gave instruction in California

2016The trial court gave the standard jury instructions on reasonable and imperfect self-defense and defense of another, and the 10 The Attorney General also argues that the lack of evidence that Jones was present established there was no imminent threat from Jones himself, but whether Miles would have been justified in using deadly force against Jones, who was not the victim, is not at issue. 21 failure to give a pinpoint instruction on an affirmative defense or lesser included offense is subject to review under the more forgiving standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , which asks whe

2006“The court gave the standard sentencing instruction (see CALJIC No. 8.85), and we have held that instruction is proper despite its failure expressly to limit aggravating evidence to the enumerated statutory factors, and to exclude nonstatutory factors as a basis for the death penalty. [Citation.]” (People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1180 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827 , 34 P.3d 937 ]; see People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 899 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 , 978 P.2d 15 ].) d.

1950(See, People v. Koenig, 29 Cal.2d 87, 91 [ 173 P.2d 1 ].) ■ Lastly, it is argued that although the trial court gave an instruction as to how a witness might be impeached, it was the court’s duty, on its own motion, to give one as to the effect of impeachment, citing People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 890 [ 129 P.2d 367 ]; and People v. Malicoat, 89 Cal.App.2d 742 [ 201 P.2d 850 ].

1950(See, People v. Koenig, 29 Cal.2d 87, 91 [ 173 P.2d 1 ].) ■ Lastly, it is argued that although the trial court gave an instruction as to how a witness might be impeached, it was the court’s duty, on its own motion, to give one as to the effect of impeachment, citing People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 890 [ 129 P.2d 367 ]; and People v. Malicoat, 89 Cal.App.2d 742 [ 201 P.2d 850 ].

2014(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 326 [waiver found where defense counsel agreed to giving of instruction and raised no objection]; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 374 [failure to 18 object to court's proposed special instruction forfeits claims on appeal]; see also People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 275 [as a general rule, appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have been but were not raised in trial court]; People v. Viray (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1209 [claims waived even if they affect substantial right where no objection in trial court].) Separate

2011As defendants acknowledge, the trial court gave the standard instruction on the factors in aggravation and mitigation, which *327 explains that the jury may consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.” (CALJIC No. 8.85; see also § 190.3, factor (k).) “ ‘We have repeatedly held that a jury told it may sympat

2026In the highly unusual circumstances of this case, however, we conclude that Torres forfeited this claim of error. 2 Under the doctrine of forfeiture, “a 2 “Although ‘waiver’ and ‘forfeiture’ are often used interchangeably to describe a party’s failure to raise an issue in the trial court, the two terms should be differentiated.” (Vascos Excavation Group LLC v. Gold (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 842 , 856.) Forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion 11 reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been made but was not made in the trial cour

2026In the highly unusual circumstances of this case, however, we conclude that Torres forfeited this claim of error. 2 Under the doctrine of forfeiture, “a 2 “Although ‘waiver’ and ‘forfeiture’ are often used interchangeably to describe a party’s failure to raise an issue in the trial court, the two terms should be differentiated.” (Vascos Excavation Group LLC v. Gold (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 842 , 856.) Forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion 11 reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been made but was not made in the trial cour

2023The fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of anyone in the company of the person robbed at the time of the robbery.” The trial court gave standard jury instructions under CALCRIM No. 1600 on the fear element of robbery, telling the jury that “defendant used force or fear to take the property or to prevent the person from resisting” and “[f]ear, as used here, means fear of injury to the person himself or herself or immediate injury to someone else present during the incident, or to that person’s property.” “To establish a robbery was committed by means of fear, the

2011To establish a robbery was committed by means of fear, the prosecution “must present evidence ‘. . . that the victim was in fact afraid, and that such fear allowed the crime to be accomplished.’ ” (People v. Cuevas (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 689, 698 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ], italics omitted (Cuevas); see People v. Davison (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 206, 212 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 ] (Davison); People v. Mungia (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1709, fn. 2 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 394 ] (Mungia).) We conclude the trial court had no sua sponte duty to explain to the jury the subjective/objective concept of fear that Morehe

