Eighth Amendment challenge in New Mexico

2018"This proposition holds true even if a defendant faces a total sentence exceeding a normal life expectancy as a result of consecutive sentences." Id. "[A] separate [Eighth Amendment] proportionality review *175 must be completed for each sentence imposed consecutively, rather than considering the cumulative total of such consecutive sentences. [This is b]ecause each sentence is a separate punishment for a separate offense[.]" Lucero , 2017 CO 49 , ¶ 23, 394 P.3d 1128 (second alteration in original); accord Hawkins v. Hargett , 200 F.3d 1279 , 1285 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The Eighth Amendment an

2018"This proposition holds true even if a defendant faces a total sentence exceeding a normal life expectancy as a result of consecutive sentences." Id. "[A] separate [Eighth Amendment] proportionality review *175 must be completed for each sentence imposed consecutively, rather than considering the cumulative total of such consecutive sentences. [This is b]ecause each sentence is a separate punishment for a separate offense[.]" Lucero , 2017 CO 49 , ¶ 23, 394 P.3d 1128 (second alteration in original); accord Hawkins v. Hargett , 200 F.3d 1279 , 1285 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The Eighth Amendment an

2018The preceding quoted passage from O'Neil is dictum, but the validity of the logic underpinning the quote is persuasive and this logic has indeed persuaded courts to reject "Eighth Amendment challenge[s] to consecutive sentences." State v. Ali , 895 N.W.2d 237 , 245 (Minn. 2017). {54} Fourth, "if the sentence for a particular offense is not disproportionately long, it does not become so merely because it is consecutive to another sentence for a separate offense or because the consecutive sentences are lengthy in aggregate." State v. Berger , 212 Ariz. 473 , 134 P.3d 378 , 384 (2006) (en banc).

2018"This proposition holds true even if a defendant faces a total sentence exceeding a normal life expectancy as a result of consecutive sentences." Id. "[A] separate [Eighth Amendment] proportionality review *175 must be completed for each sentence imposed consecutively, rather than considering the cumulative total of such consecutive sentences. [This is b]ecause each sentence is a separate punishment for a separate offense[.]" Lucero , 2017 CO 49 , ¶ 23, 394 P.3d 1128 (second alteration in original); accord Hawkins v. Hargett , 200 F.3d 1279 , 1285 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The Eighth Amendment an

2018"This proposition holds true even if a defendant faces a total sentence exceeding a normal life expectancy as a result of consecutive sentences." Id. "[A] separate [Eighth Amendment] proportionality review *175 must be completed for each sentence imposed consecutively, rather than considering the cumulative total of such consecutive sentences. [This is b]ecause each sentence is a separate punishment for a separate offense[.]" Lucero , 2017 CO 49 , ¶ 23, 394 P.3d 1128 (second alteration in original); accord Hawkins v. Hargett , 200 F.3d 1279 , 1285 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The Eighth Amendment an

2018"This proposition holds true even if a defendant faces a total sentence exceeding a normal life expectancy as a result of consecutive sentences." Id. "[A] separate [Eighth Amendment] proportionality review *175 must be completed for each sentence imposed consecutively, rather than considering the cumulative total of such consecutive sentences. [This is b]ecause each sentence is a separate punishment for a separate offense[.]" Lucero , 2017 CO 49 , ¶ 23, 394 P.3d 1128 (second alteration in original); accord Hawkins v. Hargett , 200 F.3d 1279 , 1285 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The Eighth Amendment an

2019The Court rejected both arguments, id. at 299, 308-19 , and rejected the Eighth Amendment claim with language that has unquestionable significance here. {194} The Court understood the defendant to be arguing that his death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because it was “disproportionate to the sentences in other murder cases[,]” id. at 306 , and responded to this claim with three points.

2019The Court rejected both arguments, id. at 299, 308-19 , and rejected the Eighth Amendment claim with language that has unquestionable significance here. {194} The Court understood the defendant to be arguing that his death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because it was “disproportionate to the sentences in other murder cases[,]” id. at 306 , and responded to this claim with three points.

