635 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Ky. 1982), as holding that while a legislative determination of emergency is subject to judicial review, “legislative judgment in that respect must be 60 The majority opinion cites to McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W. 931, 933 (Ky. 1927), for the proposition that even if the emergency clause was ineffective, the bill would take effect 90 days after the adjournment of the legislature. | 2 | 3 |
Lyttle, County Judge v. Keithgreen2 sentences2018Gov't, 833 F.3d 590 , 607 n.4 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Lyttle v. Keith, 95 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Ky. 1936)). 50 taking effect. 2018Gov't, 833 F.3d 590 , 607 n.4 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Lyttle v. Keith, 95 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Ky. 1936)). 50 taking effect. | 2 | 2 |
Payne v. Tennesseegreen2 sentences2018“As the Kentucky Supreme Court has explained, if the emergency clause of an otherwise valid statute is invalid, then the statute takes effect at the time it would have become law without an emergency clause.”52 Essentially, even if a violation of Section 55 existed, this point would be moot today because the RTWA would take effect 90 days after adjournment of the session in which it was passed, instead of immediately 50 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 51 Commonwealth v. Terrell, 464 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Ky. 2015) (internal citations om 2018“As the Kentucky Supreme Court has explained, if the emergency clause of an otherwise valid statute is invalid, then the statute takes effect at the time it would have become law without an emergency clause.”52 Essentially, even if a violation of Section 55 existed, this point would be moot today because the RTWA would take effect 90 days after adjournment of the session in which it was passed, instead of immediately 50 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 51 Commonwealth v. Terrell, 464 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Ky. 2015) (internal citations om | 2 | 2 |
American Insurance Ass'n v. Gearygreen2 sentences2018Ass’n v. Geary, 635 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Ky. 1982), as holding that while a legislative determination of emergency is subject to judicial review, “legislative judgment in that respect must be 60 The majority opinion cites to McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W. 931, 933 (Ky. 1927), for the proposition that even if the emergency clause was ineffective, the bill would take effect 90 days after the adjournment of the legislature. 2018Ass’n v. Geary, 635 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Ky. 1982), as holding that while a legislative determination of emergency is subject to judicial review, “legislative judgment in that respect must be 60 The majority opinion cites to McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W. 931, 933 (Ky. 1927), for the proposition that even if the emergency clause was ineffective, the bill would take effect 90 days after the adjournment of the legislature. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Terrellgreen2 sentences2018“As the Kentucky Supreme Court has explained, if the emergency clause of an otherwise valid statute is invalid, then the statute takes effect at the time it would have become law without an emergency clause.”52 Essentially, even if a violation of Section 55 existed, this point would be moot today because the RTWA would take effect 90 days after adjournment of the session in which it was passed, instead of immediately 50 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 51 Commonwealth v. Terrell, 464 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Ky. 2015) (internal citations om 2018“As the Kentucky Supreme Court has explained, if the emergency clause of an otherwise valid statute is invalid, then the statute takes effect at the time it would have become law without an emergency clause.”52 Essentially, even if a violation of Section 55 existed, this point would be moot today because the RTWA would take effect 90 days after adjournment of the session in which it was passed, instead of immediately 50 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 51 Commonwealth v. Terrell, 464 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Ky. 2015) (internal citations om | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Davisgreen2 sentences2010Simply put, what else was the officer to do?” Commonwealth v. Davis, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 88 , 823 N.E.2d 411, 413 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 2010Simply put, what else was the officer to do?” Commonwealth v. Davis, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 88 , 823 N.E.2d 411, 413 (2005) (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Ficke v. Bd. of Tr. of Erlanger C.G.S. D.green2 sentences1995See Ficke v. Board of Trustees, Etc., 262 Ky. 312 , 90 S.W.2d 66 (1936). 1995See Ficke v. Board of Trustees, Etc., 262 Ky. 312 , 90 S.W.2d 66 (1936). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tibbs v. Bunnell
