Eighth Amendment principle in Maryland

2026Following a robust analysis of the development of Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), and Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021),2 the Supreme Court of Maryland noted the following concerning Appellant’s sentences: As outlined above, Miller and Montgomery established that the Eighth Amendment requires a hearing where “youth and its attendant characteristics” are considered as sentencing factors so that life without parole is not imposed in cases where a juvenile offender’s crime resulted from transient i

2022See Jones, ___ U.S. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1322 (“[T]his case does not properly present—and thus we do not consider— any as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of disproportionality regarding Jones’s (continued . . .) 15 141 S. Ct. at 1337 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“In the context of a juvenile offender, [an as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of disproportionality] should be controlled by this Court’s holding that sentencing a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole . . . is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted

2005See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06 , 122 S.Ct. at 2441-42 ; Ford v. Wainwrigkt, 477 U.S. 399, 411 , 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]his especial concern [for reliability in capital proceedings] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion

2005See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06 , 122 S.Ct. at 2441-42 ; Ford v. Wainwrigkt, 477 U.S. 399, 411 , 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]his especial concern [for reliability in capital proceedings] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion

2005See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06 , 122 S.Ct. at 2441-42 ; Ford v. Wainwrigkt, 477 U.S. 399, 411 , 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]his especial concern [for reliability in capital proceedings] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion

2005See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06 , 122 S.Ct. at 2441-42 ; Ford v. Wainwrigkt, 477 U.S. 399, 411 , 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]his especial concern [for reliability in capital proceedings] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion

2005See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06 , 122 S.Ct. at 2441-42 ; Ford v. Wainwrigkt, 477 U.S. 399, 411 , 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]his especial concern [for reliability in capital proceedings] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion

2005See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06 , 122 S.Ct. at 2441-42 ; Ford v. Wainwrigkt, 477 U.S. 399, 411 , 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]his especial concern [for reliability in capital proceedings] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion

2005See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06 , 122 S.Ct. at 2441-42 ; Ford v. Wainwrigkt, 477 U.S. 399, 411 , 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]his especial concern [for reliability in capital proceedings] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion

2005See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06 , 122 S.Ct. at 2441-42 ; Ford v. Wainwrigkt, 477 U.S. 399, 411 , 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]his especial concern [for reliability in capital proceedings] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion

2005See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06 , 122 S.Ct. at 2441-42 ; Ford v. Wainwrigkt, 477 U.S. 399, 411 , 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]his especial concern [for reliability in capital proceedings] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion

2005See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06 , 122 S.Ct. at 2441-42 ; Ford v. Wainwrigkt, 477 U.S. 399, 411 , 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]his especial concern [for reliability in capital proceedings] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion

2018See State v. Davis , 206 Ariz. 377 , 79 P.3d 64 , 74-75 (2003) ("Although this court normally will not consider the imposition of consecutive sentences in a proportionality inquiry, this case cries out for departure from that general rule"); Close v. People , 48 P.3d 528 , 540 n.6 (Colo. 2002) ("Our holding that consecutive crime of violence statute sentences are not reviewable in the aggregate in a proportionality review does not preclude an Eighth Amendment challenge to that cumulative sentence under the 'shocks the conscience' standard").

2018See State v. Davis , 206 Ariz. 377 , 79 P.3d 64 , 74-75 (2003) ("Although this court normally will not consider the imposition of consecutive sentences in a proportionality inquiry, this case cries out for departure from that general rule"); Close v. People , 48 P.3d 528 , 540 n.6 (Colo. 2002) ("Our holding that consecutive crime of violence statute sentences are not reviewable in the aggregate in a proportionality review does not preclude an Eighth Amendment challenge to that cumulative sentence under the 'shocks the conscience' standard").

2018See State v. Davis , 206 Ariz. 377 , 79 P.3d 64 , 74-75 (2003) ("Although this court normally will not consider the imposition of consecutive sentences in a proportionality inquiry, this case cries out for departure from that general rule"); Close v. People , 48 P.3d 528 , 540 n.6 (Colo. 2002) ("Our holding that consecutive crime of violence statute sentences are not reviewable in the aggregate in a proportionality review does not preclude an Eighth Amendment challenge to that cumulative sentence under the 'shocks the conscience' standard").

2018See State v. Davis , 206 Ariz. 377 , 79 P.3d 64 , 74-75 (2003) ("Although this court normally will not consider the imposition of consecutive sentences in a proportionality inquiry, this case cries out for departure from that general rule"); Close v. People , 48 P.3d 528 , 540 n.6 (Colo. 2002) ("Our holding that consecutive crime of violence statute sentences are not reviewable in the aggregate in a proportionality review does not preclude an Eighth Amendment challenge to that cumulative sentence under the 'shocks the conscience' standard").

2018Twigg v. State , 447 Md. 1 , 27, 133 A.3d 1125 (2016) ("The notion of sentencing as a 'package' is well-recognized ... among our sister federal and state appellate courts").

2018Twigg v. State , 447 Md. 1 , 27, 133 A.3d 1125 (2016) ("The notion of sentencing as a 'package' is well-recognized ... among our sister federal and state appellate courts").