2018Moreover, and as the Supreme Court recognized long ago, "[i]t would scarcely be competent for a person to assail the constitutionality of the statute prescribing a punishment for burglary on the ground that he had committed so many burglaries that, if punishment for each were inflicted on him, he might be kept in prison for life." O'Neil v. Vermont , 144 U.S. 323 , 331, 12 S.Ct. 693 , 36 L.Ed. 450 (1892).

2018Moreover, and as the Supreme Court recognized long ago, "[i]t would scarcely be competent for a person to assail the constitutionality of the statute prescribing a punishment for burglary on the ground that he had committed so many burglaries that, if punishment for each were inflicted on him, he might be kept in prison for life." O'Neil v. Vermont , 144 U.S. 323 , 331, 12 S.Ct. 693 , 36 L.Ed. 450 (1892).

2018The preceding quoted passage from O'Neil is dictum, but the validity of the logic underpinning the quote is persuasive and this logic has indeed persuaded courts to reject "Eighth Amendment challenge[s] to consecutive sentences." State v. Ali , 895 N.W.2d 237 , 245 (Minn. 2017). {54} Fourth, "if the sentence for a particular offense is not disproportionately long, it does not become so merely because it is consecutive to another sentence for a separate offense or because the consecutive sentences are lengthy in aggregate." State v. Berger , 212 Ariz. 473 , 134 P.3d 378 , 384 (2006) (en banc).

2018The preceding quoted passage from O'Neil is dictum, but the validity of the logic underpinning the quote is persuasive and this logic has indeed persuaded courts to reject "Eighth Amendment challenge[s] to consecutive sentences." State v. Ali , 895 N.W.2d 237 , 245 (Minn. 2017). {54} Fourth, "if the sentence for a particular offense is not disproportionately long, it does not become so merely because it is consecutive to another sentence for a separate offense or because the consecutive sentences are lengthy in aggregate." State v. Berger , 212 Ariz. 473 , 134 P.3d 378 , 384 (2006) (en banc).

2018To do so produces the ridiculous consequence of enabling a prisoner, simply by recidivating, to generate a colorable Eighth Amendment claim.” Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001).

2018To do so produces the ridiculous consequence of enabling a prisoner, simply by recidivating, to generate a colorable Eighth Amendment claim." Pearson v. Ramos , 237 F.3d 881 , 886 (7th Cir. 2001).

2010The two cases on which the State relies merely illustrate the well-established principle that a voluntary plea of guilty or nolo contendere “ ‘ordinarily constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s right to appeal his conviction on other than jurisdictional grounds.’ ” State v. Chavarria, 2009-NMSC-020, ¶ 9 , 146 N.M. 251 , 208 P.3d 896 (quoting State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410, 414 , 882 P.2d 1, 5 (1994)); see also id. (limiting review to the question of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence the defendant to life in prison, rather than reaching the merits of the defendant’s Eighth Amen

2010The two cases on which the State relies merely illustrate the well-established principle that a voluntary plea of guilty or nolo contendere “ ‘ordinarily constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s right to appeal his conviction on other than jurisdictional grounds.’ ” State v. Chavarria, 2009-NMSC-020, ¶ 9 , 146 N.M. 251 , 208 P.3d 896 (quoting State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410, 414 , 882 P.2d 1, 5 (1994)); see also id. (limiting review to the question of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence the defendant to life in prison, rather than reaching the merits of the defendant’s Eighth Amen

2009See Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that a plaintiffs claim of twelve hours of tormenting, debilitating pain accompanied by severe vomiting, along with his significant physical injuries, was enough to satisfy the substantial harm requirement of the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2008); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of severe chest pain for several days prevented summary judgment on the objective c

2009See Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that a plaintiffs claim of twelve hours of tormenting, debilitating pain accompanied by severe vomiting, along with his significant physical injuries, was enough to satisfy the substantial harm requirement of the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2008); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of severe chest pain for several days prevented summary judgment on the objective c

2009See Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that a plaintiffs claim of twelve hours of tormenting, debilitating pain accompanied by severe vomiting, along with his significant physical injuries, was enough to satisfy the substantial harm requirement of the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2008); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of severe chest pain for several days prevented summary judgment on the objective c

