80 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1985–2026 29 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tindell v. Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2026As to the Eighth Amendment claim, although Petitioner cites to certain impacts on his life caused by the lack of access to the main recreation yard, he has not pled how DOC employees’ “deliberate indifference” to the conditions of his confinement have deprived him of a “single, identifiable human need.” Tindell v. Department of Corrections, 87 A.3d 1029, 1041-42 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 2026As to the Eighth Amendment claim, although Petitioner cites to certain impacts on his life caused by the lack of access to the main recreation yard, he has not pled how DOC employees’ “deliberate indifference” to the conditions of his confinement have deprived him of a “single, identifiable human need.” Tindell v. Department of Corrections, 87 A.3d 1029, 1041-42 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). | 4 | 7 |
Farmer v. Brennangreen2 sentences2025In Farmer . . . , the Supreme Court concluded that the inquiry into whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent is a subjective one, requiring the demonstration of a state of mind akin to criminal recklessness, and held that a prisoner must establish that: (i) the prison official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; (ii) the prison official was aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and (iii) the prison official drew the inference.[] 511 U.S. at 837 , 840 . . . . 2025In Farmer . . . , the Supreme Court concluded that the inquiry into whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent is a subjective one, requiring the demonstration of a state of mind akin to criminal recklessness, and held that a prisoner must establish that: (i) the prison official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; (ii) the prison official was aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and (iii) the prison official drew the inference.[] 511 U.S. at 837 , 840 . . . . | 4 | 7 |
Helling v. McKinneygreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (Eighth Amendment claim could be premised upon future harm to health from exposure to environmental tobacco smoke). 2016See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 [] (1993) (Eighth Amendment claim could be premised upon future harm to health from exposure to environmental tobacco smoke). | 4 | 4 |
Estelle v. Gamblegreen2 sentences2022The Supreme Court of the United States has thus held that the denial of medical care to a prison inmate constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment where it amounts to “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Id. at 104 . 6 In his Eighth Amendment claim, Rokita asserts that, by refusing to provide him with the opportunity to receive MAT for his substance use disorder, the Department is denying him medical care. 2019The Petition merely indicates, they argue, that, “at some unspecified date[s] and time[s]” Thomas suffered a seizure and “a severe electrical burn for which he received substandard emergency . . . [and] follow-up treatment.” (PO ¶¶ 39, 50.) Such vague allegations, which do not connect the alleged substandard 7 medical treatment to any of the named Employee Respondents, none of whom are medical staff, they argue, do not meet the applicable pleading standard for an Eighth Amendment claim under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). | 3 | 6 |
Harmelin v. Michigangreen2 sentences2022See Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1322 (“this case does not properly present — and thus we do not consider — any as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of disproportionality regarding Jones’s sentence.”), citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 , 996–1009 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 2017The focus of an Eighth Amendment challenge is whether the sentence imposed is “grossly disproportionate to a crime.” Spells, supra, 612 A.2d at 463 , quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991). | 3 | 5 |
Kretchmar v. Commonwealth, Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2025As we held in Dukes v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth, No. 281 M.D. 2020, filed February 17, 2021), slip op. at 8, when the pleading itself shows an inmate received medical attention, the allegations “do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation based on deliberate indifference.” See also Kretchmar, 831 A.2d at 799-800 (“Even a cursory review of the [p]etition reveals that [the p]etitioner receive[d] extensive medical attention while in prison.”). 2025As we held in Dukes v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth, No. 281 M.D. 2020, filed February 17, 2021), slip op. at 8, when the pleading itself shows an inmate received medical attention, the allegations “do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation based on deliberate indifference.” See also Kretchmar, 831 A.2d at 799-800 (“Even a cursory review of the [p]etition reveals that [the p]etitioner receive[d] extensive medical attention while in prison.”). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Spellsgreen2 sentences2025When an appellant presents an Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence, this Court applies the following analysis: In Commonwealth v. Spells, [] 612 A.2d 458, 462 (1992) (en banc), this Court applied the three-prong test for Eighth Amendment proportionality review set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 [] (1983): [A] court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdict 2025When an appellant presents an Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence, this Court applies the following analysis: In Commonwealth v. Spells, [] 612 A.2d 458, 462 (1992) (en banc), this Court applied the three-prong test for Eighth Amendment proportionality review set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 [] (1983): [A] court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdict | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Succigreen2 sentences2025See Commonwealth v. Succi, 173 A.3d 269, 284-85 (observing that alleged Eighth Amendment violation does not necessarily constitute challenge to legality of sentence). - 27 - J-A26044-25 excessive and that the trial court failed to consider his individual circumstances and mitigating factors. “[S]entencing is vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and we shall not disturb a sentence absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Schroat, 272 A.3d 523, 527 (Pa.Super 2022). 2021See Succi, 173 A.3d at 285 (finding Eighth Amendment challenge to sentence waived where challenge implicated discretionary aspects of sentence rather than legality of sentence). