Eighth Amendment challenge in California

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728-729 [applying Eighth Amendment analysis to both defendant’s federal and state excessive fines claims].) “The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” (Bajakajian, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 334 .) “[A] punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” (Ibid.) “The California Supreme Cou

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 [applying Eighth Amendment analysis to both defendant’s federal and state excessive fines claims]; see also People v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334 [“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish”].) “While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor.” (Aviles, at p. 1070, citing Bajakajian, at pp. 337-338.) 11 Here,

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) 26. permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, Peop

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, People v

2026By Its Terms, Section 1170, Subdivision (d) Does Not Apply Because Carnes Was Not Sentenced to LWOP Although Carnes acknowledges “Contreras . . . is an Eighth Amendment case,” he argues its “holding controls here” “because the Eighth Amendment concerns in Contreras and the Legislature’s objectives behind enacting section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) are inextricably linked.” Citing certain aspects of section 1170, subdivision (d)’s legislative history, Carnes maintains, “Both the Eighth Amendment challenge in Contreras and section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) address concerns about a juvenile offender

2026By Its Terms, Section 1170, Subdivision (d) Does Not Apply Because Carnes Was Not Sentenced to LWOP Although Carnes acknowledges “Contreras . . . is an Eighth Amendment case,” he argues its “holding controls here” “because the Eighth Amendment concerns in Contreras and the Legislature’s objectives behind enacting section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) are inextricably linked.” Citing certain aspects of section 1170, subdivision (d)’s legislative history, Carnes maintains, “Both the Eighth Amendment challenge in Contreras and section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) address concerns about a juvenile offender

2026(People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 [an Eighth Amendment challenge requires a “ ‘fact specific’ inquiry and is forfeited if not raised below”].) Although acknowledging that defense counsel did not dispute the amount of the restitution fine at the sentencing hearing, Velasquez contends that the forfeiture doctrine does not apply because he raised the issue himself during the sentencing hearing, during his outburst, when he said “I can’t pay.

2026(People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 [an Eighth Amendment challenge requires a “ ‘fact specific’ inquiry and is forfeited if not raised below”].) Although acknowledging that defense counsel did not dispute the amount of the restitution fine at the sentencing hearing, Velasquez contends that the forfeiture doctrine does not apply because he raised the issue himself during the sentencing hearing, during his outburst, when he said “I can’t pay.

2014(Id. at pp. 66, 77.) In Ewing, the court similarly upheld a Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life for a defendant who had stolen three golf clubs. ( Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. 11 , 17–18, 30–31.) In Harmelin, the court upheld a mandatory term of life in prison without possibility of parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine against an Eighth Amendment challenge. ( Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 .) California courts have grappled with this issue in connection with defendants sentenced to Three Strikes terms for violating sex offender registration requirements.

2014(Id. at pp. 66, 77.) In Ewing, the court similarly upheld a Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life for a defendant who had stolen three golf clubs. ( Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. 11 , 17–18, 30–31.) In Harmelin, the court upheld a mandatory term of life in prison without possibility of parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine against an Eighth Amendment challenge. ( Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 .) California courts have grappled with this issue in connection with defendants sentenced to Three Strikes terms for violating sex offender registration requirements.

2026Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477 , the court extended this holding to the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole on a juvenile convicted of murder because the mandatory penalty “precludes consideration of [the juvenile’s] chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Shortly after Miller was decided, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 , 267-268 that the Eighth Amendment analysis in Graham also applied to sentences tha

2026Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477 , the court extended this holding to the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole on a juvenile convicted of murder because the mandatory penalty “precludes consideration of [the juvenile’s] chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Shortly after Miller was decided, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 , 267-268 that the Eighth Amendment analysis in Graham also applied to sentences tha

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) 26. permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, Peop

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, People v

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) 26. permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, Peop

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, People v

2025(See, e.g., People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786 , 794-795; People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320 , 327-329 [holding Dueñas was wrongly decided], review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055 , 1067-1069; People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47 , 96- 97 [holding Eighth Amendment analysis applies to a restitution fine], review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1038-1039 (conc. opn. of Benke, Acting P. J.); People v. Oliver (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1084 , 1103; People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312 , 326-

2024(Lockyer, at pp. 728-729 [applying Eighth Amendment analysis to both defendant’s federal and state excessive fines claims]; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1040 (conc. opn. of Benke, J.).) “The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” (Bajakajian, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 334 .) “[A] punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defe

2026(U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “ ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” 18 (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 .) “There is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently, . . . [t]he touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’ ” (People v. Baker (201

2026(U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “ ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” 18 (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 .) “There is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently, . . . [t]he touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’ ” (People v. Baker (201

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728-729 [applying Eighth Amendment analysis to both defendant’s federal and state excessive fines claims].) “The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” (Bajakajian, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 334 .) “[A] punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” (Ibid.) “The California Supreme Cou

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 [applying Eighth Amendment analysis to both defendant’s federal and state excessive fines claims]; see also People v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334 [“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish”].) “While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor.” (Aviles, at p. 1070, citing Bajakajian, at pp. 337-338.) 11 Here,

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) 26. permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, Peop

2025(People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 .) The incorporation of Tison’s standard in section 190.2 brought California’s capital sentencing statutory law into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.

