gave instruction in Kansas

2012In State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012), this court gave the standard of review for an abuse of discretion as: “Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or th

2012In State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012), this court gave the standard of review for an abuse of discretion as: “Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or th

1971A. 470, under subhead ‘Intent,’ and 12 Cyc. 172.) It is to be borne in mind, however, that ‘the fact of intoxication, no matter how complete and overpowering, is not conclusive evidence of the absence of an intent to take life’ (The State v. White, 14 Kan. 538 , syllabus), and, as said in Zibold v. Reneer, 73 Kan. 312 , ‘for a person to be too drunk to entertain an intent to kill it would seem that he would have to be too drunk to entertain an intent to shoot.’ (Page 320.) “The court also gave this instruction: “ ‘If the defendant shot said Frank J.

1909A. 470, under subhead “Intent,” and 12 Cyc. 172.) It is to be borne in mind, however, that “the fact of intoxication, no matter how complete and overpowering, is not conclusive evidence of the absence of an intent to take life” (The State v. White, 14 Kan. 538 , syllabus), and, as said in Zibold v. Reneer, 73 Kan. 312 , “for a person to be too drunk to entertain an intent to kill it would seem that he would have to be too drunk to entertain an intent to shoot.” (Page 320.) The court also gave this instruction: “If the defendant shot said Frank J.

1971A. 470, under subhead ‘Intent,’ and 12 Cyc. 172.) It is to be borne in mind, however, that ‘the fact of intoxication, no matter how complete and overpowering, is not conclusive evidence of the absence of an intent to take life’ (The State v. White, 14 Kan. 538 , syllabus), and, as said in Zibold v. Reneer, 73 Kan. 312 , ‘for a person to be too drunk to entertain an intent to kill it would seem that he would have to be too drunk to entertain an intent to shoot.’ (Page 320.) “The court also gave this instruction: “ ‘If the defendant shot said Frank J.

1909A. 470, under subhead “Intent,” and 12 Cyc. 172.) It is to be borne in mind, however, that “the fact of intoxication, no matter how complete and overpowering, is not conclusive evidence of the absence of an intent to take life” (The State v. White, 14 Kan. 538 , syllabus), and, as said in Zibold v. Reneer, 73 Kan. 312 , “for a person to be too drunk to entertain an intent to kill it would seem that he would have to be too drunk to entertain an intent to shoot.” (Page 320.) The court also gave this instruction: “If the defendant shot said Frank J.

2020When analyzing jury instruction issues, we use a four-step process: "'"(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) 8 next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred

2020When analyzing jury instruction issues, we use a four-step process: "'"(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) 8 next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred

2020When analyzing jury instruction issues, we use a four-step process: "'"(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) 8 next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred

2012In State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012), this court gave the standard of review for an abuse of discretion as: “Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or th

2011The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “the jury was entitled to reach the commonsense conclusion that a mechanical means of removing the Snyder valve, such as the use of the sawzall, entailed less risk of physical injury than the repeated manual use of a pipe wrench.” The Court further held that the jury’s finding of contributoiy negligence could be based on the fact that Sloas either “failed to initially use the sawzall to remove the valve, or to make a sufficient effort to locate the appropriate blades for the saw.” 616 F.3d at 393 .

2009Our Supreme Court has held: "`"Errors that do not affirmatively cause prejudice to the substantial rights of a complaining party do not require reversal when substantial justice has been done."' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Holbrook, 261 Kan. 635, 636-37 , 932 P.2d 958 (1997).

2009Our Supreme Court has held: "`"Errors that do not affirmatively cause prejudice to the substantial rights of a complaining party do not require reversal when substantial justice has been done."' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Holbrook, 261 Kan. 635, 636-37 , 932 P.2d 958 (1997).

1993The facts in this case are analogous to the facts in State v. Meyers, 245 Kan. 471 , 781 P.2d 700 (1989).

1993The facts in this case are analogous to the facts in State v. Meyers, 245 Kan. 471 , 781 P.2d 700 (1989).

1989The trial court gave an instruction to the jury on intent to deprive, which was based on K.S.A. 21-3702. 223 Kan. at 193 .

1983Similar, although not identical, instructions were held not to constitute reversible error in State v. Wright, 138 Kan. 31 , 23 P.2d 475 (1933), and State v. Smith, 114 Kan. 186 , 217 Pac. 307 (1923).

1983Similar, although not identical, instructions were held not to constitute reversible error in State v. Wright, 138 Kan. 31 , 23 P.2d 475 (1933), and State v. Smith, 114 Kan. 186 , 217 Pac. 307 (1923).

1983Similar, although not identical, instructions were held not to constitute reversible error in State v. Wright, 138 Kan. 31 , 23 P.2d 475 (1933), and State v. Smith, 114 Kan. 186 , 217 Pac. 307 (1923).

1983In State v. Woolworth, 148 Kan. 180 , 81 P.2d 43 (1938), cert. denied 317 U.S. 671 (1942), the court found no error when the trial court gave an instruction identical to the one given in this case.

