drug test in Maryland

2024As in Gonce, “‘unless the context requires otherwise’ . . . does not affect [the] conclusion that the word ‘test’ may be taken to mean both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test[.]” Id. at 125, 130 A.3d at 451 (emphasis added). 16 Requesting an alcohol test initially as part of a particular law enforcement entity’s procedure has no bearing on the language of Transp. § 16-205.1.

2024As in Gonce, “‘unless the context requires otherwise’ . . . does not affect [the] conclusion that the word ‘test’ may be taken to mean both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test[.]” Id. at 125, 130 A.3d at 451 (emphasis added). 16 Requesting an alcohol test initially as part of a particular law enforcement entity’s procedure has no bearing on the language of Transp. § 16-205.1.

2024See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Krafft, 452 Md. 589, 603-04 (2017) (“In a test refusal case, .... [u]sually, there is no dispute that the individual refused to take the test.

2024See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Krafft, 452 Md. 589, 603-04 (2017) (“In a test refusal case, .... [u]sually, there is no dispute that the individual refused to take the test.

1996See State v. Moon, 291 Md. at 466 n. 1, 436 A.2d 420 (1981) (An obvious purpose for the drug test would be for the attending physician to be certain that anything he prescribed would not run counter to that already in his patient’s system, just as some pharmacies monitor prescriptions to be certain that the consumer is not using antagonistic drugs.

1988Cf. State v. Moon, 291 Md. 463 , 466 n. 1, 436 A.2d 420 , 421 n. 1 (1981) ("An obvious purpose for the drug test would be for the attending physician to be certain that anything he prescribed would not run counter to that already in his patient's system, just as some pharmacies monitor prescriptions to be certain that the consumer is not using antagonistic drugs”). 8 .

2016Nonetheless, “even when we believe that the language of [a] statute renders [the General Assembly’s] intent clear, [we may] examine the legislative history as a confirmatory process.” Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 160 , 46 A.3d 443, 462 (2012) (citation omitted).

2016Nonetheless, “even when we believe that the language of [a] statute renders [the General Assembly’s] intent clear, [we may] examine the legislative history as a confirmatory process.” Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 160 , 46 A.3d 443, 462 (2012) (citation omitted).

2016Gonce’s interpretation is inconsistent with the rule that, “[w]henever possible, a statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered ... nugatory.” Lark, 414 Md. at 224 , 994 A.2d at 973 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). *126 As a final matter, we dispose of Gonce’s contention that, assuming that we agree with the MVA (as we do), our interpretation of TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3) is unconstitution al — i.e., inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Search and Seizure) and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Right

2016Gonce’s interpretation is inconsistent with the rule that, “[w]henever possible, a statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered ... nugatory.” Lark, 414 Md. at 224 , 994 A.2d at 973 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). *126 As a final matter, we dispose of Gonce’s contention that, assuming that we agree with the MVA (as we do), our interpretation of TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3) is unconstitution al — i.e., inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Search and Seizure) and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Right

2015Id. at 1059 .

2015Id. at 1059.

2011In Melendez, the Court held that drug analysis certificates were testimonial because the contents of the certificates were “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination,’ ” and the statements were “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Melendez, 557 U.S. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 , 174 L.Ed.2d at 321 (citations omitted).

2011In Melendez, the Court held that drug analysis certificates were testimonial because the contents of the certificates were “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination,’ ” and the statements were “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Melendez, 557 U.S. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 , 174 L.Ed.2d at 321 (citations omitted).

2011See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). .

2011See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). .

2011Compare Clarke v. State, 97 Md.App. 425, 430-31 , 630 A.2d 252 (1993) (stating that expert testimony was needed to explain terminology in medical records and results of a drug test) with Titan Custom Cabinet, Inc. v. Advance Contracting, Inc., 178 Md.App. 209 , *381 229-30, 941 A.2d 547 (2008) (holding that expert testimony was not required to discuss weather records documenting rainfall totals because such “records were not complicated or outside of the ordinary layperson’s knowledge”).

2011Compare Clarke v. State, 97 Md.App. 425, 430-31 , 630 A.2d 252 (1993) (stating that expert testimony was needed to explain terminology in medical records and results of a drug test) with Titan Custom Cabinet, Inc. v. Advance Contracting, Inc., 178 Md.App. 209 , *381 229-30, 941 A.2d 547 (2008) (holding that expert testimony was not required to discuss weather records documenting rainfall totals because such “records were not complicated or outside of the ordinary layperson’s knowledge”).

2011Compare Clarke v. State, 97 Md.App. 425, 430-31 , 630 A.2d 252 (1993) (stating that expert testimony was needed to explain terminology in medical records and results of a drug test) with Titan Custom Cabinet, Inc. v. Advance Contracting, Inc., 178 Md.App. 209 , *381 229-30, 941 A.2d 547 (2008) (holding that expert testimony was not required to discuss weather records documenting rainfall totals because such “records were not complicated or outside of the ordinary layperson’s knowledge”).

2011Compare Clarke v. State, 97 Md.App. 425, 430-31 , 630 A.2d 252 (1993) (stating that expert testimony was needed to explain terminology in medical records and results of a drug test) with Titan Custom Cabinet, Inc. v. Advance Contracting, Inc., 178 Md.App. 209 , *381 229-30, 941 A.2d 547 (2008) (holding that expert testimony was not required to discuss weather records documenting rainfall totals because such “records were not complicated or outside of the ordinary layperson’s knowledge”).

2004This type of search allows prison officers flexibility and prevents inmates from anticipating, and thereby thwarting, a search for contraband." [8] In Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-322 , 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1303-1305 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513, 525-28 (1997), the Court declined to hold that a Georgia statute that mandated that candidates for elected office pass a drug test asserted a special need akin to the drug testing for the employees in Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), noting that the railroad employees directly affected public safety, but that, because it was u

2004This type of search allows prison officers flexibility and prevents inmates from anticipating, and thereby thwarting, a search for contraband." [8] In Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-322 , 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1303-1305 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513, 525-28 (1997), the Court declined to hold that a Georgia statute that mandated that candidates for elected office pass a drug test asserted a special need akin to the drug testing for the employees in Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), noting that the railroad employees directly affected public safety, but that, because it was u