12 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2025Finally, although Tyler asserts the broader language used in the South Carolina Constitution expands the protections of the Eighth Amendment, our supreme court has previously noted "that the United States Supreme Court effectively treats the 'and,' as an 'or' in their Eighth Amendment analysis." State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 512 , 413 S.E.2d 19, 27 (1992). 2025Finally, although Tyler asserts the broader language used in the South Carolina Constitution expands the protections of the Eighth Amendment, our supreme court has previously noted "that the United States Supreme Court effectively treats the 'and,' as an 'or' in their Eighth Amendment analysis." State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 512 , 413 S.E.2d 19, 27 (1992). | 2 | 2 |
Simmons v. South Carolinagreen2 sentences1995In fact, counsel for Young stressed to the jury that Young would never be released. [5] The Simmons court expressed no opinion on the Eighth Amendment issue presented. 512 U.S. at ___ , 114 S.Ct. at ___ , 129 L.Ed.2d at 141, n. 4 . [6] Additionally, Simmons is inapposite as it involves a defendant's ineligibility for parole and not, as here, information the defendant would one day be released from prison. [7] In fact, counsel for Young specifically rejected the State's contention that evidence the Victim swung at him might be mitigating. 1995In fact, counsel for Young stressed to the jury that Young would never be released. [5] The Simmons court expressed no opinion on the Eighth Amendment issue presented. 512 U.S. at ___ , 114 S.Ct. at ___ , 129 L.Ed.2d at 141, n. 4 . [6] Additionally, Simmons is inapposite as it involves a defendant's ineligibility for parole and not, as here, information the defendant would one day be released from prison. [7] In fact, counsel for Young specifically rejected the State's contention that evidence the Victim swung at him might be mitigating. | 1 | 2 |
Malloy v. South Carolinagreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 512 , 413 S.E.2d 19, 27 (1992) ("Despite this difference in verbiage, we note that the United States Supreme Court effectively treats the 'and,' as an 'or' in their Eighth Amendment analysis."); id. ("Thus, the use of the disjunctive 'or' rather than 'and' in the South Carolina Constitution is of no importance in this case, since the analysis we employ is the same under both constitutions."); State v. Brown, 284 S.C. 407, 411 , 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1985) ("Article I, § 15, of our Constitution prohibits the 59 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 512 , 413 S.E.2d 19, 27 (1992) ("Despite this difference in verbiage, we note that the United States Supreme Court effectively treats the 'and,' as an 'or' in their Eighth Amendment analysis."); id. ("Thus, the use of the disjunctive 'or' rather than 'and' in the South Carolina Constitution is of no importance in this case, since the analysis we employ is the same under both constitutions."); State v. Brown, 284 S.C. 407, 411 , 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1985) ("Article I, § 15, of our Constitution prohibits the 59 L. 2024See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 512 , 413 S.E.2d 19, 27 (1992) ("Despite this difference in verbiage, we note that the United States Supreme Court effectively treats the 'and,' as an 'or' in their Eighth Amendment analysis."); id. ("Thus, the use of the disjunctive 'or' rather than 'and' in the South Carolina Constitution is of no importance in this case, since the analysis we employ is the same under both constitutions."); State v. Brown, 284 S.C. 407, 411 , 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1985) ("Article I, § 15, of our Constitution prohibits the 59 L. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bajakajiangreen2 sentences2022See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 ("Until today, [] we have not articulated a standard for determining whether a punitive forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. 2022See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 ("Until today, [] we have not articulated a standard for determining whether a punitive forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Finleygreen2 sentences2020We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Finley, 427 S.C. 419, 427-28 , 831 S.E.2d 158, 162-63 (2019) (holding that because Finley's life sentence afforded him parole eligibility after the service of 30 years' imprisonment, any potential Eighth Amendment violation was cured, and the circuit court did not err in denying Finley's motion for resentencing); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting St 2020We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Finley, 427 S.C. 419, 427-28 , 831 S.E.2d 158, 162-63 (2019) (holding that because Finley's life sentence afforded him parole eligibility after the service of 30 years' imprisonment, any potential Eighth Amendment violation was cured, and the circuit court did not err in denying Finley's motion for resentencing); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting St | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hatchergreen2 sentences2020We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Finley, 427 S.C. 419, 427-28 , 831 S.E.2d 158, 162-63 (2019) (holding that because Finley's life sentence afforded him parole eligibility after the service of 30 years' imprisonment, any potential Eighth Amendment violation was cured, and the circuit court did not err in denying Finley's motion for resentencing); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting St 2020We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Finley, 427 S.C. 419, 427-28 , 831 S.E.2d 158, 162-63 (2019) (holding that because Finley's life sentence afforded him parole eligibility after the service of 30 years' imprisonment, any potential Eighth Amendment violation was cured, and the circuit court did not err in denying Finley's motion for resentencing); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting St | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pagangreen2 sentences2020We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Finley, 427 S.C. 419, 427-28 , 831 S.E.2d 158, 162-63 (2019) (holding that because Finley's life sentence afforded him parole eligibility after the service of 30 years' imprisonment, any potential Eighth Amendment violation was cured, and the circuit court did not err in denying Finley's motion for resentencing); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting St 2020We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Finley, 427 S.C. 419, 427-28 , 831 S.E.2d 158, 162-63 (2019) (holding that because Finley's life sentence afforded him parole eligibility after the service of 30 years' imprisonment, any potential Eighth Amendment violation was cured, and the circuit court did not err in denying Finley's motion for resentencing); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting St | 1 | 1 |
