Eighth Amendment analysis in South Dakota

2024We found the number and nature of the prior offenses, “relevant to an Eighth Amendment analysis of this sentence . . . . [N]ot only has Chipps demonstrated a tendency to commit felonies, he has demonstrated a particular penchant for the same type of crimes charged here . . . .” Id. ¶ 40, 874 N.W.2d at 490 .

2024We found the number and nature of the prior offenses, “relevant to an Eighth Amendment analysis of this sentence . . . . [N]ot only has Chipps demonstrated a tendency to commit felonies, he has demonstrated a particular penchant for the same type of crimes charged here . . . .” Id. ¶ 40, 874 N.W.2d at 490 .

2016Thus, the fact that Bonner’s sentence was the maximum permitted by statute for his particular offense was .not relevant to an Eighth Amendment analysis. 4 [¶ 20.] Finally, Bonner also states that our review under the Eighth Amendment must include “utmost deference to the Legislature and the sentencing court.” 1998 S.D. 30 , ¶ 17, 577 N.W.2d at 580 .

2016Thus, the fact that Bonner’s sentence was the maximum permitted by statute for his particular offense was .not relevant to an Eighth Amendment analysis. 4 [¶ 20.] Finally, Bonner also states that our review under the Eighth Amendment must include “utmost deference to the Legislature and the sentencing court.” 1998 S.D. 30 , ¶ 17, 577 N.W.2d at 580 .

2022Deleon was twenty-one years old at the time of the shooting. -10- #29510 37, 947 N.W.2d 402, 410 (quoting State v. Diaz, 2016 S.D. 78, ¶ 51 , 887 N.W.2d 751, 766 ).

2022Deleon was twenty-one years old at the time of the shooting. -10- #29510 37, 947 N.W.2d 402, 410 (quoting State v. Diaz, 2016 S.D. 78, ¶ 51 , 887 N.W.2d 751, 766 ).

2023“We generally review a circuit court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 26 , 958 N.W.2d 734, 740 .

2023“We generally review a circuit court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 26 , 958 N.W.2d 734, 740 .

2022Rather, our statement in Hauge declaring criminal conduct to be “insidious [where] it involves the manipulation of disabled or elderly adults” was made in the context of our Eighth Amendment analysis to determine whether the defendant’s sentence was grossly disproportionate. 2019 S.D. 45, ¶ 35 , 932 N.W.2d at 175 . -18- #29649 conclusion that a preceding criminal conviction is not required to pursue relief under this statute.

2022Id. [¶33.] Second, we have held that an Eighth Amendment analysis “does not take an individualized approach to sentencing.” State v. Bausch, 2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 38 , 889 N.W.2d 404, 415 .

2022Id. [¶33.] Second, we have held that an Eighth Amendment analysis “does not take an individualized approach to sentencing.” State v. Bausch, 2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 38 , 889 N.W.2d 404, 415 .

2022Rather, our statement in Hauge declaring criminal conduct to be “insidious [where] it involves the manipulation of disabled or elderly adults” was made in the context of our Eighth Amendment analysis to determine whether the defendant’s sentence was grossly disproportionate. 2019 S.D. 45, ¶ 35 , 932 N.W.2d at 175 . -18- #29649 conclusion that a preceding criminal conviction is not required to pursue relief under this statute.

2021As we reiterated in State v. Rice, our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has undergone a course correction. 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 21 , 877 N.W.2d at 83 . “[W]e depart[ed] from Bonner (and its progeny [including Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14, ¶ 32 , 796 N.W.2d at 407 ]) to the extent that its Eighth Amendment analysis deviates from that explained in Chipps.” Id. [¶14.] Here, Miles downloaded and possessed 18 images of child pornography and a video of child pornography.

2021As we reiterated in State v. Rice, our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has undergone a course correction. 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 21 , 877 N.W.2d at 83 . “[W]e depart[ed] from Bonner (and its progeny [including Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14, ¶ 32 , 796 N.W.2d at 407 ]) to the extent that its Eighth Amendment analysis deviates from that explained in Chipps.” Id. [¶14.] Here, Miles downloaded and possessed 18 images of child pornography and a video of child pornography.