green
2 sentences2016The primary—if not 2 See 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(a). 3 448 S.W.3d 796 (Ky. 2014). 2 sole—purpose of the hearing was to determine if the nurse's deposition scheduled for the following day could proceed as scheduled. 2016The primary—if not 2 See 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(a). 3 448 S.W.3d 796 (Ky. 2014). 2 sole—purpose of the hearing was to determine if the nurse's deposition scheduled for the following day could proceed as scheduled. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government
green
2 sentences2018Gov't, 833 F.3d 590 , 607 n.4 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Lyttle v. Keith, 95 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Ky. 1936)). 50 taking effect. 2018Gov't, 833 F.3d 590 , 607 n.4 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Lyttle v. Keith, 95 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Ky. 1936)). 50 taking effect. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Campbell County Election Commission v. Weber
neutral
2 sentences1961If one of the inconsistent acts contains an emergency clause, and the other does not, it is presumed that the General Assembly intended the act with the emergency clause to prevail.” Campbell County Election Commission v. Weber, 1931, 240 Ky. 373 , 42 S.W.2d 511, 512 . 1961If one of the inconsistent acts contains an emergency clause, and the other does not, it is presumed that the General Assembly intended the act with the emergency clause to prevail.” Campbell County Election Commission v. Weber, 1931, 240 Ky. 373 , 42 S.W.2d 511, 512 . | 2 | 1961–1969 |
Heilig v. City Council of Puyallup
green
2 sentences1926In Lambert v. Board of Trustees, 151 Ky. 725 , 152 S. W. 802 , American Annotated Cases, 1915A, p. 180, the *770 case of Heilig v. City Council of Puyallup, 7 Wash. 29 , 34 Pac. 164 , was cited with approval, wherein the court said: “But we are also of the opinion that where two conflicting’ acts upon the same subject matter are passed at the same session of the legislature, and their conflict is such that they cannot be harmonized and stand together, and one of them contains an emergency clause and the other does not, that one containing the emergency clause must be taken to overcome the othe 1926In Lambert v. Board of Trustees, 151 Ky. 725 , 152 S. W. 802 , American Annotated Cases, 1915A, p. 180, the *770 case of Heilig v. City Council of Puyallup, 7 Wash. 29 , 34 Pac. 164 , was cited with approval, wherein the court said: “But we are also of the opinion that where two conflicting’ acts upon the same subject matter are passed at the same session of the legislature, and their conflict is such that they cannot be harmonized and stand together, and one of them contains an emergency clause and the other does not, that one containing the emergency clause must be taken to overcome the othe | 2 | 1913–1926 |
United States v. Hunter Lee Williams Nicholas Edward George and Geoffrey Hillman Leek
green
1 sentence2024Crite indicates that the facts involving this police entry is similar to that which occurred in United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2003), where the Court determined that a landlord could not properly bring Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents along to investigate a possible water leak. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co.
green
1 sentence2001The act also contained an emergency clause stating that “there is a vital need to properly protect the school children of the state in going to and returning from school.” Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Charles Emmett Hoffman
green
1 sentence1999This issue has been considered by various state and federal courts, which have found a warrant unnecessary in these circumstances. 2 The minority view, requiring a warrant, is stated in United States v. Hoffman, 607 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.1979). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Sumpter v. Burchett, as Commonwealth's Atty.
green
2 sentences1961And “repeals by implication are never favored and will be sanctioned only when there is such a conflict between the two that effect can not be given to both.” Sumpter v. Burchett, 1947, 304 Ky. 858 , 202 S.W2d 735, 736 . 1961And “repeals by implication are never favored and will be sanctioned only when there is such a conflict between the two that effect can not be given to both.” Sumpter v. Burchett, 1947, 304 Ky. 858 , 202 S.W2d 735, 736 . | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Gilreath v. Blue & Gray Transportation Co.