cluster 759702green2 sentences2000Appellant does not allege an Eighth Amendment violation. [13] For purposes of this discussion, we assume the solicitor placed appellant's future dangerousness in issue. [14] Simmons was parole ineligible pursuant to § 24-21-640. [15] Keel v. French, 162 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir.1998) (recognizing "that Justice O'Connor's concurrence actually represents the holding in Simmons."). [16] The dissent contends the cases cited herein are inapposite. 2000Appellant does not allege an Eighth Amendment violation. [13] For purposes of this discussion, we assume the solicitor placed appellant's future dangerousness in issue. [14] Simmons was parole ineligible pursuant to § 24-21-640. [15] Keel v. French, 162 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir.1998) (recognizing "that Justice O'Connor's concurrence actually represents the holding in Simmons."). [16] The dissent contends the cases cited herein are inapposite. | 1 | 1 |
Whitmore Ex Rel. Simmons v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences1997Schneider v. State, 255 S.C. 594 , 180 S.E.2d 340 (1971); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 , 110 S.Ct. 1717 , 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (one must establish standing to assert an Eighth Amendment challenge by showing an injury in fact in order to invoke jurisdiction of federal courts). 1997Schneider v. State, 255 S.C. 594 , 180 S.E.2d 340 (1971); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 , 110 S.Ct. 1717 , 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (one must establish standing to assert an Eighth Amendment challenge by showing an injury in fact in order to invoke jurisdiction of federal courts). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Elkinsgreen2 sentences1996See State v. Elkins, 312 S.C. 541 , 436 S.E.2d 178 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1634 , 128 L.Ed.2d 357 (1994). 1996See State v. Elkins, 312 S.C. 541 , 436 S.E.2d 178 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1634 , 128 L.Ed.2d 357 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Elkinsgreen2 sentences1996See State v. Elkins, 312 S.C. 541 , 436 S.E.2d 178 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1634 , 128 L.Ed.2d 357 (1994). 1996See State v. Elkins, 312 S.C. 541 , 436 S.E.2d 178 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1634 , 128 L.Ed.2d 357 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Richley v. Norrisgreen2 sentences1996See State v. Elkins, 312 S.C. 541 , 436 S.E.2d 178 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1634 , 128 L.Ed.2d 357 (1994). 1996See State v. Elkins, 312 S.C. 541 , 436 S.E.2d 178 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1634 , 128 L.Ed.2d 357 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In the Interest of Justin B.
green
2 sentences2017Finally, we considered an Eighth Amendment challenge to the section 23-3-540 requirement that juveniles submit to electronic monitoring for life in In re Justin B., 1 405 S.C. 391 , 747 S.E.2d 774 (2013). 2017Finally, we considered an Eighth Amendment challenge to the section 23-3-540 requirement that juveniles submit to electronic monitoring for life in In re Justin B., 1 405 S.C. 391 , 747 S.E.2d 774 (2013). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Chapman
green
2 sentences2000In State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377 , 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1166 , 115 S.Ct. 1136 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1995), overruled on other grounds State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), we concluded there was no Eighth Amendment violation where the trial judge did not instruct the jury the defendant was parole ineligible but defense counsel argued "life imprisonment" means the defendant will never be released from prison. 2000In State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377 , 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1166 , 115 S.Ct. 1136 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1995), overruled on other grounds State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), we concluded there was no Eighth Amendment violation where the trial judge did not instruct the jury the defendant was parole ineligible but defense counsel argued "life imprisonment" means the defendant will never be released from prison. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Willcutt v. Brown
green
2 sentences2000In State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377 , 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1166 , 115 S.Ct. 1136 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1995), overruled on other grounds State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), we concluded there was no Eighth Amendment violation where the trial judge did not instruct the jury the defendant was parole ineligible but defense counsel argued "life imprisonment" means the defendant will never be released from prison. 2000In State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377 , 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1166 , 115 S.Ct. 1136 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1995), overruled on other grounds State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), we concluded there was no Eighth Amendment violation where the trial judge did not instruct the jury the defendant was parole ineligible but defense counsel argued “life imprisonment” means the defendant will never be released from prison. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Shafer
green
2 sentences2000As explained in State v. Shafer, 340 S.C. 291 , 531 S.E.2d 524 (2000), each of the referenced cases fully support the conclusion due process did not require the trial judge to instruct the jury appellant was parole ineligible. [17] Further, we note the sentencing statute provides for a mandatory minimum thirty year sentence. 2000As explained in State v. Shafer, 340 S.C. 291 , 531 S.E.2d 524 (2000), each of the referenced cases fully support the conclusion due process did not require the trial judge to instruct the jury appellant was parole ineligible. [17] Further, we note the sentencing statute provides for a mandatory minimum thirty year sentence. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Raphlah v. Texas Board of Higher Education