2023The fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of anyone in the company of the person robbed at the time of the robbery.” The trial court gave standard jury instructions under CALCRIM No. 1600 on the fear element of robbery, telling the jury that “defendant used force or fear to take the property or to prevent the person from resisting” and “[f]ear, as used here, means fear of injury to the person himself or herself or immediate injury to someone else present during the incident, or to that person’s property.” “To establish a robbery was committed by means of fear, the

2011To establish a robbery was committed by means of fear, the prosecution “must present evidence ‘. . . that the victim was in fact afraid, and that such fear allowed the crime to be accomplished.’ ” (People v. Cuevas (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 689, 698 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ], italics omitted (Cuevas); see People v. Davison (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 206, 212 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 ] (Davison); People v. Mungia (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1709, fn. 2 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 394 ] (Mungia).) We conclude the trial court had no sua sponte duty to explain to the jury the subjective/objective concept of fear that Morehe

2016(But see People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 706 (Avila) [hearing a person shout possible gang references or a challenge would not cause an ordinarily reasonable person to become homicidally enraged]; Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 584 [“‘no defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and justifiy or excuse himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless . . . the facts and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinary reasonable man’”].) Defendants assert they were entitled to an imperfect self-defense instruction based on evidence of a slow-moving

2016(But see People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 706 (Avila) [hearing a person shout possible gang references or a challenge would not cause an ordinarily reasonable person to become homicidally enraged]; Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 584 [“‘no defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and justifiy or excuse himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless . . . the facts and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinary reasonable man’”].) Defendants assert they were entitled to an imperfect self-defense instruction based on evidence of a slow-moving

2020(People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 , abrogated on other grounds recognized in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 ; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 , overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) The trial court gave the standard instruction without material change. “ ‘The trial court cannot reasonably be expected to attempt to revise or improve accepted and correct jury instructions absent some request from counsel.’ ” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 .) This contention regarding the kill zone instruction is forfeited. 20 Even

2020(People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 , abrogated on other grounds recognized in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 ; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 , overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) The trial court gave the standard instruction without material change. “ ‘The trial court cannot reasonably be expected to attempt to revise or improve accepted and correct jury instructions absent some request from counsel.’ ” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 .) This contention regarding the kill zone instruction is forfeited. 20 Even

1967This was error (Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; People v. Bostick, 62 Cal.2d 820 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 402 P.2d 529 ]), although it was correct procedure at the time of the trial.

1967This was error (Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; People v. Bostick, 62 Cal.2d 820 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 402 P.2d 529 ]), although it was correct procedure at the time of the trial.

2016The trial court gave the standard jury instructions on reasonable and imperfect self-defense and defense of another, and the 10 The Attorney General also argues that the lack of evidence that Jones was present established there was no imminent threat from Jones himself, but whether Miles would have been justified in using deadly force against Jones, who was not the victim, is not at issue. 21 failure to give a pinpoint instruction on an affirmative defense or lesser included offense is subject to review under the more forgiving standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , which asks whe

1975VI, § 13; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) Franklin’s Claim that Court Erred in Giving Instruction on Adverse Inference from His Failure to Explain or Deny Evidence The court gave an instruction (consistent with Evid.

2015Under the circumstances the error in failing to give the instruction as requested was not prejudicial.” ( Sanchez, supra, 30 Cal.2d at pp. 571-572, italics added.) In People v. Sandoval (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 885 (Sandoval), the trial court gave the “standard instruction on reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 887.) The trial court also gave defense-requested instructions on self-defense.

2015Under the circumstances the error in failing to give the instruction as requested was not prejudicial.” ( Sanchez, supra, 30 Cal.2d at pp. 571-572, italics added.) In People v. Sandoval (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 885 (Sandoval), the trial court gave the “standard instruction on reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 887.) The trial court also gave defense-requested instructions on self-defense.

