gave instruction in Arkansas

2005The trial court gave an instruction noting that an Arkansas statute provided that “[n]o vehicle shall be driven or moved on any highway unless such vehicle is so constructed or loaded as to prevent any of its load from dropping, shifting, leaking, or otherwise escaping therefrom.” Id.

2005The trial court gave an instruction noting that an Arkansas statute provided that "[n]o vehicle shall be driven or moved on any highway unless such vehicle is so constructed or loaded as to prevent any of its load from dropping, shifting, leaking, or otherwise escaping therefrom." Id.

1955In Dunham v. State, 207 Ark. 472 , 181 S. W. 2d 242 , the defendant in her appeal relied upon two grounds.

1955In Dunham v. State, 207 Ark. 472 , 181 S. W. 2d 242 , the defendant in her appeal relied upon two grounds.

2003In reaching McMahan’s arguments about the propriety of the instruction, this court held that the giving of the instruction “effectively became the riding, and we can see no sound reason why more should be required.” McMahan, 319 Ark. at 93-94 .

2003In reaching McMahan's arguments about the propriety of the instruction, this court held that the giving of the instruction "effectively became the ruling, and we can see no sound reason why more should be required." McMahan, 319 Ark. at 93-94 , 890 S.W.2d 242 . *412 McMahan , however, appears to be an unusual decision, and our case law otherwise overwhelmingly requires a party to obtain a ruling on an objection in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.

1986See Gaulden v. Emerson Electric Co., supra; Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282 Ark. 548 , 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984).

1986See Gaulden v. Emerson Electric Co., supra; Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282 Ark. 548 , 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984).

1963Co. v. Abrams, 150 Ark. 8 , 233 S. W. 825 , the Trial Court gave an instruction which said that if goods were stored with a bailee for hire “. . . and they were lost while in the possession of the defendant company (bailee), then you will find for the plaintiff for the value of the goods, as shown by the evidence.” In holding such instruction to be erroneous, Chief Justice McCulloch, speaking for this Court, said that if the goods were not returned, “... it devolved upon them (bailees) to explain the loss before the plaintiff (bailor) could be put u,pon proof as to negligence.” (Emphasis our o

1963Co. v. Abrams, 150 Ark. 8 , 233 S. W. 825 , the Trial Court gave an instruction which said that if goods were stored with a bailee for hire “. . . and they were lost while in the possession of the defendant company (bailee), then you will find for the plaintiff for the value of the goods, as shown by the evidence.” In holding such instruction to be erroneous, Chief Justice McCulloch, speaking for this Court, said that if the goods were not returned, “... it devolved upon them (bailees) to explain the loss before the plaintiff (bailor) could be put u,pon proof as to negligence.” (Emphasis our o

1963Co. v. Abrams, 150 Ark. 8 , 233 S. W. 825 , the Trial Court gave an instruction which said that if goods were stored with a bailee for hire “. . . and they were lost while in the possession of the defendant company (bailee), then you will find for the plaintiff for the value of the goods, as shown by the evidence.” In holding such instruction to be erroneous, Chief Justice McCulloch, speaking for this Court, said that if the goods were not returned, “... it devolved upon them (bailees) to explain the loss before the plaintiff (bailor) could be put u,pon proof as to negligence.” (Emphasis our o

1963Co. v. Abrams, 150 Ark. 8 , 233 S. W. 825 , the Trial Court gave an instruction which said that if goods were stored with a bailee for hire “. . . and they were lost while in the possession of the defendant company (bailee), then you will find for the plaintiff for the value of the goods, as shown by the evidence.” In holding such instruction to be erroneous, Chief Justice McCulloch, speaking for this Court, said that if the goods were not returned, “... it devolved upon them (bailees) to explain the loss before the plaintiff (bailor) could be put u,pon proof as to negligence.” (Emphasis our o

1963These instructions were in accordance with the repeated decisions of this court. ’ ’ In Hall v. Stover, 215 Ark. 485 , 221 S. W. 2d 41 , we said that the burden was on the bailor to prove that the bailee’s negligence was the cause of the damage to the property.

1963These instructions were in accordance with the repeated decisions of this court. ’ ’ In Hall v. Stover, 215 Ark. 485 , 221 S. W. 2d 41 , we said that the burden was on the bailor to prove that the bailee’s negligence was the cause of the damage to the property.

1957Judge Hemingway ably summarized the rule in Billings v. State, 52 Ark. 303 , 12 S. W. 574 : “The general rule is well established, in civil as well as in criminal cases, that evidence shall be confined to the issue.

1957Judge Hemingway ably summarized the rule in Billings v. State, 52 Ark. 303 , 12 S.W. 574 , 575: "The general rule is well established, in civil as well as in criminal cases, that evidence shall be confined to the issue.

1957In charging the jury with reference to the proof of the Fenwick robbery the court gave an instruction similar to that set out in Scrape v. State, 189 Ark. 221 , 71 S. W. 2d 460 , by which the jury were told that the Fenwick incident “might be considered by you as showing, if it does show, a scheme and a design on the part of these two defendants in the' commission of crime, and for no other purpose.” That a defendant cannot be convicted of one crime by proof that he committed another is a fundamental principle of fairness conceded by every one.

