gave instruction in Virginia

1994On appeal, we held that “Lewis’ questions of [the manager] on cross-examination called the reliability of his identification into question and, thus, opened the door for the evidence to be received.” Id. at 603, 376 S.E.2d at 298 .

1994On appeal, we held that "Lewis' questions of [the manager] on cross-examination called the reliability of his identification into question and, thus, opened the door for the evidence to be received." Id. at 603, 376 S.E.2d at 298 .

2026Id. at 198-99 .

2010Id.

2009Waters v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 72 , 569 S.E.2d 763 (2002), held that a jury instruction on accidental killing is unnecessary where the trial court gave an instruction defining malice as a “state of mind which results in the intentional doing of a wrongful act to another without legal excuse or justification.” Id. at 79 , 569 S.E.2d at 766 .

2009Waters v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 72 , 569 S.E.2d 763 (2002), held that a jury instruction on accidental killing is unnecessary where the trial court gave an instruction defining malice as a “state of mind which results in the intentional doing of a wrongful act to another without legal excuse or justification.” Id. at 79 , 569 S.E.2d at 766 .

2004Id. at 577 , 115 S.E. at 673 .

2004Id. at 577 , 115 S.E. at 673 .

1946In State v. Summers, 118 W.

1946In Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 825, 830 , 96 S. E. 801 , it appears that the trial court gave this instruction: “The court further tells the jury that when a person reasonably apprehends that another intends to attack him for the purpose of killing him or doing him serious bodily harm, then such person has a right to arm himself for his own necessary self-defense.” So far as we are advised, the rule there stated has not been questioned in Virginia until presented in this case.

1946In Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 825, 830 , 96 S. E. 801 , it appears that the trial court gave this instruction: “The court further tells the jury that when a person reasonably apprehends that another intends to attack him for the purpose of killing him or doing him serious bodily harm, then such person has a right to arm himself for his own necessary self-defense.” So far as we are advised, the rule there stated has not been questioned in Virginia until presented in this case.

1942Selfe, and that while said motor bus was in motion, traveling along a highway in Tazewell County, Virginia, the plaintiff allowed his left arm to protrude beyond the side of the said bus, or allowed his left arm to hang out of a window of said bus, then the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in riding in said bus with his arm in such position, and if you believe that such negligence on the part of the plaintiff was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff, or contributed to cause such injury, then you shall find for the defendants in this case.” This instruction, which became the law

1938“That burden is continuous, and can never be imposed upon the accused, although the evidence may shift from one side to the other, to meet the varying exigencies of the trial.” Potts’ Case (Potts v. Commonwealth), 113 Va. 732 , 73 S. E. 470, 471 .

1938“That burden is continuous, and can never be imposed upon the accused, although the evidence may shift from one side to the other, to meet the varying exigencies of the trial.” Potts’ Case (Potts v. Commonwealth), 113 Va. 732 , 73 S. E. 470, 471 .

1936After quoting with approval excerpts from Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233 , 33 S. Ct. 416 , 57 L.

1936After quoting with approval excerpts from Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233 , 33 S. Ct. 416 , 57 L.

1936One of the witnesses for the plaintiff also testified that the track was ‘in perfect order.’ ” A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed on the ground that the trial court gave instruction No. 2 reading thus: “The court instructs the jury that the. bur den of proof is upon the plaintiff, but he is not required to point out any specific act of negligence, and if you shall believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was injured while a passenger on defendant’s train on the 19th day of September, 1919, by the derailment of the car in which he was a passenger, the presumption of the law i

1933It is assigned as error that the court gave this instruction: “The court instructs the jury that where the plea of self-defense is relied upon in a trial for murder, the law is that the plea of self-defense is not available to a party unless he was without fault in bringing about the difficulty, and, in any case, the necessity relied upon to excuse the killing must not arise out of the prisoner’s misconduct.” In Vaiden’s Case, 12 Gratt. (58 Va.) 717, and in Wallen’s Case, 134 Va. 773 , 114 S. E. 786 , both cases in which the evidence warranted the giving of the instruction, the doctrine contai

1933It is assigned as error that the court gave this instruction: “The court instructs the jury that where the plea of self-defense is relied upon in a trial for murder, the law is that the plea of self-defense is not available to a party unless he was without fault in bringing about the difficulty, and, in any case, the necessity relied upon to excuse the killing must not arise out of the prisoner’s misconduct.” In Vaiden’s Case, 12 Gratt. (58 Va.) 717, and in Wallen’s Case, 134 Va. 773 , 114 S. E. 786 , both cases in which the evidence warranted the giving of the instruction, the doctrine contai

1929In Brown v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 466 , 10 S. E. 745, 747 , the trial court gave this instruction: “The court instructs the jury that if they believe the accused killed J.

1929In Brown v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 466 , 10 S. E. 745, 747 , the trial court gave this instruction: “The court instructs the jury that if they believe the accused killed J.