gave instruction in Connecticut

1994State v. Payne, 12 Conn. App. 408 , 530 A.2d 1110 (1987).

1994State v. Payne, 12 Conn. App. 408 , 530 A.2d 1110 (1987).

2022As this court has held, limiting instructions ‘‘serve to minimize any prejudicial effect that . . . evidence [of prior miscon- duct] otherwise may have had . . . .’’ (Citations omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James G., 268 Conn. 382 , 397–98, 844 A.2d 810 (2004).

2022As this court has held, limiting instructions ‘‘serve to minimize any prejudicial effect that . . . evidence [of prior miscon- duct] otherwise may have had . . . .’’ (Citations omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James G., 268 Conn. 382 , 397–98, 844 A.2d 810 (2004).

2017Furthermore, we reject the defendant's argument that State v. Feliciano , 256 Conn. 429 , 778 A.2d 812 (2001), compels us to reach a different conclusion.

2017Furthermore, we reject the defendant's argument that State v. Feliciano , 256 Conn. 429 , 778 A.2d 812 (2001), compels us to reach a different conclusion.

2016Later, as part of the court's jury charge, the court gave an instruction regarding informant testimony, cautioning the jurors to consider such testimony with "particular care" and to "scrutinize it very carefully before you accept it." 41 At the outset, we note that "[a] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, education or otherwise may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise concerning scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, if the testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue." Co

2016Later, as part of the court's jury charge, the court gave an instruction regarding informant testimony, cautioning the jurors to consider such testimony with "particular care" and to "scrutinize it very carefully before you accept it." 41 At the outset, we note that "[a] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, education or otherwise may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise concerning scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, if the testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue." Co

2014Our Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of a court’s failure to provide an accomplice credibility instruction as plain error in State v. Moore, supra, 293 Conn. 781 , holding that the lack of such an instruction did not require reversal because its failure to reverse would not result in manifest injustice.

2012“Absent evidence to the contrary, a jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.” State v. Banks, 117 Conn. App. 102, 119 , 978 A.2d 519 , cert. denied, 294 Conn. 905 , 982 A.2d 1081 (2009).

2012“Absent evidence to the contrary, a jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.” State v. Banks, 117 Conn. App. 102, 119 , 978 A.2d 519 , cert. denied, 294 Conn. 905 , 982 A.2d 1081 (2009).

2012“Absent evidence to the contrary, a jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.” State v. Banks, 117 Conn. App. 102, 119 , 978 A.2d 519 , cert. denied, 294 Conn. 905 , 982 A.2d 1081 (2009).

2012“Absent evidence to the contrary, a jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.” State v. Banks, 117 Conn. App. 102, 119 , 978 A.2d 519 , cert. denied, 294 Conn. 905 , 982 A.2d 1081 (2009).

2010The defendant did not, however, request a charge related to the defense of property, premises or dwelling, and the court did not give such a charge on those issues. *740 Although the right to establish a defense is a “ ‘fundamental element of due process of law’ State v. Ebron, 292 Conn. 656, 685 , 975 A.2d 17 (2009); our Supreme Court has concluded that “trial courts do not have a duty to charge the jury, sua sponte, on defenses, affirmative or nonaffirmative in nature, that are not requested by the defendant.” Id., 691-92 .

2010The defendant did not, however, request a charge related to the defense of property, premises or dwelling, and the court did not give such a charge on those issues. *740 Although the right to establish a defense is a “ ‘fundamental element of due process of law’ State v. Ebron, 292 Conn. 656, 685 , 975 A.2d 17 (2009); our Supreme Court has concluded that “trial courts do not have a duty to charge the jury, sua sponte, on defenses, affirmative or nonaffirmative in nature, that are not requested by the defendant.” Id., 691-92 .

2008As this court recently stated in State v. Rivet, 99 Conn. App. 230 , 912 A.2d 1103 , cert. denied, 281 Conn. 923 , 918 A.2d 274 (2007): “The defendant’s claim is not novel.

2008As this court recently stated in State v. Rivet, 99 Conn. App. 230 , 912 A.2d 1103 , cert. denied, 281 Conn. 923 , 918 A.2d 274 (2007): “The defendant’s claim is not novel.

2008As this court recently stated in State v. Rivet, 99 Conn. App. 230 , 912 A.2d 1103 , cert. denied, 281 Conn. 923 , 918 A.2d 274 (2007): “The defendant’s claim is not novel.

2008As this court recently stated in State v. Rivet, 99 Conn. App. 230 , 912 A.2d 1103 , cert. denied, 281 Conn. 923 , 918 A.2d 274 (2007): “The defendant’s claim is not novel.

2007See, e.g., State v. Wright, 246 Conn. 132, 147 , *437 716 A.2d 870 (1998) (explaining that unlike first or second degree robbery, “the force used or threatened in a typical simple robbery does not involve any sort of weapon, and is perpetrated by a single assailant” [emphasis added]); State v. Ghere, 201 Conn. 289, 295 , 513 A.2d 1226 (1986) (“[s]imple robbery becomes robbery in the first degree if, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime . . . uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument” [internal quotation

2007See, e.g., State v. Wright, 246 Conn. 132, 147 , *437 716 A.2d 870 (1998) (explaining that unlike first or second degree robbery, “the force used or threatened in a typical simple robbery does not involve any sort of weapon, and is perpetrated by a single assailant” [emphasis added]); State v. Ghere, 201 Conn. 289, 295 , 513 A.2d 1226 (1986) (“[s]imple robbery becomes robbery in the first degree if, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime . . . uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument” [internal quotation

2007The trial judge [further] instructed the jurors that they could find the defendant guilty of first degree robbery if they found, in addition to elements of simple robbery, that the defendant was ‘armed with a dangerous instrument.’ ” [Emphasis added.]), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 927 , 667 A.2d 554 (1995).