1957In charging the jury with reference to the proof of the Fenwick robbery the court gave an instruction similar to that set out in Scrape v. State, 189 Ark. 221 , 71 S. W. 2d 460 , by which the jury were told that the Fenwick incident “might be considered by you as showing, if it does show, a scheme and a design on the part of these two defendants in the' commission of crime, and for no other purpose.” That a defendant cannot be convicted of one crime by proof that he committed another is a fundamental principle of fairness conceded by every one.

1955This is a presumption that begins with the trial of the case and continues throughout the trial, or until the evidence convinces you of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” This identical question was answered contrary to appellant’s contention in the case of Hogue v. State, 194 Ark. 1089 , 110 S. W. 2d 11 , wherein we said. ‘ ‘ The court gave an instruction conforming to § 2968, Pope’s Digest, which reads: ‘The killing being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation that justify or excuse the homicide shall devolve on the accused, unless by the proof on the part of the prosec

1955This is a presumption that begins with the trial of the case and continues throughout the trial, or until the evidence convinces you of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” This identical question was answered contrary to appellant’s contention in the case of Hogue v. State, 194 Ark. 1089 , 110 S. W. 2d 11 , wherein we said. ‘ ‘ The court gave an instruction conforming to § 2968, Pope’s Digest, which reads: ‘The killing being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation that justify or excuse the homicide shall devolve on the accused, unless by the proof on the part of the prosec

1951In the case of Boone v. State, 176 Ark. 1003 , 5 S. W. 2d 322 , it was said: “The general rule is that where persons combine to do an unlawful thing, if the act of one proceeding according to the common plan terminates in a criminal result, though not the particular result meant, all are liable.” Section 41-119, Ark.

1951In the case of Boone v. State, 176 Ark. 1003 , 5 S. W. 2d 322 , it was said: “The general rule is that where persons combine to do an unlawful thing, if the act of one proceeding according to the common plan terminates in a criminal result, though not the particular result meant, all are liable.” Section 41-119, Ark.

1950Stats. 1947); and such an instruction has been discussed by this Court in numerous cases, some of which are listed in the Annotation immediately following the Statute, and other cases are cited in Gaines v. State, 208 Ark. 293 , 186 S. W. 2d 154 .

1950Stats. 1947); and such an instruction has been discussed by this Court in numerous cases, some of which are listed in the Annotation immediately following the Statute, and other cases are cited in Gaines v. State, 208 Ark. 293 , 186 S. W. 2d 154 .

1949Co., 195 Ia. 141 , 190 N. W. 150 , 30 A. L.

1948Appellants rely on the case of Nakdimen v. First National Bank, 177 Ark. 303 , 6 S. W. 2d 505 , where the trial court gave an instruction, No. 6y2, which is practically identical with the last paragraph of appellants’ requested instruction No. 3.

1948Appellants rely on the case of Nakdimen v. First National Bank, 177 Ark. 303 , 6 S. W. 2d 505 , where the trial court gave an instruction, No. 6y2, which is practically identical with the last paragraph of appellants’ requested instruction No. 3.

1940Carr v. State, 43 Ark. 99 .” (5) Complaint is next made because the court gave an instruction permitting a verdict of first degree murdor against Borne Bono.

1938In the case of Jacks v. Culpepper, 183 Ark. 505 , 37 S. W. 2d 94 , the court gave an instruction defining the duty of drivers of automobiles, and the court stated: “The instruction is a clear and concise statement of the duty of any person operating an automobile upon a public highway.” The court further said: “It is not abstract for the court in instruction No. 2, immediately following, about which no complaint is made, applied the law as stated to the facts in this case, if so found by the jury.

1938In the case of Jacks v. Culpepper, 183 Ark. 505 , 37 S. W. 2d 94 , the court gave an instruction defining the duty of drivers of automobiles, and the court stated: “The instruction is a clear and concise statement of the duty of any person operating an automobile upon a public highway.” The court further said: “It is not abstract for the court in instruction No. 2, immediately following, about which no complaint is made, applied the law as stated to the facts in this case, if so found by the jury.

1937And if you find that the most modern machinery was used in cleansing, refilling and inspecting the bottle, and that its plan and system was to use every precaution in the cleansing, refilling, and inspecting the bottle, this is not sufficient alone to meet the burden of proof cast upon the defendant company and overcome the prima facie case.” The giving of this instruction is defended upon the ground that it declares the law as stated in a headnote to the case of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McBride, 180 Ark. 193 , 20 S. W. (2d) 862 .

1937And if you find that the most modern machinery was used in cleansing, refilling and inspecting the bottle, and that its plan and system was to use every precaution in the cleansing, refilling, and inspecting the bottle, this is not sufficient alone to meet the burden of proof cast upon the defendant company and overcome the prima facie case.” The giving of this instruction is defended upon the ground that it declares the law as stated in a headnote to the case of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McBride, 180 Ark. 193 , 20 S. W. (2d) 862 .

