20 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estelle v. Gamblegreen2 sentences2020See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 , 97 S. Ct. at 291 (holding deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment); Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 544 (Ind. 1998) (“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Ratliff ‘must demonstrate that prison officials are “deliberately indifferent” to [her] “serious” medical needs . . . .’”) (quoting California in Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1255 (N.D. 2020See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 , 97 S. Ct. at 291 (holding deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment); Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 544 (Ind. 1998) (“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Ratliff ‘must demonstrate that prison officials are “deliberately indifferent” to [her] “serious” medical needs . . . .’”) (quoting California in Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1255 (N.D. | 3 | 3 |
Farmer v. Brennangreen2 sentences2024Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1649 | January 25, 2024 Page 10 of 12 [15] The United States Supreme Court has held that “a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety” and “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 , 114 S. Ct. at 1979 . 2024Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1649 | January 25, 2024 Page 10 of 12 [15] The United States Supreme Court has held that “a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety” and “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 , 114 S. Ct. at 1979 . | 1 | 2 |
Graham v. Floridagreen2 sentences2012Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 . 2012Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026 . | 1 | 2 |
Atkins v. Virginiagreen2 sentences2024There is, of course, an Eighth Amendment bar on executing “any intellectually disabled individual.” Moore v. Texas, 137 S.Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017) (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)). 2024Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a state’s determination of intellectual disability “must be ‘informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.’” Id. (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014)). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 769303green2 sentences2024Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508 , 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff “given only two half pints of milk and one sixteen and one-half ounce bottle of water” over three days stated an Eighth Amendment claim); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding allegations of inadequate drinking water over four days, along with other deprivations, sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 , 121 S. Ct. 2215 (2001)). 2024Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508 , 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff “given only two half pints of milk and one sixteen and one-half ounce bottle of water” over three days stated an Eighth Amendment claim); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding allegations of inadequate drinking water over four days, along with other deprivations, sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 , 121 S. Ct. 2215 (2001)). | 1 | 1 |
Franklin v. Lynaughgreen2 sentences2024Although the Court correctly holds that there is no Eighth Amendment violation in this case, I would follow the Court’s logic to its natural conclusion and reject all Eighth Amendment residual‐doubt claims.”); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 , 174–75 (1988) (plurality of Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.) (“This Court’s prior decisions, as we understand them, fail to recognize a constitutional right to have such doubts considered as a mitigating factor . . . . 2024In sum, even if petitioner had some constitutional right to seek jury consideration of ‘residual doubts’ about his guilt during his sentencing hearing— a questionable proposition—the rejection of petitioner’s proffered jury instructions did not impair this ‘right.’”); id. at 187 (O’Connor & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (“Our cases do not support the proposition that a defendant who has been found to be guilty of a capital crime beyond a reasonable doubt has a constitutional right to reconsideration by the sentencing body of lingering doubts about his guilt.”). | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Texasgreen1 sentence2024There is, of course, an Eighth Amendment bar on executing “any intellectually disabled individual.” Moore v. Texas, 137 S.Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017) (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)). | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Floridagreen1 sentence2024Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a state’s determination of intellectual disability “must be ‘informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.’” Id. (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014)). | 1 | 1 |
Bieghler v. Stategreen1 sentence2020To the extent Wilson presents a new constitutional argument differing from the general Eighth Amendment challenge we address above, this novel argument was waived by Wilson’s failure to bring it on direct appeal, see Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012), and counsel’s failure to advance the argument does not constitute deficient performance, see Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ind. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Roper v. Simmonsgreen1 sentence2020In Roper v. Simmons, it held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for juvenile offenders—which it defined as those who committed the crime before age eighteen. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Helmgreen1 sentence2020Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PC-548 | November 17, 2020 Page 12 of 30 dealt with a statute that specifically imposed a mandatory sentence of life”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1281 (2020); Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding Miller inapplicable to an eighty-nine-year aggregate fixed term for robbing, kidnapping, and raping a twenty-two- year-old college student); Proctor v. Kelley, 562 S.W.3d 837, 839 , 841–42 (Ark. 2018) (holding that a 240-year aggregate sentence—for eleven different robbery counts, none of which would singularly constitute a de facto life s | 1 | 1 |
