emergency doctrine in Texas

2023Ed. 2d 290 (1978)); see Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 860 (holding that the emergency doctrine justifies a warrantless entry if officers have an immediate, reasonable belief that they must act to protect or preserve life or to avoid serious injury). “[T]he emergency doctrine does not apply when the police are carrying out their ‘crime-fighting’ role by conducting a search based on probable cause to gather evidence of a crime.” Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 684 .

2021“Under the emergency doctrine, the officer has an immediate, reasonable belief that he or she must act to ‘protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.’”2 Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 861 (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 ).

2016Under the emergency doctrine, “[a] war-rantless search may be justified by a need to act immediately to protect or preserve life or to prevent serious injury.” Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex. Crim.

2013The emergency doctrine justifies the former, but it does not always justify the latter.” Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763, 768 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).

2024Appellant argues that evidence obtained through those warrants should have been excluded because the emergency exception did not apply to deputies’ warrantless entry. 3 As explained above, the emergency exception allows warrantless entry when the officer reasonably believes, based on facts he knows then, that entry is necessary to “protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.” Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 684 (quoting Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)).

2024Although Lozano went to the house to do a welfare check, the State relied on the emergency exception to justify his warrantless entry. 13 As explained above, the emergency exception allows warrantless entry when the officer reasonably believes, based on facts he knows then, that entry is necessary to “protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.” Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 684 (quoting Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)).

2024Appellant argues that evidence obtained through those warrants should have been excluded because the emergency exception did not apply to deputies’ warrantless entry. 3 As explained above, the emergency exception allows warrantless entry when the officer reasonably believes, based on facts he knows then, that entry is necessary to “protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.” Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 684 (quoting Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)).

2024Although Lozano went to the house to do a welfare check, the State relied on the emergency exception to justify his warrantless entry. 13 As explained above, the emergency exception allows warrantless entry when the officer reasonably believes, based on facts he knows then, that entry is necessary to “protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.” Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 684 (quoting Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)).

2015As this Court has long held, a reviewing court uses an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a warrantless search is justified.76 It applied that test when addressing the emergency doctrine, and the emergency doctrine is “considered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine.”77 The exigent circumstances doctrine applies when police act in a “crime-fighting” role, whereas the emergency doctrine occurs when police act in their limited caretaking role to protect and preserve 74 Oliver, slip op. at 4, 7 n. 5. 75 Id. at 5-7. 76 See Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 501 (citing G

2015App. 2003) (explaining the emergency doctrine is considered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine) (citing Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 500 ; Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim.

2005The public servant or Cady doctrine “deals primarily with warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles (and will be limited to those circumstances except in unusual circumstances) .... ” Id.; see also Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 152 n. 7 (stating that the emergency doctrine is similar to the community caretaking function, except that it applies to residences, rather than vehicles).

2005The public servant or Cady doctrine "deals primarily with warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles (and will be limited to those circumstances except in unusual circumstances)...." Id.; see also Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 152 n. 7 (stating that the emergency doctrine is similar to the community caretaking function, except that it applies to residences, rather than vehicles).

2024Significant to this appeal, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of negating Section 101.055’s applicability.” Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 529, (citing City of San Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667, 672 (Tex. 2006)); City of San Antonio v. Rosenbaum, No. 04-11-00498-CV, 2011 WL 6739583 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 21, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that once the City raised the issue, the plaintiffs “would be required to present some evidence showing that [the city actor] was not reacting to an emergency situation or responding to a 9–1–1 emergency call.”). (3) 9-1-1 exception Similar to t

2024According to the Texas Supreme Court, the TTCA’s emergency exception should be interpreted broadly to avoid excluding “emergencies the Legislature might have intended to include.” Hartman, 201 S.W.3d at 673 .

2023Smith, 562 S.W.3d at 79 ; see Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 529; Quested, 440 S.W.3d at 284 .2 1 Nothing prevents a governmental entity from also relying on undisputed allegations in a plaintiff’s petition, though that circumstance is not presented here. 2 In Maspero, for example, the City of San Antonio asserted in its plea to the jurisdiction that the city’s immunity was preserved under the emergency exception because the officer “was responding to an emergency in accordance with applicable law.” Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 527.