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Bakergreen2 sentences2016Baker includes a review of High Court Eighth Amendment proportionality decisions illustrating that successful challenges to recidivist sentencing schemes and non-capital sentences are “extremely rare.” Id. at 1048-49. 4 Justice Kennedy’s understanding of the first prong of the Solem test as a threshold hurdle in establishing an Eighth Amendment violation has been recently cited with approval by the High Court as well. 2016Baker includes a review of High Court Eighth Amendment proportionality decisions illustrating that successful challenges to recidivist sentencing schemes and non-capital sentences are “extremely rare.” Id. at 1048-49. 4 Justice Kennedy’s understanding of the first prong of the Solem test as a threshold hurdle in establishing an Eighth Amendment violation has been recently cited with approval by the High Court as well. | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Mississippigreen2 sentences2022See Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1322 (“this case does not properly present — and thus we do not consider — any as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of disproportionality regarding Jones’s sentence.”), citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 , 996–1009 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 2022See Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1322 (“this case does not properly present — and thus we do not consider — any as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of disproportionality regarding Jones’s sentence.”), citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 , 996–1009 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevroletgreen2 sentences2017Reconciling these decisions, the Commonwealth Court found that, for a civil forfeiture brought under the Forfeiture Act to survive an Eighth Amendment challenge, the Commonwealth must show, initially, that the forfeitable property was the instrumentality of the offense. 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at 858-59, 866 . 2017Reconciling these decisions, the Commonwealth Court found that, for a civil forfeiture brought under the Forfeiture Act to survive an Eighth Amendment challenge, the Commonwealth must show, initially, that the forfeitable property was the instrumentality of the offense. 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at 858-59, 866 . | 2 | 2 |
Von Hofe v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 189 (2d Cir. 2007) (co-owner knew marijuana was being cultivated in the basement of her home and was convicted of possession of marijuana but because she did not know her husband was distributing the marijuana, the forfeiture of her half interest in the house was held to impose an excessive and unconstitutional fine). 11 The underlying offense was a long-term drug trafficking operation, where Gavlak entered into a conspiracy with her children and son-in-law to sell large amounts of cocaine over a two-year period. 2023See, e.g., Von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 189 (2d Cir. 2007) (co-owner knew marijuana was being cultivated in the basement of her home and was convicted of possession of marijuana but because she did not know her husband was distributing the marijuana, the forfeiture of her half interest in the house was held to impose an excessive and unconstitutional fine). 11 The underlying offense was a long-term drug trafficking operation, where Gavlak entered into a conspiracy with her children and son-in-law to sell large amounts of cocaine over a two-year period. | 1 | 3 |
Graham v. Floridagreen2 sentences2016“A court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60-61 , 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2022 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). 2016“A court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60-61 , 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2022 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). | 1 | 3 |
Neitzke v. Williamsred2 sentences2025An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Pa.R.C[iv].P. 240(j) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). [Inmate’s] action lacks an arguable basis in law because he is unable to meet the requirements to succeed on this Eighth Amendment claim. 2025An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Pa.R.C[iv].P. 240(j) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). [Inmate’s] action lacks an arguable basis in law because he is unable to meet the requirements to succeed on this Eighth Amendment claim. | 1 | 2 |
Tillery v. Owensgreen2 sentences2023An Eighth Amendment violation can be asserted where an inmate is deprived of “‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Lopez v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 119 A.3d 1081, 1090 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 426 (3d Cir. 1990)). 2023An Eighth Amendment violation can be asserted where an inmate is deprived of “‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Lopez v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 119 A.3d 1081, 1090 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 426 (3d Cir. 1990)). | 1 | 2 |
Andrew v. Whitegreen2 sentences2026Cf. Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86, 95 (2025) (per curiam) (reaffirming that “certain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt”) (citations omitted); id. at 94– 95 (recognizing the overlap between general legal principle underlying state prisoner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and “the Eighth Amendment principle that a sentence may not be grossly disproportionate to the offense”) (citation omitted). [J-31-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 5 378, 390–393 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534–538; Williams, 2026Cf. Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86, 95 (2025) (per curiam) (reaffirming that “certain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt”) (citations omitted); id. at 94– 95 (recognizing the overlap between general legal principle underlying state prisoner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and “the Eighth Amendment principle that a sentence may not be grossly disproportionate to the offense”) (citation omitted). [J-31-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 5 378, 390–393 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534–538; Williams, | 1 | 1 |
