gave instruction in Georgia

2025See Debelbot, 308 Ga. at 169-170 (“And although the trial court gave an instruction on reasonable doubt that would be sufficient in most cases to adequately advise the jury of the burden of proof, the charge did not cure the State’s obviously wrong argument here, and to the contrary, may well have been understood by the jury as reinforcing it.” (citations and punctuation omitted)).

2025See Debelbot, 308 Ga. at 169-170 (“And although the trial court gave an instruction on reasonable doubt that would be sufficient in most cases to adequately advise the jury of the burden of proof, the charge did not cure the State’s obviously wrong argument here, and to the contrary, may well have been understood by the jury as reinforcing it.” (citations and punctuation omitted)).

2025Moreover, defense counsel’s own closing argument, which was given before the State’s, did not address the applicability of a justification defense to a charge of felony murder based on felon-in-possession in any substantive way, so it did not work to alleviate any confusion created by the State’s argument. 21 Compare Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 796 (3) (a) (784 SE2d 343) (2016) (no prejudice from any deficient performance in defense counsel’s failure to object to comment in prosecutor’s opening statement, where defense counsel responded to that comment in his own opening and trial court cor

2025Moreover, defense counsel’s own closing argument, which was given before the State’s, did not address the applicability of a justification defense to a charge of felony murder based on felon-in-possession in any substantive way, so it did not work to alleviate any confusion created by the State’s argument. 21 Compare Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 796 (3) (a) (784 SE2d 343) (2016) (no prejudice from any deficient performance in defense counsel’s failure to object to comment in prosecutor’s opening statement, where defense counsel responded to that comment in his own opening and trial court cor

2025See Scott, 290 Ga. at 888 .

2020But the prosecuting attorney in this case told the jury that something less than a 51 percent probability of guilt9 would be enough, shortly after telling the jury that, as between Albert and Ashley, the State did not “have to prove it was one or the other.” And although the trial court gave an instruction on reasonable doubt that would be sufficient in most cases to adequately advise the jury of the burden of proof,10 the charge “did not cure the State’s obviously wrong argument here,” id. at 543 (2), 9 Although our opinion focuses on the prosecuting attorney’s misstatement that proof beyond

2009However, as part of its charge, the trial court also read the aggravated assault count exactly as it appeared in the indictment, and further instructed the jury that the State must prove “each element of the crime as charged . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Tesfaye v. State, 275 Ga. 439, 441 (3) ( 569 SE2d 849 ) (2002).

2009However, as part of its charge, the trial court also read the aggravated assault count exactly as it appeared in the indictment, and further instructed the jury that the State must prove “each element of the crime as charged . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Tesfaye v. State, 275 Ga. 439, 441 (3) ( 569 SE2d 849 ) (2002).

2007There is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury ever indicated to the court that it was having difficulty reaching a unanimous verdict. *789 Pretermitting whether the instruction was error when given prior to the start of deliberations, 2 the question remains whether the instruction was so coercive as to cause a juror to “abandon an honest conviction for reasons other than those based upon the trial or the arguments of other jurors.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Widner v. State, 280 Ga. 675,678 (3) ( 631 SE2d 675 ) (2006).

2007There is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury ever indicated to the court that it was having difficulty reaching a unanimous verdict. *789 Pretermitting whether the instruction was error when given prior to the start of deliberations, 2 the question remains whether the instruction was so coercive as to cause a juror to “abandon an honest conviction for reasons other than those based upon the trial or the arguments of other jurors.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Widner v. State, 280 Ga. 675,678 (3) ( 631 SE2d 675 ) (2006).

2006See Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27, 30 (1) ( 343 SE2d 680 ) (1986).

2006See Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27, 30 (1) ( 343 SE2d 680 ) (1986).

2004See id. (if defendant asserts that the plaintiffs damages could have been avoided by surgery, evidence that plaintiff could not afford surgery becomes admissible).

1998“The fact that [trial] counsel made no objections to the charge obviously establishes no lack of effectiveness on his part absent some *235 deficiency or impropriety in the charge which was harmful to [McCurty].” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Abreu v. State, 206 Ga. App. 361, 362-363 ( 425 SE2d 331 ) (1992).

1998“The fact that [trial] counsel made no objections to the charge obviously establishes no lack of effectiveness on his part absent some *235 deficiency or impropriety in the charge which was harmful to [McCurty].” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Abreu v. State, 206 Ga. App. 361, 362-363 ( 425 SE2d 331 ) (1992).

1998See Miller v. State, 226 Ga. App. 509, 514 (3) ( 486 SE2d 911 ) (1997) (both harm and error necessary for successful appeal). 1 We need not reach Chergi’s remaining arguments on this matter because they were not raised in the enumeration.

1998See Miller v. State, 226 Ga. App. 509, 514 (3) ( 486 SE2d 911 ) (1997) (both harm and error necessary for successful appeal). 1 We need not reach Chergi’s remaining arguments on this matter because they were not raised in the enumeration.