Madrid v. Gomezgreen2 sentences2020See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 , 97 S. Ct. at 291 (holding deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment); Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 544 (Ind. 1998) (“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Ratliff ‘must demonstrate that prison officials are “deliberately indifferent” to [her] “serious” medical needs . . . .’”) (quoting California in Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1255 (N.D. 2020See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 , 97 S. Ct. at 291 (holding deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment); Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 544 (Ind. 1998) (“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Ratliff ‘must demonstrate that prison officials are “deliberately indifferent” to [her] “serious” medical needs . . . .’”) (quoting California in Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1255 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
Chaz Bunch v. Keith Smithgreen1 sentence2020Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PC-548 | November 17, 2020 Page 12 of 30 dealt with a statute that specifically imposed a mandatory sentence of life”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1281 (2020); Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding Miller inapplicable to an eighty-nine-year aggregate fixed term for robbing, kidnapping, and raping a twenty-two- year-old college student); Proctor v. Kelley, 562 S.W.3d 837, 839 , 841–42 (Ark. 2018) (holding that a 240-year aggregate sentence—for eleven different robbery counts, none of which would singularly constitute a de facto life s | 1 | 1 |
Ward v. Stategreen1 sentence2020To the extent Wilson presents a new constitutional argument differing from the general Eighth Amendment challenge we address above, this novel argument was waived by Wilson’s failure to bring it on direct appeal, see Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012), and counsel’s failure to advance the argument does not constitute deficient performance, see Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ind. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Ratliff v. Cohngreen2 sentences2020See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 , 97 S. Ct. at 291 (holding deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment); Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 544 (Ind. 1998) (“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Ratliff ‘must demonstrate that prison officials are “deliberately indifferent” to [her] “serious” medical needs . . . .’”) (quoting California in Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1255 (N.D. 2020See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 , 97 S. Ct. at 291 (holding deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment); Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 544 (Ind. 1998) (“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Ratliff ‘must demonstrate that prison officials are “deliberately indifferent” to [her] “serious” medical needs . . . .’”) (quoting California in Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1255 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
Hudson v. Palmergreen1 sentence2018Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1711-CT-2557 | July 25, 2018 Page 7 of 12 Regarding [Hill’s] Procedural Due Process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for destruction of property the Court FINDS that the Defendants named in this claim were not personally involved, and even if they were the claim would fail as it falls within the Supreme Court’s holding in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Will v. Michigan Department of State Policegreen2 sentences2016Third, with respect to the Eighth Amendment claim, the trial court agreed that the DOC is not a “person” amenable to suit for federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . 1 See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 , 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989) (holding that state agencies and state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” who can be sued under § 1983). [9] Robbins provides no argument as to why the trial court erred on any of these points. 2016Third, with respect to the Eighth Amendment claim, the trial court agreed that the DOC is not a “person” amenable to suit for federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . 1 See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 , 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989) (holding that state agencies and state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” who can be sued under § 1983). [9] Robbins provides no argument as to why the trial court erred on any of these points. | 1 | 1 |
Rhodes v. Chapmangreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 , 101 S.Ct. 2392 , 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). “[U]nder the Eighth Amendment, the State must respect the human attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2021 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 . 2011See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 , 101 S.Ct. 2392 , 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). “[U]nder the Eighth Amendment, the State must respect the human attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2021 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 . | 1 | 1 |
| Cantrell v. Morrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Joseph Toussaint, Plaintiffs/appellees/cross-Appellants v. Daniel McCarthy Defendants/appellants/cross-Appelleesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Larry Grant Bowring v. Mills E. Godwin, Individually and as Governorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gregg v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2004Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 194 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). 2004Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 194 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). | 2 | 1987–2004 |
Sochor v. Florida
green
2 sentences1995Sochor v. Florida (1992), 504 U.S. 527 , -, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119 , 119 L.Ed.2d 826 ; Stringer v. Black (1992), 508 U.S. 222 , -, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 . 1995Sochor v. Florida (1992), 504 U.S. 527 , -, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119 , 119 L.Ed.2d 826 ; Stringer v. Black (1992), 508 U.S. 222 , -, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 . | 2 | 1992–1995 |
Stringer v. Black
green
2 sentences1995Sochor v. Florida (1992), 504 U.S. 527 , -, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119 , 119 L.Ed.2d 826 ; Stringer v. Black (1992), 508 U.S. 222 , -, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 . 1995Sochor v. Florida (1992), 504 U.S. 527 , -, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119 , 119 L.Ed.2d 826 ; Stringer v. Black (1992), 508 U.S. 222 , -, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 . | 2 | 1992–1995 |
Norris v. State
green