2022See Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 529; see also Quested, 440 S.W.3d at 284 . 6 The City relies on Maspero and City of San Antonio v. Riojas, 640 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2022) in support of its argument that the emergency exception applies.

2006The motivation for an entry pursuant to the emergency doctrine must be “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Laney , 117 S.W. 3d at 860 ; Brimage , 918 S.W.2d at 501 n.5; Gonzalez v. State , 148 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref’d); see also Corbin v. State , 85 S.W.3d 272 , 281 n.7 (Tex. Crim.

2006The motivation for an entry pursuant to the emergency doctrine must be “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 860 ; Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 501 n. 5; Gonzalez v. State, 148 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref'd); see also Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272 , 281 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (Cochran, J., concurring) (emergency search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence, and it is essential that courts be alert to possibility of subterfuge).

2004Although police may seize evidence found in plain view when they enter a residence pursuant to the emergency doctrine, see Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466 , 501 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), the motivation for the entry must be “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 860 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973)); see also Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272 , 281 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (Cochran, J., concurring) (emergency search must not be prima

2004Although police may seize evidence found in plain view when they enter a residence pursuant to the emergency doctrine, see Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466 , 501 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), the motivation for the entry must be “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 860 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973)); see also Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272 , 281 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (Cochran, J., concurring) (emergency search must not be prima

2010Id. at 404–05. [4] That is not to say that we conclude the officers’ warrantless entry was not justified under the emergency exception as discussed in Stuart , 547 U.S. at 404–05, Shepherd , 273 S.W.3d at 683–84, and Laney , 117 S.W.3d at 862–63.

2010Id. at 404–05. [4] That is not to say that we conclude the officers’ warrantless entry was not justified under the emergency exception as discussed in Stuart , 547 U.S. at 404–05, Shepherd , 273 S.W.3d at 683–84, and Laney , 117 S.W.3d at 862–63.

2024The underlying policy of the emergency exception is “‘to balance the safety of the public with the need for prompt response’ from emergency-assistance personnel.” City of San Antonio v. Trevino, No. 04-22-00224-CV, 2022 WL 17480550 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem.op.) (quoting Martin, 971 S.W.2d at 429 ).

2024See City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1998); Green, 274 S.W.3d at 22- 23; Ellis, 2015 WL 3424732 , at *7.

2003U.S. v. Armendariz-Mata, 949 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 945 , 112 S.Ct. 2288 , 119 L.Ed.2d 212 (1992); Morgan v. State, 906 S.W.2d 620, 629 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 865 , 117 S.Ct. 174 , 136 L.Ed.2d 115 (1996).

2003U.S. v. Armendariz-Mata, 949 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 945 , 112 S.Ct. 2288 , 119 L.Ed.2d 212 (1992); Morgan v. State, 906 S.W.2d 620, 629 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. refd), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 865 , 117 S.Ct. 174 , 136 L.Ed.2d 115 (1996).

2015As this Court has long held, a reviewing court uses an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a warrantless search is justified.76 It applied that test when addressing the emergency doctrine, and the emergency doctrine is “considered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine.”77 The exigent circumstances doctrine applies when police act in a “crime-fighting” role, whereas the emergency doctrine occurs when police act in their limited caretaking role to protect and preserve 74 Oliver, slip op. at 4, 7 n. 5. 75 Id. at 5-7. 76 See Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 501 (citing G

2007See Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590 . [1] Compare Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (holding that emergency doctrine applied because the officers were confronted with violence then occurring within the home); Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 863 (holding that emergency doctrine applied because there would have been a substantial risk of harm to the children if left in the home alone); Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 501 (holding that emergency doctrine applied because complainant had been missing for several days and was last seen near appellant's residence); and Ja

2015App. 2003) (explaining the emergency doctrine is considered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine) (citing Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 500 ; Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 2003) (explaining the emergency doctrine is considered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine) (citing Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 500 ; Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim.

2006The motivation for an entry pursuant to the emergency doctrine must be “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Laney , 117 S.W. 3d at 860 ; Brimage , 918 S.W.2d at 501 n.5; Gonzalez v. State , 148 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref’d); see also Corbin v. State , 85 S.W.3d 272 , 281 n.7 (Tex. Crim.

2006The motivation for an entry pursuant to the emergency doctrine must be “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 860 ; Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 501 n. 5; Gonzalez v. State, 148 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref'd); see also Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272 , 281 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (Cochran, J., concurring) (emergency search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence, and it is essential that courts be alert to possibility of subterfuge).

