Eighth Amendment challenge in California

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 [applying Eighth Amendment analysis to both defendant’s federal and state excessive fines claims]; see also People v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334 [“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish”].) “While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor.” (Aviles, at p. 1070, citing Bajakajian, at pp. 337-338.) 11 Here,

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728-729 [applying Eighth Amendment analysis to both defendant’s federal and state excessive fines claims].) “The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” (Bajakajian, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 334 .) “[A] punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” (Ibid.) “The California Supreme Cou

2025(See, e.g., People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786 , 794-795; People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320 , 327-329 [holding Dueñas was wrongly decided], review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055 , 1067-1069; People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47 , 96- 97 [holding Eighth Amendment analysis applies to a restitution fine], review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1038-1039 (conc. opn. of Benke, Acting P. J.); People v. Oliver (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1084 , 1103; People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312 , 326-

2024(Kopp, at p. 96.) Using an Eighth Amendment analysis, the court assesses whether the fine is “ ‘grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense’ and thus ‘excessive.’ ” (People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055 , 1061.) In making that determination, the defendant’s ability to pay is only one of four factors to consider. ( Kopp, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 97–98.) The other three are “(1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty; [and] (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes.” (Id. at p. 97.) The California Supreme Court is cur

2026By Its Terms, Section 1170, Subdivision (d) Does Not Apply Because Carnes Was Not Sentenced to LWOP Although Carnes acknowledges “Contreras . . . is an Eighth Amendment case,” he argues its “holding controls here” “because the Eighth Amendment concerns in Contreras and the Legislature’s objectives behind enacting section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) are inextricably linked.” Citing certain aspects of section 1170, subdivision (d)’s legislative history, Carnes maintains, “Both the Eighth Amendment challenge in Contreras and section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) address concerns about a juvenile offender

2026By Its Terms, Section 1170, Subdivision (d) Does Not Apply Because Carnes Was Not Sentenced to LWOP Although Carnes acknowledges “Contreras . . . is an Eighth Amendment case,” he argues its “holding controls here” “because the Eighth Amendment concerns in Contreras and the Legislature’s objectives behind enacting section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) are inextricably linked.” Citing certain aspects of section 1170, subdivision (d)’s legislative history, Carnes maintains, “Both the Eighth Amendment challenge in Contreras and section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) address concerns about a juvenile offender

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) 26. permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, Peop

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, People v

2026(U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “ ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” 18 (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 .) “There is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently, . . . [t]he touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’ ” (People v. Baker (201

2026(U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “ ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” 18 (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 .) “There is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently, . . . [t]he touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’ ” (People v. Baker (201

2014(Id. at pp. 66, 77.) In Ewing, the court similarly upheld a Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life for a defendant who had stolen three golf clubs. ( Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. 11 , 17–18, 30–31.) In Harmelin, the court upheld a mandatory term of life in prison without possibility of parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine against an Eighth Amendment challenge. ( Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 .) California courts have grappled with this issue in connection with defendants sentenced to Three Strikes terms for violating sex offender registration requirements.

2014(Id. at pp. 66, 77.) In Ewing, the court similarly upheld a Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life for a defendant who had stolen three golf clubs. ( Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. 11 , 17–18, 30–31.) In Harmelin, the court upheld a mandatory term of life in prison without possibility of parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine against an Eighth Amendment challenge. ( Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 .) California courts have grappled with this issue in connection with defendants sentenced to Three Strikes terms for violating sex offender registration requirements.

2026Under Franklin, persons who initially receive the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence, but then are later granted the opportunity to pursue a parole hearing under section 3051 are, by operation of law, retroactively deemed to be serving a sentence with the possibility of parole. ( Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279-280 [concluding that possibility of parole mooted an Eighth Amendment challenge]; Ortega, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1265 [discussing Franklin].) Since section 3051 relief is retroactive, persons (like Lara) who have the opportunity for meaningful parole relief through a