2 sentences1987We note that in Norris this Court stated, "We can see no reason for creating a greater or lesser standard under article 1, section sixteen when its language is so similar to the Eighth Amendment standard." 394 N.E.2d at 150 . 1987We note that in Norris this Court stated, "We can see no reason for creating a greater or lesser standard under article 1, section sixteen when its language is so similar to the Eighth Amendment standard." 394 N.E.2d at 150 . | 2 | 1980–1987 |
In re Oser
green
2 sentences2024Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508 , 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff “given only two half pints of milk and one sixteen and one-half ounce bottle of water” over three days stated an Eighth Amendment claim); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding allegations of inadequate drinking water over four days, along with other deprivations, sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 , 121 S. Ct. 2215 (2001)). 2024Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508 , 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff “given only two half pints of milk and one sixteen and one-half ounce bottle of water” over three days stated an Eighth Amendment claim); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding allegations of inadequate drinking water over four days, along with other deprivations, sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 , 121 S. Ct. 2215 (2001)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Arons v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Delaware
green
2 sentences2024Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508 , 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff “given only two half pints of milk and one sixteen and one-half ounce bottle of water” over three days stated an Eighth Amendment claim); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding allegations of inadequate drinking water over four days, along with other deprivations, sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 , 121 S. Ct. 2215 (2001)). 2024Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508 , 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff “given only two half pints of milk and one sixteen and one-half ounce bottle of water” over three days stated an Eighth Amendment claim); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding allegations of inadequate drinking water over four days, along with other deprivations, sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 , 121 S. Ct. 2215 (2001)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Michael Johnson v. Susan Prentice
green
2 sentences2024Id. 2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
cluster 774049
green
2 sentences2024Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508 , 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff “given only two half pints of milk and one sixteen and one-half ounce bottle of water” over three days stated an Eighth Amendment claim); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding allegations of inadequate drinking water over four days, along with other deprivations, sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 , 121 S. Ct. 2215 (2001)). 2024Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508 , 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff “given only two half pints of milk and one sixteen and one-half ounce bottle of water” over three days stated an Eighth Amendment claim); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding allegations of inadequate drinking water over four days, along with other deprivations, sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 , 121 S. Ct. 2215 (2001)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Hill v. City of Jackson
neutral
1 sentence2020Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PC-548 | November 17, 2020 Page 12 of 30 dealt with a statute that specifically imposed a mandatory sentence of life”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1281 (2020); Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding Miller inapplicable to an eighty-nine-year aggregate fixed term for robbing, kidnapping, and raping a twenty-two- year-old college student); Proctor v. Kelley, 562 S.W.3d 837, 839 , 841–42 (Ark. 2018) (holding that a 240-year aggregate sentence—for eleven different robbery counts, none of which would singularly constitute a de facto life s | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Trappler v. New York
green
1 sentence2020Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PC-548 | November 17, 2020 Page 12 of 30 dealt with a statute that specifically imposed a mandatory sentence of life”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1281 (2020); Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding Miller inapplicable to an eighty-nine-year aggregate fixed term for robbing, kidnapping, and raping a twenty-two- year-old college student); Proctor v. Kelley, 562 S.W.3d 837, 839 , 841–42 (Ark. 2018) (holding that a 240-year aggregate sentence—for eleven different robbery counts, none of which would singularly constitute a de facto life s | 1 | 2020–2020 |
TERRANCE PROCTOR v. WENDY KELLEY
green
1 sentence2020Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PC-548 | November 17, 2020 Page 12 of 30 dealt with a statute that specifically imposed a mandatory sentence of life”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1281 (2020); Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding Miller inapplicable to an eighty-nine-year aggregate fixed term for robbing, kidnapping, and raping a twenty-two- year-old college student); Proctor v. Kelley, 562 S.W.3d 837, 839 , 841–42 (Ark. 2018) (holding that a 240-year aggregate sentence—for eleven different robbery counts, none of which would singularly constitute a de facto life s | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Antonio Hughley v. State of Indiana, The Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County, and The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
green
2 sentences2016Id. [10] Beginning with Hale’s Eighth Amendment claim, two elements are required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on deficient medical care: (1) an objectively serious medical condition and (2) an official’s deliberate indifference to that condition. 2016Id. [10] Beginning with Hale’s Eighth Amendment claim, two elements are required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on deficient medical care: (1) an objectively serious medical condition and (2) an official’s deliberate indifference to that condition. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Furman v. Georgia green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Harmelin v. Michigan green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Lee v. Webb green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Oreck Corp. v. U. S. Floor Systems, Inc. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Dugger v. Adams green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Carmona v. Ward green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| McMahan v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.