2026Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477 , the court extended this holding to the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole on a juvenile convicted of murder because the mandatory penalty “precludes consideration of [the juvenile’s] chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Shortly after Miller was decided, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 , 267-268 that the Eighth Amendment analysis in Graham also applied to sentences tha

2026Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477 , the court extended this holding to the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole on a juvenile convicted of murder because the mandatory penalty “precludes consideration of [the juvenile’s] chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Shortly after Miller was decided, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 , 267-268 that the Eighth Amendment analysis in Graham also applied to sentences tha

2025(Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 364 .) The Eighth Amendment analysis demands an answer to the question: “[R]eferring to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ ” is a punishment “so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual[?]” (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 561 .) “In accordance with the constitutional design, ‘the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the court’s] responsibility.’ [Citation.] The judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and

2025(Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 364 .) The Eighth Amendment analysis demands an answer to the question: “[R]eferring to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ ” is a punishment “so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual[?]” (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 561 .) “In accordance with the constitutional design, ‘the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the court’s] responsibility.’ [Citation.] The judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and

2009(Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 750 , 114 S.Ct. 2630 ]; People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 211.)” (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 755 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 188 P.3d 580 ]; see also People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 648 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 , 181 P.3d 1035 ]; People v. Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1330.) “As the United States Supreme Court noted in upholding factor (a) against an Eighth Amendment challenge, ‘our capital jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whethe

2009(Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 750 , 114 S.Ct. 2630 ]; People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 211.)” (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 755 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 188 P.3d 580 ]; see also People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 648 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 , 181 P.3d 1035 ]; People v. Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1330.) “As the United States Supreme Court noted in upholding factor (a) against an Eighth Amendment challenge, ‘our capital jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whethe

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) 26. permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, Peop

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, People v

2025(Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 364 .) The Eighth Amendment analysis demands an answer to the question: “[R]eferring to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ ” is a punishment “so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual[?]” (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 561 .) “In accordance with the constitutional design, ‘the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the court’s] responsibility.’ [Citation.] The judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and

2025(Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 364 .) The Eighth Amendment analysis demands an answer to the question: “[R]eferring to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ ” is a punishment “so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual[?]” (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 561 .) “In accordance with the constitutional design, ‘the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the court’s] responsibility.’ [Citation.] The judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and

2024(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1234–1235; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427 , 437– 439.) Thus, even if the reasoning of cases concerning juvenile offenders applied equally to dependency cases—which we conclude it does not—that reasoning would not necessarily assist mother in this case, since she was a legal adult by the time of the section .26 hearing. 26 [the] offense.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 538 , quoting Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 59 .) “ ‘[T]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment . . . .’ ” (In re Coley,

2024(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1234–1235; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427 , 437– 439.) Thus, even if the reasoning of cases concerning juvenile offenders applied equally to dependency cases—which we conclude it does not—that reasoning would not necessarily assist mother in this case, since she was a legal adult by the time of the section .26 hearing. 26 [the] offense.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 538 , quoting Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 59 .) “ ‘[T]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment . . . .’ ” (In re Coley,

2024(See People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886 [defendant forfeited Eighth Amendment claim “by failing to articulate an objection on federal constitutional grounds” below]; People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [“defendant’s failure to contemporaneously object that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forfeits the claim on appellate review”].) Even if not forfeited, however, the claim fails. 22 A. Governing law A sentence violates the federal Constitution only if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.

2023(See People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886 [defendant forfeited Eighth Amendment claim “by failing to articulate an objection on federal constitutional grounds” below]; People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [“defendant’s failure to contemporaneously object that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forfeits the claim on appellate review”].) Even if not forfeited, however, the claim fails.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786 , 794-795; People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320 , 327-329 [holding Dueñas was wrongly decided], review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055 , 1067-1069; People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47 , 96- 97 [holding Eighth Amendment analysis applies to a restitution fine], review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1038-1039 (conc. opn. of Benke, Acting P. J.); People v. Oliver (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1084 , 1103; People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312 , 326-

2024(People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47 , 95–98, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844 (Kopp).) Division Four of the First Appellate District similarly applied an Eighth Amendment analysis to evaluate a range of fines and fees.

2022(See Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 59-60 [discussing Eighth Amendment analysis for “term-of-years sentences”]; In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425 [describing “three-pronged test” for claims of cruel and unusual punishment under the California Constitution].) We construe Malanche’s failure to discuss these factors as a concession that they do not weigh in his favor.