2009See Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that a plaintiffs claim of twelve hours of tormenting, debilitating pain accompanied by severe vomiting, along with his significant physical injuries, was enough to satisfy the substantial harm requirement of the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2008); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of severe chest pain for several days prevented summary judgment on the objective c

2009See Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that a plaintiffs claim of twelve hours of tormenting, debilitating pain accompanied by severe vomiting, along with his significant physical injuries, was enough to satisfy the substantial harm requirement of the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2008); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of severe chest pain for several days prevented summary judgment on the objective c

2009See Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that a plaintiffs claim of twelve hours of tormenting, debilitating pain accompanied by severe vomiting, along with his significant physical injuries, was enough to satisfy the substantial harm requirement of the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2008); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of severe chest pain for several days prevented summary judgment on the objective c

2009Even accepting every allegation made by Plaintiff as true, we conclude that the allegations fail to establish an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force by Defendant as a matter of law. {18} In the context of unduly tight handcuffing, the Tenth Circuit has held that, if established, such conduct could constitute excessive force if a plaintiff alleges: (1) “some actual injury that is not de minimis, be it physical or emotional,” and (2) that the officer ignored the “plaintiffs timely complaints ... that the handcuffs were too tight.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1129 (10th Cir.2007) (en

2009Even accepting every allegation made by Plaintiff as true, we conclude that the allegations fail to establish an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force by Defendant as a matter of law. {18} In the context of unduly tight handcuffing, the Tenth Circuit has held that, if established, such conduct could constitute excessive force if a plaintiff alleges: (1) “some actual injury that is not de minimis, be it physical or emotional,” and (2) that the officer ignored the “plaintiffs timely complaints ... that the handcuffs were too tight.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1129 (10th Cir.2007) (en

2009See Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that a plaintiffs claim of twelve hours of tormenting, debilitating pain accompanied by severe vomiting, along with his significant physical injuries, was enough to satisfy the substantial harm requirement of the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2008); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of severe chest pain for several days prevented summary judgment on the objective c

2009See Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that a plaintiffs claim of twelve hours of tormenting, debilitating pain accompanied by severe vomiting, along with his significant physical injuries, was enough to satisfy the substantial harm requirement of the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2008); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of severe chest pain for several days prevented summary judgment on the objective c

2009See Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that a plaintiffs claim of twelve hours of tormenting, debilitating pain accompanied by severe vomiting, along with his significant physical injuries, was enough to satisfy the substantial harm requirement of the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2008); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of severe chest pain for several days prevented summary judgment on the objective c

2009See Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that a plaintiffs claim of twelve hours of tormenting, debilitating pain accompanied by severe vomiting, along with his significant physical injuries, was enough to satisfy the substantial harm requirement of the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2008); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of severe chest pain for several days prevented summary judgment on the objective c

2009See, e.g., Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.1990) (concluding that a delay in obtaining treatment for a prisoner’s swollen, bleeding wrists caused by tight handcuffs was insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment claim); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863 , 871 (4th Cir.1988) (concluding that a fourteen hour delay in obtaining treatment for a sliver of glass in a detainee’s palm did not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment).

2009See, e.g., Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.1990) (concluding that a delay in obtaining treatment for a prisoner’s swollen, bleeding wrists caused by tight handcuffs was insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment claim); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863 , 871 (4th Cir.1988) (concluding that a fourteen hour delay in obtaining treatment for a sliver of glass in a detainee’s palm did not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment).

2004See Handy v. Price, 996 F.2d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir.1993) (affirming that a quarrel between a prison inmate and the doctor as to the appropriate treatment for hepatitis did not successfully raise an Eighth Amendment claim). {34} We conclude that the district court’s determination that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to Petitioner’s medical needs is supported by substantial evidence.

2004See Handy v. Price, 996 F.2d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir.1993) (affirming that a quarrel between a prison inmate and the doctor as to the appropriate treatment for hepatitis did not successfully raise an Eighth Amendment claim). {34} We conclude that the district court’s determination that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to Petitioner’s medical needs is supported by substantial evidence.

1993Id.; see Wilson v. Setter, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2321 , 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir.1987) (Powell, Assoc.

1993Id.; see Wilson v. Setter, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2321 , 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir.1987) (Powell, Assoc.