| Chance v. Armstronggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Com. v. Schroat, S.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Lankfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Mourygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lopez v. Pa. Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burrell v. Hampshire Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Alabamagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robert A. Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Massachusettsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bullock v. Horngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Perry v. Roygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lamb v. Norwoodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mark A. Campbell v. Kevin Kallasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kosilek v. Spencergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Oldsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Discover Bank v. Royalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Greengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yount v. Pennsylvania Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. 502-504 Gordon Streetgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Castrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Colon-Plazagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. One 1985 Dark Blue Mercedes Benz Cargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Spruillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Battsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Trivignogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Payne v. Tennessee
green
2 sentences2026The Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court did not accept that Article I, Section 13 claims required lockstep devotion to federal law interpreting the Eighth Amendment, as the Court could have refrained from further state constitutional analysis by citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), as dispositive of the Eighth Amendment claim. 2026The Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court did not accept that Article I, Section 13 claims required lockstep devotion to federal law interpreting the Eighth Amendment, as the Court could have refrained from further state constitutional analysis by citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), as dispositive of the Eighth Amendment claim. | 4 | 2013–2026 |
Zant v. Stephens
green
2 sentences2014The Fletcher Court noted, preliminarily, that “to survive an Eighth Amendment challenge ‘an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’ ” Id. at 428, 861 A.2d at 912 (indirectly quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)). 2014The Fletcher Court noted, preliminarily, that “to survive an Eighth Amendment challenge ‘an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’ ” Id. at 428, 861 A.2d at 912 (indirectly quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)). | 3 | 2002–2014 |
Caldwell v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences2019The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address "whether a capital sentence is valid when the sentencing jury is led to believe that responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rests not with the jury but with the appellate court which later reviews the case." Caldwell , 472 U.S. at 323 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 . 2019The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address "whether a capital sentence is valid when the sentencing jury is led to believe that responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rests not with the jury but with the appellate court which later reviews the case." Caldwell , 472 U.S. at 323 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 . | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Wilson v. Seiter
green
2 sentences2018Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 . . . (1991). 2018Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 . . . (1991). | 2 | 2014–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Real Property & Improvements Commonly Known as 5444 Spruce Street
green
2 sentences2017Thus, the Court was not relying upon the understanding of “instrumentality” as that term would develop in subsequent cases, but was deeming the property at issue — a mobile home and auto body shop — not to be “contraband,” and, thus, subject to an Eighth Amendment challenge. [J-68A-2016 and J-68B-2016] - 45 further, we traced the high Court’s pre-Bajakajian decisions, discerning a pointed distinction between forfeitures which were upheld because they exhibited a significant relationship between the property and the crime, and those where the property forfeited was not significantly related to 2017Thus, the Court was not relying upon the understanding of “instrumentality” as that term would develop in subsequent cases, but was deeming the property at issue — a mobile home and auto body shop — not to be “contraband,” and, thus, subject to an Eighth Amendment challenge. [J-68A-2016 and J-68B-2016] - 45 further, we traced the high Court’s pre-Bajakajian decisions, discerning a pointed distinction between forfeitures which were upheld because they exhibited a significant relationship between the property and the crime, and those where the property forfeited was not significantly related to | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Rhodes v. Chapman
green
2 sentences2014Although correctional institutions are by their very nature restrictive and even harsh, the Eighth Amendment requires that the conditions of confinement do not include “unnecessary and wanton” inflictions of pain that are “totally without pe-nological justification.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 , 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399 , 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). 2014Although correctional institutions are by their very nature restrictive and even harsh, the Eighth Amendment requires that the conditions of confinement do not include “unnecessary and wanton” inflictions of pain that are “totally without pe-nological justification.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 , 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399 , 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). | 2 | 1986–2014 |
Roper v. Simmons
green
2 sentences2011See Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits sentence of life without parole for juveniles (defined as individuals under 18) who did not commit homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of capital punishment for offenders committing their crimes prior to age 18) Those over eighteen get no benefit from these constitutional decisions, irrespective of their subjective "psychological and emotional age and level of maturity." [32] The statements by Judge Mihalic 2011See Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits sentence of life without parole for juveniles (defined as individuals under 18) who did not commit homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of capital punishment for offenders committing their crimes prior to age 18) Those over eighteen get no benefit from these constitutional decisions, irrespective of their subjective "psychological and emotional age and level of maturity." [32] The statements by Judge Mihalic | 2 | 2008–2011 |