1983In State v. Woolworth, 148 Kan. 180 , 81 P.2d 43 (1938), cert. denied 317 U.S. 671 (1942), the court found no error when the trial court gave an instruction identical to the one given in this case.

1983In State v. Woolworth, 148 Kan. 180 , 81 P.2d 43 (1938), cert. denied 317 U.S. 671 (1942), the court found no error when the trial court gave an instruction identical to the one given in this case.

1981It requires the absence of any circumstance of justification, mitigation or excuse.” PIK Criminal 56.04 has been approved in the following cases: *527 State v. Childers, 222 Kan. 32 , 563 P.2d 999 (1977); State v. Wilson, 215 Kan. 437 , 524 P.2d 224 (1974).

1981It requires the absence of any circumstance of justification, mitigation or excuse.” PIK Criminal 56.04 has been approved in the following cases: *527 State v. Childers, 222 Kan. 32 , 563 P.2d 999 (1977); State v. Wilson, 215 Kan. 437 , 524 P.2d 224 (1974).

1981It requires the absence of any circumstance of justification, mitigation or excuse.” PIK Criminal 56.04 has been approved in the following cases: *527 State v. Childers, 222 Kan. 32 , 563 P.2d 999 (1977); State v. Wilson, 215 Kan. 437 , 524 P.2d 224 (1974).

1981It requires the absence of any circumstance of justification, mitigation or excuse.” PIK Criminal 56.04 has been approved in the following cases: *527 State v. Childers, 222 Kan. 32 , 563 P.2d 999 (1977); State v. Wilson, 215 Kan. 437 , 524 P.2d 224 (1974).

1979This evidence may be considered solely for the purpose of proving the defendant’s intent.” Appellant complains the instruction is not sufficiently limiting and cites State v. Rambo, 208 Kan. 929 , 495 P.2d 101 (1972), and State v. Roth, 200 Kan. 677 , 438 P.2d 58 (1968), in support of his argument.

1979This evidence may be considered solely for the purpose of proving the defendant’s intent.” Appellant complains the instruction is not sufficiently limiting and cites State v. Rambo, 208 Kan. 929 , 495 P.2d 101 (1972), and State v. Roth, 200 Kan. 677 , 438 P.2d 58 (1968), in support of his argument.

1979This evidence may be considered solely for the purpose of proving the defendant’s intent.” Appellant complains the instruction is not sufficiently limiting and cites State v. Rambo, 208 Kan. 929 , 495 P.2d 101 (1972), and State v. Roth, 200 Kan. 677 , 438 P.2d 58 (1968), in support of his argument.

1979This evidence may be considered solely for the purpose of proving the defendant’s intent.” Appellant complains the instruction is not sufficiently limiting and cites State v. Rambo, 208 Kan. 929 , 495 P.2d 101 (1972), and State v. Roth, 200 Kan. 677 , 438 P.2d 58 (1968), in support of his argument.

1978In State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180 , 542 P.2d 1051 (1975), we hold: “The use of excessive force may be found to be an ‘unlawful manner’ of committing the ‘lawful act’ of self-defense, and thereby supply an element of involuntary manslaughter.” (Syl. ¶ 5.) The court gave an instruction on self-defense in this case.

1978In State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180 , 542 P.2d 1051 (1975), we hold: “The use of excessive force may be found to be an ‘unlawful manner’ of committing the ‘lawful act’ of self-defense, and thereby supply an element of involuntary manslaughter.” (Syl. ¶ 5.) The court gave an instruction on self-defense in this case.

1976(See State v. Guillen, 218 Kan. 272 , 543 P. 2d 934 ; State v. Bright, 218 Kan. 476 , 543 P. 2d 928 .) In the present case the court gave an instruction enumerating the elements of the crime.

1976(See State v. Guillen, 218 Kan. 272 , 543 P. 2d 934 ; State v. Bright, 218 Kan. 476 , 543 P. 2d 928 .) In the present case the court gave an instruction enumerating the elements of the crime.

1976(See State v. Guillen, 218 Kan. 272 , 543 P. 2d 934 ; State v. Bright, 218 Kan. 476 , 543 P. 2d 928 .) In the present case the court gave an instruction enumerating the elements of the crime.

1976(See State v. Guillen, 218 Kan. 272 , 543 P. 2d 934 ; State v. Bright, 218 Kan. 476 , 543 P. 2d 928 .) In the present case the court gave an instruction enumerating the elements of the crime.

1969The propriety of such an instruction is fully discussed in Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412 , 106 A. 2d 820 .

1969The propriety of such an instruction is fully discussed in Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412 , 106 A. 2d 820 .

