30 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1976–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Torres v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen2 sentences2026Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). "[W]hether prison conditions are sufficiently harmful to establish an Eighth Amendment violation[] is a purely legal determination for the court to make." Torres, 427 Mass. at 614 . 2026Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). "[W]hether prison conditions are sufficiently harmful to establish an Eighth Amendment violation[] is a purely legal determination for the court to make." Torres, 427 Mass. at 614 . | 2 | 5 |
Farmer v. Brennangreen2 sentences2021Such an occurrence can be the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim, if it is shown to be caused by an unconstitutional "condition of confinement," see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 2021Such an occurrence can be the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim, if it is shown to be caused by an unconstitutional "condition of confinement," see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). | 2 | 5 |
Wilson v. Seitergreen2 sentences2026Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). "[W]hether prison conditions are sufficiently harmful to establish an Eighth Amendment violation[] is a purely legal determination for the court to make." Torres, 427 Mass. at 614 . 2026Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). "[W]hether prison conditions are sufficiently harmful to establish an Eighth Amendment violation[] is a purely legal determination for the court to make." Torres, 427 Mass. at 614 . | 2 | 3 |
Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green2 sentences2024See Torres v. Commissioner of Correction, 427 Mass. 611, 614 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 (1998) ("whether prison conditions are sufficiently harmful to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, is a purely legal determination for the court to make"). 2024See Torres v. Commissioner of Correction, 427 Mass. 611, 614 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 (1998) ("whether prison conditions are sufficiently harmful to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, is a purely legal determination for the court to make"). | 2 | 3 |
Helling v. McKinneygreen2 sentences2024Cf. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (regarding prison conditions, Eighth Amendment analysis requires both "scientific and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm" and "assess[ment] whether society considers the risk . . . to be so 3 On remand, the judge heard expert testimony and oral argument and accepted an additional exhibit in evidence, before issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether mandatory life without parole sentences for eighteen through twenty year old offenders violates art. 26. 1994Last, I would follow the test annunciated in Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993). 3 In Helling, supra at 2481 , the United States Supreme Court held that “[a prisoner] could state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that [prison officials] have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of [environmental tobacco smoke] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.” The Supreme Court then remanded the case “to the District Court to provide an opportunity for [the prisoner] to prove his allegations, which will require him to prove b | 2 | 3 |
Rhodes v. Chapmangreen2 sentences2020See also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (Eighth Amendment violation requires showing that living conditions amount to "serious deprivation of basic human needs," including denial of medical care for serious medical needs). 2018To prove a "conditions of confinement" claim under the Eighth Amendment, Butler must show (1) conditions "sufficiently serious" as to "result in the denial of the 'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,' " *349 Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825 , 832, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), quoting from Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337 , 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392 , 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), and (2) that the department acted with "deliberate indifference" to his health or safety. 14 Farmer v. Brennan , supra at 834 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 . *88 "No static 'test' can exist by which courts determin | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Bajakajiangreen2 sentences2025He does not raise an Eighth Amendment claim or make any reasoned argument that nonrenewal is "grossly disproportional to the gravity of [his] offense." United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). 2025He does not raise an Eighth Amendment claim or make any reasoned argument that nonrenewal is "grossly disproportional to the gravity of [his] offense." United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). | 2 | 2 |
Estelle v. Gamblegreen2 sentences2002In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove “deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291 (1976). 2002In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove “deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291 (1976). | 2 | 2 |
Hudson v. McMilliangreen2 sentences2018"Because routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1 , 9, 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (citation and quotation omitted). 2018"Because routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1 , 9, 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (citation and quotation omitted). | 1 | 3 |
DuPont v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen2 sentences2024See DuPont, 448 Mass. at 398 ("no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of th[e] [plaintiff]'s case" [citation omitted]). 2024See DuPont, 448 Mass. at 398 ("no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of th[e] [plaintiff]'s case" [citation omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Kosilek v. Spencergreen1 sentence2024Compare Torres v. Commissioner of Correction, 427 Mass. 611, 615-616 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 (1998) (stating art. 26 standard), with Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom., Kosilek v. O'Brien, 575 U.S. 998 (2015) (stating Eighth Amendment standard). | 1 | 1 |