2012Although courts previously held that the police officer must be primarily motivated by the perceived emergency rather than the desire to investigate, see Wiede v. State , 157 S.W.3d 87, 102 (Tex. App.--Austin 2005, pet. ref'd), the United States Supreme Court has made clear that, in the context of the emergency doctrine, the officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant in determining whether the officer's actions violated the Fourth Amendment.

2012Although courts previously held that the police officer must be primarily motivated by the perceived emergency rather than the desire to investigate, see Wiede v. State, 157 S.W.3d 87, 102 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. ref’d), the United States Supreme Court has made clear that, in the context of the emergency doctrine, the officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant in determining whether the officer’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment.

2010Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 862 ; Rauscher v. State, 129 S.W.3d 714, 719 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d).

2010Laney , 117 S.W.3d at 862 ; Rauscher v. State , 129 S.W.3d 714, 719 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd).

2003U.S. v. Armendariz-Mata, 949 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 945 , 112 S.Ct. 2288 , 119 L.Ed.2d 212 (1992); Morgan v. State, 906 S.W.2d 620, 629 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 865 , 117 S.Ct. 174 , 136 L.Ed.2d 115 (1996).

2003U.S. v. Armendariz-Mata, 949 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 945 , 112 S.Ct. 2288 , 119 L.Ed.2d 212 (1992); Morgan v. State, 906 S.W.2d 620, 629 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. refd), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 865 , 117 S.Ct. 174 , 136 L.Ed.2d 115 (1996).

2021See id. at 509-10 ; see also Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 861 (stating, in the related context of the emergency doctrine, that a warrantless entry into a residence may be reasonable where “the police are acting, not in their ‘crime-fighting’ role, but in their limited community caretaking role to ‘protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury’”) (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 ).

2004See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S.Ct. 1942 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978); Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 , 98 S.Ct 2408 ; Janicek, 634 S.W.2d at 691 .

2019See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 .

2018See Univ. of Texas v. Poindexter, 306 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (citing Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227-28 (Tex. 2004)). 4 When applicable, the emergency exception overrides any waiver of immunity See City of San Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Tex. 2006).

2015See Gipson v. City of Dallas, 247 S.W.3d 465, 471 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (“We conclude sections 101.055(2) and 101.062(b) are relevant only after the threshold issue of the 25 existence of a waiver of immunity pursuant to section 101.021 is met”); City of El Paso v. Hernandez, 16 S.W.3d 409, 416 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied) (“[W]e hold that the City has sovereign immunity in an action involving a claim related to 9–1–1 emergency service only where governmental immunity is waived under Section 101.021. . . .”).

2015See Gipson v. City of Dallas, 247 S.W.3d 465, 471 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (“We conclude sections 101.055(2) and 101.062(b) are relevant only after the threshold issue of the existence of a waiver of immunity pursuant to section 101.021 is met”); City of El Paso v. Hernandez, 16 S.W.3d 409, 416 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied) (“[W]e hold that the City has sovereign immunity in an action involving a claim related to 9-1-1 emergency service only where governmental immunity is waived under Section 101.021....”).

2021City of San Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d at 673 (holding that placing barricades in the road to warn travelers of widespread flooding across streets was a response to an emergency situation); Durham, 135 S.W.3d at 299 (holding that Bowie County’s placement of warning signs at a chasm caused by storms and flooding constituted an emergency, as a matter of law); City of Arlington v. Whitaker, 977 S.W.2d 742 , 743–44 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied) (holding, as a matter of law, that the fire chief’s decision to park his official vehicle across a road to block egress into four feet of wa

2004Noting that the emergency exception does not apply solely to traffic accidents involving emergency vehicles, Whitaker , 977 S.W.2d at 745 , we conclude that, under the summary judgment evidence, the effects of the weather conditions faced by Bowie County were so serious and widespread that, under the circumstances, Bowie County conclusively proved it was reacting to an emergency situation when its employees placed the road closure signs.

2019Tex. Dep’t of Public Safety v. Little, 259 S.W.3d 236, 238 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

2018Texas Dep’t of Public Safety v. Little, 259 S.W.3d 236, 238 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).