gave instruction in Montana

1988The court gave instruction Number 27 stating: “You are instructed that when a person knows or has reason to know of facts which create a high degree of risk of harm to the substantial interests of another, and either deliberately proceeds to act in conscious disregard of or indifference to that risk, or recklessly proceeds in unreasonable disregard of or indifference to that risk, his conduct meets the standard of willful, wanton, and/or reckless to which the law of this State will allow imposition of punitive damages on the basis of presumed malice.” That standard is a correct statement of th

1988The court gave instruction Number 27 stating: “You are instructed that when a person knows or has reason to know of facts which create a high degree of risk of harm to the substantial interests of another, and either deliberately proceeds to act in conscious disregard of or indifference to that risk, or recklessly proceeds in unreasonable disregard of or indifference to that risk, his conduct meets the standard of willful, wanton, and/or reckless to which the law of this State will allow imposition of punitive damages on the basis of presumed malice.” That standard is a correct statement of th

1954In Russell v. Sunburst Refining Co., 83 Mont. 452, 470 , 272 Pac. 998, 1006 , the court said: “The instructions of the court to the jury must be considered in their entirety, and where as a whole they correctly state the law, and where instructions general in their nature are by specific instructions limited to the facts in the case, error cannot be predicated on an instruction that is incomplete or too general. ’ ’ At defendant’s request the trial court gave instruction No. 16 reading: “You are further instructed that under the law a person has the right to employ all reasonable means for the

1954In Russell v. Sunburst Refining Co., 83 Mont. 452, 470 , 272 Pac. 998, 1006 , the court said: “The instructions of the court to the jury must be considered in their entirety, and where as a whole they correctly state the law, and where instructions general in their nature are by specific instructions limited to the facts in the case, error cannot be predicated on an instruction that is incomplete or too general. ’ ’ At defendant’s request the trial court gave instruction No. 16 reading: “You are further instructed that under the law a person has the right to employ all reasonable means for the

1952Simpson v. Hillman, 163 Or. 357 , 97 Pac. (2d) 527, 529 , holds that ‘ ‘ the law presumes the exercise of due care and it is incumbent upon the party charging negligence to establish it by the greater weight of the evidence.” In Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S. E. 441, 449 , the trial court gave an instruction reading: “The court instructs the jury that simply because the plaintiff was hurt in a collision with the defendants’ vehicle, does not entitle the plaintiff to a verdict.

1952Simpson v. Hillman, 163 Or. 357 , 97 Pac. (2d) 527, 529 , holds that ‘ ‘ the law presumes the exercise of due care and it is incumbent upon the party charging negligence to establish it by the greater weight of the evidence.” In Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S. E. 441, 449 , the trial court gave an instruction reading: “The court instructs the jury that simply because the plaintiff was hurt in a collision with the defendants’ vehicle, does not entitle the plaintiff to a verdict.

1952The burden of proof is never on the defendant in a case of this kind." In Riggsby v. Tritton, 143 Va. 903 , 129 S.E. 493, 494 , 45 A.L.R. 280 , the trial court gave this instruction: "If the jury believe from the evidence that H.E.

1952The burden of proof is never on the defendant in a case of this kind." In Riggsby v. Tritton, 143 Va. 903 , 129 S.E. 493, 494 , 45 A.L.R. 280 , the trial court gave this instruction: "If the jury believe from the evidence that H.E.

1952Simpson v. Hillman, 163 Or. 357 , 97 Pac. (2d) 527, 529 , holds that ‘ ‘ the law presumes the exercise of due care and it is incumbent upon the party charging negligence to establish it by the greater weight of the evidence.” In Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S. E. 441, 449 , the trial court gave an instruction reading: “The court instructs the jury that simply because the plaintiff was hurt in a collision with the defendants’ vehicle, does not entitle the plaintiff to a verdict.

1952Simpson v. Hillman, 163 Or. 357 , 97 Pac. (2d) 527, 529 , holds that ‘ ‘ the law presumes the exercise of due care and it is incumbent upon the party charging negligence to establish it by the greater weight of the evidence.” In Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S. E. 441, 449 , the trial court gave an instruction reading: “The court instructs the jury that simply because the plaintiff was hurt in a collision with the defendants’ vehicle, does not entitle the plaintiff to a verdict.