2002The trial court gave the standard shared intent aiding and abetting instructions set forth in the margin. [6] ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 , 24 P.3d 1210 ; People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 60 , 674 P.2d 1318 .) Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury on a natural and probable consequences aiding and abetting theory. ( People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1117 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 , 24 P.3d 1210 ; People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 627 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17 , 995 P.2d 152 .) The jury was instructed: "One who a

2002The trial court gave the standard shared intent aiding and abetting instructions set forth in the margin. [6] ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 , 24 P.3d 1210 ; People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 60 , 674 P.2d 1318 .) Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury on a natural and probable consequences aiding and abetting theory. ( People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1117 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 , 24 P.3d 1210 ; People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 627 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17 , 995 P.2d 152 .) The jury was instructed: "One who a

2015Under the circumstances the error in failing to give the instruction as requested was not prejudicial.” ( Sanchez, supra, 30 Cal.2d at pp. 571-572, italics added.) In People v. Sandoval (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 885 (Sandoval), the trial court gave the “standard instruction on reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 887.) The trial court also gave defense-requested instructions on self-defense.

2015Under the circumstances the error in failing to give the instruction as requested was not prejudicial.” ( Sanchez, supra, 30 Cal.2d at pp. 571-572, italics added.) In People v. Sandoval (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 885 (Sandoval), the trial court gave the “standard instruction on reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 887.) The trial court also gave defense-requested instructions on self-defense.

2024In Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 646 , the California Supreme Court considered whether codefendant Charles Rudd’s due process rights were violated when the trial court gave an instruction modeled on a former version of CALCRIM No. 315.

2022(People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644, 647-648 (Lemcke).) Putting aside the question of whether defendant forfeited the issue by failing to request a modification to the instruction at trial, any error was harmless.

2023The fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of anyone in the company of the person robbed at the time of the robbery.” The trial court gave standard jury instructions under CALCRIM No. 1600 on the fear element of robbery, telling the jury that “defendant used force or fear to take the property or to prevent the person from resisting” and “[f]ear, as used here, means fear of injury to the person himself or herself or immediate injury to someone else present during the incident, or to that person’s property.” “To establish a robbery was committed by means of fear, the

2011To establish a robbery was committed by means of fear, the prosecution “must present evidence ‘. . . that the victim was in fact afraid, and that such fear allowed the crime to be accomplished.’ ” (People v. Cuevas (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 689, 698 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ], italics omitted (Cuevas); see People v. Davison (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 206, 212 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 ] (Davison); People v. Mungia (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1709, fn. 2 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 394 ] (Mungia).) We conclude the trial court had no sua sponte duty to explain to the jury the subjective/objective concept of fear that Morehe

2018In that case, the defendant failed to appear at trial following the second day's lunch break. ( Id . at p. 459.) The trial court gave the standard instruction on flight for the sole purpose of enabling the prosecution to argue that his absence from the trial "reflected a consciousness of guilt"-even though the evidence before the jury did not establish the voluntariness of the defendant's absence or any other type of flight. ( Id . at p. 461 ; cf. People v. Snyder (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 195 , 199, 128 Cal.Rptr. 297 [upholding the flight instruction where the defendant, who was free on bail, absc

2018In that case, the defendant failed to appear at trial following the second day's lunch break. ( Id . at p. 459.) The trial court gave the standard instruction on flight for the sole purpose of enabling the prosecution to argue that his absence from the trial "reflected a consciousness of guilt"-even though the evidence before the jury did not establish the voluntariness of the defendant's absence or any other type of flight. ( Id . at p. 461 ; cf. People v. Snyder (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 195 , 199, 128 Cal.Rptr. 297 [upholding the flight instruction where the defendant, who was free on bail, absc

2016The court gave an instruction approved in People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105 , 1118–1122. 3 and voluntary manslaughter issues.

2015Given the limitations listed in instruction 625 [Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on Homicide Crimes], may voluntary intoxication be considered when deliberating implied malice? [¶] If not, and if we believe that voluntary intoxication contributed to the defendant’s mental state, then how exactly are we to ‘not consider’ it? [¶] Are we expected somehow to speculate as to what her mental state would have been in the absence of intoxication?” Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492 [ 41 L.Ed. 528 , 17 S.Ct. 154 ], The court gave an instruction approved in People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th