neutral
2 sentences1958Gilreath v. Blue & Gray Transportation Co., 269 Ky. 787 , 108 S.W.2d 1002 .” In the light of the foregoing rule, it is our view the trial court committed a reversible error when it refused to give an emergency instruction, which defendant’s counsel properly and timely requested. 1958Gilreath v. Blue & Gray Transportation Co., 269 Ky. 787 , 108 S.W.2d 1002 .” In the light of the foregoing rule, it is our view the trial court committed a reversible error when it refused to give an emergency instruction, which defendant’s counsel properly and timely requested. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Robinson Transfer Company v. Turner
green
1 sentence1949Robinson Transfer Co. v. Turner, 244 Ky. *646 181, 50 S.W.2d 546 ; Bybee Bros, v Imes, 288 Ky. 1 , 155 S.W.2d 492 . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Bybee Bros., Inc. v. Imes
neutral
2 sentences1949Robinson Transfer Co. v. Turner, 244 Ky. *646 181, 50 S.W.2d 546 ; Bybee Bros, v Imes, 288 Ky. 1 , 155 S.W.2d 492 . 1949Robinson Transfer Co. v. Turner, 244 Ky. *646 181, 50 S.W.2d 546 ; Bybee Bros, v Imes, 288 Ky. 1 , 155 S.W.2d 492 . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Bagby v. Champ
neutral
1 sentence1936In this case the intention to do so is clear from the terms of the statute itself, and it is especially shown in its emergency clause (section 2), as well as in its title, the latter of which declares the purpose of the aet “to provide additional remedies for the collection of school taxes in said graded common school districts.” The emergency clause declares the inadequacy of the present remedies for that purpose, and for which reason the act “shall take effect and be in full force and effect, from and after its passage and approval.” That the Legislature may prescribe new or additional remed | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Buckner v. Board of Education of Owensboro City School District
neutral
2 sentences1934In construing that language of the Constitution; in the case of Samuels v. City of Clinton, 184 Ky. 97 , 211 S. W. 567, 569 , a case involving the acquisition of an existing electric light plant, which was about *162 to be dismantled and which was the only one serving the city, the court said: £ £ This court has never, except in general terms, defined what an emergency must be or of what circumstances it must consist to authorize a municipality to incur indebtedness in excess of the amounts prescribed for it by section 158, supra. The emergency by the terms of the Constitution is limited to pe 1934In construing that language of the Constitution; in the case of Samuels v. City of Clinton, 184 Ky. 97 , 211 S. W. 567, 569 , a case involving the acquisition of an existing electric light plant, which was about *162 to be dismantled and which was the only one serving the city, the court said: £ £ This court has never, except in general terms, defined what an emergency must be or of what circumstances it must consist to authorize a municipality to incur indebtedness in excess of the amounts prescribed for it by section 158, supra. The emergency by the terms of the Constitution is limited to pe | 1 | 1934–1934 |
City of Marion v. Haynes
green
2 sentences1934In construing that language of the Constitution; in the case of Samuels v. City of Clinton, 184 Ky. 97 , 211 S. W. 567, 569 , a case involving the acquisition of an existing electric light plant, which was about *162 to be dismantled and which was the only one serving the city, the court said: £ £ This court has never, except in general terms, defined what an emergency must be or of what circumstances it must consist to authorize a municipality to incur indebtedness in excess of the amounts prescribed for it by section 158, supra. The emergency by the terms of the Constitution is limited to pe 1934In construing that language of the Constitution; in the case of Samuels v. City of Clinton, 184 Ky. 97 , 211 S. W. 567, 569 , a case involving the acquisition of an existing electric light plant, which was about *162 to be dismantled and which was the only one serving the city, the court said: £ £ This court has never, except in general terms, defined what an emergency must be or of what circumstances it must consist to authorize a municipality to incur indebtedness in excess of the amounts prescribed for it by section 158, supra. The emergency by the terms of the Constitution is limited to pe | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Samuels v. City of Clinton
neutral
2 sentences1934In construing that language of the Constitution; in the case of Samuels v. City of Clinton, 184 Ky. 97 , 211 S. W. 567, 569 , a case involving the acquisition of an existing electric light plant, which was about *162 to be dismantled and which was the only one serving the city, the court said: £ £ This court has never, except in general terms, defined what an emergency must be or of what circumstances it must consist to authorize a municipality to incur indebtedness in excess of the amounts prescribed for it by section 158, supra. The emergency by the terms of the Constitution is limited to pe 1934In construing that language of the Constitution; in the case of Samuels v. City of Clinton, 184 Ky. 97 , 211 S. W. 567, 569 , a case involving the acquisition of an existing electric light plant, which was about *162 to be dismantled and which was the only one serving the city, the court said: £ £ This court has never, except in general terms, defined what an emergency must be or of what circumstances it must consist to authorize a municipality to incur indebtedness in excess of the amounts prescribed for it by section 158, supra. The emergency by the terms of the Constitution is limited to pe | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Naylor v. Board of Education