2026Under Franklin, persons who initially receive the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence, but then are later granted the opportunity to pursue a parole hearing under section 3051 are, by operation of law, retroactively deemed to be serving a sentence with the possibility of parole. ( Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279-280 [concluding that possibility of parole mooted an Eighth Amendment challenge]; Ortega, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1265 [discussing Franklin].) Since section 3051 relief is retroactive, persons (like Lara) who have the opportunity for meaningful parole relief through a

2026As discussed, the central question in Franklin in considering a juvenile’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his 50- years-to-life sentence was whether he was serving a sentence that would provide him a meaningful opportunity to be released during his lifetime, satisfying the constitutional concerns raised in Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 . ( Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279-280.) Because the defendant would have an opportunity to be released in the 25th year of his sentence as a result of newly enacted section 3051, his sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP, and his “challenge to

2026As discussed, the central question in Franklin in considering a juvenile’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his 50- years-to-life sentence was whether he was serving a sentence that would provide him a meaningful opportunity to be released during his lifetime, satisfying the constitutional concerns raised in Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 . ( Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279-280.) Because the defendant would have an opportunity to be released in the 25th year of his sentence as a result of newly enacted section 3051, his sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP, and his “challenge to

2025(People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 .) The incorporation of Tison’s standard in section 190.2 brought California’s capital sentencing statutory law into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, People v

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) 26. permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, Peop

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, People v

2026(U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “ ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” 18 (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 .) “There is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently, . . . [t]he touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’ ” (People v. Baker (201

2026(U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “ ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” 18 (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 .) “There is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently, . . . [t]he touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’ ” (People v. Baker (201

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 [applying Eighth Amendment analysis to both defendant’s federal and state excessive fines claims]; see also People v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334 [“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish”].) “While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor.” (Aviles, at p. 1070, citing Bajakajian, at pp. 337-338.) 11 Here,

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728-729 [applying Eighth Amendment analysis to both defendant’s federal and state excessive fines claims].) “The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” (Bajakajian, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 334 .) “[A] punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” (Ibid.) “The California Supreme Cou

2026(Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) In reaching this conclusion, the Baldwin court first explained that the parties had based their arguments on the formulation of functional equivalence of LWOP that the California Supreme Court had applied in considering an Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence of 50 years to life in Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th 349 .

2026(Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) In reaching this conclusion, the Baldwin court first explained that the parties had based their arguments on the formulation of functional equivalence of LWOP that the California Supreme Court had applied in considering an Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence of 50 years to life in Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th 349 .

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) 26. permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, Peop

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, People v

2009(Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 750 , 114 S.Ct. 2630 ]; People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 211.)” (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 755 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 188 P.3d 580 ]; see also People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 648 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 , 181 P.3d 1035 ]; People v. Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1330.) “As the United States Supreme Court noted in upholding factor (a) against an Eighth Amendment challenge, ‘our capital jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whethe

2009(Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 750 , 114 S.Ct. 2630 ]; People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 211.)” (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 755 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 188 P.3d 580 ]; see also People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 648 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 , 181 P.3d 1035 ]; People v. Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1330.) “As the United States Supreme Court noted in upholding factor (a) against an Eighth Amendment challenge, ‘our capital jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whethe

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) 26. permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, Peop

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, People v

2026Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477 , the court extended this holding to the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole on a juvenile convicted of murder because the mandatory penalty “precludes consideration of [the juvenile’s] chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Shortly after Miller was decided, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 , 267-268 that the Eighth Amendment analysis in Graham also applied to sentences tha

2026Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477 , the court extended this holding to the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole on a juvenile convicted of murder because the mandatory penalty “precludes consideration of [the juvenile’s] chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Shortly after Miller was decided, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 , 267-268 that the Eighth Amendment analysis in Graham also applied to sentences tha

2025(Ibid.; see Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 74-75 [“for a juvenile offender who did 4 not commit homicide, the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole”]; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569, 575 [because of the differences between juveniles and adults, “the death penalty cannot be imposed upon juvenile offenders”]; see also Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 479, 489 [for homicide offenses “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”].) In People v. Caballero (2012) 55 C