green
2 sentences2000In State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377 , 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1166 , 115 S.Ct. 1136 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1995), overruled on other grounds State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), we concluded there was no Eighth Amendment violation where the trial judge did not instruct the jury the defendant was parole ineligible but defense counsel argued "life imprisonment" means the defendant will never be released from prison. 2000In State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377 , 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1166 , 115 S.Ct. 1136 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1995), overruled on other grounds State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), we concluded there was no Eighth Amendment violation where the trial judge did not instruct the jury the defendant was parole ineligible but defense counsel argued “life imprisonment” means the defendant will never be released from prison. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Chichester v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2000In State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377 , 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1166 , 115 S.Ct. 1136 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1995), overruled on other grounds State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), we concluded there was no Eighth Amendment violation where the trial judge did not instruct the jury the defendant was parole ineligible but defense counsel argued "life imprisonment" means the defendant will never be released from prison. 2000In State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377 , 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1166 , 115 S.Ct. 1136 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1995), overruled on other grounds State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), we concluded there was no Eighth Amendment violation where the trial judge did not instruct the jury the defendant was parole ineligible but defense counsel argued “life imprisonment” means the defendant will never be released from prison. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Southerland
green
2 sentences2000In State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377 , 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1166 , 115 S.Ct. 1136 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1995), overruled on other grounds State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), we concluded there was no Eighth Amendment violation where the trial judge did not instruct the jury the defendant was parole ineligible but defense counsel argued "life imprisonment" means the defendant will never be released from prison. 2000In State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377 , 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1166 , 115 S.Ct. 1136 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1995), overruled on other grounds State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), we concluded there was no Eighth Amendment violation where the trial judge did not instruct the jury the defendant was parole ineligible but defense counsel argued "life imprisonment" means the defendant will never be released from prison. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Schneider v. State
green
2 sentences1997Schneider v. State, 255 S.C. 594 , 180 S.E.2d 340 (1971); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 , 110 S.Ct. 1717 , 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (one must establish standing to assert an Eighth Amendment challenge by showing an injury in fact in order to invoke jurisdiction of federal courts). 1997Schneider v. State, 255 S.C. 594 , 180 S.E.2d 340 (1971); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 , 110 S.Ct. 1717 , 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (one must establish standing to assert an Eighth Amendment challenge by showing an injury in fact in order to invoke jurisdiction of federal courts). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Tison v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1992Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed. (2d) 127 (1987); Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed. (2d) 1140 (1982). 1992Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed. (2d) 127 (1987); Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed. (2d) 1140 (1982). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Trop v. Dulles
green
2 sentences1992Similarly, there is no authority which persuades us that a defendant who is adjudged sane under the M'Naghten test but who was acting under an irresistible impulse would have been shielded from the death penalty in 1789. [8] The Eighth Amendment analysis does not stop with an examination of the intent of the framers of the Constitution." "The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments also recognizes the `evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Penry , 109 S. Ct. at 2953 (quoting Trop v. Dulles , 356 U.S. 86, 101 , 78 S.Ct. 590, 598 , 2 L.Ed. (2d) 6 1992Similarly, there is no authority which persuades us that a defendant who is adjudged sane under the M'Naghten test but who was acting under an irresistible impulse would have been shielded from the death penalty in 1789. [8] The Eighth Amendment analysis does not stop with an examination of the intent of the framers of the Constitution." "The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments also recognizes the `evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Penry , 109 S. Ct. at 2953 (quoting Trop v. Dulles , 356 U.S. 86, 101 , 78 S.Ct. 590, 598 , 2 L.Ed. (2d) 6 | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Coker v. Georgia
green
