Eighth Amendment claim in Illinois

2026ORDER ¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s successive postconviction petition because (1) as an adult offender, defendant cannot raise an eighth amendment challenge to his life sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); (2) defendant cannot demonstrate the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test with respect to his claim under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution; and (3) postconviction counsel did not render unreasonable assistance. ¶2 Defendant Anthony Perez appeals the second-stage dismissal of his successive petition und

2023The eighth amendment rule announced in Miller is derived from the “common sense” fact that children show “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequence[.]” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).

2022People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40 . ¶ 17 Our supreme court subsequently held that for a juvenile offender to prevail on an eighth amendment claim as above, the defendant must demonstrate (1) that the defendant was subject to a de facto or natural, mandatory, or discretionary life sentence and (2) the sentencer did not consider the offender’s youth and youthful characteristics.

2022See People v. Vega, 2022 IL App (1st) 200663-U (rejecting this argument); see also Horshaw, 2021 IL App (1st) 182047 , ¶128 (rejecting the argument that Dorsey overruled the court’s prior holding in People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40 , that discretionary as well as mandatory life sentences may run afoul of youth-based constitutional protections). ¶ 77 In my view, Dorsey, which involved an eighth-amendment claim brought by a juvenile, rather than a young adult like Mr. Searles, has nothing to do with this case.

2021We note that although the eighth amendment challenge in People v. Harris was a facial challenge and limited to those defendants under the age of 18, the Illinois Supreme Court did not expressly state that an “as-applied” challenge was unavailable to those defendants 18 years of age or older. ¶ 64 The defendant cites to People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 36-38, 44 , an Illinois Supreme Court opinion, for the proposition that a challenge to a life sentence for a young adult must be framed as an “as-applied” constitutional challenge.

2018See Minnis , 2016 IL 119563 , ¶ 19, 409 Ill.Dec. 60 , 67 N.E.3d 272 (refusing to consider an as-applied challenge in the absence of an evidentiary hearing); Thompson , 2015 IL 118151 , ¶¶ 37-39, 398 Ill.Dec. 74 , 43 N.E.3d 984 (holding that the defendant forfeited his as-applied challenge by raising it for the first time on appeal and refusing to consider the claim based on an insufficient factual record). ¶ 156 In a stark departure from this precedent, the majority is now ruling against claimant on the merits of her eighth amendment claim while acknowledging that the record lacks the necessar

2020See Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 35 (in response to an eighth amendment challenge, noting that no single Miller factor is dispositive, but a reviewing court must “ensure that the trial court made an informed decision based on the totality of the circumstances that the defendant was incorrigible” and the sentence was appropriate).

2020See Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 35 (in response to an eighth amendment challenge, noting that no single Miller factor is dispositive, but a court must review the proceedings to “ensure that the trial court made an informed decision based on the totality of the circumstances that the defendant was incorrigible” and the sentence was appropriate).

2015The majority’s approach is ostensibly based upon a brief statement in People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395, 404 (1984), where the court sketched, and accepted as reasonable, the State’s offer of a possible rationale for the statute.

2014The majority’s approach is ostensibly based upon a brief statement in People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395, 404 (1984), where the court sketched, and accepted as reasonable, the State’s offer of a possible rationale for the statute.

2023Defendant contends his postconviction counsel also conceded the inability to establish prejudice, even though “[a] review of the resentencing transcript shows that the trial court did not properly consider several of the Miller factors in 2010.” We disagree. ¶ 32 To the extent Miller’s new substantive rule constitutes cause in relation to an eighth amendment claim because it was not available earlier to counsel (People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42 , 6 N.E.3d 709 ), that rule is limited to a prima facie finding of cause in the context of determining whether to grant leave to file a successive

2023Defendant contends his postconviction counsel also conceded the inability to establish prejudice, even though “[a] review of the resentencing transcript shows that the trial court did not properly consider several of the Miller factors in 2010.” We disagree. ¶ 32 To the extent Miller’s new substantive rule constitutes cause in relation to an eighth amendment claim because it was not available earlier to counsel (People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42 , 6 N.E.3d 709 ), that rule is limited to a prima facie finding of cause in the context of determining whether to grant leave to file a successive

