gave standard in Florida

2007We have previously held this instruction, based on section 776.041(1), Florida Statutes (2004), to be fundamental error in Estevez v. State, 901 So.2d 989, 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), under the same circumstances: While Estevez was alleged to have committed only one act, aggravated battery, the trial court gave an instruction *1260 that "is normally given in situations where the accused is charged with at least two criminal acts, the act for which the accused is claiming self defense and a separate forcible felony." Id.; see Marshall v. State, 604 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1992) (holding that section 776.0

2005While Estevez was alleged to have committed only one act, aggravated battery, the trial court gave an instruction that "is normally given in situations where the accused is charged with at least two criminal acts, the act for which the accused is claiming self defense and a separate forcible felony." Id.; see Marshall v. State, 604 So.2d 799 (Fla.1992) (holding that section 776.041 jury instruction was proper on claim of self defense to felony murder charge where underlying felonies were burglary and aggravated battery).

1988Several years later in Yohn v. State, 476 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1985), this Court addressed a case in which the court gave the standard jury instruction on insanity but declined to give the specific insanity instructions requested by defendant.

1988See also Yohn v. State, 476 So.2d 123 (Fla.1985).

2025“Where the instruction pertains to a disputed element of the offense and the error is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider to convict, fundamental error occurs.” Ramirez Ramos v. State, 274 So. 3d 395, 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (cleaned up).

2025Our Review “Whether a possible discovery violation exists such that a Richardson hearing is required is reviewed de novo.” Robinson v. State, 198 So. 3d 1088, 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). 1 1 As our sister court has observed, the standard of review of Richardson-based issues varies depending upon the context of the particular decision being reviewed.

2017See Ward, 40 So.3d at 857 (reversing where the stolen property was never found in the defendant’s possession); King v. State, 431 So.2d 272, 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (reversing where no evidence that appellant “possessed the goods to the ex tent that he exercised any dominion and control over them”); Boone v. State, 711 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (reversing where “no evidence suggests that appellant, at the time he was taken into custody, personally possessed or had control or custody over the stolen boxes”); Jeudy v. State, 209 So.3d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (reversing where court ga

2017See Ward, 40 So.3d at 857 (reversing where the stolen property was never found in the defendant’s possession); King v. State, 431 So.2d 272, 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (reversing where no evidence that appellant “possessed the goods to the ex tent that he exercised any dominion and control over them”); Boone v. State, 711 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (reversing where “no evidence suggests that appellant, at the time he was taken into custody, personally possessed or had control or custody over the stolen boxes”); Jeudy v. State, 209 So.3d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (reversing where court ga

2017See Ward, 40 So.3d at 857 (reversing where the stolen property was never found in the defendant’s possession); King v. State, 431 So.2d 272, 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (reversing where no evidence that appellant “possessed the goods to the ex tent that he exercised any dominion and control over them”); Boone v. State, 711 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (reversing where “no evidence suggests that appellant, at the time he was taken into custody, personally possessed or had control or custody over the stolen boxes”); Jeudy v. State, 209 So.3d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (reversing where court ga

2017See Ward, 40 So.3d at 857 (reversing where the stolen property was never found in the defendant’s possession); King v. State, 431 So.2d 272, 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (reversing where no evidence that appellant “possessed the goods to the ex tent that he exercised any dominion and control over them”); Boone v. State, 711 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (reversing where “no evidence suggests that appellant, at the time he was taken into custody, personally possessed or had control or custody over the stolen boxes”); Jeudy v. State, 209 So.3d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (reversing where court ga

2017See Ward, 40 So.3d at 857 (reversing where the stolen property was never found in the defendant’s possession); King v. State, 431 So.2d 272, 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (reversing where no evidence that appellant “possessed the goods to the ex tent that he exercised any dominion and control over them”); Boone v. State, 711 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (reversing where “no evidence suggests that appellant, at the time he was taken into custody, personally possessed or had control or custody over the stolen boxes”); Jeudy v. State, 209 So.3d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (reversing where court ga

2017See Ward, 40 So.3d at 857 (reversing where the stolen property was never found in the defendant’s possession); King v. State, 431 So.2d 272, 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (reversing where no evidence that appellant “possessed the goods to the ex tent that he exercised any dominion and control over them”); Boone v. State, 711 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (reversing where “no evidence suggests that appellant, at the time he was taken into custody, personally possessed or had control or custody over the stolen boxes”); Jeudy v. State, 209 So.3d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (reversing where court ga

2015Appellant notes that the trial court gave the instruction as a defense to the kidnapping, false imprisonment, second-degree murder, and manslaughter charges and that the court’s failure to give the instruction as a defense to first-degree murder was “illogical.” The State agrees that there is no “logical explanation regarding [why] an independent act instruction would apply to the lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder but not to first-degree murder itself,” but argues that the Defendant was not entitled to the instruction because the victim’s murder was “a natural and foreseeable cul

2014See Williams v. State, 123 So.3d 23, 27 (Fla.2013). 1 Because defense counsel neither requested nor objected to this instruction, it must be reviewed for fundamental error.

2011See Houston v. State, — So.3d -, 2011 WL 3518029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

2010See Radiant Oil, 200 So. at 377-78 .

2010See Radiant Oil, 200 So. at 377-78 .

2010See Nieves v. State, 22 So.3d 691, 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (distinguishing Montgomery where the trial court gave an instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence). *803 Here, the trial court’s erroneous instruction did not interfere with the jury’s deliberative process in a way that tainted the underlying fairness of the entire proceeding because it instructed the jury on manslaughter by culpable negligence.

2007See York v. State, 932 So.2d 413, 415-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Houston v. State, 919 So.2d 489, 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Zuniga v. State, 869 So.2d 1239, 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

2007We have previously held this instruction, based on section 776.041(1), Florida Statutes (2004), to be fundamental error in Estevez v. State, 901 So.2d 989, 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), under the same circumstances: While Estevez was alleged to have committed only one act, aggravated battery, the trial court gave an instruction *1260 that "is normally given in situations where the accused is charged with at least two criminal acts, the act for which the accused is claiming self defense and a separate forcible felony." Id.; see Marshall v. State, 604 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1992) (holding that section 776.0

2007See York v. State, 932 So.2d 413, 415-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Houston v. State, 919 So.2d 489, 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Zuniga v. State, 869 So.2d 1239, 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).