2025(Ibid.; see Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 74-75 [“for a juvenile offender who did 4 not commit homicide, the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole”]; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569, 575 [because of the differences between juveniles and adults, “the death penalty cannot be imposed upon juvenile offenders”]; see also Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 479, 489 [for homicide offenses “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”].) In People v. Caballero (2012) 55 C

2024(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1234-1235; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427 , 437– 439.) Thus, even if the reasoning of cases concerning juvenile offenders applied equally to dependency cases—which we conclude it does not—that reasoning would not necessarily assist mother in this case, since she was a legal adult by the time of the section .26 hearing. 26 [the] offense.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 538 , quoting Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 59 .) “ ‘[T]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment . . . .’ ” (In re Coley,

2024(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1234-1235; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427 , 437– 439.) Thus, even if the reasoning of cases concerning juvenile offenders applied equally to dependency cases—which we conclude it does not—that reasoning would not necessarily assist mother in this case, since she was a legal adult by the time of the section .26 hearing. 26 [the] offense.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 538 , quoting Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 59 .) “ ‘[T]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment . . . .’ ” (In re Coley,

2024(See People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886 [defendant forfeited Eighth Amendment claim “by failing to articulate an objection on federal constitutional grounds” below]; People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [“defendant’s failure to contemporaneously object that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forfeits the claim on appellate review”].) Even if not forfeited, however, the claim fails. 22 A. Governing law A sentence violates the federal Constitution only if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.

2023(See People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886 [defendant forfeited Eighth Amendment claim “by failing to articulate an objection on federal constitutional grounds” below]; People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [“defendant’s failure to contemporaneously object that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forfeits the claim on appellate review”].) Even if not forfeited, however, the claim fails.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786 , 794-795; People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320 , 327-329 [holding Dueñas was wrongly decided], review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055 , 1067-1069; People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47 , 96- 97 [holding Eighth Amendment analysis applies to a restitution fine], review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1038-1039 (conc. opn. of Benke, Acting P. J.); People v. Oliver (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1084 , 1103; People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312 , 326-

2024(Kopp, at p. 96.) Using an Eighth Amendment analysis, the court assesses whether the fine is “ ‘grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense’ and thus ‘excessive.’ ” (People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055 , 1061.) In making that determination, the defendant’s ability to pay is only one of four factors to consider. ( Kopp, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 97–98.) The other three are “(1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty; [and] (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes.” (Id. at p. 97.) The California Supreme Court is cur

2022(See Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 59-60 [discussing Eighth Amendment analysis for “term-of-years sentences”]; In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425 [describing “three-pronged test” for claims of cruel and unusual punishment under the California Constitution].) We construe Malanche’s failure to discuss these factors as a concession that they do not weigh in his favor.

2021(Sullivan, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 570 [the inquiry into the nature of the offender supported the constitutionality of a sentence of 210 years to life because the defendant was “an incorrigible recidivist offender who presents a most grave and extreme level of danger to society”]; see also 43 Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 29-30 [under Eighth Amendment analysis, the defendant’s Three Strikes sentence was “justified by the State’s public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by his own long, serious criminal record”].) The remaining

2024Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 [proportionality is the touchstone of Eighth Amendment analysis]; cf. People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1056 [$10,000 restitution fine not invalid due to inability to pay].) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 6 Notably, Dueñas. supra, did not create a right to object.

2024To the extent the Dueñas -4- DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS (CCP §77(d)) BY THE COURT court implies that it is the prosecution's burden to prove that a defendant can pay an assessment (see id. at p. 1172, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 268 ), we disagree.” (Id. at 96.) The Court also cautioned in following or applying Dueñas “without regard to the extreme facts Dueñas presented.” (Id. at p. 94.) The Court discussed that those facts included that the defendant “was an indigent, homeless mother of two, who subsisted on public aid while suffering from cerebral palsy.” (Ibid.) Justice Benke concurred in the opini

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) 26. permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, Peop

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674 (Scoggins).) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393

2026(U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “ ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” 18 (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 .) “There is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently, . . . [t]he touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’ ” (People v. Baker (201

2026(U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “ ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” 18 (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 .) “There is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently, . . . [t]he touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’ ” (People v. Baker (201