1948The court gave instruction No. 17 as follows: “The court instructs the jury, as a matter of law, that where two witnesses testify directly opposite to each other on a material point, and are the only ones that testify directly to the same point, you are not bound to consider the evidence evenly balanced, or the point not proved; you may regard all the surrounding facts and circumstances proved on the trial and give credence to one witness over the other, if you think such facts and circumstances warrant it.” In State v. Jones, 48 Mont. 505 , 139 Pac. 441, 448 , this court declared that this “i

1948The court gave instruction No. 17 as follows: “The court instructs the jury, as a matter of law, that where two witnesses testify directly opposite to each other on a material point, and are the only ones that testify directly to the same point, you are not bound to consider the evidence evenly balanced, or the point not proved; you may regard all the surrounding facts and circumstances proved on the trial and give credence to one witness over the other, if you think such facts and circumstances warrant it.” In State v. Jones, 48 Mont. 505 , 139 Pac. 441, 448 , this court declared that this “i

1948An instruction containing similar language was considered in Vande Veegaete v. Vande Veegaete, 75 Mont. 52 , 243 Pac. 1082 , and in State v. Hogan, 100 Mont. 434, 436 , 49 Pac. (2d) 446 , and the giving of the instruction was declared to be reversible error.

1948An instruction containing similar language was considered in Vande Veegaete v. Vande Veegaete, 75 Mont. 52 , 243 Pac. 1082 , and in State v. Hogan, 100 Mont. 434, 436 , 49 Pac. (2d) 446 , and the giving of the instruction was declared to be reversible error.

1948The court gave instruction No. 17 as follows: “The court instructs the jury, as a matter of law, that where two witnesses testify directly opposite to each other on a material point, and are the only ones that testify directly to the same point, you are not bound to consider the evidence evenly balanced, or the point not proved; you may regard all the surrounding facts and circumstances proved on the trial and give credence to one witness over the other, if you think such facts and circumstances warrant it.” In State v. Jones, 48 Mont. 505 , 139 Pac. 441, 448 , this court declared that this “i

1948An instruction containing similar language was considered in Vande Veegaete v. Vande Veegaete, 75 Mont. 52 , 243 Pac. 1082 , and in State v. Hogan, 100 Mont. 434, 436 , 49 Pac. (2d) 446 , and the giving of the instruction was declared to be reversible error.

1948An instruction containing similar language was considered in Vande Veegaete v. Vande Veegaete, 75 Mont. 52 , 243 Pac. 1082 , and in State v. Hogan, 100 Mont. 434, 436 , 49 Pac. (2d) 446 , and the giving of the instruction was declared to be reversible error.

1931Following Clark v. Ellsworth, 104 Iowa, 442 , 73 N. W. 1023 , the court gave instruction No. 7, which reads as follows: “You are instructed that, in arriving at your verdict in this case, in fixing the amount of compensation, if any, to which plaintiff may be entitled, you must not consider the financial circumstances, the ability to pay, or the wealth of the defendant Walter J.

1931Following Clark v. Ellsworth, 104 Iowa, 442 , 73 N. W. 1023 , the court gave instruction No. 7, which reads as follows: “You are instructed that, in arriving at your verdict in this case, in fixing the amount of compensation, if any, to which plaintiff may be entitled, you must not consider the financial circumstances, the ability to pay, or the wealth of the defendant Walter J.

1919In State v. Woods, 54 Mont. 193 , 169 Pac. 39 , the rule is stated tersely as follows: “Where a conviction is sought upon circumstantial evidence, the criminatory circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, and point so clearly to the guilt of the accused as to be inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis. ” The rule as thus stated has been recognized and approved for so many years that there cannot be any excuse for an attempt to deviate substantially from it, or to smother the essential principle in a multitude of meaningless words.

1919In State v. Woods, 54 Mont. 193 , 169 Pac. 39 , the rule is stated tersely as follows: “Where a conviction is sought upon circumstantial evidence, the criminatory circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, and point so clearly to the guilt of the accused as to be inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis. ” The rule as thus stated has been recognized and approved for so many years that there cannot be any excuse for an attempt to deviate substantially from it, or to smother the essential principle in a multitude of meaningless words.

1905Any affirmation (other than mere dealers’ talk) made at the time of the sale as to the quality or condition of the thing sold will be treated as a warranty, if it was so intended, and the purchaser bought on the good faith of such affirmation; and whether, it was so intended and the purchaser acted upon it are questions of fact for the jury.” This is derived from the opinion of the court in McLennan v. Ohmen, 75 Cal. 558 , 17 Pac. 687 .

1905Any affirmation (other than mere dealers’ talk) made at the time of the sale as to the quality or condition of the thing sold will be treated as a warranty, if it was so intended, and the purchaser bought on the good faith of such affirmation; and whether, it was so intended and the purchaser acted upon it are questions of fact for the jury.” This is derived from the opinion of the court in McLennan v. Ohmen, 75 Cal. 558 , 17 Pac. 687 .