emergency clause in Oklahoma

1949Leatherock v. Lawter, 45 Okla. 715 , 147 P. 324 . * * * * *x* * * “Although the emergency clause in this case provided that the Act take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval, that provision should be looked upon -as subordinate to the express provision contained in the body of the Act suspending its operation until a future date.

1949Leatherock v. Lawter, 45 Okla. 715 , 147 P. 324 . * * * * *x* * * “Although the emergency clause in this case provided that the Act take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval, that provision should be looked upon -as subordinate to the express provision contained in the body of the Act suspending its operation until a future date.

1980In State v. Neustadt, 149 F.2d 143 (CA 10 Okl. 1945 ), and in Harris v. Dungan, 199 Okl. 350 , 185 P.2d 949 (1947), the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Oklahoma Supreme Court respectively, found that the attempted inclusion of an emergency clause in the 1939 Tax Resale Act violated Article V, Section 58's prohibition on attaching emergency measures to legislation relating to the purchase or sale of real estate.

1980In State v. Neustadt, 149 F.2d 143 (CA 10 Okl. 1945 ), and in Harris v. Dungan, 199 Okl. 350 , 185 P.2d 949 (1947), the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Oklahoma Supreme Court respectively, found that the attempted inclusion of an emergency clause in the 1939 Tax Resale Act violated Article V, Section 58's prohibition on attaching emergency measures to legislation relating to the purchase or sale of real estate.

1968Marland, Governor v. Phillips Petroleum Company, et al, 189 Okl. 629 , 118 P.2d 621 , both the majority and dissenting opinions agree that the emergency clause was ineffective within the purview of Article V , Section 58 , Oklahoma Constitution.

1968Marland, Governor v. Phillips Petroleum Company, et al, 189 Okl. 629 , 118 P.2d 621 , both the majority and dissenting opinions agree that the emergency clause was ineffective within the purview of Article V , Section 58 , Oklahoma Constitution.

1970In the case of Cities Service Oil Company v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 191 Okl. 303 , 129 P.2d 597 (1942), our Supreme Court held: "A provision in a statute placing the same into full force and effect on a specified future date is controlling, notwithstanding the emergency clause attached thereto as provided by Article V, Section 58 of the Constitution provides that such statute shall take effect and be in full force after its passage and approval." To the same effect, see George et al. v. Randells, County Superintendent, 201 Okl. 542 , 207 P.2d 248 (1949), and Ex Parte Lee, 88 Okl.

1970In the case of Cities Service Oil Company v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 191 Okl. 303 , 129 P.2d 597 (1942), our Supreme Court held: "A provision in a statute placing the same into full force and effect on a specified future date is controlling, notwithstanding the emergency clause attached thereto as provided by Article V, Section 58 of the Constitution provides that such statute shall take effect and be in full force after its passage and approval." To the same effect, see George et al. v. Randells, County Superintendent, 201 Okl. 542 , 207 P.2d 248 (1949), and Ex Parte Lee, 88 Okl.

1939Regardless of the rule expressed in the above-cited authorities, in Keaton v. Brown, 171 Okla. 38 , 45 P.2d 109 ; and Oklahoma City v. Keaton, 178 Okla. 294 , 62 P.2d 981 , this court expressly held that ordinance No. 4578 was a valid ordinance duly passed with the emergency clause and the purpose and effect of said ordinance was the same as ordinance No. 4475.

1939Keaton v. Brown, 171 Okla. 38 , 45 P.2d 109 .

2013The Michigan court found that based on the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncement in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 , 122 S.Ct. 2268 , 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), the pharmacies did not have a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), if the pharmacies believed the state's reimbursement was inadequate.

2013The Michigan court found that based on the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncement in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 , 122 S.Ct. 2268 , 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), the pharmacies did not have a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), if the pharmacies believed the state's reimbursement was inadequate.

2010Tax Comm'n , 129 P.2d 597 , 598-99 (Okla. 1942) (noting that statutes without an emergency clause do not take effect until ninety days after the adjournment of the Legislature, but the Legislature may suspend their operation beyond ninety days). ¶ 5 In Oklahoma City v. Taylor , 470 P.2d 325 , 328 (Okla. 1970), an accident occurring on July 14, 1965, formed the basis for a claim arising under the Governmental Tort Liability Act ("Act").

