drug test in Arkansas

2014Edmisten stated that he told Schlote he wanted to take a drug test at a doctor’s 5 Cite as 2014 Ark. 89 office, and when Schlote refused his request, he quit.

2014Eastwold said 7 Cite as 2014 Ark. 89 that he told Edmisten he would have to pass a drug test before coming back to work and that Edmisten told him he could not pass a drug test that day and would rather take it after the first of the year when he was sure he could pass it.

2013Appellant Kimberly Emmons was found to have failed to maintain stable housing and employment, and appellant Robert Emmons was again found to have failed a drug test, failed to maintain 3 Cite as 2013 Ark.

2013Appellant Kimberly Emmons was found to have failed to maintain stable housing and employment, and appellant Robert Emmons was again found to have failed a drug test, failed to maintain 3 Cite as 2013 Ark.

2005In Chandler , the Court held that a Georgia statute requiring candidates for office to pass a drug test was unconstitutional because Georgia failed to articulate a "special need" that would trigger the exception to the Fourth Amendment described above. 520 U.S. at 323 .

1999In Chandler , which involved a challenge to a Georgia statute requiring candidates for state offices to certify that they had passed a drug test, the Supreme Court stated that the "special need for drug testing must be substantial — important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion." 520 U.S. at 318 .

2017The trial court also found that section 9-27- 341(b)(3)(B)(ii)(a) supported termination of Elizabeth’s parental rights because she had willfully failed to provide significant material support in accordance with her means or to 6 Cite as 2017 Ark.

2015Id. at 91 , 238 S.W.3d at 57 . ,In fact, Lambert’s behavior became so erratic that during Lee’s Rule 37 hearing, counsel for the State requested that Lambert submit to a drug test. 4 Id.

2015Id. at 91 , 238 S.W.3d at 57 . ,In fact, Lambert’s behavior became so erratic that during Lee’s Rule 37 hearing, counsel for the State requested that Lambert submit to a drug test. 4 Id.

2015Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Supp. 2013). 2 Cite as 2015 Ark.

2013The State alleged in its petition to revoke that Williams had violated conditions of probation by failing to pay fines, costs, and fees as directed; failing to report; failing to pay probation fees; failing to notify of current address and employment; possessing and using marijuana; attempting to compromise a drug test; and failing to complete community service Cite as 2013 Ark.

2012As such, we conclude that the drug test meets the “reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 665 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 .

2012As such, we conclude that the drug test meets the “reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 665 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 .

2012Moreover, although he complains that he was “seized” when he was not allowed to drive his own vehicle to the testing facility, the Supreme Court has held that “the employer’s antecedent interference with the employee’s freedom of movement” need not |15be considered an independent Fourth Amendment seizure, Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , and “[t]o the extent transportation and like restrictions are necessary to procure the requisite ... urine samples for testing, this interference alone is minimal given the employment context in which it takes place.” Id. at 624 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 .

2012Moreover, although he complains that he was “seized” when he was not allowed to drive his own vehicle to the testing facility, the Supreme Court has held that “the employer’s antecedent interference with the employee’s freedom of movement” need not |15be considered an independent Fourth Amendment seizure, Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , and “[t]o the extent transportation and like restrictions are necessary to procure the requisite ... urine samples for testing, this interference alone is minimal given the employment context in which it takes place.” Id. at 624 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 .

2008In Woodall v. Hunnicutt Construction, 340 Ark. 377 , 12 S.W.3d 630 (2000), the claimant’s urine test was positive for cocaine metabolites.

2008In Woodall v. Hunnicutt Construction, 340 Ark. 377 , 12 S.W.3d 630 (2000), the claimant’s urine test was positive for cocaine metabolites.

2008In Ester v. National Home Centers, Inc., 335 Ark. 356 , 981 S.W.2d 91 (1998), the claimant’s drug test returned positive for opiates and cocaine metabolites.

2008In Ester v. National Home Centers, Inc., 335 Ark. 356 , 981 S.W.2d 91 (1998), the claimant’s drug test returned positive for opiates and cocaine metabolites.

2008Ill. 2000) (not reported in F.Supp.2d) (granting transit authority's motion for summary judgment on bus operator's ADA claim because an employee who fails a drug test and does not successfully complete treatment is not a "qualified individual" for purposes of making a prima facie ADA claim, stating that "[e]ven if Plaintiff's status as a recovering drug addict is viewed as a protected disability status, the employer is unquestionably entitled to take action on the basis of her use of drugs or failure to complete a drug abuse program"); Schmidt v. Safeway Inc ., 864 F.Supp. 991 (D.

2005Norris v. State, 338 Ark. 397 , 993 S.W.2d 918 (1999), supplemental opinion at 338 Ark. 397 , 999 S.W.2d 183 (1999).

2005Norris v. State, 338 Ark. 397 , 993 S.W.2d 918 (1999), supplemental opinion at 338 Ark. 397 , 999 S.W.2d 183 (1999).

2005Norris v. State, 338 Ark. 397 , 993 S.W.2d 918 (1999), supplemental opinion at 338 Ark. 397 , 999 S.W.2d 183 (1999).

1998Id. at 761 .

1995In Szostek v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 116 Pa. Cmwlth. 7, 541 A.2d 48 (1988), the court affirmed the denial of benefits to an employee who failed to pass a drug test given after the employee was returned to work from a drug rehabilitation program.

1992Code Ann. § 12-12-313 (a) (Supp. 1991), permits introduction of a drug analysis report when “attested to by the executive director [of the State Crime Laboratory] or his assistants, associates, or deputies.” In support of his argument Willis relies on Nard v. State, 304 Ark. 159 , 801 S.W.2d 634 (1990), where we held that the Statute requires more than the mere signature of the person or chemist who performed the analysis.

1992Code Ann. § 12-12-313 (a) (Supp. 1991), permits introduction of a drug analysis report when “attested to by the executive director [of the State Crime Laboratory] or his assistants, associates, or deputies.” In support of his argument Willis relies on Nard v. State, 304 Ark. 159 , 801 S.W.2d 634 (1990), where we held that the Statute requires more than the mere signature of the person or chemist who performed the analysis.

1989In discussing these two potential state law claims, initial reference must be made to Arkansas' "employment-at-will" doctrine, which the Arkansas Supreme Court has most recently espoused in Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hospital, 292 Ark. 130 , 728 S.W.2d 501 (1987).

1989In discussing these two potential state law claims, initial reference must be made to Arkansas' "employment-at-will" doctrine, which the Arkansas Supreme Court has most recently espoused in Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hospital, 292 Ark. 130 , 728 S.W.2d 501 (1987).