2021(Sullivan, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 570 [the inquiry into the nature of the offender supported the constitutionality of a sentence of 210 years to life because the defendant was “an incorrigible recidivist offender who presents a most grave and extreme level of danger to society”]; see also 43 Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 29-30 [under Eighth Amendment analysis, the defendant’s Three Strikes sentence was “justified by the State’s public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by his own long, serious criminal record”].) The remaining

2025For example, the statute 4 Although the California Supreme Court expressed no view on whether the enactment of section 3051 would moot an Eighth Amendment challenge to a lengthy non- mandatory sentence, (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 280 ) California appellate courts have concluded that section 3051 renders such sentences constitutional by guaranteeing the defendant a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime.

2025For example, the statute 4 Although the California Supreme Court expressed no view on whether the enactment of section 3051 would moot an Eighth Amendment challenge to a lengthy non- mandatory sentence, (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 280 ) California appellate courts have concluded that section 3051 renders such sentences constitutional by guaranteeing the defendant a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime.

2024Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 [proportionality is the touchstone of Eighth Amendment analysis]; cf. People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1056 [$10,000 restitution fine not invalid due to inability to pay].) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 6 Notably, Dueñas. supra, did not create a right to object.

2024To the extent the Dueñas -4- DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS (CCP §77(d)) BY THE COURT court implies that it is the prosecution's burden to prove that a defendant can pay an assessment (see id. at p. 1172, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 268 ), we disagree.” (Id. at 96.) The Court also cautioned in following or applying Dueñas “without regard to the extreme facts Dueñas presented.” (Id. at p. 94.) The Court discussed that those facts included that the defendant “was an indigent, homeless mother of two, who subsisted on public aid while suffering from cerebral palsy.” (Ibid.) Justice Benke concurred in the opini

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) 26. permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674.) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 , bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; accord, Peop

2025For defendants who did not kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1 , 7; see In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674 (Scoggins).) By incorporating this requirement, section 190.2 codified the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), bringing California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393

2022(Guerrero I, supra, B292313.) However, we remanded the matter for resentencing, explaining that, while the availability of a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051, subdivision (b)(4), mooted any Eighth Amendment challenge to Guerrero’s life without parole sentence under Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 , 3 section 190.5, subdivision (b), 2 Section 190.5, subdivision (b), prescribes, in the court’s discretion, a sentence of 25 years to life or life without parole for a 16- or 17-year-old offender found guilty of special-circumstance murder. 3 In Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 the Supre

2020Where the record is ambiguous, the trial court’s understanding of its statutory obligation to consider youth-related mitigating factors at sentencing cannot be presumed Acknowledging the availability of a youth offender parole hearing in her 25th year of incarceration has mooted any Eighth Amendment challenge to her sentence, Guerrero 23 contends, and the People do not dispute, section 190.5, subdivision (b), as interpreted by Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th 1354 , requires consideration of youth-related mitigating factors at the time of sentencing.

2026(U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “ ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” 18 (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 .) “There is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently, . . . [t]he touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’ ” (People v. Baker (201

2026(U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “ ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” 18 (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 .) “There is considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently, . . . [t]he touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’ ” (People v. Baker (201

2021(Timbs v. Indiana (2019) 586 U.S. ___ , ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 682, 687 ] (Timbs).) Additionally, article I, section 17 of the California Constitution similarly provides: “Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed.” An Eighth Amendment analysis is appropriate to determine whether punitive fines in a particular case are excessive.

2021(Timbs v. Indiana (2019) 586 U.S. ___ , ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 682, 687 ] (Timbs).) Additionally, article I, section 17 of the California Constitution similarly provides: “Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed.” An Eighth Amendment analysis is appropriate to determine whether punitive fines in a particular case are excessive.

2016(See In re Alva (2004) 33 Cal.4th 254, 291 .) 5 law, the court held that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed on a shoplifter with prior convictions for burglary and robbery was not “grossly disproportionate” so as to implicate the constitutional prohibition, given the defendant’s long criminal history. ( Ewing, supra, at pp. 28-31 .) Almost concurrently, the high court decided Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63 (Andrade), which involved a defendant convicted of petty theft with a prior and sentenced as a third striker due to three prior residential burglary convictions. ( Andrade, supra,

2016(See In re Alva (2004) 33 Cal.4th 254, 291 .) 5 law, the court held that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed on a shoplifter with prior convictions for burglary and robbery was not “grossly disproportionate” so as to implicate the constitutional prohibition, given the defendant’s long criminal history. ( Ewing, supra, at pp. 28-31 .) Almost concurrently, the high court decided Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63 (Andrade), which involved a defendant convicted of petty theft with a prior and sentenced as a third striker due to three prior residential burglary convictions. ( Andrade, supra,