2022The State maintains that, if we decide that Johnson did not resolve this issue, we should decline to resolve it in this case, as we similarly declined in Horta and People v. LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 53 (citing Horta and stating that “we shall assume, without actually holding, that the proportionate-penalties claim is not automatically defeated by the failure of the eighth-amendment claim”). ¶ 21 We agree with defendant that this case is not resolved by Johnson, because there we relied on the proportionate penalties clause being coextensive with the eighth amendment, which this cour

2022The court rejected this claim noting that the “defendant falls on the adult side of that line.” Id.; see also White, 2020 IL App (5th) 170345, ¶¶ 19-21 (rejecting the defendant’s eighth amendment challenge to his mandatory life sentence because the defendant was 20 when he committed the murders and was thus past the 18-year-old division between childhood and adulthood); People v. Pittman, 2018 IL App (1st) 152030, ¶ 31 (rejecting the defendant’s challenge under the eighth amendment to his mandatory life sentence because the defendant was 18 when he 12 committed the murders); People v. LaPointe

2022We further stated that, because the defendant’s eighth amendment claim based on Miller failed, so did his claim under the proportionate penalties clause, as the proportionate penalties clause was “ ‘co-extensive with the eighth amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.’ ” Id. ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 106 ). ¶ 17 Defendant argues that, contrary to our statement in Johnson, the proportionate penalties clause is not coextensive with the eighth amendment.

2022Defendant recognizes that the supreme court subsequently stated in Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 106 , that the defendant’s eighth amendment challenge was without merit and that, “[b]ecause the Illinois proportionate penalties clause is co-extensive with the eighth amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause [citation], we also reject [the] defendant’s challenge under our state constitution.” However, he notes that in People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 70 , the appellate court stated that it did not believe that the Patterson court “intended to depart from its prior statements in

2024See Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 . ¶ 48 Although defendant does not raise an eighth amendment challenge, section 5-4.5-105(a)(1)-(9) of the Unified Code contains the following mitigating factors derived from Miller that a trial court must consider when sentencing someone for an offense committed as a juvenile: “(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense, including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any; (2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure

2024People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶¶ 38, 44 (citing Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 105 (2021)); accord People v. Morris, 2023 IL App (1st) 220035, ¶ 55 .

2022Though Miller certainly created a new substantive rule of law for juveniles to raise an eighth amendment challenge to their sentences (Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42 ), our supreme court has rejected the idea that an adult can use Miller to attack his sentence on eighth amendment grounds: “[F]or sentencing purposes, the age of 18 makes the present line between juveniles and adults.” Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61 ; see also People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 31 (Miller does not apply to individuals 18 years or older); People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶ 37 (same); People v.

2022The court rejected this claim noting that the “defendant falls on the adult side of that line.” Id.; see also White, 2020 IL App (5th) 170345, ¶¶ 19-21 (rejecting the defendant’s eighth amendment challenge to his mandatory life sentence because the defendant was 20 when he committed the murders and was thus past the 18-year-old division between childhood and adulthood); People v. Pittman, 2018 IL App (1st) 152030, ¶ 31 (rejecting the defendant’s challenge under the eighth amendment to his mandatory life sentence because the defendant was 18 when he 12 committed the murders); People v. LaPointe

2021See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991).

2020See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991).

2021Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2019). ¶ 96 Inhumane conditions alone do not constitute an eighth amendment violation.

2020Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2019). ¶ 96 Inhumane conditions alone do not constitute an eighth amendment violation.

2022Though Miller certainly created a new substantive rule of law for juveniles to raise an eighth amendment challenge to their sentences (Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42 ), our supreme court has rejected the idea that an adult can use Miller to attack his sentence on eighth amendment grounds: “[F]or sentencing purposes, the age of 18 makes the present line between juveniles and adults.” Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61 ; see also People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 31 (Miller does not apply to individuals 18 years or older); People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶ 37 (same); People v.

2019Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46 (the record included “only basic information about defendant”). 12 Similar to the Fernandez defendant, in Harmelin, where the United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s eighth amendment challenge to a life sentence, the defendant was convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine.