2 sentences1992The eighth amendment analysis applied by the United States Supreme Court in assessing the constitutionality of the death penalty for rapists, Coker v. Georgia , 433 U.S. 584 , 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 53 L.Ed. (2d) 982 (1977), for nontriggermen, Enmund v. Florida, supra , and for offenders under the age of sixteen, Thompson v. Oklahoma, supra , establishes with clarity the impropriety of appellant's sentence. 1992The eighth amendment analysis applied by the United States Supreme Court in assessing the constitutionality of the death penalty for rapists, Coker v. Georgia , 433 U.S. 584 , 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 53 L.Ed. (2d) 982 (1977), for nontriggermen, Enmund v. Florida, supra , and for offenders under the age of sixteen, Thompson v. Oklahoma, supra , establishes with clarity the impropriety of appellant's sentence. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Enmund v. Florida
green
2 sentences1992Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed. (2d) 127 (1987); Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed. (2d) 1140 (1982). 1992Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed. (2d) 127 (1987); Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed. (2d) 1140 (1982). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Diddlemeyer green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Butler green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Hawkins green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Cooper green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Riddle green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Patterson green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Reed green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Arthur green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Gaskins green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Singleton green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Drayton green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Bellamy green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Peterson green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences1991However, the fact remains that there are very few cases in which we can determine, based on the record before us, whether the failure by defense counsel to object was a strategic decision. [12] A finding of a sentence of death based on such would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation in any event. [13] To the extent they require in favorem vitae review, the following cases, inter alia , are hereby overruled: State v. Arthur , 296 S.C. 495 , 374 S.E. (2d) 291 (1988); State v. Diddlemeyer , 296 S.C. 235 , 371 S.E. (2d) 793 (1988); State v. Hawkins , 292 S.C. 418 , 357 S.E. (2d) 10 (1987); Sta 1991However, the fact remains that there are very few cases in which we can determine, based on the record before us, whether the failure by defense counsel to object was a strategic decision. [12] A finding of a sentence of death based on such would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation in any event. [13] To the extent they require in favorem vitae review, the following cases, inter alia , are hereby overruled: State v. Arthur , 296 S.C. 495 , 374 S.E. (2d) 291 (1988); State v. Diddlemeyer , 296 S.C. 235 , 371 S.E. (2d) 793 (1988); State v. Hawkins , 292 S.C. 418 , 357 S.E. (2d) 10 (1987); Sta | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Pearlie Simmons v. Sea-Land Services, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Butler v. South Carolina green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Damon green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Koon neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Lucas
green
2 sentences1991However, the fact remains that there are very few cases in which we can determine, based on the record before us, whether the failure by defense counsel to object was a strategic decision. [12] A finding of a sentence of death based on such would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation in any event. [13] To the extent they require in favorem vitae review, the following cases, inter alia , are hereby overruled: State v. Arthur , 296 S.C. 495 , 374 S.E. (2d) 291 (1988); State v. Diddlemeyer , 296 S.C. 235 , 371 S.E. (2d) 793 (1988); State v. Hawkins , 292 S.C. 418 , 357 S.E. (2d) 10 (1987); Sta 1991However, the fact remains that there are very few cases in which we can determine, based on the record before us, whether the failure by defense counsel to object was a strategic decision. [12] A finding of a sentence of death based on such would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation in any event. [13] To the extent they require in favorem vitae review, the following cases, inter alia , are hereby overruled: State v. Arthur , 296 S.C. 495 , 374 S.E. (2d) 291 (1988); State v. Diddlemeyer , 296 S.C. 235 , 371 S.E. (2d) 793 (1988); State v. Hawkins , 292 S.C. 418 , 357 S.E. (2d) 10 (1987); Sta | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Chaffee green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Adams green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Norris green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Elmore green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Patterson v. South Carolina green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Gaskins v. South Carolina
green
2 sentences1991However, the fact remains that there are very few cases in which we can determine, based on the record before us, whether the failure by defense counsel to object was a strategic decision. [12] A finding of a sentence of death based on such would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation in any event. [13] To the extent they require in favorem vitae review, the following cases, inter alia , are hereby overruled: State v. Arthur , 296 S.C. 495 , 374 S.E. (2d) 291 (1988); State v. Diddlemeyer , 296 S.C. 235 , 371 S.E. (2d) 793 (1988); State v. Hawkins , 292 S.C. 418 , 357 S.E. (2d) 10 (1987); Sta 1991However, the fact remains that there are very few cases in which we can determine, based on the record before us, whether the failure by defense counsel to object was a strategic decision. [12] A finding of a sentence of death based on such would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation in any event. [13] To the extent they require in favorem vitae review, the following cases, inter alia , are hereby overruled: State v. Arthur , 296 S.C. 495 , 374 S.E. (2d) 291 (1988); State v. Diddlemeyer , 296 S.C. 235 , 371 S.E. (2d) 793 (1988); State v. Hawkins , 292 S.C. 418 , 357 S.E. (2d) 10 (1987); Sta | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| McDonald v. Missouri green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Baldwin-United Corp. v. Eubanks green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Lucas v. South Carolina green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.