2020“To arrive at an appropriate sentence[,] the sentencing court should acquire a thorough acquaintance with the character and history of the man before it.” State v. Larsen- Smith, 2011 S.D. 93, ¶ 8 , 807 N.W.2d 817, 819 .

2020“To arrive at an appropriate sentence[,] the sentencing court should acquire a thorough acquaintance with the character and history of the man before it.” State v. Larsen- Smith, 2011 S.D. 93, ¶ 8 , 807 N.W.2d 817, 819 .

2020There is, therefore, no Eighth Amendment violation based upon the sentencing requirements set out in Miller. [¶30.] Quevedo’s argument that his sentence is cruel and unusual because its length “condemns him to die in prison” overlooks the essential holding of Miller, which prohibits only mandatory life sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. 567 U.S. at 489 , 132 S. Ct. at 2475 .

2020There is, therefore, no Eighth Amendment violation based upon the sentencing requirements set out in Miller. [¶30.] Quevedo’s argument that his sentence is cruel and unusual because its length “condemns him to die in prison” overlooks the essential holding of Miller, which prohibits only mandatory life sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. 567 U.S. at 489 , 132 S. Ct. at 2475 .

2019A lack of success on the Ring claim would prompt the inverted, but related, argument he now makes—that a defendant requesting court sentencing in a capital case must waive his jury trial right on the issue of guilt, ostensibly in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. [¶28.] Viewed in this way, the case presents essentially the same circumstances we confronted in Ramos, where we held that claim preclusion prevented a habeas petitioner from challenging his sentence on due process grounds after an unsuccessful Eighth Amendment challenge on direct appeal. 2000 S.D. 111 , ¶ 8,

2016State v. Traversie, 2016 S.D. 19, ¶ 16 , 877 N.W.2d 327, 332 .

2016State v. Traversie, 2016 S.D. 19, ¶ 16 , 877 N.W.2d 327, 332 .

2014Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 , 106 S. Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.

2014Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 , 106 S. Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.

2014Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 , 106 S.Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 , 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987). .

2014Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 , 106 S.Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 , 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987). .

2007In State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999), the Iowa Supreme Court noted that an Eighth Amendment claim does not arise where a defendant who commits multiple crimes is punished more severely than a defendant who commits one. [¶ 33.] We conclude that the imposition of consecutive sentencing is a discretionary matter for the sentencing court in line with SDCL 22-6-6.1. 5 In State v. Blair, we justified in part the circuit court’s imposition of five consecutive eight year terms against the defendant by reasoning that each of the five counts was individual and specific to one of his five

2007In State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999), the Iowa Supreme Court noted that an Eighth Amendment claim does not arise where a defendant who commits multiple crimes is punished more severely than a defendant who commits one. [¶ 33.] We conclude that the imposition of consecutive sentencing is a discretionary matter for the sentencing court in line with SDCL 22-6-6.1. 5 In State v. Blair, we justified in part the circuit court’s imposition of five consecutive eight year terms against the defendant by reasoning that each of the five counts was individual and specific to one of his five

2002The Supreme Court went on to hold that specific intent was not required in order to satisfy Eighth Amendment analysis because “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” Id. at 158 , 107 S.Ct. at 1688 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 145 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982)). [¶ 24.] While Frazier would like to characterize her role in this crime as “merely driving the car,” the evidence suggests otherwise.

2002The Supreme Court went on to hold that specific intent was not required in order to satisfy Eighth Amendment analysis because “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” Id. at 158 , 107 S.Ct. at 1688 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 145 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982)). [¶ 24.] While Frazier would like to characterize her role in this crime as “merely driving the car,” the evidence suggests otherwise.

2002The Supreme Court went on to hold that specific intent was not required in order to satisfy Eighth Amendment analysis because “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” Id. at 158 , 107 S.Ct. at 1688 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 145 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982)). [¶ 24.] While Frazier would like to characterize her role in this crime as “merely driving the car,” the evidence suggests otherwise.