1930The court gave an instruction on the defense of an alibi in accordance with the well-established principles of law decided by this court in the folloAving cases; Hawthorne v. State, 135 Ark 247 , 204 S. W. 841 ; Haskins v. State, 148 Ark. 351 , 230 S. W. 5 ; Doyle v. State, 166 Ark. 505 , 266 S. W. 459 .

1930The court gave an instruction on the defense of an alibi in accordance with the well-established principles of law decided by this court in the folloAving cases; Hawthorne v. State, 135 Ark 247 , 204 S. W. 841 ; Haskins v. State, 148 Ark. 351 , 230 S. W. 5 ; Doyle v. State, 166 Ark. 505 , 266 S. W. 459 .

1930The court gave an instruction on the defense of an alibi in accordance with the well-established principles of law decided by this court in the folloAving cases; Hawthorne v. State, 135 Ark 247 , 204 S. W. 841 ; Haskins v. State, 148 Ark. 351 , 230 S. W. 5 ; Doyle v. State, 166 Ark. 505 , 266 S. W. 459 .

1930The court gave an instruction on the defense of an alibi in accordance with the well-established principles of law decided by this court in the folloAving cases; Hawthorne v. State, 135 Ark 247 , 204 S. W. 841 ; Haskins v. State, 148 Ark. 351 , 230 S. W. 5 ; Doyle v. State, 166 Ark. 505 , 266 S. W. 459 .

1930The court gave an instruction on the defense of an alibi in accordance with the well-established principles of law decided by this court in the folloAving cases; Hawthorne v. State, 135 Ark 247 , 204 S. W. 841 ; Haskins v. State, 148 Ark. 351 , 230 S. W. 5 ; Doyle v. State, 166 Ark. 505 , 266 S. W. 459 .

1930The court gave an instruction on the defense of an alibi in accordance with the well-established principles of law decided by this court in the folloAving cases; Hawthorne v. State, 135 Ark 247 , 204 S. W. 841 ; Haskins v. State, 148 Ark. 351 , 230 S. W. 5 ; Doyle v. State, 166 Ark. 505 , 266 S. W. 459 .

1927Hays v. State, 169 Ark. 1175 , 278 S. W. 15 ; Hughes v. State, 164 Ark. 621 , 243 S. W. 70 .

1927Hays v. State, 169 Ark. 1175 , 278 S. W. 15 ; Hughes v. State, 164 Ark. 621 , 243 S. W. 70 .

1927Hays v. State, 169 Ark. 1175 , 278 S. W. 15 ; Hughes v. State, 164 Ark. 621 , 243 S. W. 70 .

1926This instruction followed the language that has been approved by this court in numerous cases since Vaughan v. State, 58 Ark. 353 , 24 S. W. 885 , where we held that the giving of such instruction, although not to "be approved as a precedent, was nevertheless not reversible error.

1926This instruction followed the language that has been approved by this court in numerous cases since Vaughan v. State, 58 Ark. 353 , 24 S. W. 885 , where we held that the giving of such instruction, although not to "be approved as a precedent, was nevertheless not reversible error.

1924Co. v. Blevins, 160 Ark. 362 , was one in which an employee was injured while unloading piling from a car at a bridge, and1 the court gave an instruction embodying the thought expressed in instruction numbered 4, set out above, and reading as follows: “If you find that plaintiff was injured while in the performance of his regular duties, and you further find that his injury was caused or contributed to by the negligence of his fellow-employees, you are instructed that he did not assume the risk arising out of the negligence of his fellow-emplovees.” We said the instruction took away the defens

1922In Darden v. State, 73 Ark. 315 , the court gave an instruction consisting of four paragraphs, at least one of which was not on the subject of reasonable doubt.

1921For instance, the court gave instruction No. 10, as follows: “You are further instructed that, upon a consideration of all the testimony in the whole case, including the testimony tending to show defendant’s in-sanitv or mental incapacity for the commission of crime, if you find he was, at the time of the act of killing, laboring under a mental delusion ‘and was unable to control his act, then you should acquit the defendant, provided you find that the imaginary facts, if real, would justify or excuse the crime.” In Bolling v. State, supra, we approved the rules announced in McNaughten’s case,

1919State v. Clark, 147 Mo. 20 ; 47 S. W. 886 , and Wharton on Homicide, (3 Ed), par. 359. (4-5) The next assignment of error is that the judgment should be reversed because the court gave instruction No. 13, which is as follows: “You are further instructed that if you believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, in Lafayette County, Arkansas, and within three years before the return of the indictment herein into the court, unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously, but without premeditation or deliberation, shot at witness, John Law, and killed the deceased, you wi

1919State v. Clark, 147 Mo. 20 ; 47 S. W. 886 , and Wharton on Homicide, (3 Ed), par. 359. (4-5) The next assignment of error is that the judgment should be reversed because the court gave instruction No. 13, which is as follows: “You are further instructed that if you believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, in Lafayette County, Arkansas, and within three years before the return of the indictment herein into the court, unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously, but without premeditation or deliberation, shot at witness, John Law, and killed the deceased, you wi