Commonwealth v. Waters
green
2 sentences1992Id., 334 Pa.Super. at 525-26 , 483 A.2d at 861 . 1992Id., 334 Pa.Super. at 525-26 , 483 A.2d at 861 . | 2 | 1985–1992 |
Wiggins v. Smith, Warden
green
1 sentence2026Cf. Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86, 95 (2025) (per curiam) (reaffirming that “certain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt”) (citations omitted); id. at 94– 95 (recognizing the overlap between general legal principle underlying state prisoner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and “the Eighth Amendment principle that a sentence may not be grossly disproportionate to the offense”) (citation omitted). [J-31-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 5 378, 390–393 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534–538; Williams, | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Williams v. Taylor
green
1 sentence2026Cf. Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86, 95 (2025) (per curiam) (reaffirming that “certain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt”) (citations omitted); id. at 94– 95 (recognizing the overlap between general legal principle underlying state prisoner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and “the Eighth Amendment principle that a sentence may not be grossly disproportionate to the offense”) (citation omitted). [J-31-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 5 378, 390–393 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534–538; Williams, | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Solem v. Helm
red
2 sentences2025When an appellant presents an Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence, this Court applies the following analysis: In Commonwealth v. Spells, [] 612 A.2d 458, 462 (1992) (en banc), this Court applied the three-prong test for Eighth Amendment proportionality review set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 [] (1983): [A] court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdict 2025When an appellant presents an Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence, this Court applies the following analysis: In Commonwealth v. Spells, [] 612 A.2d 458, 462 (1992) (en banc), this Court applied the three-prong test for Eighth Amendment proportionality review set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 [] (1983): [A] court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdict | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hiko Energy, LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n
green
2 sentences2025HIKO Energy, 209 A.3d at 263 . 2025HIKO Energy, 209 A.3d at 263 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. William Lanzaro
green
2 sentences2025Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998); Monmouth C[nty.] Corr[.] Inst[.] Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 , 347 (3d Cir. 1987). *** In addition to satisfying the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must also allege acts or omissions that evidence deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials in order to state a cognizable claim that the prisoner’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment has been violated. 2025Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998); Monmouth C[nty.] Corr[.] Inst[.] Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 , 347 (3d Cir. 1987). *** In addition to satisfying the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must also allege acts or omissions that evidence deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials in order to state a cognizable claim that the prisoner’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment has been violated. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| United States v. Michael Walker green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hutto v. Davis
green
2 sentences2025Similarly, in Huto v. Davis, [ 454 U.S. 370 (1982),] the U.S. Supreme [rejected] an Eighth Amendment challenge to a 40-year sentence for the crime of possessing nine ounces (255 grams) of marijuana. [Id. at 371-72.] Certainly, [Appellant’s] sentence is less severe than the [f]ederal standard for Eighth Amendment challenges. [Appellant’s] … sentence of 21 to 42 years is not cruel or unusual punishment. 2025Similarly, in Huto v. Davis, [ 454 U.S. 370 (1982),] the U.S. Supreme [rejected] an Eighth Amendment challenge to a 40-year sentence for the crime of possessing nine ounces (255 grams) of marijuana. [Id. at 371-72.] Certainly, [Appellant’s] sentence is less severe than the [f]ederal standard for Eighth Amendment challenges. [Appellant’s] … sentence of 21 to 42 years is not cruel or unusual punishment. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Shoul v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Bennett v. Beard green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| G. Watkins v. PA DOC, Secretary, John Wetzel, Superintendent Robert Gilmore green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Kiman v. New Hampshire Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| STONE & EDWARDS INS. v. Dept. of Ins. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Platt v. Brockenborough green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Smith v. Mensinger green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Alexander v. Weiner green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Griffin v. Vaughn green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Anthony Dixon v. Salvador A. Godinez, Theopolis Smith, Thomas P. Roth & Dennis Jennings green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Lopez v. Wetzel neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Scott Gibson v. Bryan Collier green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Smith v. Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Justice Allah v. Michele Ricci green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Commonwealth v. Dougherty green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Commonwealth v. Little green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Yasipour green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized From Young green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Charles M. KEENAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank HALL, Director Oregon Department of Corrections, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Charles M. Keenan v. Frank Hall, Director Oregon Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Commonwealth v. Wilson green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.