Joe Marsh, Leroy Owens v. Butler County, Alabama, the Butler County Commissiongreen2 sentences2021Although there had been no prior inmate-on-inmate attacks involving the large hot pots, "an Eighth Amendment violation can arise from unsafe conditions of confinement even if no assault or similar physical injury has yet occurred." Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1034 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 2021Although there had been no prior inmate-on-inmate attacks involving the large hot pots, "an Eighth Amendment violation can arise from unsafe conditions of confinement even if no assault or similar physical injury has yet occurred." Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1034 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Pineda v. Toomeygreen2 sentences2020See Zingg v. Groblewski, 907 F.3d 630, 635 (1st Cir. 2018); Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008). 2020See Zingg v. Groblewski, 907 F.3d 630, 635 (1st Cir. 2018); Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Trop v. Dullesgreen2 sentences2020To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, an individual must establish that the punishment is inconsistent with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958). 2020To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, an individual must establish that the punishment is inconsistent with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958). | 1 | 1 |
Zingg v. Groblewskigreen2 sentences2020See Zingg v. Groblewski, 907 F.3d 630, 635 (1st Cir. 2018); Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008). 2020See Zingg v. Groblewski, 907 F.3d 630, 635 (1st Cir. 2018); Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
MacLean v. State Board of Retirementgreen1 sentence2016This court has considered the claim’s second part, excessiveness, in two previous cases, MacLean v. State Bd. of Retirement, 432 Mass. 339, 347-350 (2000), and Maher v. Retirement Bd. of Quincy, 452 Mass. 517, 523-525 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1166 (2009). 8 We have never addressed the threshold question whether the forfeiture of a public employee’s pension under § 15 (4) is a “fine” under the Eighth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
Doherty v. Retirement Board of Medfordgreen2 sentences2008General Laws c. 32, § 16 (3) (a) (2), expressly provides that “the decision of the [District] [C]curt [in reviewing the board’s decision] shall be final.” See note 3, supra. “[Certiorari is the only way of reviewing decisions declared final by statute.” Doherty v. Retirement Bd. of Medford, 425 Mass. 130, 134 (1997), quoting MacKenzie v. School Comm. of Ipswich, 342 Mass. 612, 614 (1961). 2008General Laws c. 32, § 16 (3) (a) (2), expressly provides that “the decision of the [District] [C]curt [in reviewing the board’s decision] shall be final.” See note 3, supra. “[Certiorari is the only way of reviewing decisions declared final by statute.” Doherty v. Retirement Bd. of Medford, 425 Mass. 130, 134 (1997), quoting MacKenzie v. School Comm. of Ipswich, 342 Mass. 612, 614 (1961). | 1 | 1 |
MacKenzie v. School Committee of Ipswichgreen2 sentences2008General Laws c. 32, § 16 (3) (a) (2), expressly provides that “the decision of the [District] [C]curt [in reviewing the board’s decision] shall be final.” See note 3, supra. “[Certiorari is the only way of reviewing decisions declared final by statute.” Doherty v. Retirement Bd. of Medford, 425 Mass. 130, 134 (1997), quoting MacKenzie v. School Comm. of Ipswich, 342 Mass. 612, 614 (1961). 2008General Laws c. 32, § 16 (3) (a) (2), expressly provides that “the decision of the [District] [C]curt [in reviewing the board’s decision] shall be final.” See note 3, supra. “[Certiorari is the only way of reviewing decisions declared final by statute.” Doherty v. Retirement Bd. of Medford, 425 Mass. 130, 134 (1997), quoting MacKenzie v. School Comm. of Ipswich, 342 Mass. 612, 614 (1961). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bairdgreen2 sentences2008Rptr. 593, n.9 (Super.Ct. 2005) (Agnes, J.) (noting that the defendant could not challenge the potential penalties for violating his parole unless such a violation occurred); Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 754-56 (1969) (declining to consider an Eighth Amendment challenge where the defendant had not yet been sentenced for a crime). 2008Rptr. 593, n.9 (Super.Ct. 2005) (Agnes, J.) (noting that the defendant could not challenge the potential penalties for violating his parole unless such a violation occurred); Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 754-56 (1969) (declining to consider an Eighth Amendment challenge where the defendant had not yet been sentenced for a crime). | 1 | 1 |
Clancy v. McCabegreen2 sentences2005Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. at 318 . 2005Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. at 318 . | 1 | 1 |
Hathaway v. Coughlingreen2 sentences2002To determine what constitutes a serious medical need, a court contemplates, “a condition of urgency” that may result in “degeneration” or “extreme pain.” Chance, 143 F.3d at 702, citing Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). 2002To determine what constitutes a serious medical need, a court contemplates, “a condition of urgency” that may result in “degeneration” or “extreme pain.” Chance, 143 F.3d at 702, citing Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Chance v. Armstronggreen | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Barkleygreen2 sentences2002Harrison, 219 F.3d at 137. 2002Harrison, 219 F.3d at 137. | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Susan D. Bieri Leonard Bieri, IIIgreen | 1 | 1 |
| No. 98-1467 (Ca-96-1633-A)green | 1 | 1 |
| Hickey v. Reedergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Madrid v. Gomezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McGuinness v. Duboisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Steven M. Desrosiers v. John J. Morangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Meshkov v. Abington Townshipgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Madden v. City of Meridengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brewer v. Perringreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 308565green | 1 | 1 |
