Eighth Amendment challenge in Nevada

1979Confronted by an eighth amendment challenge, we have recently held that Nevada's death penalty statutes (NRS 175.552-.562) are constitutional because they "provide for a consideration of any mitigating factor the defendant may want to present." Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511 , 597 P.2d 273, 277 (1979).

1979Confronted by an eighth amendment challenge, we have recently held that Nevada's death penalty statutes (NRS 175.552-.562) are constitutional because they "provide for a consideration of any mitigating factor the defendant may want to present." Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511 , 597 P.2d 273, 277 (1979).

2020See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (requiring an inmate to show both a "sufficiently serious" deprivation and deliberate indifference on the part of the prison officials in order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2020See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (requiring an inmate to show both a "sufficiently serious" deprivation and deliberate indifference on the part of the prison officials in order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2020See Butler v. Bayer, 123 Nev. 450, 459 , 168 P.3d 1055, 1062 (2007) (explaining that deliberate indifference constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation when the prisoner shows "more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety [and that] the official . . . actually [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Shapley v. Nev.

2020See Butler v. Bayer, 123 Nev. 450, 459 , 168 P.3d 1055, 1062 (2007) (explaining that deliberate indifference constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation when the prisoner shows "more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety [and that] the official . . . actually [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Shapley v. Nev.

2020Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a mere delay in medical treatment, absent a showing of resulting substantial harm, is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference).

2020Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a mere delay in medical treatment, absent a showing of resulting substantial harm, is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference).

2015Thus, we agree that this conduct does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. 4 See Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1995) (summarizing the types of prison conditions that have amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation).

2015Thus, we agree that this conduct does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. 4 See Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1995) (summarizing the types of prison conditions that have amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation).

2015Importantly, appellant does not contend that all of the water in 3 Tothe extent that appellant contends that excessive force was used on him in his caseworker's office at the beginning of the March 5, 2007, incident, we conclude that even under appellant's version of events, that force was not inflicted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (internal quotation omitted).

2013See McNelton v. State, 111 Nev. 900, 906 , 900 P.2d 934, 938 (1995) (victim impact evidence is "not categorically barred by the Eighth Amendment") (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 808 , 825 (1991)); see also State v. Martinez, 304 P.3d 54, 59 (Utah 2013) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment doctrine of Payne, which establishes an absolute bar on certain types of victim impact testimony, does not apply to sentencing proceedings where death is not an option.").

2013See McNelton v. State, 111 Nev. 900, 906 , 900 P.2d 934, 938 (1995) (victim impact evidence is "not categorically barred by the Eighth Amendment") (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 808 , 825 (1991)); see also State v. Martinez, 304 P.3d 54, 59 (Utah 2013) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment doctrine of Payne, which establishes an absolute bar on certain types of victim impact testimony, does not apply to sentencing proceedings where death is not an option.").

2013See McNelton v. State, 111 Nev. 900, 906 , 900 P.2d 934, 938 (1995) (victim impact evidence is "not categorically barred by the Eighth Amendment") (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 808 , 825 (1991)); see also State v. Martinez, 304 P.3d 54, 59 (Utah 2013) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment doctrine of Payne, which establishes an absolute bar on certain types of victim impact testimony, does not apply to sentencing proceedings where death is not an option.").

2013See McNelton v. State, 111 Nev. 900, 906 , 900 P.2d 934, 938 (1995) (victim impact evidence is "not categorically barred by the Eighth Amendment") (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 808 , 825 (1991)); see also State v. Martinez, 304 P.3d 54, 59 (Utah 2013) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment doctrine of Payne, which establishes an absolute bar on certain types of victim impact testimony, does not apply to sentencing proceedings where death is not an option.").

1979See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 196-97, 96 S.Ct. 2909 ; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 257-58, 96 S.Ct. 2960 ; Shuman v. State, 94 Nev. 265 , 578 P.2d 1183 (1978).

1979See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 196-97, 96 S.Ct. 2909 ; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 257-58, 96 S.Ct. 2960 ; Shuman v. State, 94 Nev. 265 , 578 P.2d 1183 (1978).

1979See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 196-97, 96 S.Ct. 2909 ; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 257-58, 96 S.Ct. 2960 ; Shuman v. State, 94 Nev. 265 , 578 P.2d 1183 (1978).

1979See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 196-97, 96 S.Ct. 2909 ; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 257-58, 96 S.Ct. 2960 ; Shuman v. State, 94 Nev. 265 , 578 P.2d 1183 (1978).