emergency instruction in Oregon

2002In Bridewell , the Supreme Court held that an open front door does not provide probable cause of criminal activity that will justify a warrantless entry under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. *352 A closer analogy is the “emergency aid doctrine.” In State v. Follett, 115 Or App 672 , 840 P2d 1298 (1992), we described and applied that exception: “We conclude that the Emergency Aid Doctrine provides an exception to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9, when these conditions are met: “(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency a

2002In Bridewell , the Supreme Court held that an open front door does not provide probable cause of criminal activity that will justify a warrantless entry under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. *352 A closer analogy is the “emergency aid doctrine.” In State v. Follett, 115 Or App 672 , 840 P2d 1298 (1992), we described and applied that exception: “We conclude that the Emergency Aid Doctrine provides an exception to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9, when these conditions are met: “(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency a

2008In Ballard v. Rickabaugh Orchards, Inc., 259 Or 200, 207 , 485 P2d 1080 (1971), for example, this court stated that the emergency instruction “is unnecessary to give and should be avoided * * *.” This court has also stated that “it would be a rare situation, indeed, where it would be error to fail to give [the emergency instruction,] because the usual instruction on negligence sufficiently covers what a reasonably prudent person would do under all circumstances, including those of sudden emergency.” Evans v. General Telephone, 257 Or 460, 467 , 479 P2d 747 (1971).

2008In Ballard v. Rickabaugh Orchards, Inc., 259 Or 200, 207 , 485 P2d 1080 (1971), for example, this court stated that the emergency instruction “is unnecessary to give and should be avoided * * *.” This court has also stated that “it would be a rare situation, indeed, where it would be error to fail to give [the emergency instruction,] because the usual instruction on negligence sufficiently covers what a reasonably prudent person would do under all circumstances, including those of sudden emergency.” Evans v. General Telephone, 257 Or 460, 467 , 479 P2d 747 (1971).

2008The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 1 In Lane v. Brown, 328 Or 42, 45 , 970 P2d 206 (1998), this court had allowed review of a Court of Appeals decision to consider the “continuing validity” of the emergency instruction.

2008The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 1 In Lane v. Brown, 328 Or 42, 45 , 970 P2d 206 (1998), this court had allowed review of a Court of Appeals decision to consider the “continuing validity” of the emergency instruction.

2024The habeas court disagreed and explained that it had wanted a pain specialist to eval- uate plaintiff to provide “the most recent recommendations and trends and modalities that are available to a patient with his unique condition.” Although the court did not order Cite as 335 Or App 124 (2024) 129 defendant to comply with the pain specialist’s recommen- dations, the court ordered defendant to provide a follow-up appointment with the pain specialist within 14 days.

2024The habeas court disagreed and explained that it had wanted a pain specialist to eval- uate plaintiff to provide “the most recent recommendations and trends and modalities that are available to a patient with his unique condition.” Although the court did not order Cite as 335 Or App 124 (2024) 129 defendant to comply with the pain specialist’s recommen- dations, the court ordered defendant to provide a follow-up appointment with the pain specialist within 14 days.

2021At issue was a county property-transfer tax ordinance, which included an emergency clause intended to prevent a referendum on the ordinance. 275 Or at 547 .

2021Id.

1996Id.

1974Greenberg v. Lee et al., 196 Or 157 , 248 P2d 324 , 35 ALR2d 567 (1952); Joplin v. Ten Brook et al., 124 Or 36 , 263 P 893 (1928).

1995Notably, in Templeton v. Smith, 88 Or App 266 , 744 P2d 1325 (1987), rev den 305 Or 45 (1988), this court held that, to warrant the use of an emergency instruction, there must be evidence not just of any emergency but of an “extraordinary” one.

1995Notably, in Templeton v. Smith, 88 Or App 266 , 744 P2d 1325 (1987), rev den 305 Or 45 (1988), this court held that, to warrant the use of an emergency instruction, there must be evidence not just of any emergency but of an “extraordinary” one.

1993In Frangos v. Edmunds, 179 Or 577, 607-08 , 173 P2d 596 (1946), the court said that “the emergency doctrine ordinarily applies only when the evidence discloses that alternative action is possible and that quick judgment is required.” See also Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Or 24, 30 , 393 P2d 217 (1964).

1993In Frangos v. Edmunds, 179 Or 577, 607-08 , 173 P2d 596 (1946), the court said that “the emergency doctrine ordinarily applies only when the evidence discloses that alternative action is possible and that quick judgment is required.” See also Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Or 24, 30 , 393 P2d 217 (1964).

1992In holding that the entry into the defendant's room was lawful under the emergency exception, the court said: "[T]he initial entry into defendant's room was lawful based upon the police officer's reasonable belief, in the circumstances, that he might be able to render lifesaving medical assistance to the victim." 300 Or. at 229 , 709 P.2d 225 .

1992In holding that the entry into the defendant's room was lawful under the emergency exception, the court said: "[T]he initial entry into defendant's room was lawful based upon the police officer's reasonable belief, in the circumstances, that he might be able to render lifesaving medical assistance to the victim." 300 Or. at 229 , 709 P.2d 225 .

1988State ex rel Smith v. Kozer, 121 Or 459 , 255 P 900 (1927). *478 Striking the emergency clause means that the effective date of section 53 was October 3, 1977, not, as plaintiffs contend, January 1, 1978.

1988State ex rel Smith v. Kozer, 121 Or 459 , 255 P 900 (1927). *478 Striking the emergency clause means that the effective date of section 53 was October 3, 1977, not, as plaintiffs contend, January 1, 1978.

1983The emergency doctrine was recognized by the Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385, 392 , 98 S Ct 2408 , 57 L Ed 2d 290 (1978), when the Court stated: “* * * We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations.