2010Tax Comm'n , 129 P.2d 597 , 598-99 (Okla. 1942) (noting that statutes without an emergency clause do not take effect until ninety days after the adjournment of the Legislature, but the Legislature may suspend their operation beyond ninety days). ¶ 5 In Oklahoma City v. Taylor , 470 P.2d 325 , 328 (Okla. 1970), an accident occurring on July 14, 1965, formed the basis for a claim arising under the Governmental Tort Liability Act ("Act").

2007Id. {24 The 2005 workers' compensation reform act contained thirty-eight sections, including the emergency clause, dealing with practically every area within the workers' compensation regime.

2007Id. ¶ 24 The 2005 workers' compensation reform act contained thirty-eight sections, including the emergency clause, dealing with practically every area within the workers' compensation regime.

2004All valuations made pursuant to the Ad Valorem Tax Code shall be made and entered by the assessor pursuant to law." 68 O.S. 2001, § 2826[ 68-2826 ]. 5 This amendment was passed with an emergency clause six days after the decision was issued in Prairie Oil Gas Co. v. Cruce, 147 P. 152 (Okla. 1915).

2002Co., 1978 OK 3 , 505 P.2d 1324 , 1329: An ordinance adopted in compliance with the statute [11 0.8.1971 § 579.2, now codified as 11 0.8.1991 § 14-106] with the emergency clause attached is not effective and in force until it has been published.

2002Co., 1973 OK 3 , 505 P.2d 1324 , 1329: An ordinance adopted in compliance with the statute [11 O.S.1971 § 579.2, now codified as 11 O.S.1991 § 14-106] with the emergency clause attached is not effective and in force until it has been published.

2002Co., 1973 OK 3 , 505 P.2d 1324 , 1329: An ordinance adopted in compliance with the statute [11 O.S.1971 § 579.2, now codified as 11 O.S.1991 § 14-106] with the emergency clause attached is not effective and in force until it has been published.

2001Bd. of Trustees of Oklahoma Uniform Retirement System for Justices and Judges, 1988 OK 99 , 769 P.2d 1302 .

2001Bd. of Trustees of Oklahoma Uniform Retirement System for Justices and Judges, 1988 OK 99 , 769 P.2d 1302 .

1999We hold that rule 7, relied on by the Medical Board as authority for its action, is inoperative because unauthorized[.] Id. at 216 . ¶ 15 Like the situation in Application of State Board of Medical Examiners, that portion of the Board's emergency rule OAC 785:30-3-5.1 interpreting 82 O.S.

1998No. 3226 is an emergency clause providing: "It being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, by reason whereof this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval." Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37 , 850 P.2d 1069 , is not contrary to today's opinion.

1998No. 3226 is an emergency clause providing: "It being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, by reason whereof this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval." Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37 , 850 P.2d 1069 , is not contrary to today's opinion.

1987A finding that a parent who does not have custody of the child has willfully failed to contribute to the support of the child as provided in a decree of divorce or in some other court order during the preceding year or, in the absence of such order, consistent with the parent's means and earning capacity; or" [4] Special Indemnity Fund v. Reynolds, 199 Okl. 570 , 188 P.2d 841 , 842 [1948] and McCracken v. City of Lawton, Okl., 648 P.2d 18, 21 [1982]. [5] See footnote 1 supra at 1108. [6] The legislature amended § 1130 in 1986 with an emergency clause so that it became effective immediately upo

1987A finding that a parent who does not have custody of the child has willfully failed to contribute to the support of the child as provided in a decree of divorce or in some other court order during the preceding year or, in the absence of such order, consistent with the parent's means and earning capacity; or" [4] Special Indemnity Fund v. Reynolds, 199 Okl. 570 , 188 P.2d 841 , 842 [1948] and McCracken v. City of Lawton, Okl., 648 P.2d 18, 21 [1982]. [5] See footnote 1 supra at 1108. [6] The legislature amended § 1130 in 1986 with an emergency clause so that it became effective immediately upo

1980In State v. Neustadt, 149 F.2d 143 (CA 10 Okl. 1945 ), and in Harris v. Dungan, 199 Okl. 350 , 185 P.2d 949 (1947), the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Oklahoma Supreme Court respectively, found that the attempted inclusion of an emergency clause in the 1939 Tax Resale Act violated Article V, Section 58's prohibition on attaching emergency measures to legislation relating to the purchase or sale of real estate.