2017Cir. 1988) (same); State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473 , 134 P.3d 378, 384 (2006) (affirming the imposition of 20 consecutive 10-year sentences for separate convictions for possession of child pornography and remarking that, “as a general rule, this court ‘will not consider the imposition of consecutive sentences in a proportionality inquiry .,..’”) (quoting State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377 , 79 P.3d 64, 74 (2003)); see also Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming the imposition of cumulative disciplinary sanctions *743 against a prisoner, opining that “it is wrong to treat stac

2017Cir. 1988) (same); State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473 , 134 P.3d 378, 384 (2006) (affirming the imposition of 20 consecutive 10-year sentences for separate convictions for possession of child pornography and remarking that, “as a general rule, this court ‘will not consider the imposition of consecutive sentences in a proportionality inquiry .,..’”) (quoting State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377 , 79 P.3d 64, 74 (2003)); see also Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming the imposition of cumulative disciplinary sanctions *743 against a prisoner, opining that “it is wrong to treat stac

2017As the Supreme Court of Minnesota recently observed in State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 2017), the O’Neil Court’s dicta has been widely followed by state and federal courts in assessing proportionality challenges under the Eighth Amendment. 31 See Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279 , 1285 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence for multiple crimes.”); 32 United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2d.

2017As the Supreme Court of Minnesota recently observed in State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 2017), the O’Neil Court’s dicta has been widely followed by state and federal courts in assessing proportionality challenges under the Eighth Amendment. 31 See Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279 , 1285 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence for multiple crimes.”); 32 United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2d.

2017As the Supreme Court of Minnesota recently observed in State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 2017), the O’Neil Court’s dicta has been widely followed by state and federal courts in assessing proportionality challenges under the Eighth Amendment. 31 See Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279 , 1285 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence for multiple crimes.”); 32 United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2d.

2017As the Supreme Court of Minnesota recently observed in State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 2017), the O’Neil Court’s dicta has been widely followed by state and federal courts in assessing proportionality challenges under the Eighth Amendment. 31 See Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279 , 1285 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence for multiple crimes.”); 32 United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2d.

2017Cir. 1988) (same); State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473 , 134 P.3d 378, 384 (2006) (affirming the imposition of 20 consecutive 10-year sentences for separate convictions for possession of child pornography and remarking that, “as a general rule, this court ‘will not consider the imposition of consecutive sentences in a proportionality inquiry .,..’”) (quoting State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377 , 79 P.3d 64, 74 (2003)); see also Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming the imposition of cumulative disciplinary sanctions *743 against a prisoner, opining that “it is wrong to treat stac

2017Cir. 1988) (same); State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473 , 134 P.3d 378, 384 (2006) (affirming the imposition of 20 consecutive 10-year sentences for separate convictions for possession of child pornography and remarking that, “as a general rule, this court ‘will not consider the imposition of consecutive sentences in a proportionality inquiry .,..’”) (quoting State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377 , 79 P.3d 64, 74 (2003)); see also Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming the imposition of cumulative disciplinary sanctions *743 against a prisoner, opining that “it is wrong to treat stac

2003In the principal case, Gregg v. Georgia, supra the three-Justice opinion announcing the judgment read Furman as "mandating that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action, "id., at 189[, 96 S.Ct. 2909 ] (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.) (emphasis added).

2003See Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 179[, 96 S.Ct. 2909 ], In 1976, we upheld against Eighth Amendment challenge three “guided discretion” schemes, representative of these measures, which, in varying forms, required the sentencer to consider certain specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching its decision.

2000See Five Percenters, 174 F.3d at 472 (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381 ); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (“Depression and anxiety are unfortunate concomitants of incarceration; they do not, however, typically constitute the ‘extreme deprivations ... required to make out’ ” an Eighth Amendment claim.).

2000See Five Percenters, 174 F.3d at 472 (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381 ); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (“Depression and anxiety are unfortunate concomitants of incarceration; they do not, however, typically constitute the ‘extreme deprivations ... required to make out’ ” an Eighth Amendment claim.).

2000See Five Percenters, 174 F.3d at 472 (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381 ); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (“Depression and anxiety are unfortunate concomitants of incarceration; they do not, however, typically constitute the ‘extreme deprivations ... required to make out’ ” an Eighth Amendment claim.).

2000See Five Percenters, 174 F.3d at 472 (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381 ); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (“Depression and anxiety are unfortunate concomitants of incarceration; they do not, however, typically constitute the ‘extreme deprivations ... required to make out’ ” an Eighth Amendment claim.).

2000See Five Percenters, 174 F.3d at 472 (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381 ); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (“Depression and anxiety are unfortunate concomitants of incarceration; they do not, however, typically constitute the ‘extreme deprivations ... required to make out’ ” an Eighth Amendment claim.).

2000See Five Percenters, 174 F.3d at 472 (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381 ); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (“Depression and anxiety are unfortunate concomitants of incarceration; they do not, however, typically constitute the ‘extreme deprivations ... required to make out’ ” an Eighth Amendment claim.).