Eighth Amendment challenge in Kansas

2026See Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 .

2026See Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 .

2026See Carr, 577 U.S. at 126 . 4 The Carr brothers made their second appearance in our court on remand from the United States Supreme Court.

2022Carr, 577 U.S. at 122, 126 .

2022See State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858 , Syl. ¶¶ 4-5, 235 P.3d 1203 (2010); see also Mossman, 294 Kan. at 924-25 (noting that unlike Eighth Amendment inquiry, section 9 analysis "requires consideration of all three factors").

2022See State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858 , Syl. ¶¶ 4-5, 235 P.3d 1203 (2010); see also Mossman, 294 Kan. at 924-25 (noting that unlike Eighth Amendment inquiry, section 9 analysis "requires consideration of all three factors").

2022See State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858 , Syl. ¶¶ 4-5, 235 P.3d 1203 (2010); see also Mossman, 294 Kan. at 924-25 (noting that unlike Eighth Amendment inquiry, section 9 analysis "requires consideration of all three factors").

2020"As to the class of offenders, the Supreme Court has categorized defendants by broad characteristics such as those who committed their crimes before the age of 18 or whose intellectual functioning is in a low range." State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901, 928 , 281 P.3d 153 (2012) (holding first-time offenders is valid category for Eighth Amendment analysis); see Williams, 298 Kan. at 1086-87 (holding first-time offenders over age 18 is valid category).

2024EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE Flack raises a categorical Eighth Amendment challenge to his death sentence, even though he acknowledges we recently addressed and rejected nearly identical claims in Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 328, 337, and State v. Kahler, 307 Kan. 374, 406, 409 , 410 P.3d 105 (2018).

2024EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE Flack raises a categorical Eighth Amendment challenge to his death sentence, even though he acknowledges we recently addressed and rejected nearly identical claims in Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 328, 337, and State v. Kahler, 307 Kan. 374, 406, 409 , 410 P.3d 105 (2018).

2014The majority concludes this court’s directive in State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001) that juries be explicitly informed that mitigating factors need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt somehow takes on federal constitutional dimensions because it “implicate[s] the broader Eighth Amendment principle prohibiting barriers that preclude a sentencer’s consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence.” (Slip op. at 83.) But the majority acknowledges this conclusion is inconsistent with Walton , which the majority admits “should not be interpreted as creating any constitutional r

2004The assertion that a sentence of death may be imposed in such a case runs directly counter to the Eighth Amendment requirement that a capital sentence must rest upon a `determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.' [Citation omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) 497 U.S. at 686-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

2002The Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, i.e., whether the punishment fits the crime. 223 Kan. at 367 ; see also State v. Tyler, 251 Kan. 616, 645-46 , 840 P.2d 413 (1992) (in Eighth Amendment case, court refused to consider whether defendant’s sentence was disproportionate to other sentences for other crimes; instead, court looked to whether defendant’s sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crimes).

2002The Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, i.e., whether the punishment fits the crime. 223 Kan. at 367 ; see also State v. Tyler, 251 Kan. 616, 645-46 , 840 P.2d 413 (1992) (in Eighth Amendment case, court refused to consider whether defendant’s sentence was disproportionate to other sentences for other crimes; instead, court looked to whether defendant’s sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crimes).

2026Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment for defendants committing crimes as juveniles, i.e., under 21 the age of 18); State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1086 , 319 P.3d 528 (2014) (involving Eighth Amendment challenge to imposing lifetime postrelease supervision on first-time offenders over age 18 convicted of crimes involving possession of child pornography).

2026Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment for defendants committing crimes as juveniles, i.e., under 21 the age of 18); State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1086 , 319 P.3d 528 (2014) (involving Eighth Amendment challenge to imposing lifetime postrelease supervision on first-time offenders over age 18 convicted of crimes involving possession of child pornography).

2014See State v. Jones, 293 Kan. 757, 762 , 268 P.3d 491 (2012) (declining to reach Eighth Amendment challenge to lifetime postrelease supervision because court vacated defendant’s sentence on other grounds).

2014See State v. Jones, 293 Kan. 757, 762 , 268 P.3d 491 (2012) (declining to reach Eighth Amendment challenge to lifetime postrelease supervision because court vacated defendant’s sentence on other grounds).

2013Ed. 2d 108 (2003) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to a hard 25 life sentence for theft of golf clubs worth $1,200); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962-64 , 111 S. Ct. 2680 , 115 L.

2013Ed. 2d 108 (2003) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to a hard 25 life sentence for theft of golf clubs worth $1,200); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962-64 , 111 S. Ct. 2680 , 115 L.

2012While the majority recognized the sentence could not be treated as one for that term, given the uncertainty of parole, it also declined to presume Rummel would be incarcerated for life for purposes of any Eighth Amendment analysis. 445 U.S. at 280-81 .

2012Although the majority alluded to earlier caselaw considering punishments that might be fairly deemed “grossly disproportionate” to the offenses as indicative of an Eighth Amendment violation, the Rummel majority did not formally adopt that as a test or definition. 445 U.S. at 271-72 .

2025Ed. 2d 995 (2010) (to prevail on Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment, inmate must prove facts showing guards actually assaulted him and did so maliciously and sadistically); State v. Yurk, 203 Kan. 629, 634 , 456 P.2d 11 (1969); Camacho v. Brandon, 317 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 2003) (claimed First Amendment violation).

2022Rather, it is the Due Process Clause that wards off the introduction of 'unduly prejudicial' evidence that would 'rende[r] the trial fundamentally unfair.' Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991); see also Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006)." Carr, 577 U.S. at 123 . 57 And it concluded without reservation that the district court's failure to sever did not violate the defendants' constitutional protections under the Due Process Clause: "In light of all the evidence presented at the guilt and penalty phases relevant to the jury's sentencing determination, the contention that the admissio

2022Rather, it is the Due Process Clause that wards off the introduction of 'unduly prejudicial' evidence that would 'rende[r] the trial fundamentally unfair.' Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991); see also Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006)." Carr, 577 U.S. at 123 . 57 And it concluded without reservation that the district court's failure to sever did not violate the defendants' constitutional protections under the Due Process Clause: "In light of all the evidence presented at the guilt and penalty phases relevant to the jury's sentencing determination, the contention that the admissio

2022The Court explained that "[a] prison official's 'deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment." 511 U.S. at 828 ; see also State v. Scott, 265 Kan. 1 , Syl. ¶ 1, 961 P.2d 667 (1998) ("The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights are nearly identical and are to be construed similarly.").

2022The Court explained that "[a] prison official's 'deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment." 511 U.S. at 828 ; see also State v. Scott, 265 Kan. 1 , Syl. ¶ 1, 961 P.2d 667 (1998) ("The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights are nearly identical and are to be construed similarly.").

2022Cf. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 931 (Eighth Amendment contains no specific directive as to inmate classifications or housing placements and plaintiff's allegations of an Eighth Amendment violation cannot demonstrate a breach of a mandatory duty sufficient to overcome discretionary function immunity under the FTCA).

2022Cf. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 931 (Eighth Amendment contains no specific directive as to inmate classifications or housing placements and plaintiff's allegations of an Eighth Amendment violation cannot demonstrate a breach of a mandatory duty sufficient to overcome discretionary function immunity under the FTCA).

2022See State v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 603, 620 , 102 P.3d 406 (2004) ("While a party has the right to represent himself or herself or be represented by counsel, he or she does not have the right to a hybrid representation.").

2022See State v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 603, 620 , 102 P.3d 406 (2004) ("While a party has the right to represent himself or herself or be represented by counsel, he or she does not have the right to a hybrid representation.").