1935At the request of the county attorney the court gave an instruction as follows: “You are instructed that it is against the laws of the state of Kansas for one not an officer of the law or a deputy under such officer, to carry on his person in a concealed manner a pistol or any other deadly weapon.” This instruction should not have been requested nor given unless there was contained within it a statement to the effect that defendant was not on trial for carrying concealed weapons in violation of law, and that the jury could consider that fact, if they found it to be a fact, only for the purpose

1935At the request of the county attorney the court gave an instruction as follows: “You are instructed that it is against the laws of the state of Kansas for one not an officer of the law or a deputy under such officer, to carry on his person in a concealed manner a pistol or any other deadly weapon.” This instruction should not have been requested nor given unless there was contained within it a statement to the effect that defendant was not on trial for carrying concealed weapons in violation of law, and that the jury could consider that fact, if they found it to be a fact, only for the purpose

1934On this point the trial court gave an instruction to the jury complained of, which reads: “You are further instructed that if you find that the property was totally destroyed by fire and notice of same was given further proof was not required, and if otherwise entitled to recover, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the full amount of the policy on the house, to wit, $1,500.” Defendant cites several of the earlier cases of this court like Insurance Co. v. Ross, 48 Kan. 228 , 29 Pac. 469 , in which it was held that a failure of the insured to supply the proofs of loss within the time req

1934On this point the trial court gave an instruction to the jury complained of, which reads: “You are further instructed that if you find that the property was totally destroyed by fire and notice of same was given further proof was not required, and if otherwise entitled to recover, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the full amount of the policy on the house, to wit, $1,500.” Defendant cites several of the earlier cases of this court like Insurance Co. v. Ross, 48 Kan. 228 , 29 Pac. 469 , in which it was held that a failure of the insured to supply the proofs of loss within the time req

1934(Hamilton v. Railway Co., 95 Kan. 353, 357 , 148 Pac. 648 ; State v. Harris, 126 Kan. 710, 712 , 271 Pac. 316 ; Skaer v. American Nat’l Bank, 126 Kan. 538 , 268 Pac. 801 .) Other omissions from the court’s instructions complained of were these: The court gave no instruction to the effect that the defendant’s failure to testify in his own behalf should not be considered by the jury against him, and that the jury should disregard the prosecuting attorney’s comments thereon.

1934(Hamilton v. Railway Co., 95 Kan. 353, 357 , 148 Pac. 648 ; State v. Harris, 126 Kan. 710, 712 , 271 Pac. 316 ; Skaer v. American Nat’l Bank, 126 Kan. 538 , 268 Pac. 801 .) Other omissions from the court’s instructions complained of were these: The court gave no instruction to the effect that the defendant’s failure to testify in his own behalf should not be considered by the jury against him, and that the jury should disregard the prosecuting attorney’s comments thereon.

1934(Hamilton v. Railway Co., 95 Kan. 353, 357 , 148 Pac. 648 ; State v. Harris, 126 Kan. 710, 712 , 271 Pac. 316 ; Skaer v. American Nat’l Bank, 126 Kan. 538 , 268 Pac. 801 .) Other omissions from the court’s instructions complained of were these: The court gave no instruction to the effect that the defendant’s failure to testify in his own behalf should not be considered by the jury against him, and that the jury should disregard the prosecuting attorney’s comments thereon.

1934(Hamilton v. Railway Co., 95 Kan. 353, 357 , 148 Pac. 648 ; State v. Harris, 126 Kan. 710, 712 , 271 Pac. 316 ; Skaer v. American Nat’l Bank, 126 Kan. 538 , 268 Pac. 801 .) Other omissions from the court’s instructions complained of were these: The court gave no instruction to the effect that the defendant’s failure to testify in his own behalf should not be considered by the jury against him, and that the jury should disregard the prosecuting attorney’s comments thereon.

1934(Hamilton v. Railway Co., 95 Kan. 353, 357 , 148 Pac. 648 ; State v. Harris, 126 Kan. 710, 712 , 271 Pac. 316 ; Skaer v. American Nat’l Bank, 126 Kan. 538 , 268 Pac. 801 .) Other omissions from the court’s instructions complained of were these: The court gave no instruction to the effect that the defendant’s failure to testify in his own behalf should not be considered by the jury against him, and that the jury should disregard the prosecuting attorney’s comments thereon.

1934(Hamilton v. Railway Co., 95 Kan. 353, 357 , 148 Pac. 648 ; State v. Harris, 126 Kan. 710, 712 , 271 Pac. 316 ; Skaer v. American Nat’l Bank, 126 Kan. 538 , 268 Pac. 801 .) Other omissions from the court’s instructions complained of were these: The court gave no instruction to the effect that the defendant’s failure to testify in his own behalf should not be considered by the jury against him, and that the jury should disregard the prosecuting attorney’s comments thereon.

1930The instruction relating to inference of malice from killing with a deadly weapon was.based on the decision in the case of State v. Earnest, 56 Kan. 31 , 42 Pac. 359 .

1930The instruction relating to inference of malice from killing with a deadly weapon was.based on the decision in the case of State v. Earnest, 56 Kan. 31 , 42 Pac. 359 .

1909In Fanning v. Krapfl, 68 Iowa, 244 , this court gave a rule which we. think is authorized by precedent and reason, and guides to a proper conclusion in this case.” (Page 106.) In Cruzen v. Stephens, 123 Mo. 337 , it was held that a service by publication of notice addressed to “Etta R.