42 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1919–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fuller v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Cf. Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 926 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (instruction given morning after objectionable reference to collateral offense too late to cure error by itself). 2009Cf. Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 926 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (instruction given morning after objectionable reference to collateral offense too late to cure error by itself). | 5 | 5 |
Thrift v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Id. reprimand during his time as interim police chief, as well as his employment record, which showed that he had worked for five or six police departments since 2009. 13 Here, the trial court gave an instruction to disregard Officer Brown’s nonresponsive answer, and Wood does not direct us to any evidence that the jury failed to follow that instruction. 2023See id. | 3 | 3 |
Hawkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77 ; 32 Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259 . 2011See Hawkins , 135 S.W.3d at 77 ; Mosley , 983 S.W.2d at 259 . | 2 | 2 |
Griggs v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Cf. Griggs, 213 S.W.3d at 927 (holding that appellant’s motion for mistrial was untimely and failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review); Mitchell, 1998 WL 78122 , at *3 (holding that appellant’s motion for mistrial was properly denied when the court gave an instruction to disregard, even though appellant contended that the State’s closing argument that he was a “violent, angry person” was clearly calculated to inflame the jury and was harmful). 10 The Court erred in admitting evidence that did not substantially establish that aggravated sexual assault had occurred. 2009Cf. Griggs , 213 S.W.3d at 927 (holding that appellant’s motion for mistrial was untimely and failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review); Mitchell , 1998 WL 78122 , at *3 (holding that appellant’s motion for mistrial was properly denied when the court gave an instruction to disregard, even though appellant contended that the State’s closing argument that he was a “violent, angry person” was clearly calculated to inflame the jury and was harmful). | 2 | 2 |
Archie v. Stategreen2 sentences2007In the charge to the jury, the jury was instructed not to refer to or allude to [appellant's] decision not to testify and not to take his decision into consideration for any purpose as a circumstance against him." Archie , at 435 (Gray, C.J., concurring and dissenting). [1] Justice Reyna issued a lead opinion, which was not joined in its entirety by either of the other members of the court. 2007In the charge to the jury, the jury was instructed not to refer to or allude to [appellant's] decision not to testify and not to take his decision into consideration for any purpose as a circumstance against him." Archie , at 435 (Gray, C.J., concurring and dissenting). | 2 | 2 |
Jesse Beam v. Stategreen1 sentence2026To the extent it is relevant to our review, we note that the trial court gave an instruction directing the jury that it may consider the evidence regarding Sister’s extraneous-offense testimony only if they first found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the offenses and that even if they did, that “the defendant is not on trial for any offenses not alleged in the indictment” and that they “must determine if the State proved all elements for the offense alleged in the 13 indictment.” Cf. Beam v. State, 447 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting th | 1 | 1 |
Lane v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen1 sentence2022App. 2003). 112 Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 878 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Simpson v. Stategreen1 sentence2022The trial court gave an instruction to disregard, and ordinarily a prompt instruction to disregard will cure error associated with an improper question and answer.111 And generally, such an instruction will cure prejudice from a witness’s inadvertent reference to an extraneous offense112 or from a nonresponsive answer.113 An instruction to disregard is more likely to cure prejudice when the improper reference is isolated.114 Ranger O’Connor’s reference to bundles of marijuana was an isolated, nonresponsive answer and the trial court’s instruction to disregard was prompt, occurring immediately | 1 | 1 |
Teodora Hinojosa v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Hinojosa v. State, 555 S.W.3d at 267-268 (acts of sexual abuse in another county considered for sufficiency review); 1 Because the State could not guarantee that the child victims would not spontaneously discuss conduct not contained in the indictment, the trial court gave a standard extraneous offense limiting instruction: You are instructed that if there is any testimony before you in this case regarding the Defendant having committed any offenses, if any, other than the offenses alleged against him in the indictment in this case, you cannot consider said testimony for any purpose unless | 1 | 1 |
Osmin Agruelles Meraz v. Stategreen1 sentence2021King v. State Page 10 Meraz, 415 S.W.3d at 506 (same). | 1 | 1 |
San Jose Pacific Building & Loan Ass'n v. Corumgreen1 sentence2018In Banes v. Dunger, 181 2 Cal. App. 2d 276, 282 [ 5 Cal. Rptr. 278 ], the court gave an instruction to the effect that the jury was not to speculate as to any injuries claimed by the plaintiffs, and that if the evidence left the existence or cause of any alleged injuries a matter of conjecture or doubt, that then the plaintiffs had not sustained the burden of proof. | 1 | 1 |