neutral
2 sentences1931Naylor v. Board of Education, 216 Ky. 766 , 288 S. W. 690 . 1931Naylor v. Board of Education, 216 Ky. 766 , 288 S. W. 690 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Deaton and Boggs v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1928It was held by this court in McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 17 , 297 S. W. 931 , and in Deaton v. Commonwealth, 220 Ky. 343 , 295 S. W. 167 , that the emergency clause in the act of March 25, 1926, was invalid on its face and for that reason the act changing the terms of court in the Thirty-Third judicial district comprised of the counties of Leslie and Perry, did not take effect until 90 days after adjournment of the Legislature. 1928It was held by this court in McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 17 , 297 S. W. 931 , and in Deaton v. Commonwealth, 220 Ky. 343 , 295 S. W. 167 , that the emergency clause in the act of March 25, 1926, was invalid on its face and for that reason the act changing the terms of court in the Thirty-Third judicial district comprised of the counties of Leslie and Perry, did not take effect until 90 days after adjournment of the Legislature. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Lambert v. Bd. Trustees Public Library
green
2 sentences1926In Lambert v. Board of Trustees, 151 Ky. 725 , 152 S. W. 802 , American Annotated Cases, 1915A, p. 180, the *770 case of Heilig v. City Council of Puyallup, 7 Wash. 29 , 34 Pac. 164 , was cited with approval, wherein the court said: “But we are also of the opinion that where two conflicting’ acts upon the same subject matter are passed at the same session of the legislature, and their conflict is such that they cannot be harmonized and stand together, and one of them contains an emergency clause and the other does not, that one containing the emergency clause must be taken to overcome the othe 1926In Lambert v. Board of Trustees, 151 Ky. 725 , 152 S. W. 802 , American Annotated Cases, 1915A, p. 180, the *770 case of Heilig v. City Council of Puyallup, 7 Wash. 29 , 34 Pac. 164 , was cited with approval, wherein the court said: “But we are also of the opinion that where two conflicting’ acts upon the same subject matter are passed at the same session of the legislature, and their conflict is such that they cannot be harmonized and stand together, and one of them contains an emergency clause and the other does not, that one containing the emergency clause must be taken to overcome the othe | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins
green
1 sentence1925It would be an intolerable state of affairs if a document purporting to be an act of the legislature could thus be a law in one case and for one party and not a law in another case and for another party; a law today and not a law tomorrow: a law in one place and not a law in another in the same state.” Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260 ; Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U. S. 506 . | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Wilkes County v. Coler
green
1 sentence1925It would be an intolerable state of affairs if a document purporting to be an act of the legislature could thus be a law in one case and for one party and not a law in another case and for another party; a law today and not a law tomorrow: a law in one place and not a law in another in the same state.” Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260 ; Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U. S. 506 . | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Fiscal Court v. Commonwealth
neutral
1 sentence1914While this court has never undertaken to say precisely what state of case would amount to an emergency that would authorize the levy of a tax in excess of the statutory rate under section 158 of the Constitution, it has, in Fiscal Court of Franklin County v. Commonwealth, 139 Ky., 307, 312 , declared that the need of a new court house was not such an emergency. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Chandler v. Lee
green
1 sentence1913Chandler v. Lee, supra; Stuart v. Chapman, supra. If, therefore, there are any facts connected with the passage of these two acts, when considered in their entire history, that would indicate which act expresses the ¡mind of the Legislature concerning the common subject to which they relate, those facts must be given controlling force; and it is contended that the emergency clause in Chapter 70 should and must be given that force. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Princeton Coal Mining Co. v. Lawrence
green
1 sentence1913In Princeton Coal Mining Co. v. Lawrence, —, Ind., —, 95 N. E. 423 , two acts of the Legislature were passed on the same day; one, by its terms, being cumulative of other laws upon the subject of coal mining, and repealing inconsistent laws, while the other, with an emergency clause, embraced the subject of actions for injuries, by classifying them. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.