17 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1933–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Murphygreen1 sentence2025State v. Murphy, 465 So. 2d 811, 815 (La. | 1 | 1 |
Varner v. Daygreen1 sentence2020See Varner, 806 So. 2d at 125 . | 1 | 1 |
Independent Oil Refining Co. v. Luedersgreen1 sentence1933See Independent Oil Refining Co. v. Lueders, 17 La. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
O'Rourke v. McConaughey.
green
2 sentences1937In O’Rourke v. McConaughey, 157 So. 598 , 606 we said: “The driver of an automobile has no right to assume that the road before him is open and to proceed ahead without regard to the safety - of those who* may be thereon. * * * While under certain circumstances creating an emergency the rule may be different, there is little or no excuse for running into a stationary object, particularly one which has been stationary for some time before the collision, whether it be daylight or dark, clear or foggy, misty or rainy.” It is contended' on behalf of the plaintiff that the allegations of the supple 1937Referring to the fact that the obstruction struck was a truck loaded with long pine pilings, the court said: “There is no evidence herein to show wherein this fact affected visibility.” In O’Rourke v. McConaughey, supra, we said that, although ordinarily there is a duty in the driver of a vehicle to see any object in the roadway ahead and to operate his car at -such speed as will permit of its being stopped before such object is struck, nevertheless “under certain circumstances creating an emergency the rule -may be different,” and in Waters v. Meriwether Transfer Co., supra, the Court of Appe | 3 | 1935–1937 |
Tobin v. Jindal
green
1 sentence2014Tobin v. Jindal, 11-0888 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/10/12) , 91 So.3d 317, 321 , In this case, plaintiff seeks to have certain sections of an emergency rule issued by the Commissioner of Insurance declared unconstitutional. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Cressey v. Foster
neutral
1 sentence2001Cressey v. Foster, 96-2716 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/25/97), 694 So.2d 1016, 1021 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Greenbriar Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pilley
green
1 sentence1997For a more complete discussion of the interrelationship between the federal statutes and the state's responsibilities, see Greenbriar Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pilley, 93-2059 (La. 5/23/94), 637 So.2d 429 . [2] LSA-R.S. 49:954(B)(2) states, in pertinent part, that "an emergency rule shall become effective on the date of its adoption...." [3] The emergency rules were finalized and published as rules in the Louisiana Register, Volume 20, No. 3, pp. 304-05 (1994). [4] Indeed, pursuant to the authority of LSA-R.S. 49:955(E)(4), Bell Oaks proffered a cash deed showing the property at No. 3 Shane Drive | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Karl J. Pizzalotto, MD, Ltd. v. Wilson
green
1 sentence1988Plaintiffs' lack of consent-battery theory, based upon Pizzalotta v. Wilson, 437 So.2d 859 (La.1983), sounds in intentional tort and is a separate theory of action from lack of informed consent, which sounds in negligence. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Admiral Paint Company v. Goltzman
green
1 sentence1985EMERGENCY CLAUSE The defendant in Admiral Paint Company v. Goltzman, 254 So.2d 104 (La.App.3d Cir.1971) also argued that ill health and delay causing production difficulties constituted an emergency excusing him from his obligation to perform. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Arceneaux v. Domingue
green
1 sentence1984Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. White
green
1 sentence1982In State v. White, 399 So.2d 172 (La.1981), we approved a warrantless search made because of exigent circumstances. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Helen Frances Sutton Root v. Isabel H. Gauper
green
1 sentence1982Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir.1971); See also, Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 Buff.L.Rev. 419 (1973). *1076 The burden of showing that the entry fell within the narrow confines of the emergency exception is upon the state. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Peranio v. Superior Insurance Company
neutral
1 sentence1958Peranio v. Superior Insurance Company, La.App., 76 So.2d 315 . | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Crow v. Alesi
green
1 sentence1955In the case of Crow v. Alesi, supra, the situation was reversed. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Wayne v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1955Wayne v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., La.App.1951, 52 So.2d 55 . | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Home Ins. Co. v. Warren
neutral
1 sentence1949App., 29 So.2d 551 . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Lapeze v. O'Keefe
neutral
1 sentence1935App. 650 , 131 So. 212, 213 , we said, in speaking of a similar situation, that “ * * * if the fog affected his [Trauth’s] vision, he should not have maintained a speed of 20 miles an hour knowing that he was driving on a very narrow thoroughfare.” In O’Rourke v. McConaughey, 157 So. 598, 606 , a case arising from an accident which occurred on Canal boulevard at a time when traffic was heavy in that section and during a dense fog, this court said: “The driver of an automobile has no right to assume that the road before him is open and to proceed ahead without regard to the safety of those who | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Raziano v. Trauth
green
1 sentence1935App. 650 , 131 So. 212, 213 , we said, in speaking of a similar situation, that “ * * * if the fog affected his [Trauth’s] vision, he should not have maintained a speed of 20 miles an hour knowing that he was driving on a very narrow thoroughfare.” In O’Rourke v. McConaughey, 157 So. 598, 606 , a case arising from an accident which occurred on Canal boulevard at a time when traffic was heavy in that section and during a dense fog, this court said: “The driver of an automobile has no right to assume that the road before him is open and to proceed ahead without regard to the safety of those who | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.