1983The emergency doctrine was recognized by the Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385, 392 , 98 S Ct 2408 , 57 L Ed 2d 290 (1978), when the Court stated: “* * * We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations.

1976They cite Roy v. Beveridge, 125 Or 92 , 266 P 230 (1928), as supporting that contention.

1976They cite Roy v. Beveridge, 125 Or 92 , 266 P 230 (1928), as supporting that contention.

1974Greenberg v. Lee et al., 196 Or 157 , 248 P2d 324 , 35 ALR2d 567 (1952); Joplin v. Ten Brook et al., 124 Or 36 , 263 P 893 (1928).

1974Greenberg v. Lee et al., 196 Or 157 , 248 P2d 324 , 35 ALR2d 567 (1952); Joplin v. Ten Brook et al., 124 Or 36 , 263 P 893 (1928).

1955In Schutt v. Hull, 193 Or 18, 23 , 236 P2d 937 , we said: “It is the law that a person cannot invoke the emergency doctrine if the emergency is created by his own negligence.” In the instruction above quoted the court told the jury that the defendant Russell was entitled to the benefit of the emergency rule if through no “gross negligence” on his part he was confronted by an emergency of imminent and impending danger.

1955In Schutt v. Hull, 193 Or 18, 23 , 236 P2d 937 , we said: “It is the law that a person cannot invoke the emergency doctrine if the emergency is created by his own negligence.” In the instruction above quoted the court told the jury that the defendant Russell was entitled to the benefit of the emergency rule if through no “gross negligence” on his part he was confronted by an emergency of imminent and impending danger.

1927As stated by Mr. Justice Rand in Cameron v. Stevens, 121 Or. 538 ( 256 Pac. 395 ), decided May 24, 1927: *300 “The effect of an emergency clause upon acts passed by the legislature is to cause the act to take effect at once upon its approval by the governor and to prevent its not going into effect until after the expiration of the period otherwise prescribed by the constitution.

1927As stated by Mr. Justice Rand in Cameron v. Stevens, 121 Or. 538 ( 256 Pac. 395 ), decided May 24, 1927: *300 “The effect of an emergency clause upon acts passed by the legislature is to cause the act to take effect at once upon its approval by the governor and to prevent its not going into effect until after the expiration of the period otherwise prescribed by the constitution.

1921“When these statutes were enacted, an indorsement of a note had been long recognized as carrying with it the mortgage given to secure its payment, as the latter was regarded but an incident to the debt: Roberts v. Sutherlin, 4 Or. 219 ; Bamberger v. Geiser, 24 Or. 204 ( 33 Pac. 609 ).

1905When these statutes were enacted, an indorsement of a note had been long recognized as carrying with it the mortgage given to secure its payment, as the latter was regarded but an incident to the debt: Roberts v. Sutherlin, 4 Or. 219 ; Bamberger v. Geiser, 24 Or. 204 ( 33 Pac. 609 ).

1921“When these statutes were enacted, an indorsement of a note had been long recognized as carrying with it the mortgage given to secure its payment, as the latter was regarded but an incident to the debt: Roberts v. Sutherlin, 4 Or. 219 ; Bamberger v. Geiser, 24 Or. 204 ( 33 Pac. 609 ).

1905When these statutes were enacted, an indorsement of a note had been long recognized as carrying with it the mortgage given to secure its payment, as the latter was regarded but an incident to the debt: Roberts v. Sutherlin, 4 Or. 219 ; Bamberger v. Geiser, 24 Or. 204 ( 33 Pac. 609 ).

2025Just as it had announced in Fenton that the “unavoidable accident” instruction should no longer be given, the court announced in Bjorndal that the “emergency” instruction should no longer be given: “We * * * now hold that the emergency instruction, as used in ordi- nary vehicle negligence cases, is an inaccurate and confus- ing supplement to the instructions on the law of negligence and, therefore, should not be given.” Id. at 472 .

2022First, Taxpayer seems to assert that inclusion of an emergency clause in a bill that regulates tax- ation renders the “tax provisions” of the bill “invalid.”16 Yet elsewhere in the same discussion, Taxpayer seems to agree with Advance Resorts of America, Inc. v. City of Wheeler, where the Court of Appeals, upon review of Oregon author- ities, concluded that the unconstitutional inclusion of an emergency clause renders invalid only the emergency clause itself, with the result that the court will sever that clause from the rest of the law. 141 Or App 166, 178-79 , 917 P2d 61 (1996) (“It is well

2022First, Taxpayer seems to assert that inclusion of an emergency clause in a bill that regulates tax- ation renders the “tax provisions” of the bill “invalid.”16 Yet elsewhere in the same discussion, Taxpayer seems to agree with Advance Resorts of America, Inc. v. City of Wheeler, where the Court of Appeals, upon review of Oregon author- ities, concluded that the unconstitutional inclusion of an emergency clause renders invalid only the emergency clause itself, with the result that the court will sever that clause from the rest of the law. 141 Or App 166, 178-79 , 917 P2d 61 (1996) (“It is well

2020See Or Laws 1983, ch 763, § 64 (declaring emergency; effective August 4, 1983); Lent, 63 Or App 400 (decision dated June 8, 1983).

2013Mandela, 978 S.W.2d at 533 .

2008In Durnford v. Worden, 242 Or 536 , 410 P2d 1020 (1966), an automobile accident case, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for a new trial, concluding that it had erred in not giving an emergency instruction.

2008In Durnford v. Worden, 242 Or 536 , 410 P2d 1020 (1966), an automobile accident case, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for a new trial, concluding that it had erred in not giving an emergency instruction.