1996Moreover, in a subsequent colloquy between the trial court and counsel conducted in the presence of the jury, the trial court stated: “I have ruled that it is admissible just to show bent of mind and . . . common course of conduct.” Under these circumstances we conclude that since appellant made no request to charge in proper form, he was not entitled to a limiting instruction either upon admission of the similar transaction evidence “or in the general charge.” Bell v. State, 219 Ga. App. 553, 554 (2) ( 466 SE2d 68 ); compare Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 626 (3) ( 458 SE2d 643 ), where the tr

1996Moreover, in a subsequent colloquy between the trial court and counsel conducted in the presence of the jury, the trial court stated: “I have ruled that it is admissible just to show bent of mind and . . . common course of conduct.” Under these circumstances we conclude that since appellant made no request to charge in proper form, he was not entitled to a limiting instruction either upon admission of the similar transaction evidence “or in the general charge.” Bell v. State, 219 Ga. App. 553, 554 (2) ( 466 SE2d 68 ); compare Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 626 (3) ( 458 SE2d 643 ), where the tr

1996Moreover, in a subsequent colloquy between the trial court and counsel conducted in the presence of the jury, the trial court stated: “I have ruled that it is admissible just to show bent of mind and . . . common course of conduct.” Under these circumstances we conclude that since appellant made no request to charge in proper form, he was not entitled to a limiting instruction either upon admission of the similar transaction evidence “or in the general charge.” Bell v. State, 219 Ga. App. 553, 554 (2) ( 466 SE2d 68 ); compare Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 626 (3) ( 458 SE2d 643 ), where the tr

1996Moreover, in a subsequent colloquy between the trial court and counsel conducted in the presence of the jury, the trial court stated: “I have ruled that it is admissible just to show bent of mind and . . . common course of conduct.” Under these circumstances we conclude that since appellant made no request to charge in proper form, he was not entitled to a limiting instruction either upon admission of the similar transaction evidence “or in the general charge.” Bell v. State, 219 Ga. App. 553, 554 (2) ( 466 SE2d 68 ); compare Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 626 (3) ( 458 SE2d 643 ), where the tr

1993Consequently, we cannot determine whether appellant requested a jury charge on unanimity, see Maddox v. State, 233 Ga. 874, 875-877 (2) ( 213 SE2d 654 ) (1975); whether the court gave such an instruction to the jury; whether appellant exercised her right to have the jury polled to ascertain whether each juror’s vote of guilty was based on the same method of commission of the crime, see id.; or whether appellant raised this issue in the trial court in any manner and obtained a ruling.

1993Consequently, we cannot determine whether appellant requested a jury charge on unanimity, see Maddox v. State, 233 Ga. 874, 875-877 (2) ( 213 SE2d 654 ) (1975); whether the court gave such an instruction to the jury; whether appellant exercised her right to have the jury polled to ascertain whether each juror’s vote of guilty was based on the same method of commission of the crime, see id.; or whether appellant raised this issue in the trial court in any manner and obtained a ruling.

1986The trial court gave the standard charge on identification, presumption of innocence, rule of reasonable doubt, burden of proof and credibility of witnesses. “ ‘[I]t is no longer necessary to give the exact language of requests to charge when the same principles are fairly given to the jury in the general charge of the court. [Cit.]’ ” Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 619 ( 266 SE2d 218 ).

1986The trial court gave the standard charge on identification, presumption of innocence, rule of reasonable doubt, burden of proof and credibility of witnesses. “ ‘[I]t is no longer necessary to give the exact language of requests to charge when the same principles are fairly given to the jury in the general charge of the court. [Cit.]’ ” Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 619 ( 266 SE2d 218 ).

1979See Bass v. State, 237 Ga. 710, 711 ( 229 SE2d 448 ); State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269, 270 ( 227 SE2d 241 ); Phillips v. State, 230 Ga. 444, 445 (2) ( 197 SE2d 720 ).

1979See Bass v. State, 237 Ga. 710, 711 ( 229 SE2d 448 ); State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269, 270 ( 227 SE2d 241 ); Phillips v. State, 230 Ga. 444, 445 (2) ( 197 SE2d 720 ).

1979See Bass v. State, 237 Ga. 710, 711 ( 229 SE2d 448 ); State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269, 270 ( 227 SE2d 241 ); Phillips v. State, 230 Ga. 444, 445 (2) ( 197 SE2d 720 ).

1979See Bass v. State, 237 Ga. 710, 711 ( 229 SE2d 448 ); State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269, 270 ( 227 SE2d 241 ); Phillips v. State, 230 Ga. 444, 445 (2) ( 197 SE2d 720 ).

1979See Bass v. State, 237 Ga. 710, 711 ( 229 SE2d 448 ); State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269, 270 ( 227 SE2d 241 ); Phillips v. State, 230 Ga. 444, 445 (2) ( 197 SE2d 720 ).