| Coker v. Georgiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Edward Wayne Beverleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2018First, children demonstrate a ' "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.' Second, children ' "are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures," including from their family and peers; they have limited "contro[l] over their own environment"[;] and [they] lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.' Finally, 'a child's character is not as "well formed" as an adult's; his traits are "less fixed" and his actions less likely to be evidence of irretrieva 2018First, children demonstrate a ' "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.' Second, children ' "are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures," including from their family and peers; they have limited "contro[l] over their own environment"[;] and [they] lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.' Finally, 'a child's character is not as "well formed" as an adult's; his traits are "less fixed" and his actions less likely to be evidence of irretrieva | 2 | 2013–2018 |
Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n
green
2 sentences2024Once the Federal case was dismissed on the merits, Federal claim preclusion doctrine barred Smith from raising the art. 26 claim in Superior Court. 6 See Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc., 142 F.3d at 38 . 2024Once the Federal case was dismissed on the merits, Federal claim preclusion doctrine barred Smith from raising the art. 26 claim in Superior Court. 6 See Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc., 142 F.3d at 38 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Lakin v. Barnhart
green
2 sentences2021The First Circuit termed this a "small number of assaults"; in evaluating "when the risk of violence among inmates is sufficiently 'substantial' to satisfy the first prong of Farmer," the court deemed the padlock risk "well within the zone of those too insubstantial for an Eighth Amendment claim." Id. at 71 . 2021The First Circuit termed this a "small number of assaults"; in evaluating "when the risk of violence among inmates is sufficiently 'substantial' to satisfy the first prong of Farmer," the court deemed the padlock risk "well within the zone of those too insubstantial for an Eighth Amendment claim." Id. at 71 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Villagran
green
2 sentences2019Therefore, the sole question before us is whether this defendant's sentence crosses the line drawn by art. 26, which prohibits the imposition of "cruel or unusual punishments." "Where a defendant claims that a judge has made an error of constitutional dimension, 'we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error and leave to the judge the responsibility of determining the weight and credibility to be given ... testimony presented at the motion hearing." Commonwealth v. Perez , 480 Mass. 562 , 567-568, 106 N.E.3d 620 (2018) ( Perez II ), quoting Commonwealth v. Villagran , 47 2019Therefore, the sole question before us is whether this defendant's sentence crosses the line drawn by art. 26, which prohibits the imposition of "cruel or unusual punishments." "Where a defendant claims that a judge has made an error of constitutional dimension, 'we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error and leave to the judge the responsibility of determining the weight and credibility to be given ... testimony presented at the motion hearing." Commonwealth v. Perez , 480 Mass. 562 , 567-568, 106 N.E.3d 620 (2018) ( Perez II ), quoting Commonwealth v. Villagran , 47 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Perez
green
2 sentences2019Therefore, the sole question before us is whether this defendant's sentence crosses the line drawn by art. 26, which prohibits the imposition of "cruel or unusual punishments." "Where a defendant claims that a judge has made an error of constitutional dimension, 'we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error and leave to the judge the responsibility of determining the weight and credibility to be given ... testimony presented at the motion hearing." Commonwealth v. Perez , 480 Mass. 562 , 567-568, 106 N.E.3d 620 (2018) ( Perez II ), quoting Commonwealth v. Villagran , 47 2019Therefore, the sole question before us is whether this defendant's sentence crosses the line drawn by art. 26, which prohibits the imposition of "cruel or unusual punishments." "Where a defendant claims that a judge has made an error of constitutional dimension, 'we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error and leave to the judge the responsibility of determining the weight and credibility to be given ... testimony presented at the motion hearing." Commonwealth v. Perez , 480 Mass. 562 , 567-568, 106 N.E.3d 620 (2018) ( Perez II ), quoting Commonwealth v. Villagran , 47 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District
green
2 sentences2018First, children demonstrate a ' "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.' Second, children ' "are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures," including from their family and peers; they have limited "contro[l] over their own environment"[;] and [they] lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.' Finally, 'a child's character is not as "well formed" as an adult's; his traits are "less fixed" and his actions less likely to be evidence of irretrieva 2018First, children demonstrate a ' "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.' Second, children ' "are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures," including from their family and peers; they have limited "contro[l] over their own environment"[;] and [they] lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.' Finally, 'a child's character is not as "well formed" as an adult's; his traits are "less fixed" and his actions less likely to be evidence of irretrieva | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Maher v. Retirement Board of Quincy
green
1 sentence2016This court has considered the claim’s second part, excessiveness, in two previous cases, MacLean v. State Bd. of Retirement, 432 Mass. 339, 347-350 (2000), and Maher v. Retirement Bd. of Quincy, 452 Mass. 517, 523-525 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1166 (2009). 8 We have never addressed the threshold question whether the forfeiture of a public employee’s pension under § 15 (4) is a “fine” under the Eighth Amendment. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Roper v. Simmons
green
1 sentence2013Miller, supra. First, children demonstrate a “ ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.” Id., quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| United States v. James Lippert green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Albert Lopez Gallego v. United States green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.