2007The trial judge [further] instructed the jurors that they could find the defendant guilty of first degree robbery if they found, in addition to elements of simple robbery, that the defendant was ‘armed with a dangerous instrument.’ ” [Emphasis added.]), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 927 , 667 A.2d 554 (1995).

2007See, e.g., State v. Wright, 246 Conn. 132, 147 , *437 716 A.2d 870 (1998) (explaining that unlike first or second degree robbery, “the force used or threatened in a typical simple robbery does not involve any sort of weapon, and is perpetrated by a single assailant” [emphasis added]); State v. Ghere, 201 Conn. 289, 295 , 513 A.2d 1226 (1986) (“[s]imple robbery becomes robbery in the first degree if, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime . . . uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument” [internal quotation

2007See, e.g., State v. Wright, 246 Conn. 132, 147 , *437 716 A.2d 870 (1998) (explaining that unlike first or second degree robbery, “the force used or threatened in a typical simple robbery does not involve any sort of weapon, and is perpetrated by a single assailant” [emphasis added]); State v. Ghere, 201 Conn. 289, 295 , 513 A.2d 1226 (1986) (“[s]imple robbery becomes robbery in the first degree if, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime . . . uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument” [internal quotation

2004All right.’ The court also stated that it might ‘address [the issue]’ during the course ‘of the charge to the jury.’ “The court gave no instruction during the trial, or in its final instruction[s] to the jury, as to the proper use of the evidence of the prior uncharged misconduct, which had occurred one or two years before August 7, 2000.” State v. Gibson, 75 Conn. App. 103, 106-109 , 815 A.2d 172 (2003).

2004All right.’ The court also stated that it might ‘address [the issue]’ during the course ‘of the charge to the jury.’ “The court gave no instruction during the trial, or in its final instruction[s] to the jury, as to the proper use of the evidence of the prior uncharged misconduct, which had occurred one or two years before August 7, 2000.” State v. Gibson, 75 Conn. App. 103, 106-109 , 815 A.2d 172 (2003).

2001The defendant concedes that he failed to preserve this claim at trial and therefore seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 5 Because the record is adequate for review and the claim advanced implicates a fundamental constitutional right, 6 the defendant has satisfied the first two prongs of Golding and is entitled to review of his unpreserved claim. “[U]nder . . .

2001The defendant concedes that he failed to preserve this claim at trial and therefore seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 5 Because the record is adequate for review and the claim advanced implicates a fundamental constitutional right, 6 the defendant has satisfied the first two prongs of Golding and is entitled to review of his unpreserved claim. “[U]nder . . .

2000The objectionable remarks were made not in the opening statement but in closing argument, cf. Worden at 83 Conn. at p. 653 — the most dramatic part of the trial after evidence is closed and after the offended party can respond through evidence or measured argument to the unfair comment and its implications.

2000Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 226 , 682 A.2d 106 (1996); see State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 245 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988) (expert testimony required because nature and cause of victim’s injuries “manifestly beyond the ken of the average trier of fact, be it judge or jury”); see also Jaffe v. Dept. of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 349 , 64 A.2d 330 (1949); Sickmund v. Connecticut Co., 122 Conn. 375, 379 , 189 A. 876 (1937); Slimak v. Foster, 106 Conn. 366, 368 , 138 A. 153 (1927); Matyas v. Minck, 37 Conn. App. 321, 326 , 655 A.2d 1155 (1995).

2000Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 226 , 682 A.2d 106 (1996); see State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 245 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988) (expert testimony required because nature and cause of victim’s injuries “manifestly beyond the ken of the average trier of fact, be it judge or jury”); see also Jaffe v. Dept. of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 349 , 64 A.2d 330 (1949); Sickmund v. Connecticut Co., 122 Conn. 375, 379 , 189 A. 876 (1937); Slimak v. Foster, 106 Conn. 366, 368 , 138 A. 153 (1927); Matyas v. Minck, 37 Conn. App. 321, 326 , 655 A.2d 1155 (1995).

2000Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 226 , 682 A.2d 106 (1996); see State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 245 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988) (expert testimony required because nature and cause of victim’s injuries “manifestly beyond the ken of the average trier of fact, be it judge or jury”); see also Jaffe v. Dept. of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 349 , 64 A.2d 330 (1949); Sickmund v. Connecticut Co., 122 Conn. 375, 379 , 189 A. 876 (1937); Slimak v. Foster, 106 Conn. 366, 368 , 138 A. 153 (1927); Matyas v. Minck, 37 Conn. App. 321, 326 , 655 A.2d 1155 (1995).

2000Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 226 , 682 A.2d 106 (1996); see State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 245 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988) (expert testimony required because nature and cause of victim’s injuries “manifestly beyond the ken of the average trier of fact, be it judge or jury”); see also Jaffe v. Dept. of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 349 , 64 A.2d 330 (1949); Sickmund v. Connecticut Co., 122 Conn. 375, 379 , 189 A. 876 (1937); Slimak v. Foster, 106 Conn. 366, 368 , 138 A. 153 (1927); Matyas v. Minck, 37 Conn. App. 321, 326 , 655 A.2d 1155 (1995).