gave instruction in District of Columbia

2012This is error of a significant magnitude as we have repeatedly stated that anti-deadlock instructions “should not be given routinely,” Harris v. United States, 622 A.2d 697 , 703 n. 9 (D.C.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “is not a course to be taken precipitously and automatically when a jury announces an inability to reach a verdict.” Thompson, 354 A.2d at 851 n. 8; see also Harris, 622 A.2d at 703 n. 9 (“[A]n ‘anti-deadlock’ instruction ... ‘should not be given routinely, but only after careful consideration by the trial judge of the nature of the case and length of the deliber

2012In fact, the record is barren as to the reasons for the trial judge’s decision to give an anti-deadlock instruction save for her statement that, “I’m not giving a mistrial before I’ve even Winterized them” and her rhetorical question, “I mean, why should I — I don’t understand, why should I do that?” Accordingly, we can only conclude that the court gave the instruction as a matter of routine and not after carefully considering whether or not the court had “before it a genuinely ‘hung jury.’ ” Epperson, 495 A.2d at 1172 .

2012This is error of a significant magnitude as we have repeatedly stated that anti-deadlock instructions “should not be given routinely,” Harris v. United States, 622 A.2d 697 , 703 n. 9 (D.C.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “is not a course to be taken precipitously and automatically when a jury announces an inability to reach a verdict.” Thompson, 354 A.2d at 851 n. 8; see also Harris, 622 A.2d at 703 n. 9 (“[A]n ‘anti-deadlock’ instruction ... ‘should not be given routinely, but only after careful consideration by the trial judge of the nature of the case and length of the deliber

2007Interestingly, however, the court gave this rule only prospective effect, denied the motion to dismiss, and permitted “consideration of the originally-premature petition for review.” Id.

2005Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Johnson, supra, 613 A.2d at 898 , there was no constructive amendment of the indictment on an “essential element” of the offense when the trial court gave an instruction that was consistent with Johnson and served to advise the jury as to how to evaluate the circumstantial evidence of intent. 6 Thus, the jury’s determination that there was sufficient evidence will be reversed “only if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (emphasis in original).

2005Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Johnson, supra, 613 A.2d at 898 , there was no constructive amendment of the indictment on an “essential element” of the offense when the trial court gave an instruction that was consistent with Johnson and served to advise the jury as to how to evaluate the circumstantial evidence of intent. 6 Thus, the jury’s determination that there was sufficient evidence will be reversed “only if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (emphasis in original).

1997Ill Before trial, the government filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of unrelated sexual conduct by Ms. Smith pursuant to McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74 (D.C.1977), and its progeny. 24 No written opposition to that motion was filed by any of the appellants.

1994CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra, Nos. 4.21 and 4.23. [15] For this reason, we are unpersuaded by appellant's arguments that the instructions did not require the government to prove absence of mitigation as an element of first-degree murder and that premeditation and deliberation are unrelated to the absence of mitigation. [16] Indeed, although the trial court gave no instruction on voluntary manslaughter despite the foregoing instruction with respect to second-degree murder, cf. Bostick, supra, it did instruct the jury that if it was not satisfied that the defendant did not injure the deceas

1994Indeed, although the trial court gave no instruction on voluntary manslaughter despite the foregoing instruction with respect to second-degree murder, cf. Bostick, supra, it did instruct the jury that if it was not satisfied that the defendant did not injure the deceased in the heat of passion caused by adequate provocation, then it must find appellant not guilty of second-degree murder.

1990Kind, supra, 529 A.2d 295 n. 3 . .

1984Appellant’s reliance on Doloughty v. Blanchard Construction Co., 139 N.J.Super. 110 , 352 A.2d 613 (1976), is misplaced.

1984Appellant’s reliance on Doloughty v. Blanchard Construction Co., 139 N.J.Super. 110 , 352 A.2d 613 (1976), is misplaced.

1981Immediately before the jury retired for deliberation, the court gave the instruction again, minus the earlier reference to "modus operandi." [2] I do not believe the two incidents described by Officer Haggerty, which took place one and six months, respectively, before the incident at issue here, come within the commonly understood meaning of the "common scheme or plan" exception, which Drew defines narrowly: "A common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of the one tends to establish the other." Id. at 16 , 331 F.2d at 90 .

1981Immediately before the jury retired for deliberation, the court gave the instruction again, minus the earlier reference to "modus operandi." [2] I do not believe the two incidents described by Officer Haggerty, which took place one and six months, respectively, before the incident at issue here, come within the commonly understood meaning of the "common scheme or plan" exception, which Drew defines narrowly: "A common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of the one tends to establish the other." Id. at 16 , 331 F.2d at 90 .

1974United States v. Carter, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 149 , 482 F.2d 738 (1973).

1974United States v. Carter, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 149 , 482 F.2d 738 (1973).