Capello v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Capello v. State, 775 S.W.2d 476, 489 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, pet. ref'd) (holding no error existed where' six veniremembers initially expressed concerns about a defendant’s decision not to testify but then expressed no more concern after the court instructed . them on the law). | 1 | 1 |
Kirsch, Scott Alangreen1 sentence2017Finally, on the issue of a dog being tangible personal property, such a definition is not present in the Parks and Wildlife Code, and a “trial court may not include an instruction that focuses the jury’s attention on a specific type of evidence that may support a finding of an element of an offense.” Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Garza v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Garza, 633 S.W.2d at 512 ; Louis, 825 S.W.2d at 756 . | 1 | 1 |
Love v. Stategreen1 sentence1994See Love v. State, 833 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 1 |
| Britt v. North Carolinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mosley v. State
green
2 sentences2011See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77 ; 32 Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259 . 2011See Hawkins , 135 S.W.3d at 77 ; Mosley , 983 S.W.2d at 259 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
French, Cody Darus
green
1 sentence2022We therefore conclude that this factor therefore weighs heavily against a finding of harm. 12 We note that the trial court gave defense counsel wide latitude to make that argument, overruling the State’s objection that there was no medical testimony to support defense counsel’s claim that the tasing caused “neuromuscular incapacitation,” which he characterized as being “strong, involuntary, long muscle contractions.” In addition, defense counsel argued—without objection—that the officers had testified that Appellant had lost all voluntary use of his body, when in fact, as the State’s attorney | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Banes v. Dunger
green
1 sentence2018In Banes v. Dunger, 181 2 Cal. App. 2d 276, 282 [ 5 Cal. Rptr. 278 ], the court gave an instruction to the effect that the jury was not to speculate as to any injuries claimed by the plaintiffs, and that if the evidence left the existence or cause of any alleged injuries a matter of conjecture or doubt, that then the plaintiffs had not sustained the burden of proof. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Louis v. State
green
1 sentence2014See Garza, 633 S.W.2d at 512 ; Louis, 825 S.W.2d at 756 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Blake v. State
green
1 sentence2012Blake, 971 S.W.2d at 454-55 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Dennis v. State
green
2 sentences2009Blackwell, 193 S.W.3d at 16-17 ; Dennis, 178 S.W.3d at 181 . 2009Blackwell, 193 S.W.3d at 16-17 ; Dennis, 178 S.W.3d at 181 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Blackwell v. State
green
2 sentences2009Blackwell, 193 S.W.3d at 16-17 ; Dennis, 178 S.W.3d at 181 . 2009Blackwell, 193 S.W.3d at 16-17 ; Dennis, 178 S.W.3d at 181 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Jones v. State
green
1 sentence2007NOTES [1] Jones v. State, 942 S.W.2d 1 , 2 n. 1 (Tex. Crim.App.1997). [2] In his opinion concurring and dissenting, Chief Justice Gray noted that "the trial court gave an instruction that the jury would follow the court's instructions. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Golden v. State
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Tucker v. State
green
2 sentences1996Tucker, 771 S.W.2d at 534 . 1996Tucker, 771 S.W.2d at 534 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Waldo v. State
green
1 sentence1993Waldo, 746 S.W.2d at 752 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Young v. Members Life Insurance Co.
neutral
1 sentence1989Young v. Members Life Insurance Company, 624 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1981, no writ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Rose v. State
green
1 sentence1989Here, as in Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 554 , the court gave an instruction in addition to that required by art. 37.07, stating: You are not to discuss among yourselves how long the accused would be required to serve the sentence that you impose. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Sorrells v. United States
green
2 sentences1984It was not until Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 , 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932), that the Court gave the doctrine careful consideration and undertook to examine its rationale, determine its validity, and prescribe the applicable procedure. .V.T.C.A. 1984It was not until Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 , 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932), that the Court gave the doctrine careful consideration and undertook to examine its rationale, determine its validity, and prescribe the applicable procedure. .V.T.C.A. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Texas Employers' Insurance v. Mallard green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Evans v. State green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Sanders v. Worthington neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Swearingen v. Brown green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Hickman v. Durham neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Southland Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Cotten green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Forest v. State green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Rojas v. State neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Taylor v. State green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Bryant v. Continental Casualty Co. neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Brincefield v. Allen neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.