2000Adams, 144 Ill.2d at 386-90 , 163 Ill.Dec. 483 , 581 N.E.2d 637 .

2000Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 386-90 .

1990Moreover, in Ingraham v. Wright (1977), 430 U.S. 651 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711 , 97 S.Ct. 1401 , the Supreme Court noted that an eighth amendment analysis is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of an alleged punishment where the underlying conduct has already been established through formal criminal proceedings, whereas it is inappropriate to reach an eighth amendment analysis where the alleged punishment has been invoked absent a formal criminal process. ( Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 -72 n. 40, 51 L.Ed.2d at 730 n. 40, 97 S.Ct. at 1412 -13 n. 40, comparing Trop v. Dulles (1958), 356 U.S. 86

1990Moreover, in Ingraham v. Wright (1977), 430 U.S. 651 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711 , 97 S.Ct. 1401 , the Supreme Court noted that an eighth amendment analysis is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of an alleged punishment where the underlying conduct has already been established through formal criminal proceedings, whereas it is inappropriate to reach an eighth amendment analysis where the alleged punishment has been invoked absent a formal criminal process. ( Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 -72 n. 40, 51 L.Ed.2d at 730 n. 40, 97 S.Ct. at 1412 -13 n. 40, comparing Trop v. Dulles (1958), 356 U.S. 86

2023In the interest of construing his petition liberally, we first address the merit of any Eighth Amendment claim and hold that defendant failed to state the gist of a constitutional claim in this regard. ¶ 21 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment “guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)).

2022Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70 . -7- ¶ 26 As a matter of law, we find an eighth amendment claim does not exist where defendant was 18 years old when he committed the offense.

2018Waller v. 1989 Ford F350 Truck, 162 Ill. 2d 78, 89-90 (1994) (quoting United States v. Real Property Located at 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 732 (C.D.

2018Waller v. 1989 Ford F350 Truck , 162 Ill. 2d 78 , 89-90, 204 Ill.Dec. 759 , 642 N.E.2d 460 (1994) (quoting United States v. Real Property Located at 6625 Zumirez Drive , 845 F.Supp. 725 , 732 (C.D.

2020If defendant’s challenge succeeds on that ground, we need not decide whether it would also succeed under the eighth amendment; if it fails under the proportionate-penalties analysis, we may assume that it would not succeed as an eighth- amendment claim either ***.” - 18 - wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community,” after considering “the seriousness of the offense *** with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship” (emphasis added) (see Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d at 129-30 ), then it would seem to comport with the contemporar

2019Reviewing the history of its own cases, the Graham Court observed that, although the Rummel Court rejected an eighth amendment challenge to a life sentence for a defendant’s third nonviolent felony, it “stressed that the sentence gave the defendant the possibility of parole.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 70 (discussing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1980) (one “could hardly ignore the possibility that he will not actually be imprisoned for the rest of his life”).

2024Although defendant was 18 years old when he killed the victim here, he cited People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145 , and People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) -4- 2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B 171362, for the proposition that a young adult may pursue an eighth amendment challenge under Miller to a life sentence without parole. ¶7 Along with his petition, defendant submitted a 38-page report from James Garbarino, Ph.D., a developmental psychologist.

2022Though Miller certainly created a new substantive rule of law for juveniles to raise an eighth amendment challenge to their sentences (Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42 ), our supreme court has rejected the idea that an adult can use Miller to attack his sentence on eighth amendment grounds: “[F]or sentencing purposes, the age of 18 makes the present line between juveniles and adults.” Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61 ; see also People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 31 (Miller does not apply to individuals 18 years or older); People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶ 37 (same); People v.

2023That right “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 469 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).

2015Id. at 367 .

2022Although defendant was 18 years old when he killed the victim here, he cited People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145 , and People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362 , for the proposition that a young adult may pursue an eighth amendment challenge under Miller to a life sentence without parole. ¶7 Along with his petition, defendant submitted a report from James Garbarino, Ph.D., a developmental psychologist.

2021Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶¶ 15, 17, 27 .