1970Cr. 386 , 203 P.2d 720 (1949).

1970In Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund of City of Tulsa, et al. v. Naughton, et al. 197 Okl. 592 , 173 P.2d 425 (1946), the court observed, at page 593: "It is generally held that statutes are presumed to operate prospectively, and words ought not to be given a retrospective operation unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the Legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied, and that in case of doubt the doubt should be resolved against the retrospective effect.

1970In Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund of City of Tulsa, et al. v. Naughton, et al. 197 Okl. 592 , 173 P.2d 425 (1946), the court observed, at page 593: "It is generally held that statutes are presumed to operate prospectively, and words ought not to be given a retrospective operation unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the Legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied, and that in case of doubt the doubt should be resolved against the retrospective effect.

1965Such use comes well within the definition of 'public use’ as laid down in the case of Housing Authority of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158 , 143 S.W.2d 79 , 130 A.L.R. 1053 , * * In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ten Eyck, (CCA 2d) 76 F.2d 515 , in considering related phases of the matter, the Federal Court observed: “The governmental character of public wharves, o-r piers as well as rights in navigable water and landing places, have been recognized by the courts. * * (citing numerous authorities).

1965Such use comes well within the definition of 'public use’ as laid down in the case of Housing Authority of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158 , 143 S.W.2d 79 , 130 A.L.R. 1053 , * * In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ten Eyck, (CCA 2d) 76 F.2d 515 , in considering related phases of the matter, the Federal Court observed: “The governmental character of public wharves, o-r piers as well as rights in navigable water and landing places, have been recognized by the courts. * * (citing numerous authorities).

1965Such use comes well within the definition of 'public use’ as laid down in the case of Housing Authority of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158 , 143 S.W.2d 79 , 130 A.L.R. 1053 , * * In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ten Eyck, (CCA 2d) 76 F.2d 515 , in considering related phases of the matter, the Federal Court observed: “The governmental character of public wharves, o-r piers as well as rights in navigable water and landing places, have been recognized by the courts. * * (citing numerous authorities).

1965Such use comes well within the definition of 'public use’ as laid down in the case of Housing Authority of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158 , 143 S.W.2d 79 , 130 A.L.R. 1053 , * * In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ten Eyck, (CCA 2d) 76 F.2d 515 , in considering related phases of the matter, the Federal Court observed: “The governmental character of public wharves, o-r piers as well as rights in navigable water and landing places, have been recognized by the courts. * * (citing numerous authorities).

1963In Wilson v. Roach, 101 Okl. 30 , 222 P. 1000 , this court held: “An ‘unavoidable accident’ is a casualty which occurs without negligence of either party, and when all means which common prudence suggests have been used to prevent it.” In Rosamond v. Reed Roller Bit Company, Okl., 292 P.2d 373 , we said: “In order to apply the emergency rule, it must be made to appear that the party seeking to invoke it is free from negligence in connection with the emergency.” Under the facts in the instant action, we are of the view that in order to determine that there was no evidence of unavoidable acciden

1963In Wilson v. Roach, 101 Okl. 30 , 222 P. 1000 , this court held: “An ‘unavoidable accident’ is a casualty which occurs without negligence of either party, and when all means which common prudence suggests have been used to prevent it.” In Rosamond v. Reed Roller Bit Company, Okl., 292 P.2d 373 , we said: “In order to apply the emergency rule, it must be made to appear that the party seeking to invoke it is free from negligence in connection with the emergency.” Under the facts in the instant action, we are of the view that in order to determine that there was no evidence of unavoidable acciden

1963In Wilson v. Roach, 101 Okl. 30 , 222 P. 1000 , this court held: “An ‘unavoidable accident’ is a casualty which occurs without negligence of either party, and when all means which common prudence suggests have been used to prevent it.” In Rosamond v. Reed Roller Bit Company, Okl., 292 P.2d 373 , we said: “In order to apply the emergency rule, it must be made to appear that the party seeking to invoke it is free from negligence in connection with the emergency.” Under the facts in the instant action, we are of the view that in order to determine that there was no evidence of unavoidable acciden